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■TRANSACTION COSTS AND RURAL ECONOMY IN SOUTHERN ENGLAND, c.1780-c.1840'
By Mark A. Gray, Emmanuel College, University of Cambridge.
This dissertation utilises a method of studying economic organisation 
developed by industrial economists to explain significant change in the 
institutions of rural England in late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries. After a detailed discussion of the development of historical 
economics as institutional histo^, it illustrates the principles of a new 
historical economics of institutional change based upon the analysis of 
■property rights■ and ■transaction costs■. Drawing upon the extensive 
literature in which transaction cost methods have been discussed by 
economists. the dissertation aims to provide the first thoroughoing and 
comprehensive account of this form of economic analysis for the historian.
In the more substantial second and succeeding parts of the dissertation 
this analytical framework is used to suggest - although absolute proof of 
conjectures framed by theory cannot be offered - that rational 
■ transaction-cost-minimising■ motives may account for the institutional 
changes observed during the period. Using sources from over thirty 
archives, we investigate property rights and legal changes in the ownership 
of markets: the legal evolution of a more efficient law of contract, 
devised to help rural contractors make simple transactions: the development 
of novel forms of lease contract for land by legal and institutional 
evolution: and the development of 'privatised^ forms of market transaction
supervision. These institutional changes are regarded as successful or 
unsuccessful attempts to reduce transaction costa. Finally, the thesis 
places the tentative conclusions reached in the context of 
business history of the firm and corporation and argues for 





This study was undertaken at Emmanuel College, University of 
Cambridge, under an ESRC postgraduate award from October 1983 to 
September 1986, and was completed at the Department of Economics, 
Heriot-Watt University, Edinburgh, where I was appointed to a full­
time Lectureship in Economics and Economic History in 1986 and in the 
Department of Economic and Social History, University of Edinburgh, 
where I was appointed to a part-time Temporary Lectureship in Economic 
History from October 1988, After initial submission and examination 
It was revised after full and detailed consultation with my supervisor 
- the current text including a substantial amount of emendations and 
changes made to accord with the wishes of the examiners. This 
dissertation is the result of my own work and includes nothing which 
is the outcome of work done in collaboration with others.
This essay is a somewhat impressionistic attempt to deal with 
organisational change in late Georgian England and as such does not 
claim to be a comprehensive treatment of the subject. Rather in 
territory that 1s. by definition, novel and experimental the attempt 
has been made to establish the pattern of change over a long period 
(1780-1840) in the hope that more detailed work will follow which will 
enable economic historians to put flesh upon the bare bones given 
here. Equally important is the presentation of a novel and I hope 
comprehensive approach to the problem of Identifying 'transaction 
costs' in the continuum of equilibrium costs used by economists. 
Particular novelties of this work deserve to be recognized. Part I 
consists of the first and, to my knowledge, only attempted systhesis 
^  an economist or economic historian of the entire literature of 
transaction costs and property rights. Chapter 5 represents the first 
attempt to use archival materials to understand a little reported
transition in the nature of market transactions and property rights 
and Part 3 extends the already well known and valuable work of 
Professor Atiyah and others on the 'revolution in contract' into now 
areas. Part 4 offers the first, though again far from comprehensive, 
treatment in the transformation of the policing of contract during the 
late Georgian age, although it does not claim to deal with other forms 
of rural policing during the period.
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awkward early pages (and some of the later pages) of Chapter 2. the 
removal of mathematical and geometric material in Chapters 1-3, the 
resulting reduction of material in the first throe chapters (although 
the number of pages remains the same). the introduction of now 
material in early chapters and throughout reflecting the limitations 
of the model adopted here and limiting the claims made as a result, 
the introduction of definitions for a number of complex technical 
legal terms such as 'exclusive jurisdiction' which might otherwise 
have proved difficult to understand, and a more coherent explanation 
of the place of the Jurisprudential arguments used in Chapter 6. The 
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original text as possible and to avoid radical surgery where possible 
with the intention of preserving the harmony of the text.
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INTRODUCTION: ON THE HISTORICAL ECONOMICS OF INSTITUTIONS
’The controversy between the ’historical’ and the ’Ricardian’ 
school, between the advocates of the ’new’ and the ’old’ 
method, as they are often distinguished, with some 
inaccuracy, is closed by a mutual admission that there is 
room for both in the wide region of economic inquiry...A 
knowledge of the principles of economics, as expounded by 
Ricardo, and his more liberal and instructed successors, will 
improve the intellectual equipment of the economic historian; 
an acquaintance with the results of historical research is no 
less indispensable to the ordinary economist who wishes to be 
abreast of his subject.’ [L.L.Price, 1900].
This essay seeks to provide a novel foundation for historical economic
study using very well established principles of methodology and a little
economic theory. As such its purpose is two-fold: first, to provide a sound
theoretical and analytical framework for the study of the type of problems
economic historians encounter when studying qualitative, institutional,
economic change and, secondly, to investigate a particular problem in the
economic history of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, namely how
pure market economy declined and alternative hierarchies emerged, the
problem of the ’business history of the market’. We shall be seeking to
explain how it came to be that the older forms of market organisation were
replaced by alternative ’hierarchies’. These two interconnected tasks have
come to dominate much recent historiography, and their co-existence
suggests that unreconstructed neoclassical economic theory does not provide
a sure foundation for economic historical study. Consequently, this essay
is at once a critical and a practical contribution to economic
l^istoriography: having offered a detailed exposition and critique of
ofcontrasting approaches to one variety,^ institutional economic history, it 
proceeds to the application of this methodology to a particular
historiographical problem. Whilst the exposition of current methodological 
approaches is relatively brief in comparison with the lengthier historical 
study, the importance of the former to the whole study should be apparent 
to the reader. A more detailed exposition of the general methodological 
problems of institutional economic history appears in other published work 
undertaken concurrently with this study [1].
The problem to which this essay addresses itself is primarily non­
quant itat ive. It is perhaps the most challenging of modern economic 
historiographical problems and certainly that most central to the 
development of the discipline of economic history since the nineteenth 
century. From the earliest years of the subject organisational change in 
the economy has featured as a central element in historians' studies of the 
economic past. From Rau and Hildebrandt in the mid-nineteenth century, 
historical economic studies were principally concerned with the causes and 
consequences of organisational and institutional change in the economy. 
Through the German historical economist Roscher and later Schmoller British 
economic historians also began to recognise the central importance of 
institutional and constitutional change in economic development [2], and
[1] See in particular 'Theory and History in the Economic History of
Britain' Scottish Journal of Political Economy 35, 1, 1988, 92-96; 
'Transaction costs and the history of the law of contract in 
England,1750-1850' Department of Economics, Heriot-Watt University, 
Working Paper 86/7-03 (1987); 'Transaction costs, the Coase theorem 
and the study of economic history' (mimeo) Faculty of Jurisprudence, 
European University Institute, Florence, June 1987 and discussion 
paper, Heriot-Watt University; 'Property rights and transaction costs 
in rural southern England' , Paper given to the Economic History 
Society Conference, Norwich, April, 1988.
[2] William Cunningham The Progress of Capitalism in England (Cambridge, 
1916), 14-16.
through Schmoller in particular British economic historians like Ashley,
Cunningham and Seebohm first appreciated that institutional ’historical
economics’ allowed one ’to be an economist without ceasing to be an
historian’ [1]. This ’historical economic’ approach, now much discredited
in Britain, provides the groundwork for the methodology developed in this
essay. It is, in fact, an attempt to make use of the pragmatic
institutionalism of the German school alongside the precision of analysis
of the generic neoclassical economic theory of institutions in order to
explain an outstanding problem of the ’Methodenstreit’ era, namely the
emergence of new institutional structures and the decline of old ones in
the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The general theme of
the essay may be summarised in terms familiar to historians from the late
nineteenth century to the present as the economic history of efficient and
worko^le institutions in one modern market economy. We question the
foundations of the presumption, common in economic analysis and
increasingly common among economic historians, that the almost permanent
revolution in organisational form which is arguably the most important
characteristic of the modern economy is the consequence of rational, goal
directed, behaviour by individuals seeking to maximise their own happiness.
We shall also question whether inefficient allocations of private rights
can be swiftly and expeditiously swept away and whether the ’invisible
hand’ of the market always ’knows’ best and has performed with uniform
[1] J.F.Rees ’Recent Trends in Economic History’ History 43, 120, (1949),
pp. 1. See further N.B.Harte ’The Making of Economic History’ in
N.B.Harte (ed) The Study of Economic History (London,1971)¡D.C.Coleman 
History and the Economic Past: An Account of the Rise and Decline of
Economic History in Britain (Oxford,1987) Chp.4.; Gerard M. Koot English 
historical economics, 1870-1926: the rise of economic history and 
neomercant i1iam (Cambridge,1987); Jurgen Kuczynski Zur Geschicte der 
Wi rtschaftsqeschichtsschreibunq (Ber1 in,1978), pp. 30 ff.
effectiveness in recent centuries in allocating private property rights. 
Above all we shall be concerned with the specific problem of discovering 
how efficient the forms of policing, enforcement, surveillance and control 
over property rights were in the rural world in the years 1780 to 1840 in 
terms of their welfare implications; this specific problem we shall regard 
as a branch of the general historical theme of organisational change during 
the century and a half after 1750.
For the British economic historians of the late nineteenth century, this 
latter theme disguised a pressing economic problem, for, as Cunningham 
explained, ’The days of the supremacy of the nation as the unit of economic 
regulation seem[ed] to be passing away, as civic economic institutions and 
intermunicipal commerce have been merged...’[ 1]; the era of 'order, 
security and uniformity’, as Keynes retrospectively described it [2], had 
arrived. The geo-politically broadened organisational basis of the economic 
regulation of trade, commerce and production required a new form of 
economic analysis which abstracted the characteristics of the market 
analysis of contemporary neoclassical and Walrasian theory and applied them 
to the study of firms, industries, trades unions, cooperatives, even the 
state itself. Similarly, the economic analysis of the creation of economic 
institutions and of their demise and replacement by other institutional 
forms required the generalisation of the political economists’ theories of 
bow the Smithian ’invisible hand’ operated. Very little of even the most
[1] William Cunningham The Growth of English Industry and Commerce in 
Modern Times (3 vols. Cambridge,1917), 3, 871.
[2] John Maynard Keynes The Economic Consequences of the Peace (London, 
1919), 13.
controversial economic history written in late nineteenth century Britain
I ignored either the usefulness of the Mill-Fawcett-Marshall paradigm in
1
j analysing economic behaviour in market terms or the central importance of 
I organisational change in the historical process.
Certainly well known and still rehearsed controversy surrounded the 
British historical economists’ attitudes toward contemporary economic 
theory (Thorold Rogers’ characterisation of political economy as ’highly 
artificial’ was perhaps the most extreme case of a common reaction to the 
limitations of Millian economics [1]) but in general it should be 
recognised that almost all of these historians were aware of the usefulness 
of economic theory as a part of any analytical study of the development of 
organisation. In Britain, and indeed in Germany, the debate we label the 
'Methodenstreit’ was neither singularly nor even substantially 
philosophical; rarely, in fact, did British economic historians consider 
the choice between ’inductive’ and ’deductive’ method to be as important in 
economic science as both Mill and Whewell had done, for example. We might 
characterise their view of economic theory as being broadly supportive of 
partial equilibrium analysis but warily skeptical of the application of 
such analysis to the process of economic change itself; one might, indeed, 
characterise British historical economics from the eighteen-nineties as the 
protest of the historian at the feebleness of economists’ dynamic 
theories. Economists certainly recognised the significance of contemporary 
global institutional change ( Marshall even deemed the study of it to be
[1] James E.Thorold Rogers The Economic Interpretation of History (London, 
1888), vi.
’absolutely essential to the economist'[1]) but reacted strongly to the 
historical economists’ desire that historical method be made the foundation 
of a truly developmental, dynamic theory of institutional adaptation.
This essay may be regarded as a latter-day exercise in that variety of 
institutional historical economics which flourished at the turn of the 
present century, not because the same pressing contemporary problem of 
institutional adaptation forces historians’ attention toward institutional 
problems, but rather because without an historical account of institutional 
change in opposition to that offered by neoclassical theory and behavioural 
theories of economic action (which treat organisations as if they were 
individuals with singular behavioural motivations and knowledge) all
I historical institutions, including law and social organisation, will
i
continue to be regarded as rational maximising entities at all times and in
all places. The implication of such a view of the economic past is
fundamentally anti-historical; it suggests that institutional economic
\| evolution possesses a logic rather than a history. In the place of
j neoclassical method we shall develop an alternative approach to the
I historical economic study of institutional change in which the relatively
novel property rights and transaction cost (PRTC) approach will play a key
role. Indeed, this work asserts that PRTC economics provides the most
appropriate framework for the analysis of organisational change in history
[1] Alfred Marshall in Cambridge University Reporter 33,no.37, May 14 1903, 
772. Marshall certainly encouraged the partial equilibrium analysis of 
international and national institutions (e.g.’[Review of] Mathematical 
Psychics...by F.Y.Edgeworth’ Academy, 19, (1881), 457 col 3.) but also 
recognised the very separate problems associated with dynamic 
theorizing concerning institutional change (e.g. Marshall to 
J.B.Clark, 15 December 1902 in A.C.Pigou (ed) Memorials of Alfred 
Marshall (London,1925), 415).
and that it properly belongs to the historical economic approach of late 
nineteenth century economic historians.
In the first three chapters of this essay, a detailed outline of the 
economic theory of property rights offers a definition of economic 
institutions as ’transaction cost economising’ organisations made up of 
individuals whose common interests bind them together and to the rules 
decided collectively. Here we need only note that it is possible to take a 
pragmatic and a judicious view of the notion of this economising function 
thereby preventing the intrusion of unwarranted neoclassical behavioural 
assumptions into historical study. In the subsequent chapters a theory of 
organisational change and adaptation will be introduced with the intention 
of providing a framework for the analysis of historical change in the 
course of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century in the rural 
south of England. At that point it will prove essential to understand both 
the development of the notion of transaction costs and the source of 
significant misunderstanding about the use of PRTC theory in modern 
economic theory and in economic history. Here, however, the principles of 
pragmatic, theoretically informed, historical economic method must be 
established.
Historical economics, according to one of the leading nineteenth century
practitioners, consists simply of the reduction of abstraction in economic
thought [1]. For most of the historical economists of the later nineteenth
century, indeed, ’abstraction’ in the form of Marx’s surplus value model
[1] Gustav Schmoller, Max Lenz and Erich Marks Zu Bismarks Gedächtnis 
(Leipzig,1899), 60-62.
8incorporating dated labour or Bohm-Bawerk ’ s capital theory, prevented the 
application of the economic theory developed over the previous century to 
historical or developmental problems. Of all forms of abstraction the most 
important, the analysis of markets and market behaviour, predisposed 
economists to analyse competitive forces as the outcome of rational self- 
directed behaviour; in reality, suggested Schulze-Gaevernitz among others, 
the process of change itself involved significant ’mental’ change - notably 
in the ’means of motivation’ (’motivationsweise’) - in which the actions of 
economic agents would remain rational relative to their situation [1]. Thus 
’motivationsweise’ sat uneasily with a faith in the economic analysis of 
the classical economists and, for Schmoller at least, was nearly obscured 
by it [2]. Nevertheless, as von Bulow pointed out in 1904 [3], for almost 
all of the younger German historical economists of the nineteenth century 
the apparently romantic attachment to free trade principle which 
characterised their understanding of classical theory failed to impair the 
development of a broad but fragmentary ’theory’ of human motivation based 
upon the categorical study of behavioral patterns. Naturally these
behavioural categories were selected according to the historical theme 
selected for analysis. The basic categories (’grundkategorien’) of 
historical behaviour Schulze-Gaevernitz, the historian of the political
[1] Gerhardt von Schulze-Gaevernitz Thomas Carlyles Welt- und Gesel1schafts
-anschauung (Dresden,1893), 77. On the role of ’motivationsweise’ in
the historical economists’ critique of classical economics in general,
see Joseph Schumpeter History of Economic____ Analysis (New
York,1954),pp.807ff. and Eric Roll A History of Economic Thought 
(London,1961), 309.
[2] Matti Viikari Die Krise der ’Historistischen’ Geschictsschreibunq und 
die Geschictsmethodologie Karl Lamprechts (Helsinki,1977), 118-9.
[3] Georg von Bulow ’Zur wirdigung der Historischen Schule der 
Nationaloekonomie’ Zeitschrift fur Sozialwissenschaft, 7 (1904), 103.
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II economy of the state, was principally concerned with, for example, were 
’egoism’ and ’loyalty’. This ’mental side’ [1] of economic change remained 
an important feature of historical institutional economics during the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century. However, in the course of the 
’Methodenstreit' , ’motivationsweise’ and organisation became increasingly 
interconnected and, eventually, the one blended with the other [2]. The 
’grundkategorien* of change on the 'mental side’ were now represented as 
being socio-political expressions of the ’motivation’ toward collectivity 
or individualism and, in Weber and Sombart in particular, the whole 
historical theory of institutional change became essentially sociological.
The problem that the Weberian and Sombartian analysis posed for historical 
economics was that so often the motivation for collective or individual 
social and economic forms of organisation did not appear rational; in other 
words, the post-Methodenstreit sociological theories of economic 
development did not require a theory of human action or conduct [3]. One 
consequence of this was that it became impossible to explain organisational 
change using any other categories than those of contemporary sociology. 
The fundamental forms of economy first identified by Rau and developed by 
Roscher and Knies (’money economy’; ’credit economy’; ’capital economy’ and
[1] Cunningham Progress of Capitalism, pp. 19ff. British economic 
historians other than Ashley and Cunningham made little of the 
distinction between the ’physical’ and the 'mental’ sides of economic 
development.
[2] My argument here is essentially that of Erich Fechner’s classic article 
'Der Begriff des Kapitalistischen Geistes bei Werner Sombart und Max 
Weber und die soziologischen Grundkatagorien Gemeinschaft und 
Gesel Ischaft’ Weitwirtschaf11iches Archiv, Bd.30 (1929), 194-211.
[3] Arthur Speithoff 'Gustav von Schmoller’ Schmoller’a Jahrbuch, 42 
(1918), 14ff.
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so forth) had all depended for their usefulness upon agreement to the tacit 
classical economic - assumption that the motivation for the
transformation of the economy from one form to another operated at both the 
individual and the collective level and that ’collective rationality’ could 
be interpreted up to a point using conventional Millian economic theory.
Where pre-Methodenstreit historical economics proved particularly 
successful was in offering a framework for the critical analysis of 
economic statements about the past and, by implication, about so-called 
’general economic laws’. Historical economists asked whether rent-seeking, 
cost-minimising, profit-maximising rational conduct was always and 
everywhere evident from the historical record of human activity; where 
exceptions to the classical rule were discovered, the form of motivation 
rather than its social manifestation (collective or individual) was 
examined to assist in the understanding of the historical phenomenon under 
examination. The increasingly popular Weberian methodology eschewed this 
critical approach and adopted instead a typology of organisât ion rather 
than motivation.
Yet historical economists regarded their method as superior to the 
alternative, proto-Weberian, approaches for two principal reasons. First, 
they assumed that a critical approach to economic science based upon the 
study of ’economic motivation’ provided the firmest foundation for economic 
science itself. Since Ricardo the aim of economic science had been regarded 
as the discovery of general laws of behaviour in the economic sphere and 
the study of human motivation in its historical manifestation obviously
11
represented a means of understanding more profoundly the nature of those 
laws. For the historical economists of the late nineteenth century, after 
all, the psychosocial motivation of economic agents directly determined 
their actions; institutions merely channelled them. No theory of 
’legitimation’, however constructed, could hope to analyse sympathetically 
the motivation of communities and individuals. The second reason the 
historical economists had for their rejection of post-Methodenstreit 
sociological history was perhaps less clearly philosophical and more 
obviously methodological. For the historical economists, their interest in 
economic institutions lay not in the creation or the teleological purpose 
of organisations, but in the functioning of those forms of human 
organisation which gave effect to the motivating factors experienced by 
historical individuals and groups. Because the ’motivationsweise’ of 
historical communities and individuals was historically determined so the 
outcome of those propensities would affect institutions and groups over 
time. Historical economics, then, consisted of the study of the changing 
nature of economic motivation and of the consequences of this changing 
motivation for institutions and individuals.
For the historical school the much discussed ’deductive method’ was merely 
the research methodology for a general agenda of study embracing 
significant change in the non-material affairs of men. Deductive economic 
science was certainly a central issue of the ’Methodenstreit’, but the real 
character of the debate in Britain in the last two decades of the 
nineteenth century between supporters of Schmoller and Roschers’ insistence 
upon the use of deductive method in economic enquiry and the Marshallian
12
neoclassicals hardly amounted to a serious dispute about method - a fact 
well illustrated by Marshall’s own attitude toward contemporary historical 
economics. Marshall readily acknowledged the need for both inductive and 
deductive method in economic science [1] and as clearly as any of the most 
enthusiatic economic historians recognized the need for a well established 
stock of historical research evidence from which to build workable theory. 
Indeed, Marshall encouraged the use of what he called 'word pictures’[ 2.] 
in the economic and social analysis of others, and whilst he regarded 
historical ’fact-gathering’ as, if not a lowly occupation, at least one for 
pedestrian historians whose lack of analytical imagination and skill would 
prevent them from making full use of the record of the economic past, ho 
was keenly aware of the limited capacities of economists. He admitted to 
Lord Acton that
I read history to distil from it leading ideas suitable for 
my main problems; I then reread to select the facts wh[ich] 
bear specially on those ideas; and then suppress any fact
[1] Marshall’s frequent statements welcoming deductive method include the 
following: Alfred Marshall Principles of Economics (6th edn., London,
1910), 29-31; idem. Letter to E.C.K.Gönner, 9 May 1894 in Pigou
Memoirs. 380-383; idem. ’The Present State of Political Economy’ Times 
2 June 1885.
[_ ] ’Alcoholism and Efficiency’, letter to the Times 19 August 1910. The 
’word-pictures’ approach advocated by Marshall reflects the interest of 
his own earliest writing in the approach to economic problems developed 
by Le Play. See Alfred Marshall ’The Future of the Working Classes’ The 
Eagle [St.John’s College Magazine], 9 (1875), 1-23 reprinted in J.K.
Whitaker (ed.) The Early Economic Writings of Alfred Marshall (New 
York,1975) volume 1.
wh[ich] is not essential for my special purpose [1].
Neoclassical economic science in Britain was not entirely unsympathetic to 
economic historical research but was certainly opposed to the use of 
deductive scientific method alone in aid of the economic analysis of 
institutional change. Marshall’s sceptical attitude to economic historians’ 
presumption provoked and fuelled well known and long lasting antagonism 
between historians and economists [2], yet the real division between the 
two remained not one of philosophy or method but of practice and 
scholarship. Indeed Marshall himself planned to ’make use’ of the 
researches of a number of ’historian economists’ such as Charles Fay, John 
Clapham and the older H.S.Foxwell; each in turn rejected what Fay referred 
to disparagingly as German ’formulae’ [3].
Inasmuch as Marshall’s influence upon the fate of British economic history
[1] Marshall to Lord Acton, 13 November 1987 Cambridge University Library
Add. MSS. 6443(e) 205. Cf.’Alfred Marshall’ in John Maynard Keynes 
Essays in Biography (2nd edn., London, 1950), 189 n.l. These
diametrically opposed attitudes to historical evidence appear to have 
survived in Cambridge well into the twentieth century : Fay indicated 
to Charles Wilson that the reason for his (Fay’s) failure to remain 
friendly with John Maynard Keynes was that Keynes ’...didn’t believe 
in history. He only wanted to use bits of it for his own purposes.’ 
Charles Wilson ’Keynes and Economic History’ in Milo Keynes (ed) 
Essays on John Maynard Keynes (Cambridge, 1975), 230. In general,
there appears to have been little love lost between the King’s 
economists and the economic historians, headed by Clapham, during the 
interwar years, which appears to have resulted from the fond suspicion 
of the economists that economic history lacked rigour.(John Kenneth 
Galbraith A Life in Our Times: Memoirs (London, 1983), 88-89).
[2] John Maloney Marshall. Orthodoxy and the Professionalization of
Economics (Cambridge, 1985); Rees ’Recent trends’; Koot English 
historical economics. 142-150.
[3] C.R.Fay Cooperation at Home and Abroad : A Description and Analysis 
(London,1908), 20. See also, Kroot English historical economics. Chp. 
6 on Foxwell, unhappily the only (very imperfect) study of Foxwell.
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was positive, it was through appointments and promotions rather than 
methodological writings that a distinctively neoclassical approach to 
economic history developed which eschewed historical economic method [1]. 
His encouragement of likeminded scholars did much to drive historical 
economics from these shores. Some part of his influence must, however, be 
attributed to the fact that, as a good liberal, he did not shrink from 
holding to a Whig philosophy of history, a tradition particular not only to 
Cambridge and London economics but more general to social scientific 
historiography [2], For Marshall this attachment to whig history implied a 
view of economic history as rational, orderly and progressive. Competitive 
forces, when held in check by parliamentary institutions representing the 
’will' of a sovereign people, would ensure that organisation and welfare 
moved hand in hand. Institutional arrangements reflected the efficiency of 
the underlying economic system of markets and trading conditions. 
Consequently, Marshall's view of institutions in the economic process 
differed profoundly from that of British historical economists like 
Cunningham. For Marshall institutional arrangements did not result from 
prime motivations but from remote, economic, competitive, ones. So, too, 
for his historian-economist pupils and followers institutional change 
resulted from the workings of a competitive or a constrained economic
[1] Marshall encouraged Acton to employ Clapham in writing an economic
history of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as early as 1897 
and sought a teaching appointment from Ellen McArthur for Charles Fay 
in 1906. Marshall to Acton, 19 November 1897, CUL Add. MSS.6443(e) 
206; Eileen Power to C.R.Fay, 17 January 1906, Fay MSS., CUL Add. 
MSS.7746.
[2] Alexander Gray and A.E.Thompson The Development of Economic Doctrine:
An Introductory Survey (2nd edn., London, 1980), 349-350. Some of
what follows is based on this perceptive passage. Keynes (Essays. 
186) merely describes Marshall's attachment to competition as 'old 
fashioned'.
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system: in monopsonistic industries, wage labour institutions (like trades 
unions and workers associations) would be impossible to sustain, whilst in 
free competition all forms of combination, including labour combination, 
would prove anti-competitive and therefore welfare-reducing. Welfare­
enhancing institutions (like educational organisations and charities) might 
only exist where there appeared to be a general benefit to the whole of 
society from a reduction in social 'external’ costs. Much of this analysis 
is, of course, well known - but in its historical mode it is perhaps less 
familiar. Marshall's concern was clearly with what he described as the 
'strategy' and not the 'tactics’ of past economic organisation [1], with 
the general structure of economy rather than with the actual behaviour of 
economic agents, their aims and functions, at any particular time. Thus for 
Marshall contemporary institutions either acted to hinder the 'historical' 
theme of competition or actively encouraged it.
British and American economic historians have as a result of the success 
of post-Marshal1ian competitive theory assumed the neoclassical tale to be 
a valid one. To borrow Marshall’s own famous analogy, a naval commander 
needs to know something of the general strategy of sea warfare rather than 
to have a precise account of some particular battle of the past, a strategy 
whose general theme is competition rather than organisation. Yet little 
direct assault upon the historical school’s approach to historical economic 
problems appears to have been made ; instead historical economics of the 
variety commonly practised in Britain at the turn of the present century 
has been forgotten and a new model historical economics based upon 
[1] Marshall Principles, App.C, 777.
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neoclassical principle has been substituted. In large measure what economic 
historians today refer to as 'historical economics’ is, in fact, the 
application of neoclassical partial equilibrium theory to economic problems 
and data from the past [1]. In the following work I hope to show that the 
two approaches are not entirely irreconcileable and that a more pragmatic 
historical economic analysis of institutional change is both possible and 
desirable ■ The value of an historical economic approach to the evolution 
of institutions of the type discussed briefly here lies in the fact that it 
does not rely upon agreement as to the fundamental motivating postulates of 
neoclassical institutional theory (namely profit maximisation, positive 
rent-seeking and the equating of costs and benefits at the margin). This 
essay will assert that, on the contrary, the study of institutional change 
discloses its own logic and behavioural motivations; by relying upon the 
evidence of institutional change itself rather than upon the tacitly 
assumed motivating behavioural constants of neoclassical theory it will be 
argued that a more truthful and historically meaningful economic history 
can be written. In this sense the present essay is part of the older 
tradition of historical economics.
II
The arrangement of this essay requires some further explanation, not least
because of the apparently dissociated themes of its major parts. In the
[1] It is in this sense that Donald McCloskey recently and mistakenly used 
the term 'historical economics'. Econometric History (London, 1987), 
passim.
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first part (approximately 20,000 words) we undertake the first 
comprehensive review of the property rights and transaction cost paradigm 
that forms the core of the analytical approach developed. The relevance of 
j the approach to economic history will be demonstrated and some more 
detailed examination of the limitations of some of the more doubtful 
versions of the theory than has heretofore appeared in published form will 
be made. An extensive, but by no means exhaustive, survey of the very wide 
literature relating to transaction costs in economic theory will more 
accurately reveal the principal features upon which we shall rely in 
framing an historical approach to the phenomena of property rights 
allocations and the institutional devices used to secure them. In the 
second and subsequent parts (of approximately 60,000 words) the analytical 
framework developed in the course of the first section is applied to the 
analysis of the institutions and economic behaviour of agrarian southern 
England during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Here 
novel sources are used to establish the pattern of institutional adaptation 
in accordance with the theoretical perspective outlined earlier. The 
admittedly experimental nature of this work (at the time of submission it 
was the only detailed archival and empirical monographic treatment of 
transaction cost problems in Britain in historical perspective) provides 
part of the reason why, in opposition to current orthodoxy in economic 
historiography, these major elements of the analysis are non-quantitative. 
As will be illustrated below the measurement of transaction costs is both 
difficult to achieve and of dubious value to the historical economist, 
whose interest is in the sources of institutional change and its
chronological pattern rather than its statistical significance. It will be
asserted that the property rights and transaction cost approach developed 
here explains more than merely the particular circumstances of 
institutional change in the rural world of late Hanoverian England and 
that, as explanatory device. it stands at the centre of a revived 
historical economics whose theme is institutional development.
It will also become apparent that this method of historical economic 
analysis demands an interdisciplinary approach to historical evidence. 
Consequently much use will be made of legal evidence from the common law 
courts and legislation of Parliament; at the same time the rich archives of 
the record offices of southern England provide complementary material for 
the study of similar themes while contemporary publications and official 
statistics are also mobilised. This ecological approach to sources reflects 
the fact that the analysis of any aspect of institutional history must be 
interdisciplinary by its very nature. Like the historical economists of the 
last century, this essay suggests that the study of organisational problems 
should be taken to represent the most difficult and yet most essential part 
of economic science. for through institutions of many kinds human agents 
attempt to organise themselves, their effort and their welfare more 
efficiently. Since the economic logic of that improvement in efficiency 
that results from the successful exploitation of institutional solutions to 
economic problems of allocation expresses itself in a number of ways 
(through both legal and practical means) the historical economist must cast 
a wide net for evidence in hopes of retrieving the most important material 
for his study. Equally, as with all such ’experimental' work in historical 




CHAPTER ONE: THE NATURE AND FUNCTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS THEORY [1]
'...the economic historian who seeks to explain economic 
growth is thus called upon to explain, among other 
things, the evolution of the particular set of economic 
institutions, behavioural constraints, legal rights, and 
rules that define at any point in history what is 
commonly called the 'economic system'.' [Richard 
Sutch, 1982]
The new literature of the property rights and transaction costs (PRTC) 
paradigm is now very extensively utilised in economics and is very slowly 
and cautiously being adopted by European economists. Although a relatively 
recent innovation in economic theory, it has already had a quite noticeable
The mathematical and geometrical presentations of various approaches to 
the theory of transaction cost in this chapter should be accessible to 
the non-specialist reader with some acquaintance with Paretian welfare 
theory. The relative detail of the notes to this and successive chapters 
is intended to offer those not familiar with the extensive literature of 
the contemporary economic theory of organisation some insight into the 
diversity of approaches now common in the subject.
[1] I have offered more detailed analyses of the orientation and 
historiographical significance of the PRTC approach elsewhere: see in 
particular 'Transaction costs and the history of the law of contract in 
England, 1750-1850' Department of Economics, Heriot-Watt University, 
Working Paper 86/7-03 (1987); 'Theory and History in the Economic
History of Britain' Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 35 (1988), 
92-97; 'Transaction costs, the Coase theorem and the study of economic 
history', circulated TS, Faculty of Jurisprudence, European University 
Institute, Florence, June 1987 and discussion paper. Department of 
Economics, Heriot-Watt University.
impact upon the writing of economic history in Europe [1]. However, the use 
of PRTC methodology is still principally restricted to North American 
economists and economic historians. Some efforts have been made in Britain 
and in the rest of Europe to make more conscious use of the tradition of 
neoclassical institutional economics principally associated with the new 
American industrial microeconomics of the later 1970s and early 1980’s [2], 
but the PRTC approach has not enjoyed such an extensive use in Europe that
[1] For an excellent review of the European perspective, see Hans G. 
Nutzinger 'The Economics of Property Rights - A New Paradigm in Social 
Science ?’ in W.Stegmuller, W.Balzer and W.Spohn (eds.) Philosophy of 
Economics : Proceedings, Munich, July 1981 (Berlin, 1982), 160-90 and, 
in general, Jurgen Backhaus and Hans G.Nutzinger Eigentumsrechte und 
Part izipat ion (Frankfurt, 1981). This European approach seeks to
reconcile the Coasian version of transaction cost/property rights theory 
with existing (sociological) theories of public economy derived from the 
work of Berger and Luckmann and others in the 1970s and, more recently, 
Ulman-Marglit. This European perspective owes something to their 
earlier ’sociology of norms’, on which Karl Deiter Opp ’The Emergence 
and Effects of Social Norms. A Confrontation of Some Hypotheses of 
Sociology and Economics’ Kyklos, 32 (1979), 775-801 and idem., ’The
Economic Theory of Social Norms (’Property Rights’) and the Role of 
Social Structures and Institutions’ Archiv fur Rechts- und
Sozialphilosophie, 67 (1981), 344-359 are the most instructive
contributions. The use of now theories of the firm from within the PRTC 
nexus of analysis which remain unaffected by this European reappraisal 
is examined in Alfred D.Chandler and Herman Daems ’Administrative 
Coordination, Allocation and Monitoring: Concepts and Comparisons’ in 
Norbort Horn and Jurgen Kocka (eds.) Recht und Entwicklung der
und rechtshistorische Untersuchungen
.. . ----- ------------------ ,
zur Industrialisierung in
Deutschland, Frankreich. England und den USA (Gottingen, 1979), 28-52.
and in 
Papers
Herman Daems ’The Economics of 
of 8th International Economic
Hierarchical Organisation’ in 
History Congress: B1 Economic
Theory and History (Budapest, 1982), 74-87.
[2] See James Foreman-Peck ’Neoclassical Institutional Economics and Long- 
Term Change in the West’ Department of Economics, University of 
Newcastle, Discussion Paper 86-05 (1986) on these developments.
its success might be considered comparable with that experienced in the 
United States [1]. Indeed the use of PRTC theory in the context of 
historical explanation has been condemned by some British economic 
historians as but 'a highly imaginative piece of intellectual fun’ [2] and 
as an unnecessary addition to the population of economic 'factors’ 
determining economic performance in the past [3].
If the PRTC approach is a ’concept too many’ it cannot be because economic 
historians are presently overburdened with conceptual apparatus. As we 
have seen, the primacy of neoclassical methodology in economic history in 
the twentieth century was less the product of social scientific imperialism 
on the part of economists than the need keenly felt among economic 
historians for some organising framework for thinking about the economic
[1] The American literature is ably reviewed in Gary D.Libecap ’Property 
Rights in Economic History: Implications for Research’ Explorations in 
Economic History. 23 (1986), 227-252; Richard Sutch ’Douglass North and 
the New Economic History’ in Roger Ransom,Richard Sutch and Gary 
M.Walton (eds.) Explorations in the New Economic History (New York and 
London, 1982), 13-38; Douglass C.North ’Structure and Performance: The 
Task of Economic History’ Journal of Economic Literature, 16 (1978). 
963-78.
[2] D.C.Colemán History and the Economic Past : An Account of the Rise and
Decline of Economic History in Britain (Oxford, 1987), 133. In similar 
vein, idem. ’The Uses and Abuses of Business History’ Business History. 
29 (1987), 141-156, esp.152: ’The ’transaction-cost’ approach,
currently the darling of some theorists in an effort to explain 
investment patterns [?], has proved in practice difficult to use 
because not readily quantifiable. Indeed it may even begin to look a 
little like one of those ’empty boxes’ of economic abstractions which 
Clapham attacked in a celebrated article over 60 years ago.’ In common 
with many popular accounts of the PRTC paradigm in Britain and the 
United States, these are not to be trusted for an accurate account of 
the purpose and function of PRTC in historical study or as an extension 
of economic theory.
[3] Sidney Pollard ’Transaction Costs,Institutions and Economic Growth : A 
Comment’ Zeitschrift fur die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 140 (1984). 
18-19.
24
past. In the twilight years of the discipline, between the Methodenstreit 
and the rise of quantitative and econometric historiography in the late 
1950s, there emerged a consensus in favour of economic neoclassicism 
perhaps too unenthusiastically embraced to be called a method or school. 
Indeed, in spite of tacit support for the use of neoclassical economic 
theorizing as a conceptual (idea-organising) activity in economic history 
most economic historians in these twilight years would have agreed with 
Professor Rees that ’...there is, I am afraid, no agreement about 
scientific principles which would enable the economic historian to tabulate 
his facts and reveal their relation to one another and to the whole' [1]. 
Neoclassical economics was adopted as the theoretical tool of analytical 
economic history not necessarily because of its superior form or rigour of 
argument (economic historians in fact use little of the very considerable 
apparatus of neoclassical theory) but most probably because it provided 
richly productive categories for historical analysis.
In recent decades, however, the role of neoclassical economics in economic 
history has come under more scrutiny and has been found wanting. Earlier 
advocates of the extension of the use of neoclassical production theory in 
economic history have recognized serious limitations in using it as a means 
of actually measuring or even explaining complex economic change in past
[1] J.F.Rees ’Recent Trends in Economic History’ History, 34 (1949), 13.
time [1]. This is the product of a wider intellectual current as many 
economists themselves are currently reexamining the neoclassical paradigm 
and finding weaknesses of ineluctable difficulty. As with most sciences, 
the potential costs of wholly overthrowing the neoclassical model probably 
outweigh the benefits and instead economists have set about the task of, 
incrementally, setting their house in order. One product of this process 
has been the increasing perception of the important role played by 
institutions in economic life and the development of a variety of methods 
by which institutions and institutional change might be integrated into 
economic analysis [2]. Of particular interest has been the revival of 
interest in the concept of costly agency and the costs of running an 
exchange economy - the so-called 'transaction costs’ incurred by economic 
organisât ions.
The concept of 'transaction costs’ and their association with discrete 
'property rights' is not a recent device in economics and claims have been
[1] Notably, Peter Temin 'The Future of the New Economic History’ Journal
of Interdisciplinary History. 12 (1981), 179-197; Peter D. McClelland
'Cliometrics versus Institutional History’ Research in Economic History 
ed. Paul Uselding, 3 (1978), 369-378.
[2] Earlier attempts had been made during the 1950s to late 1970s, 
including Lindblom’s 'mutual adjustment’ model; generalised X- 
efficiency theory; the development of bargaining theories in which 
blocking coalitions played a more important role and game theory 
applications to institutional problems. However, none of these 
attempts from within and without neoclassicism sought to explain the 
evolution of institutions as historical economic phenomena.
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made that Adam Smith [1] and Richard Jones [2] mobilized 'costliness of 
organisational framework’ as a part of their respective dynamic theories of 
economic development. However, their work was not an attempt to develop a 
complete theory of transaction cost incidence and behaviour. Neither Smith 
nor Jones sought to make the minimisation of transaction costs an objective 
of trading agents. They saw them merely as impediments to the attainment of 
market, or 'partial*, equilibrium; as infrequently occuring but troublesome 
barriers to the operation of the invisible hand of the market.
In fact, as Ronald Coase pointed out in his seminal paper of 1937 [3], the 
institutions of capitalism, notably firms, entrepreneurs and shareholders, 
regularly bear these costs of trading or marketing [4].
[1] A.M.Ulph and D.T.Ulph 'Transaction Costs in General Equilibrium Theory
- A Survey’ Economica, 43 (1975), 335. See particularly Wealth of
Nat ions, Bk.4 Chp.9. Buchanan has argued that Smith developed a theory 
of public goods externality in the Wealth of Nations (James M. 
Buchanan 'Public Goods and Natural Liberty’ in Thomas Wilson and Andrew 
S.Skinner The Market and the State: Essays in Honour of Adam Smith 
(Oxford, 1976), 279-81) but there is little evidence that Smith offered 
any comprehensive treatment of the subject. [See, however. Smith’s 
(nearly formulated) account of external effects in 'Report of 1762-3’ 
in Adam Smith Lectures on Jurisprudence ed. R.L.Meek, D.D.Raphael and 
P.G.Stein (Oxford, 1978), 362ff]. It is undeniable that classical 
economists had a concept of the costs of exchange but it generally 
figured only in relation to the discussion of the public economy of 
government. The most thorough account is John Stuart Mill Principles 
of Political Economy (London,1848) Book 5 Chp.8.
[2] Gerald David Jaynes 'Economic Theory and Land Tenure’ in Hans P. 
Binswanger and Mark R. Rosenweig (eds.) Contractual Arrangements, 
Employment and Wages in Rural Labor Markets in Asia (New Haven and 
London, 1984), 43-45.
[3] R.H.Coase 'The Nature of the Firm’ Economica. 4 (1937), 386-405.
[4] ibid., 393-396.
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Coase'8 contribution was to indicate the existence of 'transaction 
costs', defined as the 'co8t[s] of using the price mechanism' [IJ - by 
which he meant the costs of conducting business (such as the costs of 
drawing up contracts, policing them. enforcing them and so forth). 
Coase also suggested that impediments to mar)<et equilibrium (such as 
distortions of information and plain cheating) should be ta)<en 
seriously. The costs involved in attaining equilbrium by removing all 
these impediments (the 'transaction costs') must be paid to clear 
stoc)<s and maximise welfare. In a later account Coase maintained that 
exchange was only costless in the absence of signs of 'marlcet failure' 
(that is, the so-called 'external effects' of consuming or producing 
behaviour by one economic agent upon another which are not reflected 
in marlcet prices) (2J . For Coase the primary motivation of all 
property-defining activity is the minimisation of transaction costs 
and the technique used to achieve it is the 'internalisation' of (the 
recognition of and payment for) all 'external effects' of production 
which give rise to marlcet failures. In the absence of all transaction 
costs a Pareto-optimal (ideal) allocation of resources would be 
achieved by the actions of competing economic agents. In the 
prescriptive version this so-called 'Coase theorem' predicts that only 
the eradication of anti-competitive impediments, reducing transaction 
costs, allows the achievement of both cleared stoclcs and optimal 
allocations of goods and services. This definition of transaction 
costs has come to dominate both the critique of neoclassical economics 
and new institutional economics (NIE) in spite of its several
111 ibid.. 394.
R.H.Coase 'The Problem of Social Cost' Journal of Law and ECAn&mlCA. 3 (i960), 1-44. Here we need only note that Coase was one cf the first to stress the importance of the costliness of exchange, ^e meaning of the 'Coase theorem' is discussed fully below (p.77).
28
limitations and contradictions - limitations and contradictions 
discussed in detail below in this essay [1].
Yet precisely because of these contradictions, 'transaction costs' 
have come to mean a variety of different things to different 
¡economists and economic historians. As one leading practitioner of
I
I PRTC institutional economics admits, '...there are too many degrees of 
i freedom' in the definition of transaction costs usually adopted by 
economists [2]. Defining which real costs of market operation are to 
be included under the heading of transaction costs has proved 
particularly difficult for applied economists and it is a problem that 
has been carried over into the use of the concept in economic history.
An example will illustrate the problem. When in 1973 Douglass North 
sought to enumerate the constituents of historically relevant 
transaction costs he chose to define them to include search costs,
I negotiation costs and enforcement costs; by 1981 he had dropped 
j negotiation costs from the outline definition but had added
information and measurement costs; a year later, he further simplified 
this list to include only information, search and measurement costs; 
but in 1984 his new definition encompassed measurement, enforcement 
and 'valuation' costs [3]. The degree of confusion evidenced by even 
a cursory examination
[1] See below, pp.77 ff. and throughout Chp. 3 below.
(2) Oliver E. Williamson 'Transaction Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations' Journal of Law and Economics. 22 (1979), 233.
131 Douglass C.North and Robert Paul Thomas The Rise of the Western tor Id: A New Economic Hi story (Cambridge. 1973), 93; Douglass C. North ^ucture and Chance in Economic History (New York, 1981), 36; idem.'The Theoretical Tools of the Economic Historian' in Charles P*Kindleberger and Guido dl Telia (eds) Economics in the Long View: MBayg Honour of W.W. Rostow vol.l (London, 1982), 16-20; idem.'Transactions Costs, Institutions and Economic History' Zeitschrift fur Us. oesamt-.e fl»aatswissenschaft. 140 (1984), 9-10.
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of the historiography suggests that the PRTC paradigm is more perplexing 
than it is enlightening to most economic historians ('valuation costs’, for 
example, must only include objective costs of valuation, and not subjective 
costs of evaluation by economic agents but how might one distinguish 
between the two 7). In order to avoid such ambiguities and to avoid the 
trap of the capacious definition of transaction costs chosen by economic 
historians, a thorough and analytically rigorous understanding of the 
function of transaction costs is required. In the rest of this and in 
succeeding chapters, therefore, an attempt will be made to find a 
methodologically satisfying definition of transaction costs for use in 
historical study which adequately captures the historical reality of 
changes in the volume and significance of transaction costs.
Given these difficulties of definition, it may be asked why economic 
historians should seek to use such a unfortunate category of economic 
explanation in aid of historical analysis. One answer is that the 
comparative study of property rights structures enables the economic 
historian to analyse economic organisation itself more acutely and enables 
him to consider the complexity of organisation and the performance of 
institutions within the economy simultaneously as no other comparable 
analytical framework permits [1]. Perhaps more significantly it permits 
aconomic history to be used as a means of constructing workable theory.
[1] On the 'proper' function of PRTC within economic history, see North 
Structure and Change chps.4-6; idem.'Beyond the New Economic History’ 
Journal of Economic History, 34 (1974), 1-7; idem. 'Structure and
Performance: The Task of Economic History’ Journal of Economic
Literature. 16 (1978), 963-78.
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'...theory which is consistent in regard to its internal 
relationships, behavioural postulates and fundamental postulates of 
economic theory' tl], theory which is derived from empirical 
observation of historically evidenced change in the structure of the 
economy. The most outstanding difference between traditional, 
neoclassical, economic history and the historiography of the PRTC 
paradigm is the relative impossibility of proof and demonstration to a 
satisfactory degree in the former [2].
Given this wide ranging agenda of historical study it is strange that 
the Coasian perspective within the PRTC literature still exerts so 
strong an influence over economic historians. For Coase, as we shall 
see, the economizing function of organisations explains their 
evolution once and for all - like all varieties of neoclassical 
economic theory it presumes that structural changes in the form of the 
economy matter less than the marginal welfare gain or loss enjoyed or 
endured from the attempt to internalise externalities, reduce 
diseconomies, reduce organisational and hierarchical inefficiency and 
so forth. Economic historians have no interest in the teleological, 
Redundant and unhistorical discourse of the neoclassical economist. 
It is natural for economic historians to wish to explain the evolution 
3f 'structure' as well as the subsequent economic 'performance' of
II) Douglass C. North and Robert Paul Thomas 'Comment' Journal of Economic History. 3 5  ( 1 9 7 5 ) ,  1 9 .  Even critics of the PRTC approachaaree with this general aim for economic history (e.g. W.W. Rostow ‘ [Review of] Structure and Change in Economic History...'Business a i a t o r v  R e v i e w . 5 6  ( 1 9 8 2 ) ,  3 0 1 ) .
[2] On which. Nark A. Gray 'Theory and History in the Economic aistory of Britain' Scottish Journal of Political Economy. 35 (1988), 
* 2- 96 .
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organisation; yet it is also the purpose of economic history to 
account for patterns of development in economies of varying historical 
experiences.
It is this latter form of historical economic discourse that has 
proved to bo the most difficult within the PRTC tradition for economic 
historians [1]. It necessarily involves the study of aggregated 
transaction costs - also referred to as the 'transaction sector' (TS). 
Theoretically, the growth of the TS accompanies economic growth, for 
in simple exchange economies few elements of TC are routinely incurred 
(those that are are relatively insignificant), whilst in more complex 
economies like our own the TS will account for a substantial portion 
of national income. Yet the growth of the TS to a present 
predominance in the aggregate economic activity of western capitalist 
economies is a relatively recent phenomenon. Aggregate measures of 
the growth of the TS are few, and indices already constructed by 
economic historians (including measurements of the growth of the 
ervice sector) are not identical. By using data from occupational 
censuses (counting the number of employees employed in a variety of 
industries or sectors) two economists have constructed indices of the 
ize of an amorphous 'exchange sector' (Table 1.1 below). Counting 
those employees whose employment is directed toward exchange but whose 
labour does not directly enter into the production of goods and 
ervices themselves, provides a very rough and selective guide to the 
history of the TS over the past century and a quarter. When such 
>}<arcises have been carried out, they
d] Douglass North 'Institutions, transaction costs and economic Orowth' Economic Inquiry. 25 (1987). 419-428.
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ahow [IJ that the experience of high aggregate levels of the TS 
stretches back to the 1920s and a little beyond in Britain and the 
USA. However, for most of human history the aggregate transaction 
sector must have been at a relatively low level and, consequently, 
occupational indicators of the size of the TS are problematic for 
earlier periods [2]. Nevertheless, the rough approximation allowed by 
the occupational census materials allows some conclusions to be drawn: 
In the main the rise of the TS as a category of economic activity is 
an overwhelmingly twentieth century phenomenon; nevertheless, the 
growth of Adams's 'regulatory sector' must have parallelled a slow but 
perceptible rise in the TS throughout the nineteenth century, a rise 
in aggregate costs of transacting most marked in the 1840s, 1860s and
from 1910 onwards.
[1] Estimates in Table 1.1 were an attempt to reconcile Adams' 'regulatory sector' with the North TS; consequently figures here given are not identical with those in Douglass North and John Wallis 'Measuring the Transaction Sector in the American Economy, 1870-1970' in Stanley L.Engerman and Robert E.6aliman (ed) Lona Term Factors in American Economic Growth (Chicago, 1986), 95-161. It must be noted that, whilst the method of calculation is the same as that used by Clark and Fourastie in their classic studies of the services in national income, their 'tertiary' sector is nominally smaller than that of North's transactions sector, for the latter includes much labour for the regulation of production which enters into total
cost. (Colin Clark Ihfl__Conditlone__fii__Economic Progress (2nd edn.,London, 1957), 397 ff.; Jean Fourastie Le Grande Espoir du XXemealecle (Paris, 1949).
[2] Long period histories of property rights are few, but see North and Thomas Rise of the Western World; Douglass C.North 'Governments, Voluntary Organisations and Economic Life: The Preindustrial Development of Western Europe' in Svetozar Pejovlch (ed.) The gadetermination Movement__in__the West;__Labour Participation in the^aaement of Business Firms (Lexington, Mass., 1978), 115-129; E'L.Jones 'Institutional Determinism and the Rise of the Western '^ oj'ld' Economic Inquiry. 12 (1974), 114-124; Alexander J. Field 'The Problem with Neoclassical Institutional Economics: A Critique with Special Reference to the North/Thomas Model of pre-1500 Europe' fejaloratlons in Economic History. 18 (1981), 174-98.
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Yet the use of occupational data to define the chimerical 
transactions sector is clearly flawed. Occupations do not entirely 
account for all of the transaction cost minimising behaviour of agents 
in the economy. Personnel merely operate institutions which are 
themselves cost minimising mechanisms for the transactions undertaken 
within the economy. Thus, while the employment of conveyencers 
constitutes an attempt to facilitate institutional transfers of 
property and land, their employment as individuals is the least 
important feature of the institution of legal conveyance. What makes 
the legal conveying of property by independent conveyencers possible 
is the existence of regulatory standards for their behaviour and laws 
or codes for documents used in their work - and it is the cost of 
establishing, policing and enforcing these standards and codes which 
are properly called the transaction costs of conveyancing.
In reality the economic analysis of transaction costs pays little
attention to the labour cost of producing marketable products; instead
economists define transaction costs in a way quite alien to the
economic historiography of transaction sector costs [1]. Before we
can usefully adapt the economic analysis of property rights and
transaction costs to the study of late eighteenth and early nineteenth
century market conditions, therefore, it is essential to determine
Pi'ecieely what the economic theory developed by economists writing
bout PRTC issues means. Many different and conflicting opinions
'emain to be resolved concerning transaction costs and their incidence
imong economists themselves. In part this chapter and the following
cwo are an attempt to make a synthesis of this broad and complex
[11 Compare North and Wallis, 'Measuring the transaction sector' with North,Structure and Change.

literature but the primary task remains to relate the PRTC paradigm to the 
work of the economic historian concerned with the essentially historical 
problem of determining the nature and causes of economic change.
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Before we define more closely the types of transaction cost with which an 
historical economist is likely to be concerned and the theory which 
supports and explains much of the behaviour of aggregate and agency 
transaction cost, it is necessary to understand in some detail what 
economists take transaction costs to be and how they expect them to express 
themselves in historic economies. It is often useful to adopt the heuristic 
of studying the historical evolution of analytical devices in economic 
science, not least because in many cases it becomes clear that the precise 
usage of a concept or category differs substantially from the latter-day, 
contemporary usage. In relation to the notion of transaction costs this 
approach seems particularly well founded for, whilst originating in 
neoclassical exchange and value theory it has come to be regarded by most 
European economists - wrongly - as part of the Walrasian tradition that 
became subsumed under general equilibrium theory; and in North America it 
is a peculiar brand of neoclassicism that now claims the idea of 
transaction costs as part of its own apparatus of theory. A review of the 
theory further enables us to get a somewhat clearer idea of the meaning of 
the concept of transaction costs. Transaction costs have come to mean at 
once everything and nothing to the contemporary economist, definitions of 
transaction cost being imprecise and eclectic in some cases and over- 
deterministic in others. Perhaps the most bothersome question facing 
economists is the seemingly trivial one of deciding whether costs of single
agency transactions are in effect discounted by agents and incorporated into 
their fixed cost constraint (or as utility function constraints). Franklin 
Fisher has described the fixity of some transaction technologies (like 
setting up the physical environment for trade) as imposing ’transaction 
constraints’ which have the same characteristics as economic constraints 
upon individual agents [1]. This quintessentially Marshallian view of some 
transaction costs has some considerable support among some economists 
although the subtlety and importance of the argument should not be 
overlooked. Since this approach to the single agent’s cost of transacting 
was introduced by Alfred Marshall an examination of his argument and 
neoclassical method takes us some way toward understanding the difference 
between transaction costs and transaction constraints, and allows us to 
enter into the analysis of transaction costs at a sophisticated level.
Neoclassical economics is that variety of economic science most commonly
taught, written and read in the West today principally because of its
success as a means of describing and predicting the behaviour of firms,
households and governments. Like most social scientists, the early
neoclassical economists to whom is generally attributed the cornerstone of
present day analysis - the analysis of costs and individual demand prepared
by Jevons, Marshall and their followers - believed that the material
conditions of the world acted to constrain human behaviour and that ’...in
three cases out of four [economic scientists believed] that in spite of our
growing command over nature it is still things that are in the saddle,
still the great mass of mankind that is oppressed - oppressed by things.
[1] Franklin M.Fisher Disequilibrium foundations of equilibrium economics 
(Cambridge, 1983), pp.l39ff., 149-151.
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The desire to put mankind into the saddle is the mainspring of most 
economic study’ [1]. The efficient allocation of the scarce resources 
somewhat mitigated the effect of the command exercised by 'things’ over men 
and women. The fact that resources might not satisfy all wants placed 
resources firmly in the saddle and left men on the ground; but if men could 
organise resources in such a way as to assign those resources to a number 
of uses efficiently so as to maximize the happiness of society and minimize 
its misery and the rider might be unseated temporarily.
For neoclassical economists. unlike the majority of their forbears, the
existence of the market secures the means by which resources and present
needs might be brought into balence. Through markets, men may compete for
those alternative uses they have for the limited resources available by
offering to buy, or ceasing to demand at present prices, the resources
offered for sale. The market acts, in the famous words of Adam Smith, as
an ’invisible hand’ to achieve an appropriate distribution of resources.
The market itself, long the centre of economic analysis, can bo viewed as
an essential institution in the 'war' against the misuse of the earth’s
limited fund of endowments. Indeed, as a political critique of the
contemporary economy neoclassical economics with its emphasis upon the cost
of alternative uses of resources (the so-called ’opportunity costs’) views
the market system as the guarantor of a freedom only occluded by the moral
implications of competition for those scarce resources. Marshall himself
pointed out in correspondance with a concerned cleric that ’In ideal
freedom there is no competition, except perhaps emulation in doing good for
[1] [Alfred Marshall] Speech to Senate, 14 May 1903 Cambridge University 
Reporter. 33 [no.37] (1903), 773 column 1.
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its own sake. But in that ideal state there is no need for private 
property, nor policemen nor any of our social burrs’ [1]. In short the 
regulation of competition in the (less than ideal) market system for 
resources consumes resources itself. for in our less than ideal state we 
have need of both private property and Marshall’s stylised ’policemen’ of 
competition, and rules or social laws to check anarchistic competition. The 
stability of the institution of the market guarantees the viability of 
allocative choices and, in Marshall's phrase, places ’things’ on the 
ground.
The problem of allocation, then, is directly concerned with the choice of 
technique to achieve the optimal distribution of limited resources. In 
’ideal freedom’ the market will facilitate the assignment of goods and 
services to optimal allocations without competition, for competition 
implies the distinction of ownership, proprietorial interest and competing 
arguments for the use of resources which are normative in character. These 
elements of dysfunction in the market process ought to be removed, 
according to the neoclassical analysis of the market system, to allow 
markets to function unfettered by conventions, institutions and habits. 
Indeed, the notion of market perfection plays a very important part in the 
logic of the neoclassical case precisely because the attainment of perfect 
markets proceeds from the elimination of the elements of dysfunction.
For Marshall and for contemporary non-Walrasian neoclassicals of his day,
the costs of running a market economy were supposed to be considerable but
[1] Marshall to Bishop Westcott, 10 January 1901 reprinted in A.C.Pigou 
(ed.) Memorials of Alfred Marshall (London, 1925), 394.
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had the characteristics of fixed or sunk costs for producers (!]. 
Producers and consumers acted as if the system of exchange, distribution 
and pricing occurred independently of decisions to produce or consume at 
all. In short. the transactions mechanism of the market incurred fixed 
coots of use similar to those associated with a toll bridge or a ferry: 
once sunk costs had been assigned. prices for associated goods or 
services would merely be 'marked up' accordingly. No consumer or 
producer would ask whether the additional sunk cost mark-up should 
affect his decision to trade or produce.
For Marshall, then, these 'costs of commerce' were fixed in the same 
way that a tax upon any commodity might restrict consumption and thereby 
affect sales. Marshall regarded the process of 'markup' - of an 
additional charge beyond that attributable to the direct coat of 
production, the coat of entrepreneurial coordination and the cost of 
labour involved in manufacture - as universal and invariable. Producers 
would have to take into account the cost of marketing a product but, 
3nce this had been done, all of the true 'accounting costs' of 
production would have been taken into account in pricing the commodity. 
Hiese fixed costs of commerce were, therefore, necessary. ineradicable 
:oats which had to bo paid in order to maximise profit and. even though 
iarshall recognized that in different circumstances of transportation, 
narkoting facilities and so forth the 'cost of commerce' might be 
■inilateral ly greater or leaser than in other circumstances, he does not 
®em to have regarded this comparative difference as in any way 
•«markable [21 ,
ill Alfred Marshall Principles of Economics (6th odn., London. 1910), Bk.S Chp.7, especially paras. 2 and 3. Contrast Mill cited above.
[21 ibid. Bk.S. Chp.7, para.3. pp.397-390.
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In Marshall's analysis, then. lump sum trading costs would reduce net 
¡revenue just like a unit tax on output - by reducing the amount of 
simple profit as a residual from revenue after all costs had been paid. 
In fact these costs which Marshall attributed to the process of trading 
or marketing are. in reality no more than sunk costs or 'prime costs' 
attributed to the operation of marketing; they do not arise because of 
the form of marketing appropriate to the current market but because 
marketing is undertaken at all. Marshall's sunk costs of marketing in 
fact enter into the fixed costs of production just as insurance costs 
enter into the fixed costs of production where risk is high. Marshall 
himself developed a close analogy between these marketing costs and the 
coot of insurance, recognizing that the latter represented an objective 
coet for the reduction of uncertainty [1]. He nevertheless carefully 
distinguished between marketing-related coats where the purpose of 
paying them was to secure nothing more than peace of mind (like insuring 
?oods for shipment) and the costs of bringing goods to market and did 
not suppose that his 'coats of commerce' were in any way affected by 
incertainty.
In quite another sense, of course, these fixed costs of commerce are 
like insurance premium costs inasmuch as they ensure that prices can be 
offered and accepted at the market. The 'costs of commerce' (nowhere 
precisely defined or itemised by Marshall) presumably include the costs 
ni delivery, specifying the content of the order and, for goods sold for 
later delivery (in futures and commodities markets, for example). the 
:o8t of underwriting failure to deliver the required order. In this 
rather imprecise sense, straining the meaning of the few passages in 
vhich he analysed the fixed costs of commerce, Marshall's
Ibid.
interpretation suggests that one might regard these costs as a form of 
insurance against the collapse of the market - of a particular form of 
market failure in fact.
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This distinctive approach to the economics of the market - ascribing zero
costs of regulation to an economy in ’ideal freedom’ and attaching all
marketing and trading costs in competitive economies to the fixed costs of
production - suggests that Marshall believed the costs of market activity
to be tangible and continuous with production. Only in one memorable and
striking passage in the Principles did Marshall hypothesise what
consequences might attach to an imaginary economy without property rights -
in this case an altruistic, moral economy:
It is quite possible that there may be worlds in which no one ever 
heard of private property in material things, or wealth as it is 
generally understood; but public honours are meted out by 
graduated tables as rewards for every action that is done for 
others’ good. If these honours can be transfened from one to 
another without the intervention of any external authority they 
may serve to measure the strength of motives just as conveniently 
and exactly as money does with us. In such a world there maybea 
treatise on economic theory very similar to the present, even 
though there may be little mention of material things, and no 
mention at all of money [1].
Whilst Marshall’s primary intention in these remarks was to illustrate the 
necessity of materialist method in the creation of a theory of value, it is 
clear that the existence of property transfer under such a regime would 
imply the existence of transaction costs only in the form of the ’graduated 
tables’ themselves, for whilst no external authority might allocate rewards 
or honours Marshall recognized that someone would have to draw up 
appropriate tables. This taxonomy of the costs of running a competitive 
[1] ibid.. Appendix D, para.2, 782-783.
economic system, which includes at one extreme the ’ideal’ economy with no 
transaction costs and at the other fully assigned. but fixed, costs for 
marketing, carries all of the fundamental characteristics normally 
attributed by contemporary economists to transaction costs: Marshall was, 
however, notionally though not at all expressly committed to the view that 
as such transaction costs were always indivisible and strictly non-convex.
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The Marshallian consensus that the costs of exchange were ordinarily ’sunk
costs’ survived well into the present century, receiving an early
formulation in the work of Pigou and Allen Young on welfare economics [1].
Pigou formulated an elaborate and detailed theory of the economic
consequences of production itself, arguing that if in the process of
creating saleable output a producer caused harmful effects to be manifested
externally to the productive activity, then some levy or ’proportional tax’
needed to be raised from the producer to compensate others not directly
involved in his production though suffering its consequences. These so-
called technological external effects or ’externalities’ clearly impair
economic efficiency if they mean that payment or tax schemes could make the
one unwilling ’externality consumer’ better off without making the producer
worse off; similarly, if the external effect were a positive benefit to the
consumer of external effects then a Pigouvian proportional ’tax’ might be
levied on the consumer to reward the producer, providing that it did not
reduce the value of the non-producer's welfare. These ’market failures’ have
been regarded by subsequent economists (notably by Coase and subsequent
[1] In A.C. Pigou Wealth and Welfare (London, 1912); Allyn Young ’[Review 
of] Pigou’s Wealth and Welfare’ Quarterly Journal of Economics. 27 
(1913), 672-686.
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students of transaction costs) as the most common source of transaction 
costs; in general, all neoclassical theories of transaction cost since 
Coase have, along with Pigou, regarded the existence of ineradicable market 
failure as the firmest evidence for the existence of transaction cost. A 
word of explanation is necessary to appreciate the link between external 
effects, market failure and transaction costs. Up to now, we have, in 
common with most neoclassical formulations of external effects, presumed 
external costs to arise in the process of production. Transaction costs 
economists perceive of external effects as the source of transaction costs 
- so that information assymetries, measurement errors and other sources of 
instability in the bargaining environment that thus give rise to market 
failure (literally, the failure of the market mechanism to cope with 
distortions of bargaining ability) are counted as part of the ex ante 
transaction cost component of exchange.
This brief and somewhat impressionistic sketch of the theory of Pareto-
relevance in external effect assignment suggests that ’proportional’
payments of a Marshallian variety might actually improve the allocative and
output performance of an economy in the presence of elements of market
failure. The most extensive, though not entirely satisfactory, part of the
debate over the effectiveness of Pigouvian tax imposition has indeed been
said to be largely semantic - a question of defining how many of the
Marshallian characteristics of proportional payments the optimal Pigouvian
tax possesses [1]. In fact, the theory of allocative efficiency associated
with the name of Vilfredo Pareto is but part of a more general
[1] Charles K. Rowley and A.T. Peacock Welfare Economics: A liberal 
restatement (London, 1975), Chp.2 .
theory of economic optimality which relates the assignment of endowments or 
property rights to outcomes from bargaining intended to maximise individual 
utility. In Walrasian, Paretian and neoclassical theories of bargaining, 
the ’proportional’ characteristics of Pigouvian taxes are varied but all 
forms of welfare allocation rules at their most extreme are alike in 
ascribing to consumers and producers well ordered, twice differentiable, 
intertemporarily stable, continuous production and utility functions for 
commodities which are at once entirely divisible and technically 
achieveable. The requirements for the achievement of economy-wide welfare
cequilibrium through o)^hange in each case (for the Paretian theory, the 
attainment of Hicks-Kaldor compensation equilibrium and Scitovsky 
negativity; for neo-Walrasian theory, the continuity of Walras’ Law and the 
attainment of Lindahl equilibrium; for a core allocation, the absence of 
’blocking coalitions’) amount to no more than rules about the use of 
initial endownments given only information about present allocations. The 
specific requirements of each need not detain us.
In general, however, the problem with all such Paretian ’clone’ theories 
of allocative welfare equilibrium is one of assuring the continuity of 
decision-making in accordance with these ’rules of the game’: of making 
sure that consumers and producers of externalities and private goods adopt 
consistent measures to ensure the attainment of allocative solutions. In 
general economic theorists can at least agree upon two such basic rules 
which could conceivably be followed by all producers and consumers. All 
would have room for a simple decision rule to the effect that, if neither 
consumer^ nor producer's budgets and utility functions were capable of
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bearing the additional costs of internalising an externality, then the 
external effect would continue unabated and utility-en hancing exchange 
might not occur. Similarly, all such welfare theories would necessarily 
include a simple minimization rule such that the costs of internalising the 
externality - principally the costs of arranging for its removal or 
reduction - were as low as possible to ensure global equilibrium. These 
two postulates have, in fact, formed the basis for the analysis of 
transaction costs within the neoclassical framework. (There is of course 
one further possible outcome: merger between producers and consumers in the 
face of external effects would absolutely ’internalize’ the external costs; 
’internalisation theory’is however merely an extension of the general 
model). To summarise, all such ’clone’ theories would broadly agree with 
the following statements of principle:
Statement 1: Present budgets and needs constrain agents in ’external 
effect internalising activity’ (Some theories of transaction 
costs make more of this than others).
Statement 2: Minimization of the total costs (opportunity costs) of the 
externality reducing mechanism or action is a necessary but 
not a sufficient condition for equilibrium in any economy.
However, where the assignment of property rights over production and 
consumption activities is unequivocal and irrevocable at the time of the 
incursion of external costs, the clone theories all suggest that exchange 
solutions to the problem of internalising market externalities are
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preferable. All of the varieties of PRTC theory appearing in the 
literature of economic science over the past twenty years have these basic 
characteristics in common. All have extracted from the Marshallian 
neoclassical formulation of the incidence of proportional payments for 
transaction technologies, Pigouvian externality theory and the common 
postulates of Paretian welfare analysis given above the material for their 
own formulation of PRTC theory: each does however maintain very different 
characteristic features without which no full understanding of the 
hetxrogeneous concept of transaction costs can be fully understood. Indeed 
the fact that no full and comparative survey of the various approaches to 
transaction costs has, until now, been presented indicates that PRTC theory 
is, by nature, varied and complex. One reason for the apparent difficulty 
experienced by historians in their application of PRTC theory has boon 
their failure to recognise this diversity of meaning and the theoretical 
foundations of the different approaches developed by economists. In the 
next two chapters we shall examine, in turn, partial and general 
equilibrium, ’pure neoclassical’, ’new institutional’ and 
neoinstitutionalist theories of transaction costs and their application in 
order to discover an applicable - and workable - theory which has relevence 
for historical economic study.
As the analysis of transaction costs and the theory of property rights 
proceeds, it will be necessary to resort occasionally to some detailed but 
not very difficult exposition of the underlying economic theory needed to 
understand the later argument about the usefulness of the transaction cost 




CHAPTER TWO: THE INTERMEDIATE ANALYSIS OF TRANSACTION COSTS: 
PARTIAL EQUILIBRIUM AND 'CHIVIRLA' VARIANTS.
'Many people have a passionate hatred of abstraction, chiefly, I think, because of its intellectual difficulty; but as they do not wish to give this reason they invent all sorts of others that sound grand. They say that all reality is concrete, and that in making abstractions we are leaving out the essential. They say that all abstraction is falsification, and that as soon as you have left out any aspect of something actual you have exposed yourself to the risk of fallacy in arguing from its remaining aspects alone. Those who argue in this way are in fact concerned with matters quite other than those that concern science ' [Bertrand Russell, 1931].
Having outlined in general terms the nature and function of 
elementary theories of transaction costs, it is necessary to embark 
upon the more detailed analysis of the concept with a view to 
examining the limitations of the theory and the variety of different 
approaches which have a claim to be regarded as principal 
representatives of the modern economics of transaction costs. 
Throughout this chapter and the following, an analytical approach will 
be developed which requires some not very extensive prior knowledge of 
economic theory. Throughout readers are recommended to observe that 
no formal presentation has been attempted hitherto which integrates 
the disparate approaches to the economics of transaction costs using 
pure theory and as such the present chapter represents a tentative 
valuation of competing approaches using the methodology of modern 
economics. Before this evaluation can be undertaken, however, some 
nore concrete model of transaction costs in a simple economy has to be 
developed to act as a tool for further discussion later. Thus far. 
indeed, we have said a good deal about the contending theories of 
transaction cost incidence and the effect of transaction costs upon 
conomic performance without specifying exactly how they affect the 
behaviour of exchanging consumers and producers. In what follows an 
lementary analytical treatment of transaction cost incidence in
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partial (or market) equilibrium will be outlined, fleshing out the 
rather insubstantial summary of the foundations of the 'clone' 
theories we have identified. Then we shall offer a detailed 
introduction to the more technically demanding theory of transaction 
costs in general equilibrium economics, as well as pursuing the 
version of transaction cost theory with which most economists are 
familiar - namely that variety of neoclassical microeconomic analysis 
associated with what we shall label the 'Chivirla school'. The order 
in which contending transaction costs theories appears is not 
especially important and it should not be supposed. for example, that 
any theory later in the sequence is regarded as necessarily better 
than its predecessor.
It is the case, however, that the partial equilibrium (or market) 
theory of transaction costs is the basis for most of the contending 
theories and approaches and therefore deserves to be outlined first. 
Neoclassical partial equilibrium theories of transaction cost are 
based upon a thoroughgoing theory of exchange - which in turn relies 
upon a set of predicates about the behaviour of consumers and their 
preferences. A simple summary of this neoclassical theory of consumer 
behaviour would refer to the assumption that consumers always maximize 
their utility (or satisfaction) where possible. taking into account 
the economic constraints upon their choice-making but assuming that 
they exercise their freedom in discrimination as a result of full 
knowledge of the market environment and that they observe some assumed 
logical constants - for example. consumers are supposed to be able to 
order their preferences between goods within the total 'bundle' of 
goods they consume in such a way as to make their preferences 
logically coherent or 'transitive'. The detailed theory of exchange
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need not detain us; it is sufficiently well known to require little 
further elaboration. Suffice it to say that the principal conclusion 
of the theory of exchange which is of vital relevance to the theorist 
of transaction costs is the principle of the 'marginal rate of 
substitution'. Briefly, economists assume that, in order to remain at 
a maximal level of satisfaction (to maximize utility by allocating 
Income to a bundle of goods and services which yield maximum 
satisfaction) consumers may have to reallocate their expenditure 
between goods. Suppose, for example, that two goods, X and Y, are 
consumed in various combinations - all of which combinations ensure 
that consumers attain the maximum level of utility. One might combine 
3 units of X and 3 of Y, for example, and gain the same level of total 
satisfaction as one would from a combination of 4 units of X and 2 of 
f. The example figures are fictitious but the principle (usually 
illustrated in introductory economics texts by use of the 
'indifference curve') is generally adopted that the marginal rate of 
substitution measures the rate at which a consumer will have to forgo 
anits of X in one combination in order to obtain more units of Y 
whilst still remaining, overall, at a constant maximum level of total 
satisfaction.
This guiding principle of the marginal rate of substitution is the 
sornerstone of the neoclassical theory of transaction cost in exchange 
- for transaction costs are hold to affect the degree to which 
Jonsumors when they are acting as single bilateral exchanging economic 
sffents can attain a more general equilibrium in exchange in which 
total community satisfaction is maximised. The full general 
•Qul librium theory of transaction costs is of course concerned both
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with production and consumption and analyses the effect of transaction 
costs upon the attainment of economy-wide efficiency. But we can 
proceed a good deal of the way toward an understanding of transaction 
costs by following the implications of the principle of the marginal 
rate of substitution further into the area of exchange. Up to this 
point we have assumed that our utility maximizing consumer chooses 
bundles of commodities without stating where such bundles come from. 
Suppose now that two such consumers face each other over a table, each 
one endowed with a certain stock of two commonly traded and desirable 
conmodities. In order to maximize their respective levels of total 
utility they are forced to exchange units of one commodity for 
another. Thus consumers A and B possess stocks of commodities 1 and 2 
iihich may be arranged according to the general principles outlined 
above in order to maximize utility. Consumer A, for example, could 
wap some of his units of commodity 1 in order to maximize his total 
utility by getting more of commodity 2 from B. Naturally there will 
36 circumstances in which exchange is possible (i.e. both are moving 
toward ’equilibrium') and some where it becomes more difficult. In 
ianeral, however, exchanges of commodities between the two will stop 
«fhere the marginal rate of substitution for each pair of goods 1 and 2 
8^ the same for A and B where they are both consuming both goods. At 
this point the 'market' for goods 1 and 2 between A and B will clear 
ind a maximum level of total satisfaction (A's satisfaction plus B's 
>atisfaction) will be attained. (Notice that although conclusions have 
36en reached regarding the general equilbrium of exchange the 
Jrinciplee upon which this conclusion has been reached are 
luintessentially partial assumptions and postulates).
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The instances where the two consumers find their marginal rates of 
substitution are equal describe a 'contract locus' or curve within a 
two dimensional space representing trades between them - and 
economists conventionally represent this by use of an 'Edgeworth- 
Bowley box' diagram [1]. Here we need only note that the diagrammatic 
representation of this exchange equilibrium occurs in most standard 
introductory and intermediate texts in microeconomics and may prove 
helpful in visualizing the process by which a contract locus is 
created. However, we can proceed a good deal of the way toward an 
accurate definition of transaction costs in exchange without using 
such a diagram. Imagine consumei— exchangers A and B are again tracing 
out the contract locus of marginal equivalence for the substitution of 
goods 1 and 2 - that is to say, by experimental bids and offers they 
are arranging to exchange sufficient quantities of either good so as 
to maximize their total utility from both goods. A number of 
imnediate contracts of exchange can be arranged and 'swaps' made.
Some swaps, however, will not be as easy to arrange. Suppose, for 
xample, that the swapping consumer A requires an extra half unit of 
oonmodity 1 to bring a bundle of goods, called X. to the contract 
locus - that is, to make the choice of X consistent with the 
prevailing marginal rate of substitution. If the swapping consumer B 
is disinclined to leave himself with a useless half unit of commodity 
in order to engineer the swap that will otherwise enable the two to 
ttaln the contract locus the contract will not occur and the two will 
tot have attained exchange equilibrium across all possible pairs or
[1] See. for example, J. W. S. Cassels Economics for Mathematicians (Cambridge. 1981), 19-22.
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combinations of bundles. Thus consumers in the exchange model are 
usually assumed not to mind dividing up commodities if the gain 
from creating fractions of commodities places them on the contract 
locus. They are said to accept the absolute 'divisibility' of their 
endowed goods 1 and 2. The fact of divisibility is thus a key feature 
of the exchange model; however, it also has consequences for the 
analysis of transaction cost. If divisibility is required to attain 
exchange equilibrium. for example, rules will have to be established 
joverning the dividing up of commodities. Thus. whilst one cannot 
physically divide a horse one might divide the time that the horse 
spends in pulling ploughs for A and for B; and whilst it might be 
practical to halve a bottle of wine it is not easy to divide a car or 
i radio.
Contractual arrangements, stipulating when and how commodities will 
3e swapped for use will have to be devised and policed; a measure of 
isage will have to be introduced and someone (probably a third, 
independent agent) will have to be employed to monitor the whole 
process of joint use. The costs associated with the policing, 
monitoring and arranging of such contracts for the joint use of a 
jornroodity are transaction costs and arise because of the fact that 
roods are often indivisible or imperfectly divisible. And because the 
»otential attainment of the contract locus with every conceiveable 
>undle. x,y,z,..n. is a requirement for general equilibrium in 
xchange, transaction costs must be paid in order to ensure that all 
•ossible swaps can occur. After all, if one person gains more from 
•ortlonlng a commodity consuming it along with other portions or 
'holes of other commodities than another person, then the
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principle of exchange equilibrium will have been disregarded. 
Transaction coats therefore have the effect of separating exchanging 
parties from the attainment of exchange equilbrium (which Includes 
Pareto equilbrium) where the divisibility problem intrudes.
Readers will have concluded rightly that divisibility is only one 
aspect of the problem of exchange which gives rise to transaction 
costs. For in an exchange economy of the type we have been imagining 
all swaps or trades will require some degree of policing and 
monitoring - and it is in this way that transaction costs arise. 
Indeed. because we have assumed that each economic agent. A and B. is 
seeking to maximize his own utility in relation to exchange we have 
left aside any thought of requiring either of them to act 'fairly' or 
decently toward each other - all the more reason, then, for both A and 
B to see}< to impose controls over the exchange process. There may 
even be circumstances in which trade cannot take place. swaps cannot 
be made, without the payment of these costs. Transaction costs are 
thus ubiquitous in the world of bilateral exchange.
However. the careful reader will want to discriminate between the 
:osts of 'setting up' exchanges in general and the costs of making 
single contracts. We have said that the governance of exchanges made 
in order to attain exchange equilibrium requires certain transaction 
costs to be paid - but we have said nothing about the costa of 
xchange which are continuous with trading. For example, 
communications must be established between A and B; a language of 
isgal obligation created; and a framework for redress developed. In a 
"'orld in which agents A and B are to act as self- interested utility
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maximizers some ground rules will have to exist before a single trade 
or swap is made.
These 'set-up* costs differ from transaction costs in two important 
ways. First, transaction costa are themselves subject to the 
principle of divisibility whereas set-up costs are not. Take for 
example a repetitive contract between A and B requiring the exchange 
of the right to use some asset for a period of time - such as a car. 
Naturally A and B wi11 want to write out an agreement stipulating that 
the car is to be used by A for a number of months and by B for the 
jremainder. They will want to include clauses and subclauses covering 
such minutiae as the time required for servicing the car, the 
responsibility for accident repairs and so forth. These are not mere 
incidental details but rather essential to the nature of the problem 
of fully specifying the exchange in such a way as to allow both A and 
B to attain maximum satisfaction. The writing of the contract - the 
Irafting, specification and enforcement of the rules governing the 
trade -will necessarily incur transaction costs in the making of the 
agreement and in its policing and monitoring. Yet the costs of 
establishing a legal code of the type that allows contractual devices 
to stand indefeasible and unchallenged by unilateral abrogation - the 
sort of general principles of law, for instance, that almost 
universally dictate the form of exchange in widely different societies 
“ ere largely indivisible. It is not possible, for instance, to Invoke 
principles of fairness on one occasion and not on another without a 
degree of power imbalence or Information distortion. Set-up type 
costs, then, are those which, whilst proving essential to the process 
cf attaining exchange equilibrium, are neither divisible nor
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subject to dispute. Set-up costs are, for example, transferable from 
one contractual setting to another and indeed from one contract to 
another; once paid, the benefit of the payment continues to the mutual 
advantage of traders.
One virtue of this simple exchange economy presentation of 
aggregative transaction costs is that, with economy of explanation we 
can proceed some way toward specifying the incidence of transaction 
coots in an economy involving both producex— traders and consumer- 
traders - that is, a general equilibrium (GE) model of transaction 
coots. Certainly the most important characteristics of the 
transaction costs incurred in trade are represented in the above 
formulation. It is clear, for example, that the movement toward 
exchange equilibrium requires a degree of divisibi1itv. A further 
virtue of the analysis is that it enables the reader to distinguish in 
his own mind the difference between the 'set-up' costs in marketing or 
trading (what we saw Franklin Fisher refer to earlier as the 
'transaction constraint') from transaction costs. Quite simply, the 
et-up costs incurred before the first trade are the costs of 
arranging for the first experimental 'swap' to take place. They are 
■>ot themselves assumed to be perfectly divisible. Indeed, were they 
o to be then exchange might take place before the market opened, 
■rhich naturally violates a conventional assumption that trade between 
ï'aders A and B only takes place through an intermediary market which 
chooses its trading hours. However, as we shall see later, the 
llvisibility of costs of exchange is very difficult to assess 
listorlcally, so that the separation of transaction costs from set-up 
:o8ts proves very difficult to achieve using the criterion of 
livisibility alone.
5 8
One might suppose that only a definition of set-up costs (or 
transaction constraints) is required to establish the distinction 
between them and transaction costa. The moat obvious distinction 
between the two is that transaction costs are continuous throughout 
the economy but that particular set-up costs are discrete and specific 
to a part of the market. However, this definition carries with it the 
potential to confuse set-up coats (literally the sunk coats of 
trading) with other fixed costs in the long run. Rather, it is 
necessary to hold to an explanation of market operation that allows 
set-up costs - whilst clearly non-recoverable - to be transferred to a 
subsequent trade by, for example, moving physical location or the 
nature of face-to-face trade.
To summarize the analysis of transaction costa in partial equilibrium 
thus far, we have stated the outcomes of trading with and without set­
up costs and have witnessed a distinction between set-up and 
transaction costs themselves. Earlier, we attempted to illustrate 
rather than rigorously prove the existence of transaction coats in 
bilateral trade using the simple analytics of exchange theory. We 
have merely stated what traders' welfare schedules will look like in 
the form of indifference curves; we have been required to state 
formally maximizing objectives for traders A and B because a move 
toward equilibrium is mutually advantageous without involving a 
recalculation of the preference functions for each trader. Naturally 
this 'finger exercise' in the analysis of transaction costa has not 
required the more substantial apparatus of the general equilibrium 
theorist - such as statements about consumer or producer preorderings 
over possible trades - for we have merely stated that preferences
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exist. Indeed. in this account of the existence of transaction costs 
the concept of 'negotiation costs' first developed for analytical 
purposes by Buchanan and Tullock [1] has been extended to allow for 
the differentiation of set-up costs from discrete transaction coats 
using the analytical techniques more commonly ascribed to welfare 
theory. As presently described this cannot bo a sufficient model for 
the formal specification of transaction costs and a further 
explanation must develop the full general equilibrium theory of 
producer-consumer trade and production with transaction costs [2].
The economic theory of general equilibrium (GE), by comparison with 
that of exchange equilibrium, is concerned with the almultanooua 
equilibrium of producing and consuming activities and thus with the 
naxlmization of profit as well as utility. Because of the technically 
sophisticated nature of GE theory, much of what follows may appear 
lifficult or abstract to the historian. In general terms, however, 
the reader should bo assured that ho has already covered much of the 
necessary ground to appreciate the GE account of transaction costs and 
s brief sketch of the method will suffice to explain it. In the stead 
consumer-swappora. GE theorists place consumei— producers - assuming
tl] James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock The Calculus of Consent (Ann Arbor, 1965). Similarly. the presentation here draws on the micro- theory of 'disagreement costs' developed in John G. Cross The Economics of Bargaining (New York and London, 1969), Chp.6. See also App. 1 below.
[2] For attempts to distinguish between set-up and transaction coats in GE models see variously Walter Heller 'Transactions with Set-Up *p°®ts' Journal of Economic Theory. 4 (1972), 465-78; Seppo Honkapohja 'Studies in the General Equilibrium theory of Money and Transaction
5°^ '^ Annfllffg___Academiae__Sciantiarium__Fennicae.___PlBBartatlonaBHumanlormn 21 (Helsinki, 1979); and, latterly, Raefael Repullo 'The existence of equilibrium without free disposal in economies with transaction costs and incomplete markets' International Economic HfiYifilf. 28 (1987), 275-90.
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Ithereby that the goods swapped can be used in new production, that the 
labour or capital of both A and B can bo hired out for production and 
[that both stock-holding and saving are possible. In this sense the GE 
Imodel provides a most realistic. if mathematical. setting for the 
[analysis of transaction costs. However. as we shall see. there are 
[reasons to believe that the relatively elementary forms of analysis 
[offered by the GE economist to date are unable to take us much further 
in discovering an historically relevant approach to transaction costs. 
■Before proceeding further to analyse the general equilbrium 
■ consequences of the
6existence of transaction costs, however, it is necessary to explain the 
relationship between generalised and partial equilibrium models of economic 
behaviour and the qualities of the general equilibrium analysis of 
transaction cost that influence perceptions of economic theorists about the 
structure and nature of the transactions sector. Naturally, this implies a 
familiarity with the general equilibrium (GE) methodology which has, 
perhaps more markedly than any other strand of economic theory in recent 
decades, come to view the transactions cost of exchange in Walrasian 
tâtonnement bargaining as central to an understanding of the theory of 
production as well as the theory of exchange [1].
Fundamentally an extension of the Walrasian tradition of the analysis of 
equilibrium states, the most significant characteristics of the archetypal 
j GE model of the equilibrium of market demand and supply across all markets 
are its rigour and computability. In its definition of economic
equilibrium, the Arrow-Debreu (A-D) conceptualisation of general (economy­
wide) economic equilibrium adopts a method quite foreign to that familiar 
to most economic historians in an effort to be both precise and 
mathematically concise. Equilibrium, in the Walrasian tradition, is 
regarded by GE scholars as historically 'evidenced' only by price-relative 
stability and the collusion of buyers and sellers at 'equilibrium prices'. 
This equilibrium point is neither morally 'good' nor 'bad', but is rather 
instantaneous and yet existential. The GE paradigm emphasises the
existence rather than attainment of equilbrium for:
[1] The standard introduction, Kenneth Arrow and F.H.Hahn Compet i t ive 
Analysis (San Francisco and Edinburgh,1971 ) is accessible for the 
mathematically able.
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When we uae an equilibrium concept we are singling out a subset of possible states of the economy for special attention. To say that an economy is in equilibrium is only of interest if it excludes other possible states of the economy. That is why we need existence proofs and why it is not a fruitful use of equilbrium to assert that only equilibrium states are possible 
[11 .
The equilibrium postulated by the GE paradigm is therefore conjectural 
and not historically verifiable. Rather, the GE theorist is interested 
in ascertaining the conditions necessary for the attainment of (even 
temporary) equilibrium. As such the GE theory of transaction costs 
offers a very different perspective from those encountered thus far.
The definition of transaction costs in general equilibrium theory begins 
by defining a 'transactions set' similar in character to the Arrow- 
Debreu (A-D) consumption set (a set of choices which may be made under 
specified circumstances) and fully conformable with the conditions of 
general equi1ibrimn. The 'transactions set' is said to be 'closed' 
(there is a finite number of possible choices) and 'convex' (choices 
between goods 1 and 2 and combinations of 1 and 2 can yield identical 
levels of utility). Any point within the transaction set can be 
specified by vectors of purchases, sales (according to a profit 
function) and resources used in exchange [2].
[1] Fran)< Hahn Equilibrium and Macroeconomics (Oxford, 1984) .
[2) This somewhat tortuous shorthand, in keeping with the set-theoreticcharacter of GE derived from Debreu's specification of a consumption set (Gerard Debreu Theory of Value (New York, 1959) Chp.3), captures the fundamental features of the choice set of transaction technology. A i^ xed point theorem is used to identify a unique (general) equilibrium, (he only accessible presentation of the full theory of transaction costs In general equilibrium using such an apparatus is Repullo, 'Existence of »qullibrium without free disposal', theorems 3.1 and 3.2; W.P. Heller *nd R.M. Starr 'Equilibrium with non-convex transaction costs: Monetary »nd non-monetary economies' Review of Economic Studies. 43 (1976), 195-ii5. Economic historians are unlikely to find set theoretic GE very Inviting and hereafter all references to results will be expressed in ion-mathematical terms.
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Equilibrium in this stylised A-D economy turns out to determine the 
content of the final consumption set with respect to the transaction set. 
Whether, as in Kurz’s exposition [1], this suggests we specify 'norms' of 
behaviour with respect to transaction costs in the absence of (even ill- 
defined) preference 'pre-orderings', or as in Foley's earlier model we 
allow the derivation of the equilibrium conditions for A-D economies with 
respect to production through an indirectly specified profit vector (n) [2] 
or, in Hahn's sequence market model, we require the specification of a 
single exchange 'technology' for all period markets [3], the basic 
characteristics of A-D GE models of the incidence of transaction costs are 
the same. As in all GE models, general equilibrium is derived from fully 
specified, pre-ordered, choice sets for consumers and producers who observe 
Walras' Law, have transitive preference orderings with respect to producer 
goods, satisfy the normal non-satiety assumption and, most significantly, 
prefer to trans^r the payment of costs associated with purchase to others.
In dealing with transaction costs, GE scholars have been less strictly 
bound by these convexity assumptions common to A-D models of the 
consumption and production sets. Some of the earliest GE formulations 
simply ignored the possibility of non-convexity in the transactions set. 
Producers in Foley's description of equilibrium in an A-D economy, for
[1] Moredecai Kurz 'Equilibrium in a finite sequence of markets with
transaction costs' Econometrica, 42 (1974), 1-20; idem. 'Equilibrium
with transaction cost and money in a single market exchange economy' 
Journal of Economic Theory, 7 (1974), 418-452.
[2] Duncan K.Foley 'Economic equilibrium with costly marketing' Journal of 
Economic Theory, 2 (1970), 276-291.
[3] F.H.Hahn 'Equilibrium with transaction costs' Econometrica, 39 (1971), 
417-439.
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example, maximize profits with respect to the consumers’ orientation toward 
their products, which in turn is influenced by the consumer pre-ordering
[1]. However. GE scholars have more frequently simplified the modelling 
exercise by assuming, contrary to our earlier formulation of the nature of 
transaction costs, that the transactions set is non-convex (that is to say, 
transaction costs are mainly of the ’set-up’ cost type and are therefore 
merely a constraint upon the attainment of GE) [2], As a result, in the 
formulation of a theory of the transactions sector, GE theory assumes that 
transaction costs are absolutely indivisible. In some senses of course 
this is merely the polar opposite of the Coasian assumption that 
transaction costs are completely divisible. But the assumption of absolute 
indivisibility does not end there. A further necessary condition for 
competitive equilibrium in an A-D exchange economy recognized implicitly by 
Hahn and, formally, by Cornwall [3] is that all markets need to be open 
though not necessarily active. Time, similarly, is not divisible in the 
transact ion set.
Furthermore, the aggregation of transaction cost in the A-D economy is 
exactly analogous to the general equilibrium analysis of aggregate demand. 
Just as economic agents in tradable markets will seek to equate demand and 
supply at notional equilibrium prices, so too an equilibrium of buying and
[1] Foley, ’Economic equilibrium with costly marketing’, especially 
theorem 4.1, pp.282-3.
[2] Reviewed in Heller and Starr ’Equilibrium with non-convex transaction 
costs’
[3] R.R.Cornwall ’Marketing costs and imperfect competition in general
equilibrium’ in G.Schwodiauer (ed) Equilibrium and Disequilibrium in 
Economic Theory (Dordrecht, 1977), 239-254; Hahn ’Equilibrium with
transaction costs’.
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selling prices in the Foley-Kurz account of transaction costs and 
technology indicates the presence of equilibrium activity and transaction 
costs in exchange. Yet in the earliest transactions technologies written 
by general equilibrium theorists, the bilateralism of exchange was not 
reflected in bilateral shares of transaction cost. In the words of 
Professor Hess:
The Foley model assumes that consumers perform none 
of the intermediary roles themselves. They always 
buy at the higher price and sell at the lower price.
The marketing activities...are carried out by profit 
maximizing producing agents [1].
The spread of buying and selling prices in the simplest transaction cost 
model mirrors the equation of aggregate demand and aggregate supplies 
offered written, in Walrasian fashion, as a vector of prices in general 
equilibrium. In more recent accounts of money and transaction cost the 
general spirit of the Foley-Kurz model is carried forward and again there 
appears to be no bifurcation in the incidence of transactions costs. In 
short, the general equilibrium account of transaction costs presently has 
little or nothing to say about the distribution of transaction costs 
between agents in single, multiple or sequential markets.
The most significant criticism of the existing literature within the A-0 
paradigm, however, relates to the nature of transaction 'technologies' 
allowed by the Foley-Kurz model. As has been noted, of principal 
importance, though often neglected, is the assumed perfect divisibility of 
the transaction sector resources used in exchange. The divisibility issue 
creates most problems in relation to the specification of bundles of 
[1] James D. Hess The Economics of Organisation (Amsterdam, 1983), 39.
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completed exchanges and one solution is to represent the degree of 
divisibility associated with a transaction technology by the institution 
operating it. Neoclassical theorists commonly adopt the heuristic of 
assuming that institutions and their rules actually embody the transactions 
technology required to attain equilibrium. This neoclassical solution is 
perhaps the only solution currently available, although both its use and 
elaboration extend beyond the limits of the present survey. Suffice it to 
say that as observed earlier the degree of divisibility of the transaction 
mechanisms in the economy does not depend to any considerable degree upon 
the size of the so-called ’set-up’ costs in marketing and that, contrary to 
the orthodoxy of assumed non-convex transaction sets in GE models (after 
Heller), it is difficult to avoid holding to our first intuition that 
divisibility exactly defines the nature of transaction sector costs.
Yet these criticisms of the A-D transaction sector apply only to the 
existing and very elementary elaborations of general equilibrium models 
with transaction costs. Indeed, the very elementary nature of much of the 
analysis of the transaction sector indicates the problems in framing a 
workable model of producer and consumer actions in the light of transaction 
costs.
Whilst we have thus far regarded transaction costs as a feature of 
elementary partial equilibrium models or general equilibrium models of 
economic behaviour and have concentrated upon the determination of economy­
wide equilibrium in the presence and absence of transaction costs, little 
has been said of the most commonly understood theory of transaction costs.
Associated with partial equilibrium neoclassical theory of a variety
particularly popular in the United States, the ’pure neoclassical’ theory
of property rights starts from the assumption that economic efficiency is
indicated by market clearing and not by price vector shifts; that the
holding of unsold stocks may signal price effects rather than price effects
always and only signalling stockholding activity. The familarity of this
approach means that it should not require further elaboration of its
fundamental character (introductory accounts feature in most undergraduate
university textbooks); however the importance of this popular and much
favoured non-Walrasian approach to economic dynamics does lead its
supporters to frame a quite different theory of property rights in which
transaction costs represent not simply the costs of using the exchange
mechanism but rather the opportunity costs of market trade itself. It is
worth examining the views of those neoclassicals in the tradition of J.B.
Clark labelled the ’Chivirla’ economists by John Burton - named after the
principal locations in which the neoclassical application of the Coasian
theory of property rights was taught and studied in the early 1970’s,
Chicago University, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and the University of
California Los Angeles [1] - whose approach to the economics of transaction
costs is significantly different from those we have encountered thus far
and whose influence upon historians’ perceptions of transaction
[1] John Burton ’Externalities, Property Rights and Public Policy: Private 
Property Rights or the Spoilation of Nature’ in Steven N.S.Cheung The 
Myth of Social Cost:a critique of welfare economics and the implications 
for public policy lEA Hobart Paper 82 (London, 1978), 76. Those
unfamiliar with varieties of neoclassical theory and the evolution of 
property rights theories since Clark may consult Louis de Alessi
’Property Rights, Transaction Costs and X-efficiency: an essay in 
economic theory’ American Economic Review, 73 (1983), 65-66; Victor 
P.Goldberg 'Commons, Clark and the emerging post-Coasian law and 
economics’ Journal of Economic Issues, 10 (1976), 877-894.
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costs has been greater than those alternative formulations we have examined 
up to this point. The choice of the descriptive title for this group is 
merely convenient; certainly not all students of the neoclassical theory of 
property rights either attend or work in these institutions. Nevertheless, 
the choice of academic affiliation rather than any intellectual category 
for this group seems best. Neither Rowley and Peacock’s denotation of them 
as ’Public Choice Paretians’ [1] nor Mark Blaug’s description of them as 
'Positive Paretians’ [2] seem to exactly specify their concerns. save to 
indicate their obvious though informal relationship with those public 
choice theorists whose work has focused on allocative questions where 
property rights assignments have largely been eradicated and where 
transaction costs are usually assumed to be zero. Langlois’ tentative 
designation of them as ’comparative-institutionalists’ [3] alone is 
entirely inappropriate for, as we shall see, the Chivirla and
neoinstitutionalist approaches to PRTC are largely though not entirely 
incompatible and. if anything, Chivirla economists definitively reject any 
form of institutional analysis which does not regard institutions as 
constraints upon the individual utility function as shall be demonstrated. 
In fact it is the Chivirla approach to the incidence of transaction costs 
and the assignment of property rights that has become the most favoured and 
the most frequently used analytical device in transaction cost
[1] Rowley and Peacock Welfare Economics. 104-108.
[2] Mark Blaug The methodology of economics, or how economists explain 
(Cambridge. 1980), 143-146.
[3] Richard N. Langlois ’Internal Organisation in a Dynamic Context: some
theoretical considerations’ in Meheroo Jussawalla and Helene Ebenfield 
(eds.) Communication and Information Economics: New Perspectives
(Amsterdam, 1984), 23.
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historiography although there appears to bo little evidence that 
economic historians are aware of the problems involved in using of the 
approach to property rights developed by Chivirla school theorists.
The economic analysis of efficient markets, which is the prime concern
of neoclassical economic theory, suggests a very different approach to
the economics of property rights from the GE paradigm. As a part of the
theory of economic externality, Chivirla transaction cost economics
concerns itself with identifying the conditions in which internalisation
of an external effect will prove appropriate. Its formulation of the
phenomenon of transaction coats is an attempt to explain the role of
external effects in causing market failure - but unlike the formulation
leveloped by Coaae, it seeks to explain not the fact of internalisation
(and thus organisational change) but the conditions in which it is
optimal. In efficient markets, external costs should always be
oounteracted by sufficient beneficial effects from the internalisation
of the harmful consequences of production. For example, the efficient
narket will compensate those suffering the effects of pollution from
producers' activities up to the point at which the marginal profit from
producing the next unit of output exactly equals the cost of
:ompensating an affected party for each producer. Thereafter, the
'ational maximising producer will find it more advantageous to himself
<^P internalise the external effect costs by, for example, taking over
-he property rights of the affected party. In the form of a rational
choice rule, we might say with Demsetz that
•..property rights develop to internalize externalities when the gains of internalization become larger than the coat of internalization... [1] .
11 Harold Demaetz 'Toward a Theory of Property Rights' American Economic Review. Papers and Proceedings, 57 (1967), 350.
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Consequently organisational change occurs on the basis of a rational 
calculus of the costs and benefits of externality internalising activity.
One general conclusion of this particular analysis of the property rights 
consequences of external effects is that organisational change is 
motivated, like every other form of economic behaviour in the neoclassical 
model, by self-seeking rational behaviour. Property rights become 
transfered, adapted and incorporated into other institutional structures 
when and where it proves efficient in some absolute sense so to act. It is 
hardly surprising therefore that the Chivirla approach to this extension of 
Coasian framework makes much use of the device of cost-benefit analysis 
[1]. Early Chivirla analytical writings suggested that transaction costs 
were the penalties paid by society for the friction within an economy 
caused by the misalignment of the social costs and social benefits from the 
market allocation of goods and services. In the form of a critique of 
Pigouvian welfare theory the Chivirla school’s early work on transaction 
costs proceeded from the observation of Coase that the absence of 
transaction costs was a prerequisite for the allocation of resources to 
their optimal use or (which means the same thing) to the point at which 
their market price and their welfare value would be one and the same [2].
[1] Especially in Harold Demsetz 'Some Aspects of Property Rights’ Journal
of Law and Economics. 9 (1966), 61-70 ; idem. ’Towards a Theory of
Property Rights’, 347-359; idem.’The Exchange and Enforcement of 
Property Rights’ Journal of Law and Economics. 7 (1964), 11-26; Armen
Alchian and Harold Demsetz ’Production, Information Costs and Economic 
Organisation’ American Economic Review. 62 (1972), 772-795.
[2] In other words the marginal rates of substitution for money and goods 
would be equal at one optimal point within the consumption set described 
by the indifference curves of buyers and sellers.
71
Chivlrla theorists make use of the apparatus of welfare theory to 
justify their subsidiary, and prescriptive (policy) claim that the 
reduction in transaction costs associated with the definition, 
enforcement, policing and control of property rights allocations will 
bring about stable equilibrium. Defining the equilbrium level of 
transaction costs as that state in which marginal costs (MC) are exactly 
equated with marginal benefits (MB) of property defining activity, 
Chivirla economists regard excessively costly transaction costs as 
inimical to the we 1 fare efficiency of an economy. The marginal benefit 
from transaction cost payments - the attainment of welfare enhancing 
exchange and general increase in the level of total utility - will be 
equated with the marginal cost of employing resources to undertake those 
tasks necessary to allow all possible welfare enhancing exchange and 
production to occur. The opportunity cost of these resource costs 
incurred in returning the economy to the equilibrium level represents a 
real loss of productive output and consequently of welfare. So only 
where MB-MC will transaction costs be reduced to zero or, more 
precisely, only in an economy of zero transaction costs will it prove 
possible to attain true equilibrium prices.
Zero costs of transaction then implies that one can write a contract containing as many stipulations as desired, all fully enforced, without expense. In such a world (abstracting from transport, storage and so forth) there would be no spread between retail and wholesale prices. or between selling and buying prices: they become identical. Conversely. the use of a single price...implies zero costs of transacting (1].
tl) Yoram Barzel 'Some Fallacies in the Interpretation of Information Cost' Journal of Law and Economics. 20 (1977), 292.
The ’social equilibrium’ of marginal costs and marginal benefits in the 
Chivirla account represents the equalisation of on the one hand the 
combination of enforcement and ’rights-dofining’ activity and on the other 
the resulting benefit from the allocation of property rights using the 
resources for enforcement and property rights assignment [1], The benefit 
gained from moving toward this ’social equilibrium’ is regarded as having 
been redistributed from the sum of potential private benefits from the 
holding of exclusive rights over resources or properties. It has been 
argued - as we shall see - that this observation is trivial and that only 
the analysis of the welfare implications of property reassignment in terms 
of the subsequent initial allocations would yield relevant results [2]. 
However the significant product of the attainment of the ’social 
equilibrium’ is stated to be precisely that new allocations based upon 
native bargaining powers becomes possible. In the words of Harold Demsetz:
In such a world it will be bargaining skills and not market 
structures that determine the distribution of wealth...[t]he 
coexistence of monopoly power and monopoly structure is 
possible only if the costs of negotiating are differentially 
positive, being lower for one set of sellers (or buyers) than 
it is for rival sellers (or buyers) [3].
More cynically, this neoclassical world of zero transaction costs has
implications for the type of economic structure one would expect to evolve:
'...in such a world growth is not a problem, its rate being simply a
[1] Illustrated in Terry L.Anderson and P.J.Hill ’The Evolution of 
Property Rights: A Study of the American West’ Journal of Law and 
Economics. 18 (1975), 165.
[2] Warren J. Samuels ’The Coase Theorem and the Study of Law and 
Economics’ Natural Resources Journal. 14 (1974), 1-33.
[3] Harold Demsetz ’Why Regulate Utilities ?’ Journal of Law and Economics 
11, (1968), 61.
function of the number of children people have and the rate of saving’ 
[1]. The tendency of the economy toward this state as the result of the 
working out of some encoded logic of human agency suggests that the 
historical study of the evolution of human society as a whole is in reality 
the study of the failure of men to understand the inevitable optimality of 
rational, reactive, economic agency through pure exchange systems with 
costless supporting arrangements for property rights transfer and 
definition. It is in this respect that the Chivirla paradigm approaches 
classical theory in its form and empirical predictions.
What does this analysis imply for any form of applied economic study ? 
First the Chivirla approach suggests a definitive methodological approach 
to property rights. The Chivirla version of the Coasian method approaches 
the phenomenon of high transaction costs and similar negotiating 
disabilities in contracting as a part of a largo class of market 
inefficiency-producing factors which includes generalised externality and - 
as subclasses of external effects - monopolistic and public goods 
allocation [1], unique patents [2] and an undersupply of relevant
[1] Douglass C.North 'Institutions, Transaction Costs and Economic Growth* 
Economic Inquiry, 25, (1987), 419.
[2] Carl Dahlman 'The Problem of Externality’ Journal of Law and Economics 
22, (1979), 141-162.
[3] Jack Hirschleifer ’The private and social value of information and the 
reward to inventive activity' American Economic Review 61. (1971), 561- 
74.
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information [1]. All such forms of market inefficiency behave like the 
better known forms of external effect; just as costly externalities 
imply market inefficiency and therefore long-run institutional 
instability so too the existence of high transaction costs implies that 
current institutional arrangements lack the permanence associated with 
perfect market conditions and with zero transaction costs [2] . Within 
the variety of economic systems Chivirla economists presume to be 
characterised by any of the sources of market failure they identify 
efficiency will be relative and not
1] Yoram Barzel. 'Some Fallacies', 291-307. It is unclear whether natural monopolies resulting from natural endowments are to be included here; logically they should be excluded for command over them has no opportunity cost for those without access to them but few accounts from within the Chivirla school convincingly deal with the problem. One is reminded of Dennis Robertson's happy observation on Marshall's treatment of rent '...not 'entering into' cost, a phrase which always conjures up to my mind a stately temple labelled Costs of Production with poor Rent standing disconsolately on the mat outside!' (Dennis Robertson Lectures on Economic Principles (London,1963), 204); post-Coasian neoclassical theorists of transaction cost have an equal disdain for naturally occurring imperfections of the market when including elements of market failure in the temple of transaction cost.
21 Harold Demsetz 'The Cost of Transacting' Esonomics. 82 (1968), 34. Quarterly Journal__
absolute. Consequently statements about the relative efficiency of various 
historical economies is dubious; only the comparison of the efficiency of 
their transaction-enabling technologies (or, more precisely, their 
mechanisms for minimising aggregate transaction cost) will provide an 
appropriate guide to the develop of economic organisation and factor use.
In the Chivirla account institutional change results from the attempt to 
reduce all classes of generalised external effect, including transaction 
costs. As a result the existence of these signs of market inefficiency 
seems historically implausible. Institutions continue to adapt themselves 
to meet the requirements of the perfect market model until no further 
adaptation is necessary and proves merely a costly inconvenience and incurs 
organisational diseconomies. One obvious implication of this is that 
economic historical study itself becomes an irrelevcince and a mere 
superfluous commentary upon the working out of the rational behaviour of 
individuals agents for the economist. To rescue historical economics from 
the oblivion to which Chivirla economists wish to consign it requires a 
clearer understanding of the content of the partial equilibrium theory of 
PRTC than has heretofore been available [1]. It is this theme that will be 
developed in the following chapter.
[1] The voluminous publications of Douglass North to date have effectively 
been an attempt from within the neoclassical fold to achieve exactly 
this. See particularly. Structure and Change in Economic History (New 
York, 1981); idem. 'The theoretical tools of the economic historian’ in 
Charles P. Kindleberger and Guido di Telia (eds.) Economics in the 
Long View; Essays in Honour of W.W.Rostow (London,1982) volume 1, 15-
26; idem. 'Transaction costs, institutions and economic history’ 
Zeitschrift fur die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, Bd. 140, heft 1, 
(1984), 7-17. It should be noted, however, that none of the
observations made below in our attempted critique of Chivirla PRTC 
theory have been explicitly stated by North in this literature.
CHAPTER THREE: INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMIC HISTORY AND POST-COASIAN VARIANTS 
OF THE TRANSACTION COSTS THEORY OF ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE.
76
'The new institutional economics is preoccupied with the origins, 
incidence, and ramifications of transaction costs. Indeed, if 
transaction costs are negligible, the organization of economic 
activity is irrelevent, since any advantages one mode of 
organization appears to hold over another will simply be 
eliminated by costless contracting’ [Oliver Williamson, 1984].
We have seen that the modern (and largely neoclassical) theory of 
transaction costs is based in large measure upon acceptance of the so- 
called Coase theorem, a theorem which states that in the absence of 
transaction costs and motivated solely by considerations of market 
efficiency in the use of resources in their most productive setting, a 
Pareto optimal allocation of resources would result from exchange 
regardless of the initial allocation of property rights and the legal 
allocation of rights. In the presence of external effects, indeed, market 
efficiency and Paretian welfare criteria will be met through trade if 
transaction costs are reduced to zero. The economy operating in the 
absence of such transaction costs is thus free to oper«4c with the 
limitless resources for marketing allocated to all traders in the absence 
of such marketing costs and attain intertemporal and general equilibrium in 
product and factor markets. The attainment of economy-wide equilibrium in 
this manner is thus entirely the result of rational profit maximizing 
behaviour in a perfect market. The normative and prescriptive corollary of 
this theorem is evident: only by freeing markets from the controls which 
binder the assignment of resources to their optimal use can an efficient 
market economy be created. It is, then, not surprising that non-Coasian
versions of transaction cost theory often begin by analysing the role of 
this 'theorem' in the neoclassical theory of transaction costs.
The most damaging criticisms of the Coase theorem itself have concerned 
the elegance and economy of the argument most prized by its champions. 
Specifically it has been suggested that the theorem is tautological in 
character. Far from being a scientific deductive exposition of the real 
forces which shape the assignK>ifcotof resources through trade, the Coase 
theorem makes the existence of transaction costs dependent upon the 
character of economic life: it is asserted that the Coase theorem implies a 
definition of the efficient market which crucially depends upon the level 
of transaction costs whilst the definition of transaction costs offered by 
Coase similarly depends upon an already determined level of economic 
efficiency [1].
Other economists have gone further by arguing that the historical
implausibility of market perfection is confirmed by experience. There have
always been transaction costs in exchange and their reduction to zero would
in fact prove unattainable for there would bo no substantive economic
[1] This criticism of the Coase theorem can occasionally be traced in a 
substantial literature. See particularly Guido Calabresi and Douglas 
Melamed 'Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of 
the Cathedral' Harvard Law Review, 85 (1972), 1094-5; E.J.Mishan 
'Reflections on Recent Developments in the Concept of External Effects ' 
in Welfare Economics : Ten Introductory Essays (Now York, 1964), 218-
223; Mark Kalman 'Consumption Theory , Production Theory and Ideology in 
the Coase Theorem' Southern California Law Review, 90 (1979), 1023-45;
'Introduction' in D. Francis et al Power Efficiency and Institutions; A 
Critical Appraisal of the 'Markets and Hierarchies Paradigm' 
(London,1983). (On more general tautology in the economic theory of 
property rights, see Issac Erlich and Richard A. Posner 'An Economic 
Analysis of Legal Rule Making' Journal of Legal Studies, 3 (1974), 282 
n.87).
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system within which to make repetitive transactions. Using evidence 
gathered from game theory or real-time experiment on human subjects, the 
applicability of the Coase theorem has been subjected to a variety of types 
of analysis many of which suggest that the very complexity of multiple 
agent economies implies ineradicable transaction costs. Some costs of 
transaction cannot therefore be reduced and any institutional adaptation 
seeking to achieve their reduction through the internalisation of external 
effects or the reassignment of property rights to alternative institutional 
structures of ownership will prove to be frustrated.
There are two essentially different but structurally similar criticisms
worth regarding here. First, following Wellisz and Knesse [1], some
economists argue that in relation to public goods externalities - a major
class of market failure in modern and historical economies - there is an
incentive for victims of some external effect to misrepresent their own
preference for a reduction in the economic impact of the externality and to
seek to lower their own contribution to any abatement transfer to the
polluter; and if enough victims act in this way , resources will continue
to be allocated inefficiently. Using a prisoner’s dilemma strategy in
multi-party externality cases does not result in optimal allocation. In
short, rational public 'free riders’ may actually prevent the assignment of
property rights to their Pareto-optimal and therefore efficient level. The
[1] Steven Wellisz ’On external diseconomies and the government-assisted 
invisible hand’ Economica. 31 (1964), 345-62; G.A. Mumey ’The ’Coase
Theorem’: a reexamination’ Quarterly Journal of Economics, 85 (1971),
718-23. Kenneth Arrow has more conventionally and thoroughly illustrated 
the point in terms of the information requirement in bargaining toward 
Nash equilibrium in ’The Property Rights Doctrine and Demand Revelation 
under Incomplete Information’in Melvin J.Boskin (ed) Economics and Human 
Welfare : Essays in Honor of Tibor Skitovsky (New York, 1979), 23-39.
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s9Cond lln® of criticism of the real-world applicability of the Coaae 
theorem is really an extension of this observation, for it is intended 
to apply - like the Coase theorem itself - to all classes of market 
failure. The game theoretic models developed by Aivazian and Callen. 
Woj, Kalman and Samuelson all suggest that in repetitive, multi-agent, 
games transaction costs cannot be reduced by the intertemporal
reassigment of property rights [11. With more than two players
(polluter, victim and government, for example) bargaining may include 
some elements of bribery or side-payments or public good free-riding, 
flulti-agent scenarios of this variety turn out, not surprisingly, not 
to be amenable to analysis by moans of the Coase theorem. From within 
the neoclassical fold. these criticisms suggest the historical
implausibi 1 ity of the attainment of zero transaction costs and
therefore their 'natural' occurrence within the trading and producing 
conomy has to bo recognized as a permanent rather than a temporary, 
sradicable, feature of human economic systems.
ill Notably Varou Aivazian and Jeffrey L. Callen 'The Coase Theorem ¡nd the Empty Core' Journal of Law and Economics. 25 (1901), 175-81; •arolyn WoJ ' Property Rights Disputes: Current Fallacies and a New Approach' Journal of Legal Studies. 14 (1985). 411-423; Mark Kalman Spitzor and Hoffman on Coase; A Brief Rejoinder' Southern California ^  Review. 53 (1980), 1215-1223; William Samuelson 'A Comment on theoaae Theorem' in Alvin Roth (ed.) Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining Cambridge, 1985), 321-339. See Hans van den Doel Democracy and '8.1 fare economics (Cambridge, 1979). 87-90 where similar arguments areJade in relation to other public choice issues. In relation to so- called 'pure entitlement systems', see Edward J. Green 'Equilibrium nd Efficiency under Pure Entitlement Systems' Public Choice. 39 1982), 185-212, esp. Appendix B. pages 208-9.
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j The second substantive criticism of PRTC method and of the Coase 
I theorem relates to the central role played in both by the analysis of 
I the utility maximising strategy of individual agents. Earlier. in 
Chapter 2 above, we saw how the analysis of transaction cost was built 
upon the analysis of exchange and welfare and. in particular, upon the
perception that constraints existed to efficient and mutuallyIjbeneficial bargaining. This interpretation suggests that evidence of 
the successful internalisation or eradication of transaction costs 
will be found in the calculation of the benefits to each individual of 
exchange. Critics, like Furubotn and Pejovich. point out that in PRTC 
method, and in the Coasian analysis in particular:
...the utility function is associated with the particular decision­maker. and specifically empirical content 1s introduced into the function...Attention is concentrated on the objectives of the individual. not on those of the organisation. The latter comes into the analysis as a limiting factor or contraint; different property rights assignments lead to different penalty-reward structures and. hence. determine the choices that are open to decision-makers... Consider. for example. the discussion of the modern corporation. Instead of treating the firm as the unit of analysis and assuming that the owners' interests are given exclusive attention via the process of profit maximisation. the utility maximising model emphasizes individual adjustment to the economic environment and seeks to explain the firm's allocation and use of resources by observing individual actions within the organisation [1).
The emphasis upon the effects of transactions costs as contraints 
ijpon the choices of individuals is. it is argued widely. quite out of 
keeping with a theory which claims to be able to represent the logic 
of organisational change. In particular. the centrality of the 
'Utility maximizing model in the Coase theorem - with it's narrow focus 
upon the decisions of individuals - has led many critics to reject it 
S8 the basis for the study of institutional problems.
Eirik G. Furubotn and Svetozar Pejovich 'Introduction: The New Property Rights Literature' in Eirik G.Furubotn and Svetozar Pejovich f®do.) The Economics of Property Rights (Cambridge, Mass..1974), 2-3.
81
What is important about these various neoclassical criticisms of the 
Chivirla approach to PRTC theory is that they centre upon the 
usefulness of the Coase theorem as the basis for a theory of private 
goods allocations. As such the analysis offered by critical economists 
appears to be narrowly technical and, for the historian anxious to 
participate in the debate surrounding the reinterpretation of the role 
and creation of institutional diversity in the economies of the 
present as well as the past, they may seem a little too pedantic and 
inessential. Yet the very importance of the Coase theorem in the PRTC 
account of the process of institutional change and of transaction cost 
neans that historians must be aware of the implications of this 
apparent thread of critical comment based as it is not upon the 
"Wholesale rejection of Coase's elementary observation that there is a 
:ost to using the price mechanism but rather upon the analysis of the 
implications of the more general theorem associated with his name. It 
'fill be admitted that the quarrel some neoclassical economists have 
■fith the central place of the Coase theorem in the PRTC account of 
institutional change is not with the special features of the theorem 
■fhich colour the PRTC account of institutional change alone but rather 
focuses upon the implications for the analysis of market processes in 
-he narrowly technical sense. But by far the majority of critical 
responses from this same quarter have concerned the implications of 
-he theorem, the implications of the theorem and of the method of PRTC 
analysis to the study of institutional behaviour.
8 ,
The PRTC theory developed by Chivirla economists depends more heavily than 
most upon unqualified assent to the utility and integrity of this theorem; 
by contrast alternative theories of transaction cost develop an approach 
which demands less rigorous adherence to the Coase theorem and are 
consequently less likely to be confounded by the type of theoretical 
problems identified here. Neither the *new institutional economics’ 
associated with the name of Oliver Williamson and others nor the 
’neoinstitutionalist* approach to PRTC developed in the course of the 
1970’s depend to any very great extent upon the Coase theorem although, as 
we shall see, both make some considerable virtue of their own critique of 
the theorem in an effort to develop an alternative to those formulations we 
have already encountered.
A product of the severe censure of the centrality of the Coase theorem by 
conventional, non-Chivirla, neoclassical economists has been the growing 
realisation that a thorough PRTC theory must develop from the normative 
rather than the positive side of Coase’s exposition. From the 1970’s - and 
quite without reference to contemporary developments in GE (notably the 
discovery of the stability of equilibrium with transaction costs under non­
convexity assumptions for the transactions set) - Oliver Williamson, 
latterly at Yale, developed an alternative ’neo-neoclassical’ theory of the 
firm which took account of neo-behaviourist criticisms of neoclassical 
theory and extended the analysis of business decision-making developed in
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the 1960s by Herbert Simon [1]. This Wi 11 iamsonian PRTC theory stands in 
apparent opposition to the Chivirla theory encountered earlier for, in 
Williamson's own words
Neoclassical economics, which regards the firm as a production 
function, holds that non-standard forms of organisation have monopoly 
purpose and effect. Transaction cost economics, which regards firms, 
markets and hybrid 'mixed modes' as alternative governance structures, 
maintains instead that the institutions of contract ought mainly to be 
regarded in economizing terms. Assigning transactions to governance 
structures in such a way is what transaction cost economics is all 
about [2].
For Williamson, alternative 'hierarchies' to the market form beloved of 
neoclassical theory - such as firms, divisionalised bureacracies in 
centralised states or, centralised economy planning autarchies - are caused 
to be created as a result of transaction costs. In the somewhat confusing 
language of Wi11iamsonian PRTC theory, 'transactions' - as
[1] First in 'The vertical integration of production: market failure 
considerations' American Economic Review. 61 (1971), 112-123; idem. 
'Markets and hierarchies: some elementary considerations' ibid., 63, 
(1973), 316-25; idem. Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust 
Implicat ions (New York,1975). Williamson only cleared up some of the 
obfuscation of his earlier version of PRTC theory in 'Transaction-cost 
economics: the governance of contractual relations' Journal of Law and
Economics, 22 (1979), 3-61 and his most recent comprehensive statement. 
The Economic Institutions of Capitalism : Firms , markets, relational 
contracting (New York,1985), must be taken to represent the most 
complete exposition of his approach after nearly a decade of scholarly 
debate.Wi11iamson's work in the fields of industrial economics and the 
economics of institutions may be regarded as one of a number of 
contributions to a 'new industrial organisation' theory developed 
largely in the late 1970's and 1980's in an attempt to find an 
alternative to conventional 'structure-conduct-performance' type models 
of industrial (firm) behaviour and to account for the diversity of 
industrial and contractual forms of economic institution.On the rich 
vein of new theory ( based upon extensive work in non-cooperative game 
theory in the main) the economic historian is advised to consult Alexis 
Jacquemin The New Industrial Organisation : Market Forces and Strategic 
Behaviour (Oxford, 1987) and Richard Schmalensee 'The new industrial 
organization and the analysis of modern markets' in W. Hildenbrand (ed) 
Advances in Economic Theory (Cambridge, 1982), 253-285.
[2] Oliver E. Williamson 'Corporate Governance' Yale Law Review, 93 
(1984), 1201.
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I  individua1 contractual arrangementa within the structure of 
institutional devices [1] - become 'assigned to and organized within 
jpovernance structures in a discriminating (transaction cost 
economizing) way' [2]. Williamson avers that transactions are 
¡'matched' to governance structures according to three principal 
characteristics, all of which are inherited from the neoclassical 
formulation of Demsotz and others, namely the specificity of an asset 
(that is, the unique features of the asset which make it less 
transferable to other uses), the frequency with which transactions 
occur and the level of opportunism (or 'cheating') resulting from 
uncertainty [3J. Governance structures can be identified which 
ideally (optimally) correspond to those characteristics; and while the 
first two characteristics are assumed to elicit characteristics in the 
jovornance structures which correspond to the ex ante costs of 
organisation, the opportunism of individual agents warrants structures 
of governance which minimise other costs ex post - such as the costs 
of monitoring transactions and ensuring that individual sources of 
sconomic rent
[1] Some critics of Williamson (such as Kay and Dow) have failed to give Williamson the benefit of the doubt in this regard, arguing that Williamson's concept of a transaction as the differentiated 'unit of account' of governance structures is too 'elastic'. Neil Kay 'Markets ind false hierarchies: some problems in transaction cost economics' European University Institute Working Paper No.87/282 (1987), 13-18; ‘regory K.Dow 'The function of authority in transaction cost »conomics' Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organisation, 8 (1987), 15. To some extent, of course, Williamson's use of the concept offers in easy target for critics, and ho has latterly admitted that the identification of a 'transaction' as a unit of analysis is a mere ^suristic and is not to be pressed too far. See Michael H.Riordan and Oliver E. Williamson 'Asset Specificity and Economic Organisation' LPt^rnational__Journal of Industrial Organisation. 3 (1985), 365-78.
2] Oliver E. Williamson 'The modern corporation: origins. evolution ■'d attributes' Journal of Economic Literature. 19 (1981). 1564.
5) Oliver E. Williamson 'Transaction Cost Economics: The Governance Contractual Relations'. 245 ff.
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earnings are tninitnised [1]. Institutions like firms are thus able to 
economise upon transaction costs principally because of their ability 
to reduce informational asymmetries which give rise to opportunistic 
behaviour (that is 'cheating') by individuals. Internal regulation, 
the monitoring of 'opportunism'. and the assertion of authority 
reduce the ex post costa of transaction.
This so-called 'new industrial economics' of transaction costs is. of 
course, dependent upon the development of the purely comparative 
method common to all forms of what has been labelled the 'new 
institutional economics' (or NIE); and it is precisely these ex post 
costs which are moat demanding of a comparative analysis. as both 
economists and historians making use of the Wi11iamsonian framework 
agree [2]. Internal organisation and not external circumstance 
determines the efficiency of institutional arrangments with respect to 
individual transactions. Consequently. the economic scientist is 
invited to compare institutions with alternative (and hypothetical) 
governance arrangements with respect to single transactions
[1] Benjamin Klein, Robert Crawford and Armen Alchian 'Vertical integration, appropriable rents and the competitive contracting process' Journal of Law and Economics. 21 (1978). 297-326; David Teece 'Toward an economic theory of the multiproduct firm' Journalof Economic Behaviour and__Organisation. 3 (1982). 39-63; KirkMonteverde and David Teece 'Appropriable rents and quasi-verticalintegration' Journal of Law__and__Econgmlgg. 25 (1902). 321-320develop this theme.
12] On which, Langlois 'Internal organisation in a dynamic context'. 30-33. where differences in 'imperfect structural knowledge' (33) are said to indicate varying degrees of organisational efficiency, and Douglass North 'Comment on Stigler and Friedland 'The Literature of Economics; The Case of Berle and Means'' Journal of Law and Economics. 26 (1903). 269.
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in order to assess the performance of existing structures. Because of the 
primacy of the ex post costs of monitoring, enforcing and policing 
contractual arrangements resulting from (institutionalised) bargaining, the 
comparative method usually resolves itself into the relatively simple issue 
of identifying internally consistant rules for the minimisation of 
opportunism within the institution [1]. The question which naturally 
imposes itself upon the mind of the discerning economic scientist is 
exactly what evidence constitutes proof of the existence of internally 
consistent rules of this type 7 More significantly, what evidence is there 
that non-ideological factors alone influence the performance of governance 
structures [2] 7 The main problem experienced by most economists and 
historians in their use of the Williamsonian comparative method of NIE is 
the relative difficulty in defining standards of comparison and objective 
measures of the 'transaction cost minimising’ performance of governance 
structures. As such it must be accounted a relatively unsophisticated and 
unworkable form of historical economic analysis - although apparently the 
most frequently mobilised in empirical studies of the modern economy - and 
will be abandoned without further discussion. Comparable but superior 
forms of comparative analysis are nevertheless available which use much of 
the descriptive and analytical 'baggage' of both neoclassical and NIE 
theories of PRTC, the most flexible of which (the neoinstitutionalist) 
provides the basic structure for the formal model of transaction costs
[1] Discussed in Romano Oyerson 'Technical change implications for economic
organisation in the CAOCAM sector: a suggested transaction cost 
approach', circulated TS, Department of Economics, Heriot-Watt 
University, May 1987, 24. My thanks to Romano for furnishing me with
some unnoticed references to comparative NIE studies using such a 
method.
[2] North Structure and Change, 204-205.
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developed in the rest of this essay through the study of historically 
relevant governance structures and their performance.
The neoinstitutionalist critique of PRTC theory is largely the result of 
the articulation of a post-institutionalist response to the economic theory 
of property rights developed by the Chivirla economists during the 1960s 
and 1970s. As such it is a natural part of the complete critique of 
neoclassical, or orthodox, theory and in particular of NIE made by the so- 
called neoinstitutionalist economists - often called 'heterodox' economists 
or writers of the 'economics of dissent'[l]. The neoinstitutionalist 
economists of today claim for themselves an intellectual ancestry which 
includes, in the present century. Commons, Veblen and Clark among 
economists and Tawney, G.D.H.Cole and Polanyi among historians and other 
social scientists [2]. While earlier economists and students of economic 
phenomena who dissented from the pervasive neoclassical theory of atomistic 
market behaviour certainly attempted to direct their historical studies of 
labour organisation (Commons), religion and moral forces (Tawney and 
Veblen) and industrial society (Mitchell, Cole, Nutter, Veblen, Galbraith 
and others) toward the critique of received theory as doctrine, their 
scholarship was intended to offer a commentary upon the current state of 
economic theory rather than specifically developing more relevant or
[1] See Allan G.Gruchy Contemporary Economic Thought:The Contribution of
Neo-Institutional_____ Economics (London,1973), Chp.l; idem.
'Neoinstitutionalism and the Economics of Dissent' Journal of Economic 
Issues. 3 (1969), 3-17; Warren J.Samuels (ed.) The Methodology of
Economic Thought (New Brunswick and London, 1980) on the nature of 
neoinst itut ionalism.
[2] Gruchy Contemporary Economic Thought. 1.
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workable theory. It was specifically not intended to be the starting point 
for a theory of the ’post-industrial’ polity and the forces that shaped it.
Neoinstitutionalist economists appear to have argued, from the 1960s, that 
the economics of the market economy in the ’post-industrial’ age of 
’consumerism’, collective choice and rational planning demanded that 
institutionalist economic analysis translate the critique of neoclassical 
theory it had offered over the previous half century into a holistic theory 
of that ’post-industrial’ economic system in which they suppose we now live 
[ 1 ] .
Yet the mainstay of the neoinstitutionalist response to neoclassical
theory remains to this day the challenge to the marginalist theory of
rational economic behaviour. From observation, empirical historical
deduction and from anthropological induction neoinstitutionolisl economists
have subjected the received orthodoxy of neoclassical theory about the
choice theoretic basis of the economic system to severe analysis.
Consequently the development of a broader and market oriented theory of
property rights such as that developed by the Chivirla economists in the
1970’s naturally prompted neoinstitutionalist comment upon both the
economic implications of the theory and the philosophical and logical basis
of the theory. Here we can only deal briefly with the complex and often
fragmentary critique of PRTC theory offered by these economists,
nevertheless we shall see that their arguments are largely directed toward
[1] H.H.Liebhafsky ’Allan Gruchy, Neoinstitutionalist’ in John Adams (ed.) 
Institutional economics: Contributions to the Development of Holistic 
Economics - Essays in Honor of Allan G.Gruchy (Boston, The Hague and 
London, 1980), 21-22.
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the micro-foundations of the PRTC theory and not to its principal 
assumption that the costless enforcement and policing of property rights 
most effectively maximises welfare. Indeed, neoinstitutional economics 
makes much of the value of freer markets and trade in the analysis of 
technological change, the socio-economic consequences of combination and 
concentration of market and indirect (non-market) power and in social 
change. Yet for the neoinstitutionalist economists, it is not enough that 
market mechanisms perform optimally for the economy is but a subset, and in 
fact a very small part, of a wider and more complex dynamic social system.
Drawing principally upon the theoretical basis of the Chivirla approach
for their critique - namely the Coase theorem - the neoinstitutionalist
economists argue [1] that the PRTC approach advances a decidedly normative
policy prescription for welfare optimisation and efficient economic
[1] The following argument is based upon a number of disparate and almost 
contradictory statements about the function of the Coase theorem in 
welfare theory and the PRTC paradigm made by neoinstitutionalist critics 
in the 1970's and results from a reading of the following papers: Allan 
Gruchy 'Neoinstitutionalism and the Economics of Dissent...’, 14-17; 
H.H.Liebhafsky 'Price Theory as Jurisprudence - Law and Economics 
Chicago-style’ Journal of Economic Issues, 10 (1976), 23-43; idem.'The 
Problem of Social Cost - An Alternative Approach’ Natural Resources 
Journal, 13 (1973), 615-676; Allan Randall 'Coasian Externality Theory
in a Policy Context’ Natural Resources Journal, 14 (1974), 35-54; idem. 
'Market Solutions to Externality Problems; Theory and Practice’ American 
Journal of -Afll icultural Economics, 54 (1971), 175-183; idem. 'Property 
Rights and Social Microeconomics’ Natural Resources Journal, 15 (1975), 
729-47 ; idem. 'Property Institutions and Economic Behaviour’ Journal of 
Economic Issues, 12 (1978), 1-21; Warren J.Samuels 'Introduction: The 
Chicago School of Political Economy’ Journal of Law and Economics, 14 
(1971), 435-50; idem. 'The Coase Theorem and the Study of Law and 
Economics’ Natural Resources Journal. 14 (1974), 1-33. This critical
literature on the Coasian basis of PRTC theory has now largely vanished, 
although recent work by Alexander Field (from a very different - 
neoclassical - perpective) has embellished and developed a fuller 
critique of Chivirla PRTC theory based upon similar observât ions.See 
Field 'Microeconomics, Norms and Rationality’ Economic Development and 
Cultural Change. 32 (1984), 683-711.
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organisation, and they hold these beliefs to be the cornerstone of the 
Chivirla approach rather that its supposed positive theoretical grounding 
in Paretian welfare theory. They argue that the PRTC approach advocated by 
Chivirla economists, unlike the Pigouvian welfare theory it claims to 
replace, regards the distribution of initial endowments and subsequent 
bargaining over them as less important than the market process by which 
Pareto optimality is achieved with fixed endowments. In support of this, 
some neoinstitutionalists offer an explanation of how initial property 
rights arise and are distributed in terms of political, military and other 
social forms of coercion through power relations on the one hand and 
through the evolution of contractual forms, general rights and other forms 
of legal restriction within given ’constitutional frameworks’ on the other.
The argument against the restrictive assumptions of the Coase theorem is, 
however, far less significant for neoinstitutionalist economists than the 
analytically narrow focus of the resulting theory of institutions. 
Institutionalist economists. like their intellectual forerunner John 
Commons, view property rights not as the outcome of the degree of market 
perfection but as the consequence of deliberate collective action or 
through the artificial selection of efficient public, human, rights [1]. So 
transaction costs actually represent ’...the protection of interests 
through rights as they become valued through the market, which is the case 
with all other costs’ [2]. In other words, transaction cost payments act 
as the ’guarantors’ of private but collective rights which cannot be
[1] Randall ’Property Institutions and Economic Behaviour’, 4.
[2] Warren J. Samuels ’The Coase Theorem and the Study of Law and 
Economics’, 19.
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alienated by the market. Indeed the collapse or disappearance of aggregate 
transaction costs would actually reduce the real welfare benefit of private 
citizens in some cases where the ’constitutional framework’ of their rights 
was impaired by market action. Institutions are the physical or - in the 
form of rules or laws - the metaphysical embodiment of those collective 
rights. Consequently efficient institutional arrangements will ensure that 
the collective benefits of the maintenance of collective rights, together 
with the capacity of institutions to reduce market failure like external 
effects, exceed the (transaction) costs associated with the operation of 
the institution [1]. Conversely, the institutional arrangements which may 
be made to reduce transaction costs may reduce the gap between the (social) 
costs and benefits in the reduction of a technological externality without 
encountering the market itself. For neoinstitutionalist theorists there are 
in fact multiple possible levels of externality-reducing internalisation 
technology associated with different sets of private rights, through for 
example improvements in the operation of institutional rules divorced from 
considerations of opportunity cost or the attainment of the optimal 
utilisation of capital through gains in institutional ’x-efficiency ’ [2].
[1] H.H.Liebhafsky ’The Problem of Social Cost’, 629-76.
[2] Randall ’Property institutions and economic behaviour’,10-11 ; Samuels 
’The Coase Theorem and the study of law and economics’, 19-25 ; Randall 
’Market Solutions to Externality Problems...’, 179-80. X-inefficiency, 
although regarded by some as a part of transaction cost, relates to that 
part of welfare loss not attributed to the allocative function and 
institutions of the market. On x-efficiency, see Harvey Leibenstein 
Beyond Economic Man: A New Foundation for Microeconomics (2nd edn., 
Cambridge, Mass.,1980), Chp. 3. On the parallels between X-efficiency 
theory and the PRTC approach to allocative efficiency, see Louis De 
Allesi, ’Property rights, transaction costs and x-efficiency’, and 
particularly, Kurt Reding and Ernst Dogs ’Die theorie der ’X-Effizienz’ 
- ein neues Paradigms der Wirtschaftswissenschaften 7’ Jahrbuch fur 
Sozialwissenschaft, Bd. 37,(1986), 10-39, the moat thorough treatment of 
x-efficiency theory in terms of a general model of economic development.
Instead, neoinstitutionalists point to those alternative economising 
activities of institutions and organisations designed to reduce external 
effects such as risk reduction, intra-institution reductions in the 
specification errors associated with property rights assignment and non- 
market economies emerging from changing patterns of trade. Although some 
Chivirla economists and followers have made much of the existence of such 
additional considerations in organisational development, they have regarded 
risk of any kind as being essentially ’traded-off’ against reduced 
transaction costs [1]; neoinstitutionalists, on the other hand, regard risk 
reduction in contractual organisation as essentially uninfluenced by 
transaction costs considerations. Contractors (for example, firms and 
workers) care more about ensuring that their present contracts cover 
tomorrow's anticipated eventuality than in ensuring that the costs of 
specifying and policing tomorrow’s contracts are reduced through efficient 
property rights assignment.
Of undeniably greater significance, but of a less controversial nature in 
the light of our earlier discussion, is the neoinstitutionalists 
identification of the problem we earlier labelled 'divisibility'. The 
existence of perfectly divisible transaction resources is as unlikely, they 
argue, as the attainment of an economy of zero transaction costs [2]. What 
this means is best understood in terms of an example. Suppose two agents 
seek to improve their total and individual welfare to a position of Pareto
[1] Notably Steven N.S.Cheung 'Transaction Costs, Risk Aversion and the 
Choice of Contractual Arrangements ’ Journal of Law and Economics 12, 
(1969), 23-42.
[2] Randall 'Property Institutions...', 10; John Weld 'Coase, Social Cost 
and Stability' Natural Resources Journal 13, (1973), 599.
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optimality by engaging in the assignment of property rights in external 
effects through the process of wholly or partly internalising the external 
effect which is Pareto relevcxnt. Neoinstitutionalist economists would argue 
that both agents may actually be made worse off beyond a certain point in 
the introduction of the transaction technology - for example, Pareto 
optimality might be attained where a supervisory mechanism detected one in 
ten infringements. If the only available transactions technology detects 
ten out of ten infringements, any additional cost resulting from the 
technically superior technology will increase the social costs of 
installation without correspondingly increasing the social benefits. This 
can be a very real problem where specification and policing technologies 
are employed: often in fact the transactions technology cannot be 
manufactured or utilised in such a way as to exactly match the efficiency 
requirements of agents and thereby secondary external effects are created 
which in turn require internalisation or some other form of reduction.
This problem of divisibility in transactions technology is most clearly 
seen in relation to legal technologies for the regulation of conduct such 
as ’liability rules’ (rules for the forfeiting of some compensatory sum to 
reestablish optimal allocation). Those who criticise the work of that 
branch of legal economics most commonly associated with PRTC, the ’law-and- 
economics’ genre or ’Posnerian law-and-economics’, have pointed to the very 
real problems caused by the indivisibility of liability rule technologies 
in exchange and property rights regulation. Guido Calabresi for one, whose 
own earlier work embraced much of the neoclassical theory which supports 
Chivirla PRTC economics, argues that lawyer-economists who ignore the
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divisibility issue become habitually trapped by what he has called the 
’fanatical Pareto test’ [1] by which efficient assignments rather than 
effective, law-enforcing, assignments through a liability rule technology 
are adopted. Judges simply are not able to break the characteristic 
indivisibility of the transactions technology infallibly and inevitably. 
This becomes a particular problem within PRTC methodology of the Chivirla 
variety where liability rules as institutions are said to be a priori 
rational and optimal in their result but where the indivisibility of 
liability rules results from incomplete knowledge on the part of a judge. 
In the words of one incisive critic
Generally speaking the only occasions on which the common law went 
wrong (it seems) was in the (rare) adoption of paternalistic rules 
which restricted freedom of contract, for example the rules against 
penalties. The monotonous regularity with which judges untrained in 
economics have come up with solutions which are thus said to be 
economically optimal has, not surprisingly , come in for a good deal of 
scepticism, not to say derision [2].
It must not be thought that the existence of indivisibilities in 
transactions technology are observed solely by neoinstitutionalist
economists - indeed earlier in this chapter we noted the existence of the
divisibility issue without following the same apparatus of theory utilised 
by neoinstitutionalist economists. However the very importance of this 
issue to the neoinstitutionalist case cannot be underestimated, for it
indicates that the nature of an institution may and frequently does
determine the efficiency of property rights assignments through the 
distributive, exchange, mechanism.
[1] Guido Calabresi ’The New Economic Analysis of Law’ Proceedings of the 
British Academy, 68, (1982), 85-108.
[2] P.S. Atiyah 'Executory contracts. Expectation Damages and the Economic 
Analysis of Contract’ in Essays on Contract (Oxford,1986), 151.
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For neoinBtltutionalist critics indeed the economic analysis of the 
jssignment of property rights and associated transaction costs can bo 
sxpreased as a problem of understanding institutional arrangements 
themselves before analysing their relative efficiency in the economy. 
Institutions are the starting point for the analysis of economic 
efficiency. Neoinstitutionalists argue that the multiplicity of 
issumptions made by the Coasian PRTC method reduces its usefulness 
[1] and. moreover, that the types of institutional structures analysed 
by the method are unreal. For the neoinstitutionalist economist 
institutions are the embodiment of existing rights and power and 
:onsequently are liable to influence the outcome of using transactions 
technologies in the attainment of Pareto optimal allocations in 
successive time periods. As such. they are the very elementary forms 
to be studied in any PRTC analysis of economic efficiency. Instead of 
explaining what forma of economic orgnaiaation ought to emerge, 
neoinstitutionalista seek to explain why existing forms persist. 
Equally. and contrary to the form of comparative analysis promoted by 
Williamson-type approaches to empirical transaction cost problems, 
neoinstitutionalist method starts by identifying the obstacles to 
transaction cost economising activity due to existing power or 
ownership structures.
'n^ is and the previous chapters has dealt in some considerable detail 
'^ ith the economic theory considerations behind the use of the PRTC 
theory common
1] Warren J.Samuels 'The Coase Theorem', 25-6 and the sources cited therein.
to all economists making use of the elementary concepts of transaction 
cost. The purpose of these chapters has been at once to introduce economic 
historians for the first time to the diversity of alternative theories and 
to point to some of the contradictions in individual formulations of PRTC 
theory.
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In the rest of this study explicit use is made of a general theory of 
property rights which draws for its language and basic characteristics upon 
the Paretian and Coasian formulation common to Chivirla, Wi11iamsonian and 
neoinstitutionalist theories alike. That is to say, it will be accepted 
that transaction costs (contrary to some neoclassical and neo-Walrasian 
formulations) are continuous with production; that the efficiency with 
which institutions assign property rights is determined by the level of 
transaction costs; and that transaction-cost economising considerations 
eventuate institutional change. Consequently instead of arguing that 
institutional change results from the inherent logic of profit maximisation 
we shall maintain throughout that profit considerations play little part in 
the evolution of institutional form and that competitive forces have little 
role in the development of elementary institutions of the type found in 
later Georgian rural England. However we shall not accept the Coasian 
argument, enshrined in Chivirla PRTC economics, that the utility function 
should remain at the centre of analysis in PRTC theory. As indicated above, 
there are reasons to doubt the logical basis for this claim (the trenchant 
criticisms of the Coase theorem itself give these doubts substance), 
notably that the 'institutional constraints’ upon the individual utility 
function are too confused or nebulous to be identified in contemporary let
alone in historical economies. Consequently, we shall pay little to the 
(counterfactual) evidence of the ex post augmentation of agents’ welfare 
following any institutional change. Instead, we shall concentrate upon the 
'logic' of organisational change itself.
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In general, the neoinstitutionalist method of analysis - which starts with 
institutions rather than agents - will be preferred throughout and effort 
will be made to explain institutional change in the context of wider 
economic and social change. Further, and in common with both Williamsonian 
and neoinstitutionalist formulations of PRTC theory, the issue of the 
divisibility of transactions technology and the existence of opportunism in 
non-internalised governance structures resulting from informational 
asymmetries (usually in the form of private rights to policing and 
surveillance) will be fully explored. We shall also make use of the 
(Williamsonian) observation that the appropriation of rents by 
institutional structures further reduces transaction cost. The pattern of 
institutional change, in our account, will depend upon agreement with the 
assumption shared by all Paretian 'clone' theories that efficiency in 
rights assignment more nearly approaches Pareto optimality where 
transaction costs are minimal. Consequently, we shall maintain that new 
institutional structures result from attempts to minimise transaction 
costs. However, unlike conventional Chivirla-type accounts, and in common 
with neoinstitutionalist PRTC theory, we shall be careful to avoid the 
suggestion that institutions only undergo change in governance structures 
as a result of transaction cost considerations.
98Parts II to IV of this essay contain a detailed but by no means 
:omplete account of the role of transaction cost considerations in the 
development of economic organisation in later Georgian rural southern 
England. This makes some use of the framework of analysis offered 
above. Some aspects of the process by which institutional change in 
provincial England came about will be ignored - notably enclosure and 
the creation of larger farms, which has already been dealt with 
elsewhere using PRTC analysis [1]. Indeed, not even all aspects of
he process by which supervision, control and enforcement of 
transactions developed will be examined here; this essay is, after 
all. an exercise in an historical economic theme and not a complete 
history of rural economic institutions. Attention will, however. be 
paid to the evolution of informal organisations (such as voluntaristic 
agencies and clubs) whose development is subject to forces unconnected 
in the main with the problem of minimising transaction cost. The 
general argument will be that. in the course of the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth century, rural southern England experienced a 
virtual revolution in institutional organization - a revolution which 
it sis suggested, can be attributed (although there can be no 
conclusive proof) to an attempt to reduce transaction costs. The 
specification of private rights in all forma of monitoring and 
exchange created, it will be argued. entirely new structures of 
governance. The consequences for the efficiency of the economy of the 
rural south are debatable but it will be maintained that the mixed 
fortunes of these new forms of governance belies the existence of a 
Pattern of institutional change in the provinces conformable to the 
principles of PRTC theory outlined here.
tl) Carl J.Dahlman The Open Field System and Bevond (Cambridge, 1960).
99In general we shall study historically sifnificant institutional 
change with the help of PRTC theory using historical records and try 
to avoid writing what Basu, Jones and Schlict have quite properly 
labelled 'theorist's history' [2). However, the often inscrutable 
Materials available do not allow the historian precisely and 
conclusively to establish the relationship between transaction cost 
reduction and institutional change and much that might appear in these 
pages as conclusive assertion must be read as plausible hypothesis 
based upon theory. Specifically. the reader must guard against 
supposing that the imputation of motives of transaction cost reduction 
can be categorically demonstrated - instead they are here preferred as 
an appropriate and consistant explanation. With the materials 
available to the historian of the period, however. it is difficult to 
aee how this could bo otherwise. Thus, for example, wo shall not seek 
slavishly to quantify the unquantifiable. It has boon a persistent 
complaint of non-practitioners that PRTC historiography is in the main 
non-quantitativo [21 . but such critics
[11 Kaushik Basu. Eric Jones and Ekkohart Schlict 'The Growth and Decay of Custom The Role of the Now Institutional Economics in Economic History' Explorations in Economic History 24. 1987:15.
(21 Critics of PRTC theory who complain of the non-quantitativo nature of PRTC historiography include. D.C. Coleman loc. cit; S.R.H. Jones 'Technology. Transaction Costs and the Transition to Factory Production in the British Silk Industry. 1700-1070' Journal of Economic History 47. 1987: 74; Lance E.Davis 'Comment' in Stanley L.Engerman and Robert E. Gallman op. cit :149-159. However, measurement methods vary from one PRTC study to another. There have been quantitative studies unashamedly utilising a Coasian approach (e.g.L«e Alston Costs of Contracting and the Decline__fii__Tenancy__in__til®South. 1930-1960 (New York and London. 1985)). neoclassical partial «quilibrium method (e.g. Elizabeth Hoffman and Joel Mokyr 'Peasants. Potatoes and Poverty : Transaction Costs in Pre-famine Ireland' Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. Northwestern university, discussion paper 474 (1981)) and the simple fudge of 'counting instances' (e.g. North and Wallis op. cit). The most commonly affirmed framework for the quantitative analysis of transaction costs in economic history requires adopting a cost-benefit framework for the analysis of institutional efficiency.
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fail to recognize that the relative size of the transactions sector is 
less important than the explanation of the process by which 
institutional structures which incorporate transaction cost olementa 
»rise. PRTC economic history is an attempt to explain how 
institutional change occurred and does not depend upon the existence 
of quantitative data for success.
Nevertheless. it is important to remember exactly how far 
demonstrative proof of the assertions made above [1] and elaborated in 
the following chapters can be guaranteed. Whilst evidence of the 
reduced costs of exchange can be inferred (if rarely accurately 
estimated), it will be readily admitted that the causal relationship 
between institutional change and transaction cost reduction - and 
indeed the exact degree of reduction in such costs associated with 
changing patterns of organization - cannot be indisputably proved. 
Instead we shall suggest that organizational change tended in the 
direction of reduced coats of transaction. This is all that can, or
ought, to bo assorted until a more comprehensive and definitive 
methodology of transaction costa analysis allows the historian to add 
measurement to conjecture and precise correlation to inference. 
Throughout what follows. then, the reader must presume conclusive 
proof of motivation is elusive and suggestive inference is preferred.
With a clearer understanding of the functions and limitations of 
transactions cost economics, we are in a position to begin the 
analysis of the organisational changes which occurred in the rural 
south during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.
11 See supra p. 90.

CHAPTER FOUR: THE LEGAL HISTORY OF MARKET INSTITUTIONS, 1780-1840
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’The history of western Europe from the fifteenth to 
the nineteenth centuries has often been misread because 
of a failure to grasp the distinction between the Self- 
Regulating Market System and a number of markets more 
or less free to regulate themselves, but in sum not 
constituting a Self-Regulating System’ [Walter C.
Neale, 1957]
Having studied the logical and theoretical foundations of the PRTC theory 
it is now our task to put it to work in the analysis of change in the 
institutions of the market economy of provincial southern England during 
the later Georgian and Regency eras. Following much recent work to be 
discussed below it has become apparent that during these years something 
approaching an organisational revolution occurred in the market economy by 
which property rights in the means of exchange were transfetied to new 
owners and transaction costs reduced. We shall argue that private rights 
came to be specified in transactions technologies rather than in new 
products or devices for the production of new forms of commodity. In 
general, the argument of this essay will be that these years were marked by 
a reformulation of the principles of property rights allocation, transfer 
and definition in a way which allows us to discern a distinct discontinuity 
with the past; we shall assert that these apparently previously unconnected 
elements of the legal-economic order constitute, when taken together and 
seen as part of a process of reform of the basis of property ownership and 
transfer, a revolution in the organisation of the means of exchange. In 
this and subsequent parts of this essay, the exact nature of this 
organisational revolution will be explored and the most vital featues of it 
- namely the creation of separable rights in transaction, supervision and
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enforcement with accompanying instruments suggesting the reduction of 
transaction costs - will be examined through the study of a variety of 
sources. Frequent (but not slavish) reference will be made throughout 
to the conceptual scheme which was elaborated above and institutional 
snd organizational metamorphosis described in the language of the 
hybrid PRTC theory developed in the latter sections of the previous 
chapter. Our guiding rule in chief will be to observe institutional 
change directly and to impute rational transaction cost reducing 
actions to agents without explicitly stating the welfare outcomes for 
individual utility maximizers. Central to the whole conception of an 
'organizational revolution' during this period, however. is the 
fundamental change in the character of the market as the basic 
institution of the economy. It is with these changes in the function 
and ownership of the market institutions of the provincial south that 
we begin.
Economists regard markets as chimerical institutions made up of 
buyers and sellers whose interest in the organization of exchange is 
ninimal . This perception assumes that our interest is only in the 
rational outcome of exchange and bargaining expressed in terms of 
price. It assumes further that the market is 'ownerless* but is 
copulated by economically powerful but politically powerless traders 
whose only opportunity to influence market behaviour is through buying 
ind selling and not through direct control or regulation of the market 
tself. The Coasian version of the transaction cost theory outlined 
arllsr starts from the important observation that. even when 
^pressed in terms of the costs of producing market information. this 
Image of the market-place 1s unrealistic. For historical economists
1 0 4
also the institution of the market performs the function of making 
repetitive exchange possible at low cost; markets are in fact 
economizing institutional arrangements which act to increase the 
welfare efficiency of transactions for the 'price' of access to tholr 
facilities. This feature of the Coasian (and 'clone') PRTC analysis of 
elementary, non-hierarchical structures has important implications for 
the historical economist, for the very fact that the use of the market 
is not freely and costlessly available implies that property rights in 
market institutions do exist. In part at least this and the following 
chapter are a vindication of the correctness of this view - for 
eighteenth and nineteenth century markets were indeed 'owned' by 
private individuals and collectives. Further, as this chapter and the 
following one shows, these property rights in markets appear to 
exercise a considerable influence upon the performance of the 
'institutions of market exchange and consequently upon the economy as a 
whole. This chapter hypothesises that, by both legal and 
organizational means, property rights in markets underwent a 
significant transformation in the course of the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries with the probable effect of reduced market 
transaction costs and increasing market efficiency. Whilst legal 
change was slow and occasionally acted in a manner which contradicted 
this tendency, the pattern of change in market rights confirms this 
historical account of the development of the nineteenth century 
market; and where law failed, institutional adaptation by market 
traders themselves succeeded.
Two processes were principally responsible for the evolution of
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alternative forma of market inatitution. Firatly, by transferring aome 
of the tranaaction coata of market exchange to 'aub-contracting' 
leaseholdera, preacription holdera or buyera, ownera created new forma 
of hierarchical arrangements with alternative governance structures. 
The creation of these intermediate institutions maintaining the 
communal property rights of now owners may in turn have reduced the 
tranaaction costa associated with market exchange for owners because 
of their greater organisational efficiency. The second process by 
which property rights in the market underwent significant change was 
through a subtle legal revolution. With the creation of a novel law 
of proscriptive rights (that is. law relating to the rights to the use 
of an asset as a result of immemorial custom). the courts effectively 
made previously worthless assets in market property saleable and 
tradeable. facilitating the transfer of much of the organization of 
market exchange to new ownera. In order to appreciate the complex 
nature and consequences of the historical evolution of property rights 
in markets during the late eighteenth century and the early nineteenth 
century. it is necessary to study both the legal and organisational 
aspects of this economic revolution. Before undertaking a detailed 
study of the behaviour of markets and their owners in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. it is essential to 
understand the legal context in which property rights transfer was 
effected and organisational change occurred.
The evidence of the legal granting of market rights had always been 
relatively simple to produce. for statute law alone could create 
I'ights in the market property intended for trade. During the late 
®ighteenth and early nineteenth century, however. the common law of 
markets, which was principally concerned with the obligations of the 
users of the market as
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well as those of the owner. witnessed a not insubstantial battle 
between proprietors and users (both traders and consumers) over the 
exact nature of the rights of market owners, the prescription of tolls 
for market use and the requirements that owners provide adequate 
facilities. We shall suggest that. in practice. these problems were 
all associated with the need to reduce market transaction costs and 
that new organizational arrangements as well as legal change seems to 
have facilitated their reduction. The study of the legal history of
the property rights in markets during the period does allow the
Investigation of the practical aspects of the process by which
aggregate transaction costs may have been reduced. not only because 
the legal framework provides the background against which
organizational change in rural marketing occurred. but also because 
organizational change in market institutions frequently appears to 
have been running ahead of change in the common law of markets from 
which one might infer that institutional change in market property 
rights and associated transaction costs may have orchestrated and 
promoted legal change. Indeed, so successful was the organisational 
reform of the market rights ownership without the law that legal 
decisions tended to concentrate not upon the determination of
ownership itself but upon the limitation of obligations and duties.
'Use' rather than 'ownership' and the obligations of owners rather 
than the duties of traders crowd the pages of learned judgments during 
this period. for the assignment of property rights in markets was no 
longer an issue in the English common law courts. The right to grant 
inarkots had rested with the crown since the Statute of Westminster 
ill. but it was only
111 Joseph Chitty A Treatise on the Law of the Prerogatives of the Srawn; and the relative duties of the subject (London.1820). 193.
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during the late eighteenth century that the predictable contest between 
owners and users moved beyond the point of merely defining the status of 
rights in markets given by the monarch [1]. The obligation of owners to 
offer those making use of market facilities ’convenient accommodation’ was 
only finally established by a judgment in the House of Lords in 1835 [2] 
whilst the common law restraint upon owners, under the terms of the 
franchise of a market, not to confiscate goods in distress for payment 
during the period of trading had been decided over a century earlier [3].
Between the two decisions, a discernible pattern of legal reform emerged 
in which the rights of traders and market users came to represent the most 
important element of the law of markets. Before the period with which this 
essay is concerned began, the major concern of law in relation to markets 
was to establish limitations upon the charter and statute rights of owners; 
during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries the obligations 
of owners toward traders and other users came to be recognized as being in 
need of significant reform in the courts.
[1] See J. G. Pease and Herbert Chitty A Treatise on the Law of Markets and
Fairs with the Principal Statutes Relating Thereto (London,1899); F.S. 
MacGatchen The Law of Fairs and Markets (London,1859);Wi11iam Harriot 
The Country Gentleman’s Lawyer; and the Farmer’s Complete Law Library 
(London,1808). These texts have been used to trace the main lines of 
development of the law relating to markets; however, several
significant errors in each have needed to be corrected in this essay by 
the careful analysis of contemporary case law itself.
[2] In re Islington Market Bill (1835) 6 ^  1530-34; Lords Journal
41,(1835), 285, 583-4. The significant words ’convenient accomodation’ 
were uttered by Littledale, L.J. at 1532 of Islington Market Bill.
[3] Wigley v. Peachy,Keddon and others (1732) 99 ^  527-29. See also Sawyer 
V .  Wilkinson (1598) 78 ER 868-69 and Austin v. Whittred (1746) 125 ER 
1353-55 for restraint upon distress confiscation at the end of the 
market.
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Indeed when the issue of the limitation of ownership rights appeared at 
all in the courts of common law after the mid-eighteenth century it was 
only discussed in relation to the effect of custom and usage upon planned 
expansions of markets or removals to other sites - and here the important 
decisions of the courts were almost wholly in favour of existing owners. 
When owners failed to provide adequate accommodation for traders and 
farmers, the latter could not defy the owner of the market by removing to 
another site [1]; equally when owners removed their market to another site, 
buyers and sellers had but a limited right to resort to the old market site 
[2]. Of central importance to these few cases concerning the rights of 
owners was the law relating to the evidence of custom; yet only in relation 
to the obligations and duties following ownership did the law adopt the 
evidence of custom in preference to the tost of efficiency. Custom and 
ancient rights might be assumed by a jury to remain unchallenged even where 
no title deed or bill of sale was available to indicate clearly and 
indisputably who owned the market rights [3], and by 1802 [4], a term of 20 
years had been fixed as evidence of 'immemorial existence’.
[1] Curwen v. Salkeld (1803) 102 ER 703-6. Later owners wore required to 
give notice of the demise of an old market site before reestablishing 
the market at a now location. Prince v. Lewis (1825) 172 ER 30-32.
[2] Prince v. Lewis. Before Prince it appears that corporate owners 
sought to limit resort to the old sites by means of byelaws alone. In 
Hertford in 1781, for example, the Common Council promulgated an 'Act' 
(or order of council) '...to prevent the continuance and use of the 
said Market Place for the sale of Butchers Meat...’ after using the 
site for the building of the new Town Hall. Orders of Common Council, 
Borough of Hertford MSS. Volume 36, Herts. R.O., entry for 26 
September 1781. Cf. A. Temple Patterson Radical Leicester: A History of 
Leicester. 1780-1850 (Leicester, 1954), 4-5.
[3] Mayor of Hull v. Horner (1774) 98 ER 989-94.
[4] Rex V .  Smith (1802) 170 ER 659-60.
lü:
This support for, even redefinition of, custom was, however, quite 
contrary to the general tendency of law. For whilst the practice of law and 
the changing nature of legal argument concerning prescriptive, market, 
rights cannot indicate the chronological development of institutional 
change in response to the pressures of transaction cost with the certainty 
and precision required the law courts were the stage for the reaction of 
rural traders to the long lasting and basically feudal privileges of 
ownership only during these years. The coincidence of market expansion in 
the early years of the nineteenth century with a catalogue of cases 
reversing, attenuating or reinterpreting those ancient privileges suggests 
that resort to law was, in fact, becoming less effective as a means of 
challenging the institution of market property. By then, organisational 
adaptation had taken a firm hold in rural market society and legal 
innovation proved less successful. It was in the courts that the opposition 
of the trading community to outdated and illiberal trading practices took 
root, however, and it is to judgments at common law that we must look to 
trace the history of market property rights in this period.
First, it is necessary to outline the relationship between traders and 
owners as it was understood by the law throughout the late eighteenth 
century. Only with the codification of a standard definition of the nature 
of a market in the case of Rex v. Marsden in 1765 [1] was a distinctive 
meaning given to the assorted rights associated with the grant of a market. 
This important case established that market rights, like contractual 
obligations, could only be proved with the evidence of some payment or
[1] 96 ER 335-336.
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’consideration’ for the use of the market, and in the case of eighteenth 
and nineteenth century markets this implied that the taking of tolls on 
market day was the sole evidential test of the existence of market property 
rights. Whilst earlier cases and even statute law had established the rules 
governing toll prescription (the right to collect toll without hind ranee)
[1] little attempt had been made before Rex v. Marsden to relate the 
collection of the toll to the property rights in the market, either as a 
rule of evidence or as part of the law of the market. Certainly the common 
law of contract suggested by the 1760’s that toll prescription implied 
ownership unless tolls were leased. Yet earlier attempts to find a 
resolution of the problem of identifying conditions for ownership had 
effectively separated the ownership of facilities and the ownership of 
access tolls and whilst only Gavelkind law maintained the rule that market 
rights and piccage and stallage rights decended separately - and were 
transfered separately - common law before 1765 held that the one was not 
sufficient proof of the other [2]. The proof of ownership lay not in the 
power to affect users but in the contirtuation of the market after custom
[3].
In Rex V .  Marsden. Lord Justice Mansfield made it clear that behind his
[1] Especially through 22 Car.II c.8 and Mayor of Northampton v. Ward 
(1746) 93 ER 1155.
[2] Thomas Robinson The Common Law of Kent: or. The Customs of Gavelkind
(London,1741), 79. See also Customs and Privileges of the Manor of
Stepney and Hackney in the County of Middlesex (London,1736) [copy in 
Goldsmiths Library, University of London],
[3] [Anon.] Points in Law and Equity, Selected for the Information, Caution
and Direction of all persons concerned in Trade and Commerce (London, 
1791), 144-5; Giles Jacob A New Law Dictionary (London.1772). av.
'Market'.
judgment lay the important and novel assumption that without evidence of 
the taking of toll or the operation of a regulatory court of the market, 
there could be no usurpation of a market, for there could be no market in 
existence. Ownership depended upon the ’exercise of use’ and, in 
particular, upon the regulation of tolls and fines; power of this kind 
actually constituted ownership. In Mansfield’s own words ’There are no 
marks of a market or fair, no toll taken...’ [1], yet regulatory power, 
too, represented evidence of ownership and should similarly be taken to be 
valid for a claim of the ownership of a market. Two important consequences 
followed from this interpretation of the common law of market ownership: 
first, that ownership and prescription of toll were regarded as being 
synonymous with regulatory power and, secondly, that ownership still 
carried with it an implied right to the fruits of trade during the 
continuation of the market. Both of these consequences proved to have an 
effect upon the development of the rural market in the course of the 
following century. A digression will illustrate why this was the case.
The regulation of markets and fairs was exercised through local courts 
whose specific function was to deal with abuses of market customs. The 
Courts of Pie Poudre, of the Clerk of the Market and Court Leet of the 
Manor all acted as regulating jurisdictions for their markets. Yet in the 
course of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries many of these 
local courts declined in importance or were, at local level, superseded or 
abolished and similarly the posts of their officers came to be consolidated 
with those of other town officials. Frequently corporations took over these
[1] Cited in J.G. Pease and Herbert Chitty Treatise on the Law of Markets.3.
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market courts with newly transferred property rights in the market. In 
Cambridge, for example, the pie poudre court of Stourbridge Fair met only 
three times between 1768 and 1823 [1], its functions having been
transferred to the Mayor’s court and in Lewes in Sussex the town’s corranittee 
for establishing a new market suggested in 1790:
1. That the Lords of the said Manor [who owned the market 
rights] shall continue to exercise their ancient Right of 
appointing a Clerk of the said Market who shall receive 
the annual Sum of Pounds...[and]
2. That the Commissioners [of the new market] shall have a 
power appointing an Officer to collect and receive the 
Tolls of the said market [2].
The new, private, commissioners of the market plainly had little need to 
control the regulatory post but required the power of appointment to the 
toll collector'^s post. This common division of responsibilities reflects the 
contemporary realisation that the old court posts and functions were now 
largely irrelevent to contemporary market conditions; with the growth of 
local, corporate government in the course of the eighteenth century and the 
decline of older forms of property rights, the transfer of these and other 
duties to the councils and the shires brought many courts of market
[1] Record Book of the Court of Pie-poudre, Cambridge, 1760-1823, Cambs. 
R.O. Cambridge Corporation MSS. Box II/5. The only other surviving 
records of the courts of pie-poudre located are for Rye (Suffolk R.O. 
(I) Eye Borough MSS. K/5/21); these fail to indicate how regular and 
independent the court was. Other disappearing pie-poudre courts of the 
period included Southampton ([Anon.] A Description of England and 
Wales. Containing an Account of Each County (London,1769-1770) volume 
2, 172), Chipping Norton, Chipping Wycombe and Henley (’First Report of 
the Commissioners appointed to inquire into Municipal Corporations of 
England and Wales...’ BPP Sess. 1835, 23 (116), 171,178,208), and 
Portsmouth (VCH Hants and Isle of Wight, 3, 182). On the decline of 
pie-poudre courts in general, see John Pettingell ’Of the Courts of 
Pypowder’ [1762] Archaeologia [third edition], 1 (1804), 210-24.
[2] Verena Smith (ed.) The Town Book of Lewes 1702-1837 (Lewes,1973), 85
entry for 7 September 1790. See also Andover Corporation minutes cited 
in J.E.H. Spaul (ed) Andover Archives: The Bailiwick 1599-1835 
(Andover, 1971), 15, entry for 8 September 1820.
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regulation into the hands of the corporation proper. One solution was to 
combine the features of the market court with those of the courts leet or 
baron of the town at first; this proved particularly useful where 
corporations held market prescriptive rights themselves from local lords or 
where local courts of request were stronger than local administration. 
However, larger - and more financially stable - corporate bodies made great 
efforts to extend their control over the market by transferring the 
administrative and legal responsibilities of the market court to their own 
hands. The only national survey of these market courts - made by the Royal 
Commission on Municipal Corporations in 1835 - revealed, indeed, that the 
office of clerk of the market was no longer held separately from the other 
elected posts of town councils and corporations. In nineteenth century 
England, the Mayor usually held the position of clerk as a largely 
honorific and ceremonial duty along with a good many other titles bestowed 
upon him for the sake of custom (Table 4.1).
Table 4.1: Appointees to the position of Clerk of the Market in 




Created post 12 11.0
Alderman 3 2.8
Port reeve 2 1.8
Sub-bail iff 1 0.9
Sergeant 1 0.9
Source: ’Analytical Digest of the Reports of Commissioners 
on Municipal Corporations in England and Wales...*BPP Sess. 
1839 18 (402),120-22.
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Only IIX of the surveyed towns had especially created the post of clerk of 
the market or equivalent and in half of those cases the clerks had been 
nominated either by the entire council or by the Mayor. A brief survey of 
some councils suggests that in all too many cases the specially created 
post of clerk fell to a nephew or brother of a council official. 
Furthermore, in about two-thirds of councils, council representatives were 
elected for life [1] and no doubt continued to hold the office of market 
clerk long after they were physically able or willing to take on the task 
of supervising market transactions.
Yet process in market courts of any description - pie poudre, leet or 
clerk’s courts - represented a very small part of the framework of law that 
guaranteed a hearing to small pleas in early nineteenth century England. 
Indeed, few market courts allowed townspeople the opportunity to take 
personal actions for small claims against market traders or others (Table 
4-2). All forms of market court were intended, after all, not to dispense 
local justice but to refer cases to higher local or shire courts for 
arbitration and judgment. The power of the clerk was, in the words of the 
seventeenth century jurist William Sheppard, '...much lessened by the
distribution of it to, and exercise by. Justices of Assise [sic], of Oyer
and Terminer and Justices of the Peace...’ [2], and the closure of so many
[1] A.F. Fremantle England in the Nineteenth Century Volume 1: 1801-1805
(London,1929), 176.
[2] W[illiam] Sheppard Of the Office of the Clerk of the Market, or
Weights and Measures and the Laws of Provision for Man and Beast 
(London,1665), 117-20. The Act regulating the activities of the Clerk, 
16 Car.I c 19, failed to deal adequately with the problem of the 
duplication of responsibilities. (See Thomas Walter Williams A Compend 
-ious Digest of the Statute Law from Magna Carta to the Twenty- Seventh
Year of the His present Majesty King George III (London, 1787), 70).
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market courts by 1835 suggests that in the late eighteenth century this 
transfer of responsibility was reaching a crescendo of administrative 
reorganisation. These courts were, after all. intended principally for 
summary arbitration and not for complex cases. In courts of pie poudre an 
injury had to be reported to the court ’within the compass of one and the 
same [market] day...’[l] for the case to be heard. This relatively 
restricted period for the settling of disputes had significant consequences 
for corporate owners, for if they could maintain evidence of ownership 
merely by providing regulatory courts, they might dispense with these 
smaller courts and consolidate legal power in the Mayor’s court or even the 
shire and assize courts. Market traders lost thereby the great benefits of 
the small market courts, which the contemporary jurist Wooddeson described 
as their ’...easy and prompt modes of redress’[2]. Similarly where manors 
held the rights to markets or fairs as an ancient privilege, land stewards 
and borough clerks. through the Court Leet or Court Baron, could only 
exercise the right to refer cases concerning market illegalities up to 
higher courts [3]; where these privileged jurisdictions could be separated
[1] Richard and John Burn A New Law Dictionary : Intended for General Use 
as well as for Gentlemen of the Profession (London,1792) volume 2, 208.
[2] Robert Wooddeson A Systematical View of the Laws of England ; as
treated of in a course of Vinerian Lectures Read at Oxford (London, 
1792-3) volume 1, 101. Compare William Blackstone Commentaries on the
Laws of England [fifth edition] (London,1773) volume 4, 275 on the
status of the office.
[3] Giles Jacob The Complete Court Keeper; or Land Steward’s Assistant 
eighth edition (London,1819), 57; Henry Fellowes The Laws Respecting 
Copyhold and Court Keeping (London,1799) esp. pp. 134 ff.; John Ritson 
The Jurisdiction of the Court Leet (London,1809); Richard Barnard 
Fisher A Practical Treatise on Copyhold Tenure with the Methods of 
Holding Court Leets, Courts Baron and other Courts (London,1794). On 
the effect of the decline of such courts upon other forms of property 
holding not discussed here, readers will recall J.L. and Barbara 
Hammond The Village Labourer 1760-1832 (London,1911), Chapter 1.
from ownership and the court's powers transferred, little stood in the way 
of such a move. Indeed, in Abingdon in 1788 the court leet acted as the 
court of the clerk of the market because no doubt it was easier and more 
convenient for all concerned that the reference of troublesome cases to 
higher courts should be accomplished efficiently and without the need for 
two courts [1].
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Nevertheless, what little power the clerk or market court had now passed
to the corporations of towns and into the hands of the mayoralty in
particular. After Rex v. Marsden, therefore, the regulatory power of the
corporations and councils guaranteed their ownership and secured their
property rights in markets. Either toll-taking or regulation provided
evidence of ownership, and consequently - as at Lewes - only one of the two
needed to be maintained. This significant reduction in the transaction
costs involved in market operation resulted from the relatively light
burden of the clerk’s court being substituted for the more onerous duties
of toll collector. Indeed, the fact that toll prescription was actively
'farmed out’ in the course of the late eighteenth century and early
nineteenth century, as shall be demonstrated, suggests that councils were
[1] Presentments of the Court Leet acting as the Court of the Clerk of the 
Market, Abingdon, 1788, Berks. R.O. JM 4/2 1-7. In certain other 
locations similar duality of function appears to have been common. 
Examples include Gilbert White’s Selbourne, where Magdalen College, 
Oxford, combined the courts leet and baron with the purely supervisory 
functions of market court (Gilbert White The Natural History and 
Antiquities of Selbourne in the County of Southampton (London,1789), 
423); Marlborough, where the Court Leet held twice yearly exercised the 
powers of the Clerk’s court (’First Report of the Commissioners 
appointed to inquire into Municipal Corporations of England and 
Wales...’ BPP Sess. 1835, 23 (116), 219); Winchester, where the 
Consistory Court of the Bishop exercised powers to maintain the pie 
poudre Court of St. Giles Fair (Jacob New Law Dictionary, qv. 'Pie 
Powder Court’); and Westoning in Bedfordshire (VCH Beds. .3. 453).

is against this background of often subtle yet significant change in the 
definition of the evidence of property rights in markets that the economic 
history of market society must be viewed.
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By 1802, common law had established a definition of customary usage in 
association with markets which effectively opened the possibility of 
prescription to many more owners [1]. In spite of a limitation upon this 
definition allowed in 1817 [2], it received general and wider acceptance in 
a more explicit judgment in 1823, in which the legal requirements for 
prescription ownership by custom were clearly indicated [3]. In the case 
of Rex V .  Jolliffe in that year twenty years usage, where uncontradicted, 
was held to be sufficient evidence for the existence of a market. Grounds 
for contradiction of this plea on grounds of usage might now only be found 
in evidence of the discontinuity of the operation of the market or, in 
subsequent judgments of the court, in the insufficiency of market 
accommododion and trading facilities [4]. Where market prescription rights 
were now lost or franchises had disappeared, juries were to be directed to
[1] Rex V .  Smith (1802) 170 ER 659-60. This new law of prescriptive rights 
in markets was but part of what one scholar has suggested was a general 
revision of the doctrine of prescription in law and constitutional 
theory from the late eighteenth inspired by Burke. As such it 
contributed to some degree toward the general redefinitioon of rights 
in property and terms of contracting which is explored in greater 
detail below. P. Lucas 'On Edmund Burke’s doctrine of prescription
or an old appeal from the new to the old lawyers’ Historical Journal. 
11 (1968), 35-68.
[2] Rex V .  Cotterill (1817) 106 ER 25-30.
[3] Rex V .  Jolliffe (1823) 107 ER 303-07.
[4] Only in the Lords’ judgment in In re Islington Market Bill (1835) 6 ER 
1530-34 was this corollary given substance through a full definition of 
the duties of owners.
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decide cases of disputed ownership simply on the basis of the test of usage
[1] . In short, within a very few years ownership and control by 
prescriptive right rather than franchise was referred to the very test of 
custom already used in cases related to disputed ownership by title.
Through the definition of ’immemorial existence' and the transfer of 
decisions concerning prescription to juries,market ownership by title or 
custom^the separable rights to take toll were freed from the earlier 
constraint of interpretation solely on the basis of the foundation document
[ 2 ]  .
Yet it was precisely in relation to prescriptive rights such as toll­
taking, rights which many owners sold off during the course of this period, 
that the legal reform of market property rights lagged behind
organisational and institutional change. Toll allocation was in fact 
central to the contemporary legal discussion of the ownership and 
organisation of the market. Toll prescription was of importance not only 
because the evidence from custom of toll taking now constituted ownership 
evidence, but because it required an effective and efficient machinery for 
enforcement and administration. Only in relation to the administration of 
toll did nineteenth century courts place control again in the hands of 
owners rather than users or perscription holders. In the course of Rex v. 
Marsden. Lord Mansfield indicated that toll was indeed a sign of ownership 
in whatever form it appeared: whether toll was taken as pennage, stallage,
[1] Mosley v. Walker (1828) 108 ER 640-46.
[2] See Mayor of Hull v. Horner
piccage or entry-toll it might still be taken to imply the right to receive 
the profits of a market. This uncontradicted assertion (it was eventually 
to receive statutory support in the form of the Prescription Act of 1832 
[1]) was taken to mean that owners would always set reasonable tolls and 
that they would only set tolls to be paid at the market site. Certainly 
existing case law had established that the ownership of a title to a 
feoMchise allowed the lord of a market to impose a reasonable toll. What 
remained to be established, and still remained unsettled after 1765, was 
the point at which goods going to market became liable for toll and little 
effort appears to have been expended before 1835 in framing an adequate 
definition of the 'reasonable toll’ the owner might take. Broadly, the 
courts inconsist«ntly but frequently found in favour of owners after 1765, 
but so unsatisfactory was this state of affairs that throughout the early 
nineteenth century traders challenged the rights of owners and prescription 
holders to take toll where and when they chose and their right to remove 
market s.
The taking of toll before goods arrived at the market proved to bo 
particularly contentious not least because of the reportedly large scale of 
attempted evasions. Evasion of toll by sale in a contiguous part of the
[1] 2 & 3 Will. IV C . 7 1 .  By this legislation markets or fairs were no
longer to be regarded as easements or 'profit a prendre' within the 
terms of the Act.
town was held to be an interference with the title of the owner [1].
Prosecutions against those who challenged the title were therefore common 
and owners and prescription holders proceeded against those who sold near 
to their markets in contravention of the law. Yet in the treatment of these 
cases the courts exercised very little consistency of interpretation. In 
1809 a King’s Bench case gave unconditional support to the earlier 
principle that prescription of toll was available to an owner or
prescription holder from all goods brought to the area of the franchise on 
market day [2]. By 1821, however, a judgment of equal distinction 
specified that no prescription should be allowed for goods not actually
brought into the market [3], though in a superior judgment brought in the
same year in one of the cases anciUiary to the contest over the new Reading
market the earlier principle was again given the status of current law [4].
This indecision in the courts did not reflect any uncertainty about the
[1] The leading cases in this matter were Mosley v. Chadwick (1782) 99 ER 
568-71; Mayor of Northampton v. Ward (1746) 93 ^  1155. See also 
Rickards v. Bennett (1823) 107 ER 83-88 and Mosely v. Walker (1828) 108 
ER 640-6. The metropolis appears to have been an exception, 
seventeenth century cases allowing the selling of fish outwith 
Billingsgate (William Illingworth An Inquiry into the Laws Antient and 
Modern respecting Forestalling, Regrating and Ingrossing (London,1800), 
17; Alexander Pulling A Practical Treatise on the Laws, Customs and 
Regulations of the City and Port of London as settled by Charter. 
Usage. By-law or Statute (London, 1842), 411).
[2] Hill V .  Smith (1809) 103 ER 856-61.
[3] Wells V .  Miles (1821) 106 ER 1041-44.
Vines V .  Mayor of Reading (1826) 130 ER 670-671. The farming 
community clearly regarded Vines as leading and indisputable authority 
hereafter. See ’News of Agriculture, Rural Economy etc. ’ British 
Farmers Magazine I 1826-7, 264.
nature of ownership and its powers but rather the lack of any simple 
definition of the limits of the market. Consequently, many market 
committees of traders and representations of traders for new facilities 
produced bills before Parliament which deliberately and explicitly restated 
the ’limit of the market’ in the early nineteenth century. In the 
improvement and market acts of these years, the growing dissatisfaction of 
traders with limitations upon the places in which trading were allowed 
appears. The most fundamental of private rights (to trade from one’s own 
house in spite of the market on a market day) was assured in these acts, 
either through the use of previously scheduled bye-laws or by express 
confirmation of the right in the market act itself [1]. The Exeter market 
improvement act of 1820, for example, declared ’That nothing herein 
contained shall extend or be construed to extend to prevent any Person or 
Persons from selling or exposing to Sale any live Cattle or Beasts, being 
his, her or their own Property only, in his, her or their own Yards and 
Premises only, within the said City and County [of Exeter]’ [2]. This 
quiet but successful reaction to old restrictions [3] guaranteed traders 
and farmers a limited amount of trading freedom (although regrating 
naturally remained illegal for farmers).
If the law relating to the ’limit of the market’ remained undecided, to 
the apparent advantage of the trading community, the law of market removal 
moved almost entirely in the direction of giving absolute power to owners
[1] e.g. 55 Geo. Ill c.85 s.lll (Bodmin); 51 Geo. Ill c.172 s.l8 
(Gosport); 56 Geo. Ill c.25 s.23 (Cowes).
[2] 1 Geo. IV C . 7 8  s.lO.
[3] Under 1&2 Phil. & Mary (Sess.l) c.7.
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and toll rights holders before reverting to a position of benevolent 
neutrality - giving neither traders nor owners an absolute advantage. 
Nineteenth century courts at once extended the right to remove but limited 
the circumstances in which removal might take place, to the disadvantage of 
prescriptive rights holders. Whilst recognizing an inherent right (as part 
of the title to a market) to remove the market from ’...time to time to a 
convenient place...’, Curwen v. Salkeld (1803) both limited the right of 
traders to return to the old market site and enforced the obligation upon 
owners to remain at the site named in the franchise [1]. In Succeeding 
years, the hands of the trading community were strengthened by gaining the 
additional advantage of appealing a franchise on the grounds that the owner 
had provided inadequate accomodation [2]; further, where the owner of a 
market was not also the landowner of the market site (where, for example, 
the landholder had leased or sold toll collecting rights) removal was not 
allowed to deprive the landowner of any of the future revenues he might 
expect [3].
A conclusion upon the legal history of market property rights in the 
course of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries is almost 
certainly to be expected to be equivocal. Without the distinction between 
toll ownership rights and title or franchise rights in Rex v. Marsden both 
the motivation for and economic gain from subcontracting toll collection 
and associated rights would have been reduced. However, what the courts
[1] 102 ER 703-06.
[2] Rex V .  Cotterill (1817) 106 ER 25-30.
[3] De Reutzen v. Lloyd (1836)
gave with one hand they removed with the other. Owners and traders remained 
in conflict in the courts well into the later nineteenth century over these 
contentious issues. Without the organisational and institutional revolution 
in market property rights, indeed, legal change would have been 
insufficient to reduce aggregate transaction costs in market trade. 
Institutional innovation by traders and toll holders, by corporations and 
by their officers individually effectively reduced the costs of policing 
markets. Yet the legal history of the period belies the complexity and the 
radical nature of these changes in the organisational structure of the 
institutions of market capitalism, for as we shall see institutional 
adaptation to new conditions of market transaction occurred in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when markets still predominated and 
before firms and alternative hierarchies replacing the allocative market 
mechanism were in place. All of these forms of adaptation to new conditions 
of marketing had one thing in common: the property rights in markets became 
the object of fierce competition, rivalry between owners and non-title 
holders, cooperative ventures between owners and prescriptive rights 
lessees and various intermediate arrangements - some with the distinctive 
allocative advantages of firm-type hierarchies. Indeed, whilst the law 
failed to arrive at a satisfactory - optimal - allocation of property 
rights between title holders, prescription holders and traders until much 
later in the nineteenth century, the institutional innovation 
characteristic of the early nineteenth century may be understood not as the 
result of the absolute decline of the formal market but rather as the 
adaptation of its form to meet novel conditions of exchange in a hybrid 
form of organisation with some of the characteristic features of the
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classical nineteenth century firm and some of the older, more tenacious and 
perhaps efficient, features of the traditional provincial market. To 
understand how this happened, it is necessary to observe individual market 
rights in this process of transition. With scanty evidence and bearing in 
mind the fact that much must of necessity be missing from the record of 
what little survives, it is neverthless possible to discover how the 
process of redefining rural market rights occurred and how these elementary 
institutions changed after 1780.
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE PROPERTY RIGHTS IN MARKET EXCHANGE, 1780-1840.
'If property be an unconditional right, emphasis on its 
obligations is little more than the graceful parade of a 
flattering, but innocuous metaphor. For whether the obligations 
are fulfilled or neglected, the right continues unchallenged 
and indefeasible’ [R.H.Tawney, 1926]
Market centres were, of course, much more than just places for buying and
I selling commodities. They acted as the social centre of towns and, in the
' more prosperous settlements of the south of England, offered local gentry 
and the affluent a fashionable resort and an attractive meeting place in 
the town. At Northampton the market area was noted by one visitor to serve 
the function of a ’fashionable mall for the ladies to walk on...’ [1] and
at Horsham the walkway leading to the market centre offered a secluded area 
for courting couples [2], while at Exeter the Market place near the 
I cathedral was used as the site for a ’Grand Menagerie of Foreign Beasts and
I Birds’ [3]. This ’fashionable’ function of the market site, often
I
I forgotten by historians, was no doubt important in some towns but not in 
others. For the rural working family, however, the market was the regular 
resort for community entertainment; fairs, bull running, celebrations and 
exhibitions all made appearances in the larger market Towns of England
[1] ’Journal of a Tour of the Midlands, East Anglia etc...’ September 
1790, James Plumtre MSS., CUL Add. MSS. 5794 fols. 16-16v.
[2] ’Travel diary of three weeks tour in S.E. England, 1785 [by] Elizabeth 
Collett’, typescript transcription, 1947, Bath P.L. [no acc. no.], 6.
[3] Histor ical Manuscripts Commission Report on the Records of the City of 
Exeter (London,1916), 259-60.
[1], though the smallest and least frequented often brought visiting 
tradesmen which proved reason enough for celebration. At this extreme of 
size the ’market’ at the then small town of Swindon in Wiltshire (now the 
Old Town) consisted for much of the early nineteenth century solely of the 
appearance of one Mr. Tidd from Dammas Lane who sold meat in the square 
from a wheeled cart once a week; Mr. Tidd’s appearance, according to one 
contemporary commentator, brought children into the market street to play 
and dance [2].
Whether large or small, then, markets were centres of social as well as of
commercial intercourse. Yet the size of the market certainly determined how
far it might be a place of recreation as well as a site for trade - how
[1] See inter alia R.M. Wiles ’Crowd Pleasing Spectacles in Eighteenth 
Century England’ Journal of Popular Culture. 1 (1967), 90-105; Bob
Bushaway By Rite: Custom, Ceremony and Community in England 1700-1880
Recreations in English(London, 1982); Robert W. Malcolmson Popular 
Society 1700-1850 (Cambridge. 1973).
[2] Mark Childs ’Aspects of Swindon’s History’ mimeo of typescript, 
[revised edition], 1973, Swindon LSL [no acc.no.], 26; Diary of Thomas 
Goddard, 1810, Swindon LSL, Goddard MSS. 1397 fol. 5v. One must 
remember that, as one contemporary account of the district remarked, 
most roads to the town wore impassable for most of the year (’Un 
Officier Français Emigre’ Promenade Autour de la Grande Bretagne 
precede de Quelques Details sur la Campagne du Duc de Brunswick 
(Edinburgh, 1795), 135-6). Thomas Dearn describes the absence of the 
market at Smarden in Kent and its replacement by visiting ’higglers’ 
like Tidd as a ’judicious arrangement’ which gave more time to 
villagers to pursue other interests. T.D.W. Dearn An Historical, 
Topographical and Descriptive Account of the Weald of Kent (Cranbrook, 
1814), 219. (See also the description of the higgling trade of Reading 
in John Man The History and Antiquities, Ancient & Modern. of the 
Borough of Reading in the County of Berks. (Reading, 1816), 167). Cf. 
the experience of the rural Midland villages, J.M. Martin ’Village 
traders and the emergence of a proletariat in South Warwickshire, 1750- 
1851’ Agricultural History Review. 32 (1984), 179- 188; and, for other 
parts of England, John Clapham An Economic History of Modern Britain; 
The Early Railway Age, 1820-1850 [second edition] (Cambridge, 1930), 
221-222 remains the best source.
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many people, for example, might attend a market day parade or war victory 
celebration was determined by physical space rather than by anything else. 
In fact, the majority of English provincial markets were small and 
relatively cramped for space. Table 5.3 below presents an estimate of the 
distribution of corn market areas for a sample of market towns in southern 
England during the period 1745 to 1840 using the cartographic evidence of 
numerous small maps and plans of the towns and cities of Britain published 
in the period. Both the relatively small scale of the maps utilised in the 
survey and the small number located of sufficient merit limits the 
representative character of the distribution. However, the broad categories 
of market size offered in the table can be easily distinguished even on 
very small scale maps; even small scale town plans and the vignette plans 
of towns on county maps therefore offer some useful evidence of the size of 
the market that can be made use of [1].
The majority of markets fell within the category of 10,000 ft^ to 59,999 
ft‘ (or approximately 100 feet by 100 feet to 245 feet by 245 feet) in 
area, allowing only limited trading in a confined space. The reality of 
much of the popular experience of market society during the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries was indeed that cramped conditions and busy 
trade reduced the attractiveness of markets as centres of recreation and 
even of trade.
[n For a justification of the use of small scale maps of this period in 
historical research, see Mark A. Gray ’The Use of Small Scale Maps in 
Local History Research’ Quest: Journal of the Avon Local History 
Association. 9 (1979), 5-9.
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throughout our period [1]. entertainment and social intercourse were as 
much a part of the functioning of the market site as marketing itself. At 
Salisbury’s Michaelmas fair in 1796, for example, (a unique extension of 
the weekly market to accommodate cheese sellers from Hampshire who, in that 
year, had failed to sell all of their north Wiltshire cheese at Andover) a 
Camera Obscura was exhibited alongside the cheese sellers and garden 
produce stalls which made up the majority of the pitches licensed by the 
market court [2]. 'Pleasure fairs’, almost certainly an eighteenth century 
invention [3], were naturally more successful than day fairs at providing 
entertainment, but were ususally located outside of towns and away from 
market squares. Yet whenever trade was established in it the market place 
served the function of playground, meeting place and entertainment venue as 
well as private meeting place and rendezvous for rural gentry. In this 
sense, the market ’belonged’ to every part of the social order of the rural 
communities of southern England and ’belonged’ to the people of the rural 
hinterland of the market town as much as to urban consumers.
In spite of this communal use of the market and the central role of the 
market place in defining local communities, the private ownership of market 
property and rights to market tolls was fundamental to the structure of the
[1] Wendy Thwaites ’The Marketing of Agricultural Produce in Eighteenth 
Century Oxfordshire’ (unpublished D.Phil. dissertation. University of 
Oxford, 1981), 77. Cf. the experience of northern day-fairs in S. Ian 
Mitchell ’Urban Markets and Retail Distribution 1730-1815 with 
particular reference to Macclesfield, Stockport and Chester’ 
(unpublished D.Phil. dissertation. University of Oxford, 1974), 33-38.
[2] Daybook of Salisbury Market and Day-Fair, 1796-1804, Wilts. R.O. 
6/23/1/29 fol. 2.
[3] Malcolmson Popular Recreations. 23.
eighteenth and nineteenth century rural economy. Control over property 
rights, as we have seen, determines who pays the transaction costs involved 
in exchange. The indeterminacy of property rights requires bargaining 
resources to be devoted to establishing ownership and control. 
Consequently non-market hierarchies devote much energy and resources toward 
the specification of property rights where the exercise of establishing 
ownership is relatively costless. Much of this activity is, of course, 
social and particularly legal; non-market hienwchies seek to discover those 
means of unequivocally establishing their ownership of assets which most 
effectively and costlessly ensure the continuity of their profit or income 
generation. Market institutions during the period under study here 
similarly viewed rights in markets and tolls as essential to the efficiency 
of market economy itself. Throughout the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries traders and market owners entered into the contest for 
prescriptive rights over market trade reflected in the legal history of 
markets discussed earlier. However, whilst the legal history of the period 
offers some indication of the general tendency toward corporate rights in 
markets and away from old and long established ownership, it cannot 
indicate how far that tendency was dominant during the period. Indeed, 
precisely because the important determinant of communal ownership rights to 
property in markets was the specification cost of the legal 
responsibilities associated with markets, the legal history of market 
ownership should be studied in relation to the contractual obligations and 
duties allowed at law. The increasingly unfavourable definition of 
prescription holders’ responsibilities we uncovered earlier was, I shall 
argue, entirely consistent with the transfer of property rights and
therefore of the associated transaction costs from public corporations and 
councils to private individuals and groups and the creation of subtle 
alternatives to market hierarchy.
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Yet, as has already been noted, exceptions to the general pattern of legal 
evolution are evident in the historical record, the significance of which 
should not be overlooked. Neither the documentary nor the legal evidence of 
changing conditions for the holding of property rights in markets can 
suffice independently of one another. In no small number of cases local 
gentry title holders won long and often costly contests in spite of new 
found corporate influence and the baloince between the apparently frequent 
appeals by corporations of market towns or private presumptive owners which 
received support at law and the successful resistance of the holders of 
prescriptive rights cannot be assessed quantitatively. Nevertheless, 
several legal battles between would-be corporate owners of prescriptive 
rights and noble families are recorded during the period. In Tiverton in 
Devon, for example, the urgency of repair noted in a report of 1824 
initially prepared at the behest of traders (though later supported by the 
Town Council [1]) encouraged a challenge to the rights of the local 
prescription holder through the courts, a process not finally resolved 
until 1831; the council, it should be noted, lost the case and any hope of 
establishing property rights over market tolls [2]. Not only were title
[1] Printed report to the inhabitants of Tiverton. with additional notes 
on the state of Tiverton market, 1824, Devon R.O. Penny and Harward 
MSS. 1044 B/27.
[2] Times 19 October 1831. On the history of the dispute see Lt. Col. 
Harding The History of Tiverton in the County of Devon (London, 1845) 
volume 1, 138.
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owners to prescriptive markets frequently uncooperative and tried a number 
of ways in which to hold up the movement toward wider ownership, they 
frequently flouted the spirit if not the letter of judgments against them. 
Lord Sherbourne, perhaps an exceptionally recalcitrant example, not only 
opposed the PavingGtmmissioners of Cheltenham in their application to the 
courts for the right to build a new market upon his old, title market, site 
but further leased the tolls of the old market to a private individual 
against the wishes of corporation and traders alike [1]. Similar 
opposition to the transfer of new rights to corporate bodies and the 
creation of new markets came, naturally enough, from other adjacent market 
towns threatened by the establishing of superior facilities nearby. Also in 
Devon, and of similar contemporary infamy to the case of Tiverton, the 
grant of a now writ of ’ad quod damnum’ to Sir Bourchier Wray to open a 
market on his own behalf at Ilfracombe in 1802 [2] brought protests from 
nearby Barnstaple. Barnstaple, noted by one informed contemporary in 1779 
as a market town which attracted ’farmers from thirty parishes to cross the 
bridge...to bring their produce to it...’ [3], felt the threat to its own 
trade from the revived market and openly objected, sending a copy of the
[1] Gwen Hart A History of Cheltenham,(Leicester, 1965), 298-99; [Anon] The 
Stranger’s Guide to Cheltenham and Its Environs,(Cheltenham,1832). 122.
[2] Writ of inquisition ad quod damnum, September 30, 1802 PRO (CL) C202/
190/42.
[3] ’Memorandums of a Tour of the West of England’[1796] BL Franklin 
Papers Add. MSS.47771 vol IV fol. 59. In 1791, the Cambridge tourist 
E.D. Clarke noted that Barnstaple market had more stock than Covent 
Garden market, E.D. Clarke A Tour Through the South of En ili and, Wales 
and Part of Ireland.made during the Summer of 1791 (London, 1793), 127.
Town Council’s resolution on the matter to London [1].
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However these contests for the control of the market ended, they almost 
always began with the protest of the traders who used market facilities at
the poor state of the square and its buildings. The slight space available
in some of the markets recorded in our sample (Table 5.3 above) were the 
direct cause of the frequent complaints of traders about market facilities; 
and where community interests conflicted with those of commerce the latter 
almost invariably came to dominate. Yet the complaints of general 
dilapidation wore not restricted to the smaller or older markets during our 
period, and many complaints and opinions of locals about their market 
survive in contemporary topographical literature. The prosperous town of 
Maidenhead in Berkshire, which had gained an important position for itself 
in the London hinterland as the source of most of the barge traffic down 
the Thames to the Surrey docks, was neverthless left with a market house 
beneath the Town Hall ’built of timber and plaister [which was]...old and
ruinous’; and in the nearby town of Newbury the market house was described
as being ’built of timber,laith and plaister and in indifferent 
repair...’ [2]. In Cheltenham in 1811, the market house on the market site
[1] Resolution of Barnstaple Corporation against the opening of Ilfracombe 
Market, 1802, N.Devon A Lib. MSS. Acc. 1767. See also Royal Cornwall 
Gazette 7 November 1802. Cf. the case of March market, ’RC on 
Markets...’, 1. 225.
[2] [Anon.] A Description of England and Wales, Containing an Account of
Each County (London,1769-1770) volume 1; 59,96. For similar comments
concerning other towns, see volume 1, 25-5 (Bedford). 39 (Woburn), 86 
(Abingdon), 103 (Wokingham); volume 2, 144 (Kel1ington), 167 (Truro); 
volume 3, 234 (Melcomb Regis); volume 4, 114 (Gloucester); volume 5, 62 
(Canterbury); volume 7, 197 (Thame). For later stories of delapidation, 
see Samuel Lewis A Topographical Dictionary of England [seventh 
edition] (London.1849) volume 1, 6; ibid, volume 2, 12.
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owned by the unmoving Lord Sherbourne even collapsed, mercifully without
causing any injury; elsewhere there was a real cost in lives for the poor
state of market buildings [1]. Of course the imperfections of the market
were not always as serious or as lethal. A common contemporary complaint,
for example (possibly the most common), was of the obstruction of market
crosses which blocked the way of carts and wagons entering the market on
market day. Following his extensive tour of the Cotswold towns in the late
1780’s, William Marshall observed:
Market places never struck me, as a subject entitled to 
particular notice, until I saw the good effect which has 
taken place, by a reform in the market places of this
district.
In 1783, the markets of Gloucester, Tewkesbury and 
Cheltenham were kept on old fashioned crosses, and under 
open market houses, standing in the middle of the main 
streets; to the interruption of travellers, the 
disfigurement of the towns, and the inconveniency of the 
market people, whether sellers or buyers.
Now, [1788] these nuisances are cleared away, and the
markets removed into well situated recesses, conveniently 
filled up for their reception [2].
Elsewhere, too, market crosses came down where the 'market people’ objected
to their incoiwenience. When a German visitor, S.H. Spiker, reached
Salisbury during his tour of the country he made particular notice of the
[1] Berrow’s Worcester Journal 31 January 1811. Similar accidents at
London’s Clare Market and in 1790 at Cloth Fair in Smithfield, gained 
more public attention, when collapsing buildings surrounding the market 
crushed several people to death. See W. Toone A Chronological Record of 
the Remarkable Public Events, Political, Historical. Biographical, 
Literary. Domestic & Miscellaneous during the Reigns of George the 
Third and Fourth and His Present Majesty (London, 1834), 146; William
Connor Sydney England and the English in the Eighteenth Century : 
Chapters in the Social History of the Times (London,1891) volume 1, 41.
[2] Will iam Marshall The Rural Economy of Gloucestershire [second edition] 
(London, 1796), 105-106.
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market poultry cross which still stands at the corner of the market square 
and at the only entrance to the market from the north — a market cross 
which remained in place, he thought, in spite of a contemporary fashion for 
their removal [1]. Across the rural south this ’fashion’ appears to have 
begun in the late 1770’s and to have reached epidemic proportions by the 
beginning of the nineteenth century. A simple but effective means of 
improving access, all eviating the anxieties of buyers and sellers and 
attracting greater trade such as the removal of market crosses might 
staunch the flood of complaints about poor market conditions in southern 
provincial towns. Complaints from traders about the state of the market 
did, of course, move some of the town corporations to take more 
comprehensive action, but sometimes traders had to take matters into their 
own hands. In 1804 the graziers of Aylesbury, dissatisfied with the 
existing provision for fatstock penning and selling in the market square, 
set up their own market [2].
Fear of the law and owners’ rights nevertheless dissuaded many unhappy 
traders from this drastic form of action, so petitions and letters of 
protest more frequently began the campaign for better facilities. There is 
considerable evidence of these kinds of protest in a number of southern 
English towns throughout the period of the late Georgian age. In Devizes in
[1] S.H. Spiker Travels Through England.Wales and Scotland in the Year
1816 (London,1820) volume 2, 140. Cf. The Salopian Magazine and Monthly 
Observer (London,1815) volume 1, 554; Norwich Chronicle 17 March 1792;
CUL Add. MSS. 5794 fol. 18v. for reports of exceptions to this 
apparent rule in Shrewsbury, Norwich and Worcester respectively.
[2] George Lipscombe The History and Antiquities of Buckinghamshire 
(London. 1847) vol 3, 31.
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about 1803, for example, a number of traders petitioned the town council in
the following terms for new buildings;
We the undersigned Dealers, Farmers and others attending 
Devizes Market beg to represent to you the very serious loss 
to which we have been subject for many years in consequence 
of the inconvenience and the damage occasioned to the 
Commodities in which we deal by exposure to the rain in wet 
weather. We submit that could a convenient Site be procured 
near or adjoining the present Market Place for the erection 
of a covered Building for the Corn Market, It would not only 
be a personal accommodation to ourselves but we think it 
would add to the respectability and tend to increase the 
Trade of the Town at Large - We think also the removal of
the Corn Market to another site would materially improve the
accommodation for Cattle etc. and prevent the Annoyance at 
present occasioned by the public Roads and pavements being 
impeded - We therefore request that a better accommodation 
be provided for the transaction of our business [1].
Arguments of this variety - particularly that new facilities would attract
new business to the town - were frequently cited in petitions and,
presumably in recognition that owners might actually be impairing the
economic development of the local community, corporations and councils
sought control over the market with this factor in mind. When in 1818 the
Bedford corn dealer J.H. Warden sought to persuade the town authorities of
the need for new facilities for a ’pitched’ market to replace the small
’sample’ market instead of the grant of a new, free, market, he wrote that
‘...if we had a Pitched Market for Corn it would add more to the
respectability of the Town, as well as advantage to the farmer and dealer.
[1] Petition of traders of Devizes for a new market [c. 1803] Wilts. R.O.
G/20/1/89. Similar arguments were made by the 178 farmers and dealers 
of Devizes who petitioned for new market accommodation in 1836. See 
James Waylen Chronicles of The Devizes (London, 1839), 219. Cf. Records 
of the Borough of Nottingham being a series of extracts from the
Archives of the Corporation 
(Nottingham, 1952), 415-416.
of Nottingham Volume Vlll: 1800-1835
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than anything that could be done for a toll-free market' [1]. Often traders 
were well organised and, as in Cambridge, encouraged the council by 
supporting the preparation of detailed plans for the removal of the 
existing market, the raising of new capital for the new building and the 
arrangement of subscriptions. In Cambridge, indeed, the market committee 
planned the relocation of all the town markets in 1787 with both advice and 
finance from the local tradesmen [2]. During the discussions which led to 
the rebuilding and relocation of the all of the facilities used in 
Cambridge, farmers, traders and small dealers in the less important goods 
sold in Cambridge markets were involved in the debate [3]. Similarly, when 
Worcester's hop market became too small for the many growers and dealers 
who wanted to use it, the Mayor and Justices decided, after petitions from
[1] Huntingdon,Bedford,Cambridge & Peterborough Gazette and Northampton
General Advertiser 7 February 1818. In many petitions and appeals 
traders thus suggested that conditions of marketing themselves would be 
improved; at Bath, for example, the institution of a new cattle market 
would offer the opportunity for the sale of the 'most excellent 
varieties' only (William Matthews A Dissertation on Rural Improvements; 
Being the Substance of an Introduction to the Ninth Volume of the 
Letters and Papers of the Bath and West of England Society (Bath,1800), 
49). For further evidence of the use of these sorts of argument in 
petitioning and market reconstruction schemes, see Thwaites 'Marketing 
of Agricultural produce', 21, 102-03; Malcolm Graham 'The Building of
Oxford Covered Market' Oxoniensia, 44 (1979), 81-91; Verena Smith 'The 
Lewes Market' Sussex Archaeological Collections 107, (1969),87-101;Alec 
Holden 'Greenwich Market' Transactions of the Greenwich and Lewisham 
Antiquarian Society, 7 (1961), 15-24; Maureen Boddy and Jack West 
Weymouth: an illustrated history (Wimbourne, 1983), 106; K.A. MacMahon 
'The Street in Eighteenth Century Kingston-upon-Hul1' Publications of 
the Georgian Society of East Yorkshire, 5 (1961), 43-66.
[2] Printed notice regarding the relocation and rebuilding of Cambridge 
markets, 1787, Cambs. R.O. P25/28/4. In the case of Cambridge, the 
reason given by traders for the need for a programme of relocation and 
repair in 1787 was that, if the inhabitants agreed to pay for paving, 
better access to markets was bound to increase their trade.
[3] Cambridge Intelligencer 11 February 1787.
the traders themselves, to keep open the markets longer each week [1]; and 
when the market at Abingdon in Oxfordshire became too inconvenient, 
petitioners called for both more space and more time to trade [2]. Whether 
new accommodation was required, or merely more time in which to sell and 
buy produce, traders’ and farmers’ requests almost always met with a 
sympathetic reception.
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In most of those cases in which corporate local government supported the 
appeals of the traders. Parliament rather than law offered the most 
immediate relief. All but one of the petitions noted above resulted in an 
act of parliament for the provision of a new market or the removal of old 
obstacles. These market acts echo the protests of the traders and 
complaints of exposure to the elements and the effect of location upon the 
local road network feature particularly frequently in the acts passed 
between 1800 and 1840 [3]. Similarly, a large number of improvement acts 
included sections requiring the clearing of old sites and preparation of 
better market areas, the clearing away of obstacles to trade - like market
crosses - and the control of local traffic congestion in the centres of the
market towns. At Cowes in the Isle of Wight, Kings Lynn, Oxford, 
Basingstoke and Bath, for example, slaughterhouses and hogstys near to the
[1] Berrow’s Worcester Journal 17 September 1801.
[2] Petition relating to the holding of markets, Abingdon, 1797, Berks.
R. O. A/AM 1/2.
[3] See, for example, the market acts relating to Bodmin, 55 Geo. Ill c.85
[1815] (preamble); Exeter, 1 Geo. IV c.78 [1820] (preamble);
Southampton, 51 Geo. Ill c.172 [1811] (preamble); Frome, 50 Geo. Ill
C.62 [1810] (preamble); Brighton, 50 Geo. Ill c.38 [1810] (preamble and
S. 36).
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site of trading were required to be removed [1]. whilst in other towns, 
such as Andover, Frome, Brighton, the village of Bathwick near Bath, Bognor 
and Cheltenham, carriages left in the street and impeding free passage to 
the market were to be fined and removed [2], These seemingly minor 
arrangements included in improvement, lighting and paving and local 
government acts often offered the trading community all that it wanted; if 
carts and waggons clogged the streets and prevented potential customers 
from arriving at market, removing the market to another site was obviously 
more expensive than merely instructing the corporation through an 
improvement act to be mindful of its obligations to traders. Consequently 
many of the appeals from rural farmers and dealers were answered, not with 
acts for the regulation or even rebuilding of the market, but with 
legislation enabling local authorities to improve their towns.
This enabling legislation prepared the ground for the building of new 
markets, or the remodelling of the old, at local level. Town councils were 
therefore careful to instruct the drafter of a local bill how they intended 
to raise the funds for any improvement to be undertaken in markets to 
accord with the wishes of traders. A range of possible ways of raising the 
necessary revenue were employed, nearly all of which involved a financial 
commitment by the whole community, and if not a commitment then a 
sacrifice. In Southampton, pressure upon space in the market forced the
[1] 56 Geo. Ill C .25  s s . 32 ,6 5  [ 1 8 1 6 ] ;  43  Geo. Ill c . 3 7  s s . 4 4 , 5 2  [ 1 8 0 3 ] ;  52 
Geo. Ill C .72  S .21  [ 1 812 ] ;  55 Geo. Ill c . 7  s .65  [IBIS]; 54 Geo. Ill 
C.105 S . 4 6  [ 1 8 1 4 ] .
[2] SO Geo. Ill C.62 s.4S [1810]; SS Geo. Ill c.43 s.28 [1815]; SO Geo. 
Ill C.38 S.37 [1810]; 41 Geo. Ill c.126 s.35 [1801]; 3 Geo. IV c.57 
S.40 [1822]; 1-2 Geo. IV c.l21 s.59 [1821]; 51 Geo. Ill c.l73 s.43
[1811]; 43 Geo. Ill c.37 s.Sl [1803].
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[1]. As these case opinions pointed out, the exchange of newly created 
rights in corporate property for buildings or land ran entirely contrary to 
both the spirit and the letter of the law; private rights in public 
property designated by the crown could not exist. Consequently individuals 
could not legitimately be ’sold’ a market. Certainly more ingenious and 
less corrupt means of allowing private individuals to fund the expansion or 
rebuilding of a market were available, but charity or gifting proved to be 
exceptional rather than common. Only prominent local patrons could afford 
the expense of construction whilst forgoing any return. In the small town 
of Cambourne in Cornwall it would have been difficult to justify the 
building of a new market until the patronage of Lord de Ounstanville 
brought one into being in 1802 [2], and earlier in 1783 the Earl of Orford 
had built a market cross at Swaffham in Norfolk to establish a market at 
the market hill [3]. Neither took the toll of their respective markets.
[1] Case opinion on market toll rights, [71827], Hunts. R.O., Huntingdon 
Corporation MSS. Acc. 2525 box 3 bundle 6; Case opinion on market 
tolls, Newmarket, 1828, Cambs. R.O. R54/10/9b (verso) [opinion in 
pencil as reply to submission]. Cf. VCH Berks. 3, 68.
[2] Daniel and Samuel Lysons Magna Britannia being a Concise Topographical 
Account of the Several Counties of Great Britain (London, 1806), III, 54.
[2] Richard Beatniffe The Norfolk Tour: or Traveller’s Pocket Companion; 
Being a Concise Description of All the Principal towns. Noblemen’s and 
Gentlemen’s Seats and other remarkable places in the County of Norfolk 6th 
edn. (Norwich, 1808), 266. Further evidence of Orford’s philanthropy
associated with market refurbishment and building can be found in Beds. 
R.O. KK/880-883. Cf. VCH Beds. .3. 268. The rationale for such gifts was 
stated by James Anderson in 1797: ’There are many of the distant hilly
parts of Britain, whose prosperity is much repressed by want of
markets...; and it much behoves the owners of land in those districts, to 
remove an evil which diminishes the income they have a just title to 
expect from their land. to such an astonishing degree’.(James Anderson 
’Want of Markets Hurtful to Agriculture’ in Essays Relating to Agriculture
and Rural Affairs 4th edn., (London, 1797), III, 219). The most obvious
advantage, according to later writers in the Ricardian tradition, was that 
market provision locally increased rents for land (’J.B.’ ’On J.D. Jun’s 
’Theory of Rent’’ British Farmer’s Magazine. 8 (1835), 565).
Naturally both generous gifts and illegal deals of the type undertaken in 
Southampton were a means of ensuring the reduction of set-up type 
transaction costs associated with market exchange. More commonly, however, 
market committees proposed that, in order to achieve the same effect, the 
revenue for the building programme should be secured either from the widest 
possible constituency or through terms so tightly drawn as to bind lessees 
to covenants for virtual self-regulation. In the process of discovering the 
means by which popular support for market improvement might be turned into 
financial support for new building or the clearing away of market 
impediments, English towns engaged in what we shall recognise as an attempt 
to partially internalise the functioning of the decentralised market by 
creating private property rights therein.
The costs of rebuilding or relocating a market could be considerable yet
the most common and apparently successful means of raising the necessary
funds was, according to the contemporary student of rural economy William
Marshall, to raise tolls [1]. However, where major improvements to the
whole town were intended, increased rates and levies had more commonly to
be used. In most of the significant improvement schemes of the period for
county or market towns which included plans for the refurbishment of
markets (such as those for Margate, Stamford, Ipswich, Derby, Norwich,
Plymouth and Cambridge and, in London, Billingsgate and Smithfield markets
[1] William Marshall The Rural Economy of Gloucestershire (2nd edn., 
London, 1796), 106. King’s Lynn paid for improvements by increasing
rentals by between five and twenty per cent following the 1806 
improvement Act. Beatniffe The Norfolk Tour, 236.
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snd the surrounding areas [1]) any and every method of raising funds 
was employed. Subscription schemes of one variety or another were 
frequently chosen, not least because only those who supported the 
improvement schemes would directly benefit as a result; besides, 
subscribers to a projected building might be allowed to purchase a 
lease to the tolls of the market thereby. At Tewkesbury in 
Gloucestershire the historian of the town, William Dyde, reported:
...a commodious market-place has been lately erected, at the upper end of Church-street, at the joint expense of twenty subscribers. to whom (in consideration of their having erected such a building) a lease has been granted by the corporation. of the tolls of stallage, for the term of ninety-nine years, at the end of which term, the building and all the profits of the market are to revert to the corporation [2].
This legal means of transferring public rights to private hands was 
probably consistent with the tendency toward reduced transaction costs 
associated with market property rights. It represented, in fact, the 
single most innovative contribution of England to the development of 
the market in the course of the late eighteenth and
til See limfifl 22 August 1807 (Margate); Huntingdonshire. Bedfordshire, gambridaeshire and Peterborough Gazette 11 April 1818 (Stamford); rifflea 30 October 1817 (Ipswich); ibid, 26 February 1821 (Derby); t^grwich Chronicle 17 March 1792, Times 16 October 1818 (Norwich's two improvement schemes); Times 9 January 1823 (Plymouth); andf^rmiingdonshire. Bedfordshire. Cambridgeshire and Peterborough (Gazette January 19 1820, ibid, 16 September 1820 (Cambridge); Thomas Pennant A__from London to the Isle of Wight (London. 1801) volume 2. 146(Gosport); C. Wills A__S h o r t __ H i s t o r i c a l  Sketch of the Town ofeamstaple (Barnstaple, 1855), 24 among other descriptions, Bristol, often an exception in the history of market organisation, improved the conditions of the cattle market and raised money for the new Council House by using loans of 4,000 in 1825 - it succeeded because of the profitability of the council's own market ventures (Graham Bush and Its Municipal Government 1820-1851 (Bristol, 1976), 73).
¡2) William Dyde The 'Tewkesbury. 1798). 85. __ and__ Antiquities___al___Tewkesbury
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early nineteenth century and appears to have occurred in numerous 
markets towns throughout the southern part of the country [1]. By 
transferring the stallage and piccage tolls described in the 
corporation's market charter. the town council had managed to find 
something that potential subscribers would purchase at a premium. 
Furthermore. leasing out the market toll was entirely consistent with 
municipal law and practice. By leasing the tolls of their market, 
corporations found that they were able to enjoy all of the benefits of 
the ownership of unproductive but saleable capital without having to 
incur any of the costs of repair or removal. After all. tolls for 
stallage and piccage in particular were difficult to police and costly 
dues to collect. Were private individuals to collect them on their 
own behalf. the transaction costs associated with toll baaed market 
prescription might bo substantially reduced. When Cambridge Town 
Council sought an opinion of counsel on its plan to sell off tolls and 
replace them with what it described as 'rents' for stalls and access 
to the market. it argued that such a move would offer '...both to the 
seller and the buyer comfort and convenience' [2]. As if to emphasise 
the very real costa of
til Because the 'subscriber' had no substantive moaning in law. subscription clubs frequently referred to their members as 'trustees'; this should not bo taken to imply that subscription schomoa wore organised as legal trusts. however. and the old municipal law of trusts hardly would have applied to them. See 'RC on Markets...'. 1. 195 ff. Below the formation of a number of such clubs la discussed. Apart from those detailed instances, see John Wodderspoon Memorials oftha-Ancient Towp of Ipswich in the County  Suffolk (Ipswich andLondon. 1850). 11-12; Times 24 November 1811; VCH Beds. 2. 260; 'RCon Market Rights...'. 2. 134; 'Nows of Agriculture. Rural Economy*tc.' British Farmera Magazine 1. (1826-7). 404; ibid. 2. (1828). 377.
[21 Case for counsel's opinion as to Stallage and Piccage Tolls in Cambridge. 1838. Cambs. R.O.. Cambridge City Council MSS. Bundle document 1. In almost identical circumstances. Nottingham had ’ought clarification on the same point in 1833. See Records of the lyouah gf Wgttinaham being a series of extracts from the Archives of ma-CorDoratM»n of Nottingham (Nottingham. 1952). VIII. 423-427.
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organising toll collection and administration, the council recalled in the 
same document the problems that had been experienced in relation to the 
livestock markets:
In the Hog and Cattle Market no certain account of the amount of 
toll received can be obtained. Some Toll was taken on Sale of Hogs 
and Horses up to the period of the Action brought by the 
Corporation some years since to establish their right to a Toll 
traverse in which they failed. Since that event no toll has been 
taken for sale of any goods in the Cattle Market (except Hogs) 
which is now used, not only for the Sale of Hogs and Cattle but of 
dead Goods of various sorts...[1].
Since it was seeking to reduce the costs of maintaining a toll based market 
the council wished to know whether the plan to replace stallage and piccage 
charges by rents (such as a Id per yard of stall frontage in the Vegetable 
market) would be legal. Sadly for the council, counsel’s opinion was that 
it was not. Nevertheless it was quite legal for councils such as Cambridge 
to follow the example of other towns and sell or more frequently lease toll 
rights whilst preserving their charter ownership. This compromise was, in 
fact, so successful - at Tewkesbury as well as elsewhere - that the leasing 
of tolls to subscribers became the most frequently used form of raising 
funds for restoration or rebuilding. Furthermore, where markets had been 
held by unknown title holders for longer than eleven years, customary law - 
as a contemporary precedent noted [2] - allowed that leases might be
assigned to any ’stranger’. Consequently many ’ownerless’ markets and fairs 
could legitimately be leased by corporations through the crown, an 
arrangment that no doubt profited both. Of course, the sale of tolls was
[1] Cambs. R.O. Cambridge City Council MSS., Bundle 101. Cf. the case of 
Wallingford, VCH Berkshire,3, 68.
[2] Precedent document, undated [71790-71810], PRO (CL) DL 41/39/59. This 
precedent opinion in Ouchy of Lancaster papers is the only reference 
found concerning this point of law. Whether it was tested and applied 
can only be conjectured.
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not an entirely novel form of reducing the fixed costs of running 
local markets - such as the maintenance of markets in good order.
However, as we shall see from the evidence of lease and assignment 
arrangements themselves. toll selling probably provided the town 
corporation with an opportunity to reduce the transaction costs 
associated with market exchange in an era of changing regulatory 
practice.
The specification of the rights of collectors of markets tolls 
through leases was obviously important for the market committees of 
town councils. not least because the transaction cost internalising 
effect of leasing market tolls for rent farming by others would only 
be efficient if the specification costs of the contractual 
arrangements were designed to be lower than all existing transaction 
coats. The higher the specification and supervision cost of 
'contracting-out' market tolls the less efficient the market would be. 
Indeed much of the effort directed toward designing lease contracts 
for markets during this period was devoted to ensuring that neither 
supervision nor specification costs would be excessive. One way in 
which this might be achieved was by writing leases in such a way as to 
niake lessees self-regulatory and self-supervisory. requiring in other 
words that they observe strict rules about which there could be no 
dispute. Some conditions for those lease documents wore perhaps 
Identical with those in other leases and were not particular to market 
lease arrangements. With the assignment of the Sunday market tolls at 
Brldport in 1826. for example. the new owner of the market tolls was 
■■equirod to observe covenants to 'deliver up the peaceable and quiet 
possession of the said Tolls hereby granted and
also...the Toll-gatherers box...’ at the end of the lease [1].
11
Nevertheless the often less than generous terms devised by some town 
councils indicates that it was their intention to do much more than to 
establish terms for entry and exit to a profitable leasehold property. In a 
number of market leases of the latter half of the period under examination 
more wide ranging covenanted responsibilities appear to have been 
envisaged. An example of such wide ranging toll-lease covenant arrangements 
comes from Kingston-upon-Thames, where the draft of a lease prepared in 
1836 required the potential lessee to pay for ’all sufficient and necessary 
Stalls, Shambles, Tressels, Boards etc. and fixtures for the use and 
accomadation [sic] of traders’: further, he had to agree to ’Take care to 
keep the Pitching and Paving of that part of the Market Place where the 
fair and Market are held in good [?order]’ [2]. These fixed costs are, of 
course, not a part of the generalised transaction cost element of market 
maintenance; but they do represent a significant abrogation of council 
responsibility for local services, like paving and stall arrangement and a 
concern with the reduction in the supervision costs associated with the 
maintenance of physical property. However in several toll-lettings in the 
course of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century conditional 
covenants transferred the costs of supervision and even measurement to toll
[1] Indenture of assignment of tolls to Thomas White for Sunday market, 
Bridport, 1826, Dorset R.O. B3/050 fol. 2. On the regulation of Sunday 
tolls in general, see Times 10 May 1814, 12 May 1814.
[2] Draft of lease for the market tolls, Kingston-upon-Thames, 1836, 
Surrey R.O. KB 19/4/38 (3). These rules were later echoed in printed 
orders of the Corporation, see KB 19/1/1. Cf. Brynmor Pierce Jones From 
Elizabeth to Victoria. The Government of Newport (Mon.) 1550-1850 
(Newport, 1957), 149.
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lessees. In Devizes, for example, tolls for the cheese market carried 
responsibility for inspection of the weighing the product before sale [1] 
and a not insubstantial number of toll lettings featured similar covenanted 
responsibilities which would otherwise have been regarded as a part of the 
duties of the council under the supporting market charter or Act. Apart 
from those leases already mentioned,the covenanting of responsibilities for 
the management of exchange in the market area appears in the lease of 
market tolls at Wallingford dated 1819 [2], the lease of piccage and 
stallage tolls at Evesham in 1822 [3], Banbury’s lease for similar rights 
in 1834 [4], the lease of the market site and all associated rights made by 
the Corporation of Rye [5] and the early nineteenth century toll leases of 
Leighton Buzzard in Bedfordshire [6]. It is not clear from the evidence of 
the surviving market leases alone, however, when lease covenants for the 
partial or absolute transfer of management responsibilities became common 
in southern England. In Bildeston in Suffolk, for example, the covenanted 
reponsibi1 ities described on leasing the market along with other rights in 
1765 did include some deal of supervision and the maintenance of regular
[1] Waylen Chronicles of The Devizes, 206.
[2] Berks. R.O. W/TLt 1-11.
[3] Worcs. R.O. 7123/8/1.
[4] Oxford R.O. BB XXIX/i 1-2.
[5] Sussex R.O. (L), Rye Corporation MSS. 121 /1-3 .
[6] Beds. R.O. KK. 320-3 (1 bundle, piece numbers not given).
policing of market transactions [1]. In the main however lease evidence 
does suggest that, as in the case of covenants for agricultural tenure, the 
early nineteenth century rather than the late eighteenth century was the 
period in which the lease specification of market rights became most common 
and most essential and that more of the leases of toll written in the 
1820’s and 1830’s specified the exact administrative requirements of 
lessees than in any other part of the period with which we are concerned.
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Obvious advantages were to be gained by creating this class of independent 
toll owners or prescription holders in addition to any reductions in 
aggregate specification cost - advantages which become apparent after 
examining the circumstances under which public market regulation was 
undertaken. In the town of Chichester, a not untypical market town of the 
period, toll collection rested in the hands of the corporation well into 
the nineteenth century. Consequently they had to undertake to pay the costs 
and salary of a toll collector. This could impose significant and rising 
costs upon a small council, costs which, moreover, were required to be paid 
as part of the charter responsibilities of the council. Chichester - a not 
over-conscientious authority - employed only two men from 1796 for 
’...putting out the market wattles and collecting the market dues’ at ten 
pounds each [2] but only reduced this burden after the passing of the 
">arket act for a new market house in 1808; thereafter two toll collectors
[1] Suffolk R.O. (I) HA 61/436/247.
[2] Francis W. Steer (ed.) Minute Book of the Common Council of the City 
of Chichester 1783-1826 Sussex Record Society volume 62 (Lewes,1962), 
48, entry for 9 June 1796; idem. The Market House. Chichester 
(Chichester, 1962), 7. Cf. Brynmor Pierce Jones Elizabeth to Victoria, 
39,72.
five pounds each [1]. The
f rom much 1more than the e
tol Is might actual ly incr
 advantage of farming out tolls,
however, came    xpenditure saved upon salaries.
e trade. In Dartford the
advantages of leasing toll prescription were plain to John Dunkin in 1844;
The Market-house and shambles continued to exist in their original 
situation till 1769, when having been long found most incommodious to the 
thoroughfare and trade of the town, pursuant to an arrangement with the 
feofees of the Grammar school, they were removed to their present 
situation; the farmers however continued to assemble in the High-Street 
as heretofore, but the practice of selling corn by sample having 
ultimately entirely superceded bringing it in sacks to market, the space 
below the Market-house gradually became unoccupied and at the close of 
the last French War the market place was nearly deserted by hucksters, 
butchers etc., when Mr. William Lucas who rented the tolls, with 
difficulty persuaded some tradesmen from London to bring down their 
goods. They succeeded, and he enclosed the hucksters’ stalls for their 
use. One tradesman brought another and the market so much increased, 
that Mr Pearce, finding the space too small, accommodated them with 
stalls in the High Street, which from its thoroughfare everyone seemed to 
prefer, insomuch that at last the new market-place in the feofee’s yard 
became deserted; and the traders again took their station on the ancient 
site [2].
Pearce appears to have made some considerable efforts to maintain and even 
develop his investment in the market toll rights; it appears inconceivable 
that the part-time salaried cryer and his assistant at Chichester would 
have had any incentive to undertake the same market expansion. Indeed, 
their duties would ultimately have included fining traders who strayed from 
the charter site for the market. At Dartford the persuasive Mr Pearce 
brought traders back to a market site with the promise of better facilities 
and access.
[1] Steer (ed.) Minute Book. 99, entry for 21 February 1809. In some
instances it proved apparently economical to allow certain individuals 
to take some portion of toll in lieu of salary, as at Salisbury (Wilts. 
R.O. G/23/1/34, entry for 14 July 1824) and at Wokingham (VCH 
Berks..3. 227). This practice does not appear to have been widespread
however.
[2] John Dunkin The History and Antiquities of Dartford with Topographical 
Notices of the Neighbourhood {London,1844) , 252-53.
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When leasing proved to be less attractive to subscribers, more general 
forms of funding had to be found and. in some few cases, an annuity or 
tontine was issued to fund the building of the new market. The tontine, a 
favourite means of raising capital in the eighteenth century, reduced the 
risk of investing in projects like new markets by operating a sinking fund 
of capital in which default of payment or decease increased returns for 
survivors and non-defaulters. For smaller investors who at the same time
/
! wanted an investment opportunity and a means of improving their own
environment, the tontine offered a way of accomplishing both; for town
councils, of course, the tontine was an ideal solution. Self-management by
members of the tontine reduced the costs of organising capital finance, and
allowed the council to concentrate upon more important and routine
payments. At Plymouth, for example, the tontine issue of a few hundred
pounds succeeded where an attempt at leasing had previously failed [1] and
when Gloucester’s traders and farmers reported themselves to be in need of
a new site for market, the corporation had a survey drawn up of the Fleece
[1] John Beckerlegge ’Four Hundred Years of Municipal Finance’ Annual 
Reports and Transactions of the Plymouth Institution 17, 1928/9 -
j 1935/6, 255. Contemporary Plymouthians seem to have been willing to
augment the fund at intervals, Times 9 January 1823. Precisely when 
I tontines and other forms of mutual fund were replaced by share issues
as a form of raising capital is difficult to discern. Only three of the 
624 companies floated in the equity markets in 1824-5 were market 
companies, and these together with the so-called ’provisions companies’ 
also floated at the time,represented a mere 2.25X of the total equity 
capital raised; over four-fifths of these companies were. in turn, 
created for and located in London (Henry English A Complete View of the 
Joint Stock Companies formed during the Years 1824 and 1825; being six 
hundred and twenty four in number (London.1827), 29). By comparison,
the number of market companies founded in the 1850’s through share 
issue suggests that this properly belongs to the age of Victorian civic 
reform rather than to the late Georgian age. See, for example, the 
experience of Crewe in W.H. Chaloner The Social and Economic
Development of Crewe,1780-1923 (Manchester, 1950), pp.8Sff. and notes 
below.
Inn in the city ’...to see whether the same can be converted into a 
commodious Market Place’[l]. After deciding instead to take premises for 
the market in the city’s Eastgate Street in 1783, some £4000 was raised 
through a tontine to pay for the new building [2].
153
All of the alternative forms of ownership discussed (by transfer of
prescription, lease of tolls or subscription to either a purchasing
federation or a plan to take over toll-gathering made up of a local
consortium) produced entirely different forms of organising institution
from the market court or committee. It is logical to infer that, because
these forms of organisation could now meet the considerable transaction
costs associated with market exchange, they were indeed more efficient
institutions. The evidence is however more equivocal and several points
should be born in mind in appraising the relative efficiency of these
alternative forms of ownership and control. First, the subscription ’clubs’
which purchased markets or market rights were legally restricted in the
policing and control they had to undertake. Unlike the market or mayoitdty
courts they were not required (indeed were not, as private citizens,
allowed) to enforce obedience to their own prescriptive rights save through
the courts. Whilst eighteenth century councils had effectively prevented
market users from bypassing their corporations’ market rights by excluding
offenders from their rights as private citizens (at Gloucester those who
avoided toll payment to the corporation had to show cause why they should
oot lose their franchise and in the town of Hertford only freemen were
['] Order for survey of the Fleece Inn, Gloucester, 1778, Corporation 
Minute Book, Gloucs. R.O. Gloucester Corporation MSS. B 3/11 fol. 226.
i2] ibid. B3/11 fol. 357; B3/12 fol. 31.
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given access to markets from 1773 [1]), the new types of organisation could 
not exercise direct influence over consumers and stall holders through 
similar sanctions. Their ultimate sanction was, of course, to remove 
stalls or close or remove the market. More frequently, no doubt, 
subscribers committees or representatives urged that transgressors should 
be punished by the courts or by notice to the common council of the town. 
In one of the few surviving minute books of a committee of subscribers, 
from Arundel’s corn market for the period after the sale to subscribers in 
1833, not infrequent referrals of cases are made to the town council in
[1] Orders of Common Council, Borough of Hertford MSS. Volume 5, Herts. 
R.O. fol. 290v, entry for 30 December 1773; Order respecting preventing 
toll-taking, Gloucester, 1779, Corporation Minute Book, Gloucs. R.O. 
Gloucester Corporation MSS. B 3/11 fol. 245. A later account suggests 
that the decision to prohibit non-freemen from marketing in Hertford 
caused 'considerable litigation at the time...’ although no evidence 
has been uncovered of this in the higher courts (’RC on Markets...’, 2, 
119). Other examples of summary restrictions upon who could buy and 
sell in the market can be found in ’Order respecting Tolls at 
Dunstable’, 1814, Beds. R.O. P72/28/12; ’Proceedings of the Committee 
appointed by the Corporation of Salisbury’, 1817-49, Wilts. R.O. 
G/23/1/34, entry for 12 May 1822; John Boys A General View of the 
iculture of the County of Kent (London,1796), 172 and Felix Hull
(ed.) A Calendar of the White and Black Books of the Cinque Ports. 
1432-1955 (London,1966), 562-3 but in only one of these instances
(at Hastings) did councils seek to restrict market entry to ’freemen’ 
only. These rules for the use of the market should be distinguished 
from more general municipal legislation of the town councils throughout 
the period which sought to prevent hawkers and pedlars from taking 
advantage of the market without paying toll. See, among the many 
accounts of meetings raised by or on behalf of market traders 
themselves for the supression of the hawking trade during the market, 
Huntingdonshire.Bedfordshire.Cambridgeshire and Peterborough Gazette 27 
July 1816, 6 Juno 1818; Felix Farley’s Bristol Journal 6 February 1790; 
Annual Register 56, 1813, 102.
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I hopes of retribution [1]. The second source of the relative efficiency of 
I subscription schemes or purchasing consortia resulted from the pedestrian 
j observation made earlier in this essay that small groups of individuals 
with capital investment in price-regulated institutions have lower 
j incentive costs to police fraudulent behaviour; in other words,
j responsibility for policing and detection of evasion now rested with those1
I few people with a personal incentive to detect wrongdoing. Consequently 
I these new forms of organisation associated with newly transferred property
i rights in markets (seemingly half way between organised firms and
i
i representative councils) were, in the true sense of the word,more
economical.
Of course rural market traders were not entirely unfamiliar with the
(
j introduction of hierarchical forms in market organisation having themselves
been threatened by the attempt to substitute regulated shops for markets in
the years of the most significant price rises of the war years. The
'parochial shops’ founded in the 1790’s were an immediate solution to the
[1] Minute books of subscribers meeting, Arundel corn market, 1833-1923, 
Messrs. Holmes, Campbell and Co. (Solicitors), Arundel. My thanks are 
due to Mrs. Gill, Archivist of West Sussex Record Office, for making 
available photocopies of this very rare and (in 1984) undeposited item. 
There exist only two archival collections relating to nineteenth 
century southern English provincial market companies - those for the 
Ashford and Rye Cattle market companies (Lesley Richmond Company 
Archives: The Survey of the Records of 1000 of the First Registered 
Companies in England and Wales (Aldershot,1986), pp.2, 10) - although
some earlier urban market company records survive in county and borough 
collections, for example those used by Barber in his study of Leeds 
(Brian Barber 'Municipal government in Leeds, 1835-1914’ in Derek 
Fraser (ed) Municipal Reform and the Industrial City (Leicester,1982), 
B2), the records of the Market company established in Newport (Brynmor 
Pierce Jones Elizabeth to Victoria, 148) and the records of the various 
London market companies surveyed by Webb in 1891 are all still extant 
(Sidney Webb The London Programme (London,1891), Chp. 6).
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pressing problem of feeding the population in times of dearth (the first 
recorded parochial shops were opened in 1794 [1]) but began as charitable 
solutions to the short term problem of relieving the pressure of want from 
the local poor population. This charity usually took the form of extended 
credit facilities of one kind or another [2] but soon developed the 
characteristics of firm type hierarchies of internal allocative functioning 
- that is to say, these parochial shops soon developed their own methods of 
procuring stock, producing finished products and selling to customers. What 
the parochial shop movement - for such it was proclaimed to be [3] - 
offered was a rational solution to the problem of market misallocation by 
the humanitarian rationing of community credit, a feature which was seldom 
evident in the best run markets communities of the rural south; yet for our 
purposes the most significant feature of these ad hoc arrangements for 
emergency provisioning was the presence of very similar structural snd 
operational characteristics to those associated with the decentralised, 
privatised market or the nineteenth century firm. The Reverend Glasse’s
[1] David Macpherson Annals of Commerce (London,1805), volume 4, 461.
[2] e.g. M.F. Davies Life in an English Village: An economic and
historical survey of the parish of Corsley in Wiltshire (London,1909), 
77-78; Bishop of Durham 'Extract from an Account of a Village Shop at 
Mongewell in the county of Oxford’ Reports of the Society for Bettering 
the Condition and Increasing the Comforts of the Poor 1, (1803), 13-20; 
Annual Register 51, (1807), 867; John Vancouver An Enquiry into the
Causes and Production of Poverty, and the State of the Poor, Together 
with the Proposed Means for their Effectual Relief (London, 1796), 23,
note.
[3] Thomas Bernard 'Extract from an account of what is doing to prevent
scarcity, and to restore plenty in this country; with observations’ 
Reports of the Society for Bettering the Condition and Increasing the 
Comforts of the Poor, 3 (1801), 60-61. The earlier 'box-clubs’ were
more nearly charitable enterprises relying on the generosity of local 
gentry for support (see, for example, the description in Gentleman's 
Magazine. 60 (1790), 591).
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hop at Groenford in Middlesex, for example, procured stocks locally, 
set rigid opening times and provided tickets for the use of the shop 
by the poor in lieu of price or quantity rationing. By controlling 
the allocative process, Glasse reasoned, the opportunity for market 
traders to engineer a monopolistic control over their customers and 
the shirking of legal responsibilities for the observance of weights 
and measures laws was reduced [1]; equally a certain economy in 
transaction costs may be inferred through which more efficient - and 
inot to say safer — forms of market transaction wore probable. 
Neverthless the internal or organisational control of market provision 
was loss frequently conducted through ouch temporary shops than 
through the new market subscription clubs, whoso functions also 
included the fixing of sufficient capital for refurbishment and market 
improvement as well as determining the rules for the functioning of 
the market. The simultaneous appearance of the new private committees 
and the parochial shop movement should nevertheless be recognized as 
more than a coincidence.
Naturally, improvement of any kind coot money and however it was 
arranged, whether through lease, tontine or sale, market title holders 
including corporations did their best to reduce the costs of repair 
and refurbishment. Some improvement might be made using existing 
buildings and adapting them to the needs of the trading community; in 
particular other public buildings could bo used to provide
accommodation for farmers' and factors' stocks. Places of
antortainment and worship. for example. often proved to offer more 
apace for market trading. In Bury St,. Edmunds,
tl) Rovd. Dr. Glasse 'Extract from an account of a village shop at Groonford, in Middlesex' ibid.. 55-58.
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Ringwood in Hampshire and at Lincoln the theatres of the town, usually 
owned not by private individuals but by the corporation or council, were 
made to provide facilities of one variety or another for the market [1], 
It is by no means certain that all newly built places of entertainment were 
intended to have such a dual function; indeed the one hundred or so 
theatres built in provincial England during the reigns of the last two 
Georges were funded by subscription schemes which must have vied with those 
of the market authorities for local capital for market improvement [2]. 
Where unused churches or chapels were available they too were mobilised to 
help manage the overflow from growing markets but were naturally never 
designed with this use in mind. When the market at Poole expanded in 1827 
to the Unitarian meeting house, the move was intended to offer a short term 
and very imperfect solution to the problem of finding more space for 
traders [3]. Another, perhaps more natural solution, was to sell off those 
parts of the fabric of the market which appeared most in need of removal to 
suitable buyers; in this way a number of southern English market towns 
managed to rid themselves of the physical problem of market dilapidation 
noted earlier whilst also raising funds. Here, however, it was
[1] Bury St. Edmunds Corporation Journal, 1769-1834, Suffolk R.O. (B)
D4/1/4 fol. 32, entry for 6 June 1774 ; George Lipscombe A Journey into 
Cornwall Through the Counties of Southampton, Wilts., Dorset and 
Somerset and Devon (Warwick,1799), 50; Robert Mudie Hampshire Its
Present and Past Condition (Winchester, 1838), 151; T. H. Allen The 
History of the County of Lincoln from the earliest period to the 
present time (London,1834), 204.
[2] C. W. Chaikin 'Capital Expenditure on Building for Cultural Purposes 
in Provincial England, 1730-1830’ Business History, 22 (1980), 54.
[3] John Sydenham The History of the Town and County of Poole
(Poole,1839), 434. (By 1833, a correspondent to the Times was
complaining of the frequency with which shops and other commercial 
premises were attaching themselves to churches, Times 1 January 1833).
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the intervention of individuals rather than subscription clubs that offered 
relief. At Southwold in Suffolk, the old ’market hall’ - really a covered 
market cross of octagonal dimensions - was taken down and sold in 1809 for 
a mere £39 [1] whilst at Sandwich in Kent plans to build a new market in 
1795 were partially funded by the sale by auction of the Crosshouse (again, 
the market cross of the old market) [2]. The premium upon space in all 
such cases added urgency to these sales and no doubt eased congestion at 
both Southwold and Sandwich as at other towns.
Similarly many boroughs planned to make room for traders under, or inside, 
other public buildings and in many corporations the building plans for a 
new town hall included market accomadation or space under the portals of 
the new municipal offices for the traders [3]. At least three shire 
buildings were used for the purpose of providing space for corn marketing, 
either under the entrance pillars or near the dry side of the building; and 
in Launceston, Bodmin and Warminster it must be supposed that even if these 
facilities did not prove to be adequate they were inexpensive [4]; and when 
the council of Gravesend erected a new Town Hall in 1764 convenience
[1] Arthur Farquhar Bottomley (ed.) The Southwold Diary of James Maqqs, 
1818-1876 Volume 1 [Suffolk Records Society volume 25] (Woodbridge, 
1983), 25.
[2] Dorothy Gardiner Historic Haven; The Story of Sandwich (Derby,1954), 
335. C f . the case of Liskeard in Cornwall, F.W.L. Stockdale Excursions 
in the County of Cornwall (London,1824) , 149.
[3] Colin Cunningham Victorian and Edwardian Town Halls (London,1981), 3-4.
[4] ’Report of the SC on County Rates. . . ’BPP Sees.1834, 14 (542), pp.297,
300.
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dictated that the design included space for the town poultry market [1]. 
The ’market-and-town-hal1’ type of construction survived well into the age 
of opulent civic architecture and preceded the building of the major 
municipal town halls of the late nineteenth century. Yet despite their size 
these early attempts to unite the institutions of commerce and political 
control were costly and only infrequently undertaken without a public 
subscription for the town hall building. The new courthouse at Croydon, for 
example, was erected in 1809 and provided space beneath its portals for 
some part of the corn market; it cost the small town corporation of Croydon 
£8000 to build [2].
When corporations and councils were forced to fund new building or 
refurbishment themselves and were either unwilling or unable to raise the 
requisite funds from subscriptions, other funds were often diverted or 
local taxation or rates revenue was used to pay for any necessary repairs 
and maintenance. Over one quarter of the funds needed to build the new 
market place at Wisbech in Cambridgeshire in 1811 came from the highway 
rate (a highly dubious financial ’sleight-of-hand’ in itself); the 
remainder came from corporation income and ’unspecified’ sources, none of 
which were connected with any subscription scheme [3]. In Dunstable in 
Bedfordshire similar switching of funds occurred when the market had to be
[1] G.A. Cooke Topographical and Statistical Description of the County of 
Kent (London,[?1801]), 235.
[2] Rev. D.W. Garrow The History and Antiquities of Croydon (Croydon, 
1818), 191. (This expansion was still apparently insufficient, Times 4 
October 1821 ).
[3] William Watson An Historical Account of the Ancient Town and Port of 
Wisbech (Wisbech,1827), 296.
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repaired and in part rebuilt in 1803. More than forty per cent of the final 
cost of refurbishment and extension of the market was funded from money 
made available by local Turnpike trustees presumably as a gift and as part 
of general improvements to the town [1]. Yet the most incongruous of all 
of these suspicious forms of funding for market sites occurred in Lincoln. 
Here the butter market which was established in the early nineteenth 
century was funded throughout most of its life from monies left over from a 
fund for the provision of borough feasts [2].
By a variety of methods, then, town councils sought to reduce the costs of 
transaction associated with market exchange primarily by transfering most 
of those costs to toll-lessees or buyers thereby funding the extension or 
repair of their local markets. Whether they used legal or illegal (or 
morally dubious) means so to do, their actions were governed in the main by 
the wishes of traders themselves, whose requirements were frequently given 
as the reason for the auction of tolls or the sale of rights to the market. 
Yet the precise chronology of the changing structure of property rights in 
markets cannot be inferred either from the legal record or from the 
documentary evidence of a few southern English councils alone. The evidence 
that is available, however, confirms our general hypothesis that councils 
sought to alienate property rights where the burden of transaction costs
[1] Accounts relating to the rebuilding of Dunstable market, 1803-04, 
Beds.R.O. R5/955.
[2] T.H. Allen History of the County of Lincoln, 204. Lincoln appears to 
have been particularly poor in this regard. Following complaints from 
traders in 1828 asking for better facilities, the corporation merely 
sought additional powers of regulation through bye-laws. Sir Francis 
Hill Georgian Lincoln (Cambridge,1966), 214.
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became intolerable. Yet the exact chronology of this dispersal of community
property rights and the effective ’privatisation’ of common property is not
immediately clear from the study of the examples of individual towns.
Table S.4:Legislation and market building in England and Wales by date in 


























pre-1800 - - - 30.2 -
1801-10 26.3 23.0 50.0 10.3 19.0
1811-20 22.8 16.0 14.3 11.2 20.7
1821-30 31.6 42.0 28.6 19.8 36.5
1831-40 19.3 16.0 7.1 12.9 23.8
1841-50 - - - 13.8 -
1850- - - - 1.7 -
Sources : See Appendix 3.2
Table 5.4 attempts to display leading indicators of the development of 
property rights in markets during the period with which we are primarily 
concerned. Column [1] reports the proportion of legislation which sought to 
amend old obligations or impose new duties upon corporations in relation to 
market ownership passed in each of four decades ; column [2] similarly 
represents the proportion of acts for the remodelling of markets or their 
relocation over the same period. Column [3] represents the issue of new 
rights for market holders in the form of Chancery writs of inquisition ad
quod damnum, and column [4] shows the number of new market sites and 
buildings recorded in each year in several major topographical works 
throught the period 1773 to 1850. The final column converts the market 
buildings sample into a shorter period sample compatible with the 
legislation and writs issue samples by recalculating all of the relevant 
subperiod samples.
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The evidence of Table 5.4 suggests an interesting chronological sequence 
of circumstances which largely agrees with the evidence gathered from the 
leases studied earlier and with the transaction costs approach taken in 
this essay. What becomes apparent immediately is that the largest 
proportion of writs, acts for regulation and improvement and new market 
buildings all occurred during post-war depression years of the 1820’s. 
Whilst contemporary opinion supposed that most of the effect of the long 
cycle depression of 1815-32 was absorbed by the agricultural sector, 
marketing appears to have boomed. One explanation of this phenomenon. in 
line with the evidence of the growth of the use of specific toll lease 
covenants, is that the growth of regulatory legislation specifying the 
responsibility of existing owners in the first and second decades of the 
nineteenth century accompanied the growth of new rights in markets acquired 
autonomously. New responsibilities, in other words, were given to new 
owners of markets. Sales of rights in markets fell during the first years 
of the post-war depression but picked up again thereafter. In the second 
wave of newly created rights to markets in the 1820’s, however, the 
influence of new corporate owners (subscribers and purchasers) is evident; 
only they could observe the necessary regulatory and policing needs of the
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market, and recognized their responsibility to pay the transaction costs of 
market exchange in the lease documents they signed locally and in the 
market acts which passed control of the market to them.
From the 1820’s Parliamentary legislation rather than writs appear to have 
been used to transfer both rights and attendant transaction costs to the 
new owners precisely because of the need to ensure that the specification 
costs of market assignment remained lower than the transaction costs of the 
untransfetted market property. Whilst 22 market titles were transfened by 
writ before 1820, only six were transferted through Chancery between 1820 
and 1841 [1]. In the mid-Victorian decades further centralisation further 
promoted the devolution of rights, though later the strict intention was to 
create the conditions for corporate control with little opportunity for 
subcontracting services in control and surveillance. What is apparent from 
the record of government legislation before 1837, however, is that little 
effort was expended to enhance the trend toward parliamentary supervision 
of ownership. Thus whilst the Municipal Corporations Act of 1835 itself had 
little direct effect upon the building of new markets, it did permit 
corporate owners to extend the extent of their market to accord with the
[1] PRO (CL) C.202/161/24 - C.202/230/29. The in 
London Gazette (from 1811) must be supplemented 
Chancery papers and Local & Private Acts in 
picture of the process. Some markets appear i 
example, writs for Poplar and Herne Bay appear 
- 31 March 1835 and 25 May 1841 respectively - 
writs ) and some earlier writs issued before 
Gazette 2 January 1813) do not appear in 
collections at Chancery Lane or the Acts of Par 
purpose. One extraneous piece, a grant from 
46. All of these materials have been consulted 
writs in the above table.
complete listings in the 
by reference to the 
order to form a complete 
n only one list (for 
ed in the London Gazette 
but not in the surviving 
sherrifs (e.g. London 
either the Chancery writ 
liament passed for the 
1791, is in PRO D.L.41/ 
in preparing the data on
16 i)
new boundaries designated by the Act [l];this was in fact little more than
an administrative convenience. Rather it was later. Victorian, social
administration that achieved the coordination of market law and practise.
Surveying the English market systems in 1910, the Office of the American
Consul in London commented upon the effect of this Victorian legislation
with an uncommon retrospective perceptiveness.
The passing of the local government act of 1858 may be said to have 
inaugurated a new era in the history of markets. since it gave to 
local authorities, elsewhere than in London, conditional powers to 
establish markets. Before this however, the markets and fairs 
clauses act, 1847, had formulated a scheme for the establishment 
and regulation of markets, but its application was limited to those 
cases where its provisions should subsequently be incorporated into 
an act of Parliament. Some of the clauses of the act of 1847 were 
subsequently incorporated in the local government act, 1858, and 
afterwards in the public health act. 1875 [2].
What the 1847 Act offered was a statutory right for councils and
corporations to effect and support the creation of private rights, whereas
the 1858 Act created the conditions under which local authorities might
eventually take control of those private rights. The 1858 Act sounded the
end of the extension of private rights and properly belongs to the earliest
period of Victorian municipalisation in country and city. This pattern is
similarly consistent with the argument that the specification costs of
market rights assignment were critical in determining the need, first for
new forms of property transfer, then for new forms of supporting
institution for market society. At the zenith of nineteenth century
industrial capitalism, then, the state - the ultimate guarantor of private
rights and certainly the least costly - created and enforced these private
[1] 5 & 6 Will. IV c. 76 ss. 7,8, Schedules A and B [Part 1],
[2] U.S. Department of Commerce and Labor, Bureau of Manufactures 
Municipal Markets and Slaughterhouses in Europe Special Consular 
Reports volume 42 , number 3 (Washington,1910), 65.
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and communal rights in private property. This transformation of 
market property rights from private feudal rights to corporate 
obligations and thence to private and often communal private property, 
can be explained in terms of the attempted reductions in transaction 
costs achieved by each successive change in the controlling 
organisational form. As the organisational form of market control 
became transmogrified so too the need for hierarchical internal 
organisation increased. As market ownership became a popular form of 
communal property ownership through subscription schemes and other 
forms of 'shareholding', declining market forms increasingly came to 
resemble modern firms - not only in ownership and control but also in 
internal structure. With the disintegration of private. feudal, 
ownership the orderliness of markets came belatedly to mimic the 
rational market of the classical economists' textbooks. Only from the 
1830's did it become possible to reorganise markets on the scale 
demanded by atomistic capitalism. When in 1834 the Liverpool market 
committee decided that, instead of allowing market trade to spread 
into neighbouring streets, they should remodel the site they decided 
on principle '...to send the market to the inhabitants...[rather] than 
to bring the inhabitants from a great distance to the market' [1].
The new organisation of market economy achieved in the course of this 
process produced a new style of market architecture as well. With 
plentiful
tl) J.A.P. 'A short account of St. John's Market. Great Charlotte Street. Liverpool with some notice of other Markets in that Town' Arghltectural Magazine. 2 (1835), 130. In 1822, the corporation of Liverpool had undertaken the first stage of market refurblshment by building a market hall of 1100 feet by 200 feet. J.H. Clapham Economic History of Britain, volume 1, 226; Brian D. White A History £i_the Corporation of Liverpool. 1833-1914 (Liverpool, 1951), 6.
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capital, corporations and subscription committees engineered the
significant remodelling of the larger markets and some of the smaller.
Pioneered by George Dymond, Charles Fowler and others the new architecture
of the provincial market was to follow very closely the practical guidance
of the Liverpool market. As one contemporary observer of the new
architecture of markets observed in 1834:
It is worthy of remark that the advantages derivable from the 
concentration of business which takes place in markets and the 
facilities which they afford to purchasers and vendors by giving 
to the former the opportunity of procuring commodities at the 
cheapest rate, and to the latter the convenience of more readily 
disposing of their goods, should until'][^ave been appreciated in a 
greater degree in all countries on the Continent than in Great 
Britain [1 ] .
The new architecture - examples of which included the new markets at Exeter
(1835), Hungerford in London (1834) and Covent Garden (1830) - sought to
make access easy and space for trade plentiful. Traders were themselves 
consulted, not as owners but as users of the property of others. In an 
attempt to draw market traders to the new market at Exeter, for example, 
George Dymond sought the views of the users of the old market and, 
afterwards, installed moveable stalls, a fountain near the fish stalls to
keep the fresh produce cool and marble slabs for cutting the fish for
[1] J. Robertson ’A Descriptive Account, accompanied by plans. Elevations 
and sections, of Hungerford New market recently built from the Designs 
of Charles Fowler Esquire, Architect’ Architectural Magazine 1, 1834,
53-54. Compare this with the reserved judgement of ’Taste, as Displayed 
in the London Markets’ Surveyor, Engineer & Architect 1, (1840), 273-
76. On Fowler’s contribution to the redesign on urban markets, on the 
recognized revolutionary design of the covered market at Tavistock and 
the new architecture of markets in general, see Jeremy Taylor ’Charles 
Fowler: Master of Markets’ Architectural Review 135, (1964), 174-182;
idem. ’Charles Fowler (1792-1867): a centenary memoir’ Architectural 
History 11, (1968), 57-74.
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eventual customers [1]. Even humble market crosses - once berated by 
Marshall for their inconvenience - became at once more grandiose and 
classically ornate and more functional [2] and, after Derby introduced gas 
lighting in the market in 1821 [3], others similarly illuminated their 
traders in order to improve market conditions. This seemingly minor 
revolution might not have been possible had not market ownership changed in 
character over the previous half century. Indeed, in each of the cases of 
architectural improvement noted above, it was a private subscription club 
or market company that directed the design or demanded the improvements 
provided.
The physical remains of the late Georgian and early Victorian markets are 
in reality symbols of the effectiveness of the more enduring changes that 
took place in market organisation and the control of market rights after 
1780. The transition from the small cramped conditions of the provincial 
markets of the major market towns characteristic of the earlier period to 
the grand and elegant market designs of the Victorian architects might 
certainly be explained in terms of the growth of investment and capital in 
market equipment as a result of general, macroeconomic, circumstances. 
However, we are forced to ask both who invested in the markets of the rural 
south and why they did so during the period and only one answer appears to
[1] George Dymond 'Description, Plan, Elevation, Sections and 
Specifications of the Exeter Higher Market' Architectural Magazine. 3 
(1836), 12-30.
[2] Hugh Braun A Short History of English Architecture (London,1978), 
158; John Brushe 'An unpublished design by William Thomas for the 
Market Cross, Mountsorrel' Burlington Magazine. 119 (1977), 36.
[3] Times 26 February 1821.
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satisfy the evidence of the large number of towns surveyed above. Once town 
market sites had been freed from feudal rights of ownership and effectively 
transferred to private hands was refurbishment, redesign and redecoration 
and improvement made possible; only through the reassignment of rights in 
markets were the conditions for subsequent improvments in market trading 
conditions possible and transaction costs incidentally reduced. As with 
most private good transaction technologies, markets benefited their 
customers by virtue of these developments and secondary reductions in the 
transaction costs incurred in the course of trade, such as those observed 
above, may further have increased the efficiency of the market system. 
Seldom is the 'privatisation' of public rights entirely successful for 
reasons intimated earlier; in relation to the provincial market, however, 
the process appears to have been a consummate success.
This interpretation of the evolution of the Georgian market as an
institution is, of course, somewhat at variance with that offered by
certain other social and economic historians of the rural institutions of
late eighteenth century England. Following Edward Thompson [1], many have
argued that the institutions of landed and capitalist property came in the
course of the eighteenth century to dominate the traditional forms of
[1] See particularly E.P. Thompson The Making of the English Working 
Class [second edition] (Harmondsworth,1968), 246ff.; idem. Whigs and
Hunters (London,1975) passim.; idem. 'The moral economy of the English 
crowd' Past and Present 50, (1971), 76-136; idem. 'Patrician society, 
plebian culture' Journal of Social History 7, (1973), 382-405. On this 
view of the relationship between property rights and the popular 
conception of traditional sanctions within the framework of the market, 
see Peter Burke 'Revolution in Popular Culture' in Roy Porter and 
Mikulas Teich (eds) Revolution in History (Cambridge, 1986), 210-11 and 
Douglas Hay 'The criminal prosecution in England and its historians' 
Modern Law Review, 47 (1984), 12-14,
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market allocation; that the ’moral economy' of the eighteenth century
crowd, the popular opposition to the excessively punitive game laws, and
the reassertion of community sanctions in the course of the revolutionary
era amounted to a reactionary populist demand for freer and fairer market
conditions in which monopoly would be eradicated. The interpretation of the
history of the institution of the market offered here requires less support
from the evidence of the violent, the political and the mystically
traditional behaviour of 'the crowd’. In fact the ’traditional sanctions’
gradually being eroded in the course of the reign of George III - the
gradual disappearance of the appeal to what Thompson and others evidently
regard as an Elizabethan ’golden age’ of market regulation by customary law
~ did not actually vanish from the rural world ; they were merely taken up
by private individuals whose own interests determined the performance of
market institutions in succeeding years. This constituted not so much what
Harold Perkin regarded as a professionalisation of the market [1] as a
transitional phase in the evolution of economic institutions from being the
means of the controlled exchange of collective property to the private
vehicle for restricted transactions. The regulation of markets passed into
the hands of private individuals, ’property owners’ rather than managers of
a distinctive kind. With the passing of feudal controls, feudal obligations
too passed away and property rights in markets became vested in the hands
of those most interested in their exercise - the traders themselves. To
what extent this revolution in the structure of ownership caused or
affected the organisational and structural changes in the operation of the
market we have witnessed requires much more detailed research than is
[1] Harold Perkin The Origins of Modern English Society, 1780-1880 
(London,1969), 118.
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possible on the small canvass allowed here; but, as has been 
indicated in this chapter, it does appear that substantial changes in 
both ownership and structure occurred with the probable effect of
reducing transaction costs in rural markets.
How far is the experience of the eighteenth and nineteenth century 
provincial market consistent with alternative accounts of the 
evolution of economic structure 7 In this chapter, we have seen that 
the creation of private prescriptive rights, often because of the need 
for capital for market refurbishment, led directly to the formation of 
private associations or subscription clubs which, in the course of 
time, became the better known market companies which emerged in the 
second quarter of the nineteenth century. The motivation for the
formation of these companies was, in the first instance, no different 
from that which prompted the previous generation to devise local 
subscription schemes, and the arguments used in support of the 
formation of local companies - and later joint stock enterprises which 
reached flotation within years - were remarkably the same as those 
used in the promotion of subscription schemes. In one town '...there 
was a feeling generally throughout the town of that kind which 
prompted people to arouse themselves and say that something ought to 
be done, and they formed the Company...' in 1832 [1]. Giving evidence 
bo a late nineteenth century Royal Commission on Market Rights, those
who had been involved it its creation some fifty years earlier
recalled, with some evident surprise given the later history^ of the 
Company, that it had originally been created merely to purchase the 
property of an old and ill
tl] 'RC on Markets...', 3, 20-21. Cf. note 09 above.
appointed market square; it had become a major local employer and a source 
of considerable local pride almost to the surprise of those who had been 
present at the inception of the scheme [1]. Yet there were plainly 
differences between early Georgian subscription clubs and later, Victorian, 
market companies. Subscribers, tontine holders and members of market toll 
'clubs’ bought not only the rights to take toll but often had to take on 
the responsibility (or part of the responsibility) for the administration 
of markets and the punishment of offenders - and this internalising 
function appears to have been of benefit to corporate owners of market 
sites and rights as well as to the community as a whole. The 
internalisation of function associated with this transfer of prescriptive 
rights was accompanied by the creation of alternative internal 
hiererachical arrangements for the administration of these newly acquired 
rights so that, by the time the early market companies were established in 
the larger cities of Britain in the 1830’s and 1840’s, a framework for 
control and administration already existed. We have further suggested that 
the attempt to reduce the transaction costs associated with market 
operation was primarily responsible for this chain of events in the 
evolution of market organisation.
Recognition that market ventures of this type did not fully internalise 
the transaction costs associated with exchange, however, suggests that some 
residual advantage lay in their continued externalisation. Indeed we might 
assert that in the early stages of the transition from market- to firm-type 
organisation competition was weak enough to require that regulatory powers 
[1] 'R.C. on Markets...’, 3, 15.
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had to rest with councils and local authorities who, after all, still owned 
markets in all other senses. Toll holders and subscribers did not merely 
acquiesce in this state of affairs, they positively gained from it. As we 
have seen rudimentary attempts were made to assign some of the functions of 
the market committee to the subscribers and tontine holders through 
covenants, but substantial powers for the detention, trial and punishment 
of offenders still rested with councils because of the demands of 
contemporary administrative law. Even through the improvement acts of 
parliament self regulation by appointees of the council was not encouraged. 
Equally it should be remembered that councils themselves secured an 
advantage through toll rights sale or toll-farming for transaction costs 
were reduced in the market. Perhaps the clearest message of this account of 
the development of alternative forms of organisation to the nineteenth 
century firm has been that we are simply unclear as to the role of market 
processes in the creation of the internally structured hierarchy of the 
firm and that the need for a business history of the market is as great as 
the need for a thorough business history of firm-type organisation.
What was remarkable about this episode in the economic history of the 
market economy was not that the assignment of toll rights took place (toll 
farming itself had long existed in England) but that new forms of 
organisation emerged to exploit the opportunity by reducing transaction 
costs through their partial internalisation. This first sign of the 
creation of internally structured firm-type hierarchies in elementary 
markets forshadowed the development of the vertically integrated wholesale 




CHAPTER SIX: THE ’REVOLUTION IN CONTRACT' AND ELEMENTARY EXCHANGE.
’In no human transactions, not even in the simplest and 
clearest, does it follow that a thing is fit to be done 
now because it was fit to be done sixty years ago.’ [John 
Stuart Mill, 184S]
Economic historians only very occasionally pay attention to the evolution 
of the rules that governed the economic behaviour of men and women in past 
time. The historical evolution of those legal rules which protect and 
guarantee personal freedoms and yet also limit action in pursuit of 
personal or social satisfaction has been viewed as part of an older, less 
rigorous, institutionalist account of economic history and little of the 
older genre of economic history associated with the British economic 
historians of the latter half of the nineteenth century (Ashley, Cunningham 
and even Thorold Rogers, for example) now influences the writing of 
economic historians working today. The traditional themes of the economic 
historiography of the 1890’s - the rise of guilds against the traditional 
individualism of English society: the decline of the feudal ’servus’ as a 
result of purely economic factors affecting the landholders of medieval 
England; the emergence of capital as a ’category’ in the economic life of 
early modern England and the decline of usury; the development of the town 
as the fundamental unit of economic life; and the development of laissez- 
faire doctrines in response to the spur of commerce - all tell of the rise 
of nineteenth century progressive individualism and its emergence from pre­
industrial communalism. Well into the present century the themes of 
individualism and the social impact of capital guided the research and 
writing of historians in the field of legal-economic evolution. Yet the 
final success of the neoclassical paradigm in economics checked the
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development of what had become, by 1939, the dominant form of legal- 
economic history written by historians. From the earliest years of the 
century institutionalist legal economic analysts of one variety or another 
had offered a contrary interpretation to that of both the generic 
neoclassical legal economics and the historical economists' legal-economic 
account of the evolution of modern forms of ownership and control. Even 
institutionalist economists began to adopt similar methods in pursuit of 
the study of economic evolution and it was John Commons who principally 
directed the monumental American legal and labour history researches of 
this new genre of legal-economic history [1]. In recent years, however, 
this approach, too, has come under attack and the writing of almost any 
conceivable variety of legal-economic history is now thought to require at 
least an apology or justification [2]. Unhappily perhaps part of the reason 
for this has been that the most important themes in recent legal economic 
historiography have required - as will be the case here - a substantial 
understanding of the principles and thereby the practise of the common law 
in England.
In this chapter we shall see that new institutionalist explanations of
historical legal evolution associated in recent years with a critique of
* See the note on legal citation in the prefatory notes to this essay for 
details of the practices observed in this chapter with regard to case 
ident ificat ion.
[IJJohn R. Commons Myself: the Autobiography of John R. Commons (Wisconsin, 
1964), 143; idem. Legal Foundations of Capitalism (Madison, Milwaukee 
and London,1968).
[2] G.R.Rubin and David Sugarman (eds.) Law, Economy and Society, 1750- 
1914: Essays in the History of English Law (Abingdon,1984), 1-123 
describes the development of the ’new legal historiography’.
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the neoclassical economics of institutions finds an echo in the slender but 
impressive literature of those legal historians who find themselves 
reacting against conservative, instrumentalist, interpretations of the 
evolution of legal rules. This chapter and the following one will 
illustrate the extent to which the issues raised both by the 
neoinstitutionalist critics of the neoclassical paradigm in economics and 
the 'revisionist’ legal historians of contract share similar 
preconceptions, common themes and common points of view in their work. 
Nowhere has the affinity between the two been more apparent in recent years 
than in the study of the history of contract law where the categories of 
analysis of both the revisionist historians and the neoinstitutionalist 
economists have been almost identical and based upon a critique of 
neoclassical notions of the determinants of legal evolution offered both by 
lawyers and by economists.
The debate over the rise of contract and, more controversially, the 'death 
of contract’ possesses for lawyers the significance economists attach to 
the incremental and wholesale criticisms of the neoclassical assumptions 
used in descriptions of economic organisation and behaviour: indeed, just 
as the subjects of transaction cost, information asymétries and the limits 
of bounded rationality have figured large in the economists’ account of 
legal evolution, lawyers have been concerned principally with the 
consequences of classical, legal, perfectability in contract, the design of 
legal rules for equity or even equality in bargaining and the political 
Question of control over contractual obligations and accountability. The 
twin concerns of economists and lawyers in the two traditions (the
imperfection of allocation through ’contracting’ and the existence of 
social objectives in framing allocative rules) colour the writing of both 
legal historians and economists. We shall incidentally see how closely 
related the two have become by studying the development of contract in 
England between 1770 and 1850 - the period of the ’rise of contract’ 
recently described by one ’revisionist’ legal scholar. Professor Atiyah 
[ 1 ] .
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Because of its considerable importance and apparent unfamiliarity in 
economic history. Professor Atiyah’s important thesis requires some further 
discussion here, for not only will this argument be supported throughout 
this and the following chapter, it will also be developed and a more 
detailed legal economic history of the ’rise of contract’ out of its 
medieval obscurity will be given which accords with the general argument of 
the present essay. Atiyah maintains that during the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth century ’[t]he concept of contract was... replacing custom 
as a source of law’ [2]. The development of a mercantile individualism 
spurred legal change in the area of commercial contract by dissolving the 
older, customary law of market transactions. From the 1770’s, therefore,
[1] Patrick Atiyah The Rise and Fall of the Freedom of Contract (Oxford, 
1979). Atiyah’s thesis is examined here as a refinement and extension of 
much broadly institutionalist writing on the later legal economic 
history of theories of property and exchange obligation, principal among 
which are William Ashley Economic History and Theory (London, 1888), 
Book 2, Chp. 3; Thorstein Veblen The Theory of Business Enterprise (New 
York, 1958), Chp.8; Commons Legal Foundations, Chp.3 and C.B. Macpherson 
The Rise and Fall of Economic Justice and Other Essays (Oxford, 1985), 
Chps. 1, 4, 7-8. Only Atiyah’s work, however, provides a quitessentially 
jurisprudential approach to institutional change and relies upon the 
evidence of the substantive law of elementary contract.
[2] Atiyah Rise and Fall. , 37.
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the conditions existed in which older assumptions about property rights
fell into decline [1] while traditional market sanctions regulating the
market on the behalf of the consumer were gradually being eroded [2]. The
new law of property contract emerged to replace the medieval law of
property as part of ’...the now familiar process by which the significance
of property rights changed from their use value to their exchange value’
[3]. Atiyah summarises this movement toward contract-based commercial
exchange in the following terms:
The period 1770-1870 saw the emergence of general principles of 
contract law closely associated with the development of the 
free market and the ideals of the political economists...The 
period saw the shift in emphasis from property law to contract; 
and within the realm of contract it saw the shift from 
particular relationships, or particular types of contract, to 
general principles of contract and the emphasis shifted from 
executed to executory contract [4].
The present essay largely accords with Professor Atiyah’s interpretation of 
the legal economic history of the period, but suggests that the legal 
historians’ concern with the history of contract during this period is but 
a part of a wider historiographical issue of the late Georgian age, namely 
the emphasis in law and administrative practice upon the reduction of 
transaction costs associated with exchange.
This subject has offered some scope to both economic historians and legal 
scholars of late, though only the latter have been principally concerned in 
the study of the development of the doctrines of contract after 1600. The 
Cl] Ibid., 102.
[2] Ibid., 65.
[3] Ibid., 103 
[<»] IbifJ. . 398.
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very complexity of the issues involved in approaching the whole thesis of a 
’revolution’ in contract means that only those parts of the argument which 
obviously accord well with the general thesis advanced here will be 
discussed, although we shall be saying a good deal more - and in rather 
more detail - about specific issues related to that revolution than has 
hitherto been thought necessary. By analysing the history of contract law 
during the period I want to show both how far legal and economic 
revisionists agree in their assessment of the significance of contractual 
evolution and illustrate how the development of contract during the early 
nineteenth century affected the economic life of Britain by changing the 
rules for the allocation of property rights themselves. The history of 
contract during these years is one of significant if incremental change in 
the protection offered to contractors by the courts - of the decline of 
notions of perfectabi1ity in contract and the rise of an agrarian rather 
than commercial interpretation of breach.incapacity and insufficiency in 
contracting. While very few contemporary texts survive which discuss these 
issues with the clarity required for an appreciation of the trend toward 
freer contract, we can go some way toward illustrating the fundamental 
character of Atiyah’s ’revolution’ by reconstructing the detailed history 
of the law relating to simple contracting from contemporary cases now 
forgotten and generally unremarked by lawyers.
By analysing the legal and institutional history of contract law, I 
further want to show how the institutionalist critique of the concept of 
transaction cost can be used the better to understand the nature of 
fundamental changes in English contract before the present century. We
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shall see that the economists' definition of transaction cost is 
compatible with the conservative critique offered by the 'revisionist' 
contract lawyers. Specifically, we shall see that the existence of 
transaction costs in a competitive economic system presupposes the 
existence of enforceable but flexible property rights in law or, more 
precisely, secure and well established principles of liability in the 
substance and the execution of contract. We shall see how the law of 
contract on the eve of English industrialisation actually accommodated 
the needs of rural as well as of industrial society, and how reform in 
this aspect of the legal framework was part of a longer term evolution 
in post-medieval law. We shall also correct the chronology of the 
revisionist case to support the view that contract law changed in 
response to the immediate need of English society for a means of 
enforcing the allocation of property rights whilst maintaining 
flexibility and minimising transaction costs in the late eighteenth 
end early nineteenth centuries.
The later history of contract law after the introduction of the 
'assumpsit' action (the opportunity to sue someone in the public 
courts for a breach of an undertaking instead of suing them for a 
debt) following Slade's Case (1601) has been regarded as a part of the 
history of commercial law and therefore of law created to suit the 
fieeds of the expanding commercial economy of seventeenth century 
England. Traditionally, legal historians have argued that the law of 
contract had been created by that case and that the leading principles 
cf that law required little if any alteration or further innovation to 
w)<e it acceptable and workable in the commercial climate of 
ndustrialising Britain. Indeed the traditional
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historiography of the development of contract law from the late 
seventeenth century is clear and unequivocal. Only the doctrine of 
consideration (the idea that evidence of parting with money or another 
isset in anticipation of exchange was good enough to prove the 
existence of a contract) needed refinement. and received it, in the 
form of gradual revision of the doctrine according to the principles 
of the new action of assumpsit. Holdsworth, the doyen of the older 
historians of contract, argued in 1933 that '...the doctrine of 
consideration is striking testimony to the manner in which the English 
law of contract has been built up around, and has been conditioned by 
the development of. the common law actions by moans of which contracts 
are enforced' [1] . Such a history was based upon the assumed 
universal applicability of this legal doctrine oven when social, 
economic and political change made the original practice of the legal 
framework of contract invalid. This 'conservative tradition' of legal 
historiography has until recently boon almost unchallenged [2]. 
Today, writers in this tradition argue mainly over how effective the 
transition from debt actions to assumpsit actually was and largely 
ignore the later history of the law at all [3]. They believe that the
[1] W.A.Holdsworth 'Formation and Breach of Contract' (1933) in W.A.Holdsworth Essays in Law and History (Oxford.1946), 134.
[2] Morton J. Horwitz 'The Conservative Tradition in the Writing of American Legal History' American Journal of Legal History 17 (1973), 275-294.
[3] James Barr Adams 'The History of Assumpsit' in Association ofynerican Law Schools (ed.) Select__Essays in Anglo-American Legaliistory (Cambridge,Mass., 1909) . 3, 259-303; J.W.Salmond 'The Historyof Contract' ibid., 320-338; Charles Morse 'History of the Common Law Theory of Contract' Canada Law Journal. 39 (1903), 379-395; W.A.Holdsworth 'Debt. Assumpsit and Consideration ' Michigan Law Review (1913) :347-357; James Barr Adams 'Two Theories of Consideration' Harvqr^ Law Review 12 (1899), 515-531; Samuel Willistón 'Consideration In bilateral contracts' Harvard Law Review 27 (1914), 503-529; George P.Alt 'The Origin and Reason for the Consideration Rule in the Law of Contract' American Law Review. 56 (1922), 345-364.
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lawyers and jurists of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries made 
significant innovations in the law of contract in accordance with the 
principles of assumpsit at common law and, specifically, that they had no 
need to call upon Equity for support. In the words of Sir William 
Holdsworth:
The manner in which they moulded the action of assumpsit, partly 
by logical extension, partly by skilful use of analogies derived 
from the action for Debt, and partly by their own clear perception 
of the conditions under which it was expedient to enforce 
agreements; and the manner in which, by generalising the 
conditions under which that action lay, they gave the common law 
an entirely original theory of contract - are perhaps the most 
striking illustrations of that power [of thought]. No doubt they 
left some problems to their successors to solve; and since those 
successors were often men who had forgotten or who had ignored the 
proceedural basis from which the doctrine of consideration had 
evolved,they sometimes created more problems than they solved. In 
more recent years the sounder knowledge of this branch of our 
legal history, to which the lawyers of the United States have 
mainly contributed, has restored to us the original basis upon 
which the creators of that doctrine built [1].
Until very recently, this interpretation of the later history of contract
might still be regarded as the most popular and the least challenged. The
few earlier criticisms of the conservative historiography took up the
specific issue of the innovation of the sixteenth century lawyers with
regard to breach and specific performance [2].
Yet a new conservative historiography has emerged: it similarly emphasises 
the origins of modern contract in the decline of the action for debt and 
the rise of assumpsit, but also recognizes the later nineteenth century 
innovations as independent activities on the part of a concerned judiciary 
facing modern conditions of contracting and seeking a legal framework
[1] Holdsworth 'Debt, Assumpsit and Consideration’, 357.
[2] e.g. Harry Ballantine 'Is the Doctrine of Consideration Senseless and 
Illogical ?’ Michigan Law Review 11 (1913), 423-434.
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within which to reconcile interests of legal principle and contemporary 
business and commercial practice. The conservative American jurist James 
Adams had asserted in 1899 that these modern doctrines were at variance 
with the strict intention of the founders of the assumpsit action and 
contract itself and that modern. revisionist, practice in England could 
hardly fail to be popular in the United States to the detriment of American 
law [14], The new conservative interpretation has however developed both an 
historiographical and a jurisprudential interpretation of contract which 
emphasises continuity at the expense of innovation. The history of contract 
is written by the conservatives in two distinct parts - the rise of the 
action of assumpsit and the clarification of the doctrines of contract, 
including but without particular emphasis upon the development of the 
doctrine of consideration, from the sixteenth century and earlier; and, 
secondly, a period of innovation in the mid- to late-nineteenth century is 
recognized in which modern doctrines of breach and void condition of 
contract were discussed and reformed [1]. More significant has been the 
return to an interpretation of contract - and thus of the history of 
contract - based upon the moral category of ’promise' rather than 
consideration. The new conservatives argue that contract as promise is in 
accord ’...with decency and common sense’ [2] and that there still exists a 
specific theory of contract law in spite of the recent development of
[1] The most erudite British conservative writing in the genre is that of 
Professor Simpson: A.W.B.Simpson The History of Contract Law: The Rise 
of Assumpsit (Oxford, 1976); idem. ’The Horwitz thesis and the history 
of contracts’ University of Chicago Law Review. 46 (1979), 533-601; 
idem.’Contract: The Twitching Corpse’ Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1 
(1981), 265-277; Idem. ’Innovation in Nineteenth Century Contract Law’ 
Law Quarterly Review. 91 (1975), 247-252.
[2] Charles Fried Contract as Promise : A Theory of Contractual Obligation 
(Cambridge,Mass., 1981), 6.
what has been called the ’open-textured interpretation’ of contracts - a 
development in the practice of construction entirely separate from the 
debate [1].
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This new conservative approach mirrors the development of a new theory of 
contract which emphasises the historical discontinuity rather than 
continuity of the experience of contract under Anglo-American common law 
and measures the efficiency of contract regimes according to distributive 
rather than economic efficiency. It argues against the conservative 
interpretation that there no longer exists a specific and distinct set of 
doctrines which might be recognized as the traditional field of contract 
law; legal scholars associated with this ’revisionist’ position have in 
fact talked of the ’death of contract’ [2]. Essentially. they argue that 
the role of assumpsit in the history of legal evolution has been much 
overstated and that efficient contractual schemes provide efficient 
liability rules which place greater emphasis upon the ex post allocation of 
welfare after some infraction of the law than neoclassical theory allows. 
The revisionist contract theorists, inasmuch as they can be said to adhere 
to a single legal philosophy, are essentially pragmatists. Here too 
scholars of jurisprudence and philosophy have played a not inconsiderable
[1] The ’open-textured rule’ in contract is discussed in G.H.Treitel
Doctrine and Discretion in the Law of Contract : An Inaugural Lecture 
delivered before the University of Oxford (Oxford, 1981), 4ff.; See
also the conservative account in N.E.Simmonds The decline of juridical 
reason: doctrine and theory in the legal order (Manchester, 1984),
Chp.9.
[2] The ’revisionist’ position is equally as wide as that of the
conservatives, but see principally Grant Gilmore The Death of Contract 
(Columbus, 1974): Morton Horwitz The Transformation of American Law 
(Cambridge.Mass., 1976); Patrick Atiyah The Rise and Fall of the
Freedom of Contract (Oxford, 1979).
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role in defining the development of modern contract, most notably in their 
treatment of the distributive efficiency of contract settlement and the 
development of a social-contractual theory of the origins of all contract 
[1]. This novel approach to the theory of contract parallels recent 
developments in law in which a more pragmatic and, in the legal sense of 
the word, an equitable treatment of contract appears to have been 
developing for some time. Indeed, the recent growth of ’open-textured’ 
interpretations of breach, non-performance and inequality of bargaining in 
the courts has indicated that the revisionist case for something 
approaching a common law version of equity principles in contract has 
received support in some judicial quarters [2].
How might the revisionist-conservative debate relate to the equally 
earnest debate among economists and economic historians concerning the 
ubiquity and significance of transaction costs? Clearly the conservative 
viewpoint draws upon a more formal conception of rule-making than that of 
the revisionists. In fact, whilst the new conservative contract theorists 
have dropped much of the older conservative argument concerning the 
inalienability of legal principle from contract they have not entirely 
abandoned the tradition of adherence to a strict interpretation through a 
single coherent theory of legal activity and rule-making in their
[1] In particular A.T.Kronman ’Contract Law and Distributive Justice’ Yale 
Law Journal, 89 (1980), 472-511; I.R.MacNeil ’Essays on the Nature of 
Contract’ North Carolina Central Law Review, 10 (1979), 159-200; Harry 
W. Jones ’The jurisprudence of contracts’ in Gabriel M.Wilner (ed.) Jus 
et societas: essays in tribute to Wolfgang Friedmann (The Hague, 1979), 
169-180.
[2] A popular account of open-textured readings in action is the judgment 
of Denning, M.R., in Lloyd’s Bank v.Bundy (1975) 3 A11 ER 763-764.
interpretation of the history of contract law. Thus contracts are made 
according to the new conservatives against a background of deeply rooted 
moral principles which are embedded in the contractual, and thereby the 
economic, process. These principles are said to exist in the absence of 
specific institutions and, significantly, remain unaffected by 
institutional innovation. Institutions do not call into being legal rules; 
rules pre-date, even predetermine, the emergence of the institutions. In 
their ubiquity, timelessness and fundamental character, these rules possess 
all of the characteristics commonly ascribed to transaction costs by 
neoclassical economists. It would be idle to extend the analogy to the 
dynamic model for the contract theory of the conservative lawyers and the 
property rights model of the free-market economists seek to explain 
different types of economic and legal evolution: the first is interested in 
rule-making merely as a moral or political activity and is plainly anti- 
historical whilst the latter views it as an economic activity.
Nevertheless the anti-institutionalism of the conservative contract 
lawyers is precisely that area of their case most readily and 
enthusiastically attacked by revisionists as being unrealistic. The 
revisionists have in fact stressed that the will to contract of equal 
partners became in the course of the eighteenth century the most important 
determinant of the evolution of the case law of contract in the century 
1750-1850. Dicey had already intimated a similar view when arguing for the 
historical importance of the nineteenth century as a period of significant 
legal innovation, although he had not directly ascribed this to the 
development of the so-called 'will theory’. Dicey’s account was based
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argely upon a perceived division between public and private issues in 
contract which, he argued, emerged in the course of the century (11. 
(Such an argument has been avidly pursued by some new conservative 
theorists of late [2]). Even among revisionists it has boon common to 
identify the early nineteenth century as the lesser of two periods of 
innovative reform in contract. In fact the chronology of the 
revisionist case is largely the same as that of the conservatives: the 
later period (from 1863 to 1900) is said to have witnessed the solid 
achievement of specific reforms, notably the introduction of the idea of 
the 'frustrated contract' (the sort of contract which becomes impossible 
to enforce for reasons altogether out of the control of the contracting 
parties), the specification of the contractual powers of the state and 
the development of the law of evidence from a medieval obscurity to an 
instrument for judging the validity of all contracts. In this chapter I 
want to argue, in support of the revisionist case, that the reformation 
of contract in the early nineteenth century was the start of a wider 
reassesment of the scope of contractual power, but that the contract 
reformation of those years was a product not of commercial or industrial 
needs but rather of agrarian ones. In the next chapter, I want to show 
how the revisions of the law of contract in England between 1750 and 
1850 answered the needs of the community for more clearly defined 
property rights in transaction and that whilst the 'will theory' itself 
the supposition that the 'wills' or wishes of parties to a contract 
were paramount) was an attempt to abridge transaction costs by reducing 
litigati on. the early nineteenth century reforms operated at a simpler
tl] A.V.Dicey Can Enalieh Law Be Taught at the Universities? (London, 1883), 13-19; idem. ' Blacl«stone' 8 Commentaries' National Review. 54 (1909). 653-675.
[2] Simmonds Decline of juridical reason, chp. 9 and worlds cited there.
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level through institutional innovation in relation to simple. market, 
contracts.
Far from disagreeing with the revisionist perspective. the broadly 
institutionalist perspective adopted throughout this essay suggests 
that wo should seek to assess how rooted these innovations wore in 
substantive institutional change in contemporary society and economy. 
In fact. as we shall see. the groat innovations of the nineteenth 
century lawyers — obscured by the conservatives and hailed by the 
revisionists - had their foundation much earlier (in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries) and affected to a 
considerable degree the institutional framework of the domestic 
economy. Some detailed illustration will provide the focus for the 
enalysis of changes in law most nearly affecting Englishmen during 
these years. Through this study we shall see how far the arrival of a 
new law of contract may have been related to autonomous efforts to 
reduce transaction costs through the reduction in opportunities for 
self-seeking behaviour and the regulation of contractual bargaining. 
In particular, we shall examine a number of areas in which revisionist 
legal historians have discovered evidence of a genuine 'revolution' in 
contract and. by a closer examination than has hitherto been 
attempted, we shall discover considerable evidence of a Hanoverian, 
not Victorian. reconstruction of contract law. The most significant 
oi these revisions. because of its general failure to receive 
widespread recognition as a principal reform of the Georgian courts 
before 1037. was the attempt to develop a law of frustrated contract.
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Before the emergence of the idea of the frustrated contract [1] the 
resumption that contractual arrangements should always bo unavoidable 
enunciated in Paradine v. Jane (1647) (21) guaranteed the
nviolability of contracts. For contractors after 1647 in most 
lituations once contracts had been made it was known that withdrawal 
from the conditions of their contracts on the grounds of the 
impossibility of their carrying them out was difficult. By the 
ightoenth century. jurists had come to roly upon this elementary law 
3f contract for the settling of relatively complex questions relating 
to the most simple forms of contract, basing their argument upon the 
mplied inviolability of contractors wishes and the advantages of 
’aradine in increasing the confidence of the commmunity in the legal
instruments of contract. For much of the eighteenth century therefore 
Uttle amendment to the common law of contract performance was thought 
ecessary as a corrective to Paradine. Indeed during the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries the most eminent of jurists 
actually widened the scope of the rule of Paradine (31. Yet even 
before the enunciation of the 'doctrine of frustration'[4] by Lord 
Blackburn in 1863 lawyers tried very hard to wriggle free of the 
unrealistic notion of the inviolability of contract associated with 
the seventeenth and eighteenth century contract theory they had 
inherited. Only in relation to repairs was a theory of frustrated 
contract available to law before 1063 according to the traditional
Chittv on Contracts (24th ed., London, 1977), I, para.4-5.
121 82 EB 897-8.
.'31 e.g.Atkinson v.__ Ritchie (1809). 103 EB 877-9 par Ellenborough,■•J. at 870J Bullock V. Dommitt ( 1 7 9 6 )  101 EB 753.
*^1 i.e. the idea that whore overwhelming obstacles exist to the P®J^ formance of a contract it need not be fulfilled. Tavlor v. Caldwell 1863) 122 EB 309-315.
historiography of contract [1]. The law in this field it has been argued 
ntertained no intention of reform before the reform in covenant law in 
fulk V .  Moxhay (1848) [2] and did not initiate innovation in relation to
19^
the privity of simple contract. However there does appear to have been at 
east one notable attempt to provide a definition of frustration not 
mtirely incompatible with later doctrine, the subtlety of which indicates 
ho* far innovation in relation to the frustration of elementary contracts 
till depended upon notions of sanctity inherited from the early common law 
theory of obligations. It also suggests, powerfully, that private rights in 
tontracts might from time to time escape the ’catch-all’ provisions of the 
tommon law in spite of the iron rule of sanctity.
In 1796, Praed, J., argued not that intentions of the parties to the 
¡ontract had to be reasonable but rather that the performance of the 
:ontract had to be reasonably interpreted. Like much of the case law we 
hall have cause to examine his arguments rather than the application of 
is conclusions to other cases indicate the significance of this revision 
T the common law. In the case opinion of Praed, the failure of a bridge to 
esist the excessively fast flowing and abnormally high waters of a river 
'as said to be an unreasonable interpretation and expectation of the 
ontract [3]. Praed’s statement of his interpretation of the law in the 
recknock Company case is sufficiently interesting to reproduce:
1] The only detailed account remains ’E.F.’ ’Evolution in the Law of
Contracts and the Covenant to Repair’ Law Times, 144 (1918), 418-421.
It is erroneous on several counts.
2] 47 ER 1345-50.
Company of Proprietors of the Brecknock and Abergavenny Canal Co. 
v-Pritchard and others (1796) 101 ER 808 per Praed.J.
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Although a loss by a common flood was probably in the contemplation of 
the parties. they did not look forward to the extraordinary flood which 
was alledged in the plea as the occasion of this loss, nor was it in 
their contemplation to become insurers...Even in cases of covenant, as 
well as in cases of legal obligation of the parties. impossibility will 
discharge the party from the performance of his contract.
Of course some elements of the older assumpsit notions of contract in which
parties' intentions alone determined the performance of the contract were
present even here. Praed remarked, after all, that the impossibility of
performance of the contract depended not upon some physical impediment to
the execution of the contract (the bridge might actually have been designed
to be stronger in fast waters) but rather upon there being no intention of
one of the parties to act as insurers. Yet the complexity of this seemingly
innocuous judgment betrays evidence of a substantial attempt at revision of
the law of frustrated contract. In a subsequent part of his judgment Praed
went on to draw a comparison with Keighley's Case [1] - a case in which a
prescription to repair a wall was held to be unreasonable in a circumstance
similar to that related in Brecknock Company. Prescriptive rights (rights
to take the benefit of some asset in return for some payment) unlike the
ownership of physical assets of a contract might include some element of a
duty to the asset to maintain it carefully. Yet a duty of care in relation
to a prescriptive right seemingly made little sense: how might one have a
duty to an asset owned by someone else? It was quite impossible to expect a
prescription holder to exercise such a duty in relation to an unanticipated
event. 'Now' argued Praed ’...a prescription supposes some original
contract...’ so that by analogy, in the original contract no less than in a
covenant, and with the intention of the parties fully within the view of
the court, the impossibility of performance through some fundamental
[1] 77 ER 1136-1139.
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rustration of the contract must be allowed.
This early attempt to revise the law of contract by challenging the 
jre-assumpsit notion of a universal duty in bilateral contracts 
liffered significantly from later attempts to devise rules for 
(xceptions to the 'reasonable performance' of a contract - such as the 
later doctrine of frustration itself and the attack upon contract 
inviolability in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. What was 
ignificant about the Brecknock case was that it achieved the perfect 
jalence between sanctity of contract and common sense, an achievement 
all the greater because the later nineteenth lawyers singularly failed 
to match it; it also made no appeal to the legal fiction of the 
axistence of an unwritten condition of contract that physical 
impossibility of performance nullified contracts (1). These later 
efforts depended upon an interpretation of contractual obligation 
which in turn rested upon the assumed difference between public and 
private interests - made explicit at last in Printing & Numerical 
leaisterina Co v. Sampson (1875) (2). These developments resulted
from the increasingly popular appeal to principles of 'public policy' 
(broadly, the convenience of the public) in the courts, a significant 
engine of commercial and public law reform during the course of the 
nineteenth century and of importance
1] The only similar treatment of Brecknock to my own demonstrates the importance of the rule established by the case: see Roy Granville McElroy Impossibility of Performance (Cambridge. 1941), 10-11, 62-3. McElroy recognized that legal innovation in this period effectively i®termined the course of later legal history inasmuch as the physical impossibility of performance and the performative incapacity of contractors wore for the first time separated - effectively the rule ®f Brecknock. Contemporary commentators undoubtedly agreed with this ■"oading, an interpretation now lost to legal theory. For a close »xposition, see 'C.J.G.' 'Of the righto of action arising upon a part Parformance of a contract' Westminster Hall Chronicle & Legal Examiner  ^ (1835), 169-172 et ooq.
2] (1075) LB 19 Eg 465.
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here in relation to its first use in contract law in the early years of the 
nineteenth century. The concept of 'public policy’ requirements was, in 
fact, quite a novel development in English law for, in the words of 
Professor Wicks:
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the courts used 
the doctrine of public policy sparingly, only invoking it where a 
contract was clearly unmoral and no statute could be found 
forbidding it. During the nineteenth century, however, the
liberalising influence of equitable principles. ..made a permanent 
change in the character of the doctrine of public policy [1].
Indeed it was not until social reform by statute became a feature of late
Georgian and Victorian government that the 'public policy’ issue became
important in deciding cases of breach of contract and discovering
consideration in cases involving commercial property. The one exception to
this pattern - the earlier adoption of public policy rules in relation to
acts in restraint of trade in merchant shipping [2] - though interesting in
itself is hardly conclusive. Previously public policy had only appeared as
a means of regulating acts in restraint of trade generally regarded as
being 'against the benefit of the Commonwealth’ [3], though few such cases
[1] James Wicks Consideration in the Law of Simple Contract (London, 
1939), 38.
[2] Of the major cases refering to public policy criteria in relation to 
the seemingly perennial problem of fixing seamens’ wages , for example, 
Harris v.Watson (1796) 170 ER 94 used 'public policy’ in the rule of 
the court.For more traditional approaches see Stilk v.Myrick (1809) 170 
ER 851;Frazer v.Hatton (1857) 140 ER S16-522;Harris v.Carter (1854) 118 
ER 1251-1253; 'The Cambridge’(1829) 166 ^  233-236.Legislation in 1854 
(Merchant Shipping Act,s.2) recognized the superior force of the public 
policy criteria.
[3] Colgate v. Batcheler (1601) 78 ER 1097. Holdsworth cites this as the
earliest example of the use of public policy in relation to the 
restraint of trade. W.A.Holdsworth A History of English Law, 8 (London, 
1925), 57. From the late seventeenth century, legal texts cited much
earlier cases, and clearly the appeal to public policy was regarded as 
very much a part of the common law of contract. See, for example, 
’J.A.’ The Law of Obligations and Conditions (London, 1693), 46.
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specified the nature of the social disamenity the courts sought to remove 
by interpreting the contract in such a fashion [1]. This is not to suggest 
that nineteenth century courts, unlike their predecessors in early modern 
England. liberally applied the criteria of public policy in review of most 
contractual obligations. There were indeed limits to the suitability of the 
appeal to the principles of public policy even in the nineteenth century 
and, in general, the growing popularity of the appeal to public policy had 
little effect in the countryside. Certainly very little of the Georgian 
public legislation and case law - though more of the Victorian - was 
stamped with public policy ’rules’ and prevented the conclusion of
contracts which appeared contrary to the public interest. Indeed only in 
some few exceptional cases were arrangements for contracts which were 
clearly against the public interest or even likely to inhibit ’public
convenience’ (such as wagers intended to influence the outcome of certain 
political events or the destination of real property [2]) declared
prohibited by the common law. Futhermore, even though much of the medieval 
law prohibiting restraint of trade might have been thought to affect much 
of the elementary contracting undertaken in the rural shires of the south, 
little use appears to have been made of this aspect of the common law even 
in opposing (or effecting) enclosure or field consolidation. Before the 
development of the so-called ’will theory’ in the late eighteenth century 
jurists argued that ’common contracts’ of the sort ordinarily made in 
^Sricultural communities for the transfer of land and chattels were ’...no
[1] Barrow v.Woods (1643) 82 £R 470-472 ;Ferby v.Arrowsmith (1669) 54 ^
239 (defendant argues public policy): Broad v.Jolliffe (1614) 79 ER
278-9.
[2] ’Legality of Wagers’ Westminster Hall Chronicle & Legal Examiner 2, 30 
(1836), 191-97; ibid., 2. 31 (1836), 213-27; ibid., 2, 32 (1836), 239-46
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part of the law of nature* [1] and that consequently no question of public 
policy could ever arise in relation to them. Only where the condition 
implied by an obligation was contrary to natural law was its performance 
thought to be void so that the relief offered by public policy doctrine 
could not be extended to simple contracts and obligations. Yet most 
agricultural contracts were, by the early nineteenth century, no longer 
simple contracts; from the late Georgian period the development of new 
forms of contracting advanced elementary contracting for land and services, 
a tendency reflected in the parallel development of the more complex law 
relating to breaches of contractual obligation.
Of more lasting importance for the contracts which comprised the majority 
of property transfers incurring transaction costs, indeed, were the new 
rules for breach, non-performance and, most significant of all, estoppel 
all of which changed the character of the simple executed contract as much 
as they aided the development of the executory contract. The development of 
estoppel, often overlooked in the history of contract, deserves particular 
attention because early nineteenth century jurists used it as a vehicle for 
significant reforms in relation to so-called elementary contracts; it also 
illustrates well how even minor changes in the practice of law in relation 
to contract might affect the exchange of property rights.
Of all the categories of contractual breach and remedy the most important
y®t least regarded as far as the development of the contract 'reformation*
[1] [Anon.] Enchiridion Lequm; A Discourse Concerning the Beginnings, 
Nature. Difference, Progress and Use of Laws in General: And in 
Particular of the Common and Municipal Laws of England (London, 1673),
20:
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is concerned was the increasing use and wider definition of estoppel. 
Estoppel' is a doctrine of law - a principle observed by the courts - 
which states that a person may not deny something to which he has been 
a party if sufficient evidence or testimony exists to prove that his 
agreement was obtained in the making of the original contract. Since 
the sixteenth century. however. it has also been a means by which 
property can be costlessly transferred. If 'A' denies a promise to 
transfer property to 'B' whilst satisfactory evidence of even the 
vaguest kind exists of the promise. then the property legally belongs 
to 'B'. the court effecting the transfer without either party 
incurring the cost of a specific contract. This subtle principle and 
practical implication of estoppel was difficult to escape by the 
eighteenth century. A defence of non est factum (literally. that 'it 
is not my deed') could still be made by certain classes of contractors 
in our period (notably married women and children) although a defence 
of non compos mentis at the time of the contract was rarely allowed as 
» defence for breach of contract. During the late eighteenth and 
aarly nineteenth centuries. estoppel and other doctrines of pleading 
ind evidence in relation to breach of contract came to importance 
precisely because innovations in contract law had made it possible 
that contractual obligation depended upon what the parties intended. 
With the transformation of the assumpsit action for breach the status 
°f pleas of estoppel changed - and even the plea of non compos mentis 
«'as rehabilitated as evidence of void contract [1].
Initially jurists were unwilling to recognize estoppel in relation to
simple contracts upon small estates - and in particular so-called
tl] On 'non compos mentis' see the historical discussion of Fry. L.J. 1" Imperial Loan Company v. Stone (1892) LB 1 ÛB 602. On 'non est actum' pleas by married women see the nineteenth century annotations ■O Whelpdale's Case (1605) 77 EB 241 note (c).
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contingent remainders. Rather estoppel as a mode of conveyance appears to 
have been most commonly associated with the fine sur concessit generally 
made available in Common Pleas for estates granted for life only [1]. In 
spite of earlier decisions in favour of similar treatment for leases for 
years [2], when during the eighteenth century a review of estoppel in 
relation to fines was made the opportunity to clarify the position of the 
executory fine was seemingly ignored by several authorities in spite of 
consistent and learned argument to the contrary [3]. The curious fact is 
that by the late eighteenth century writers like Cruise were clearly 
impressed by the doctrine of estoppel in relation to a present fine, but 
remained unimpressed by the arguments used in Edwards v. Rodgers (1636), 
which gained support in contemporary judgments and which sought to extend 
to executory fines the privileges of pleading available in a suit on a 
present fine [4].
Holdworth, writing earlier in this century and against the background of a
[1] James Chetwynd A Treatise Upon Fines: to which is added some General
Observations on the nature of Deeds leading and declaring the Use of 
Fines and Recoveries (London, 1773), 5-6. Charles Fearne An Essay on
the Learning of Contingent Remainders and Executory Devises (London, 
1772) observed, apparently mistakenly in the light of the seventeenth 
century case law, that ’...a contingent remainder may, before it vests, 
be passed by fine by way of estoppel, so as to bind the interest which 
shall afterwards accrue to the contingency’ (p.60).
[2] Trevivian v. Lawrence (1704), 91 ^  241-2; Gilman v. Hoare (1704), 91 
ER 241,747.
[3] The cases regarding estoppel of fines for executory fines at mid­
century were Wright v. Wright (1749) 27 £R 1111-1113; Whitfield v. 
Fausset (1749) 27 ER 1097-1102; Taylor v. Phillips (1749) 27 ER 999- 
1000. Compare Kenyon, C.J. in Goodtitle v.Morse (1789) 100 £R 623-627.
[4] [William Cruise] An Essay on the Nature and Operation of Fines 
(London, 1783), 115, 211; Edwards v.Rodgers (1636) 82 ^  239.
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legal historiography of contract which ascribed a greater role to the 
development and consolidation of ’consideration’ argued persuasively that 
Lord Mansfield’s attempt in 1762 to extend estoppel to ’estoppel by 
conduct’ was the most significant innovation in relation to the doctrine 
during the century 1750-1850 [1]. Indeed, had it received general 
acceptance in the later judgments of distinction in relation to estoppel, 
Mansfield’s idiosyncratic view might have effected a significant change in 
the role of estoppel. In fact Mansfield’s attempted reform of estoppel - 
merely a part of his projected but unstated plan for a reform of the law of 
evidence itself - was never intended to reduce directly the costs of 
contracting and was not followed by any concerted attempt by later jurists 
to revise evidence. In a number of cases much hailed by recent conservative 
legal historians, Mansfield attempted to make contract dependent both upon 
the written evidence of consideration and the existence of a simple promise 
to undertake some action equivalent to exchange, with or without 
consideration - in short, to depend upon the conduct of the parties with 
respect to their obligations for evidence of consideration [2]. As a part 
of the law of evidence this interpretation of contract failed to survive
[1] Holdsworth History, 9, 161-63.
[2] On Mansfield’s conception of the role of evidence in contract, see 
C.H.S.Fifoot Lord Mansfield (London, 1936), 75-79. Pillans v. Van 
Mierop (1765) 97 ER 1035-1041, based on the Statute of Frauds s.4 is 
the best remembered of these cases among lawyers and celebrated by 
Blackstone (Commentaries (7th edition, London, 1790), 2, 445). However 
the lesser known dicta of Hawkes v. Sanders (1782) 98 ^  1091-1094 per 
Mansfield, L.J. at 1093 was the more renowned for contemporaries, in 
which Mansfield argued that some moral obligation was good 
consideration and that therefore evidence of the existence of moral 
responsibility alone was sufficient to verify the existence of a 
cont ract.
into the middle of the nineteenth century [1] and little of the spirited 
effort of Mansfield to make promissory contract depend upon evidence alone 
survived. Certainly very little of the reform of estoppel during the early 
nineteenth century made use of this unique and complex exposition of the 
law of contract as evidence. Indeed only in relation to deeds registered at 
one of the four land registries did the Georgian courts attempt to simplify 
the law of estoppel as a part of the law of evidence [2].
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In a quite separate development, however, and encouraged by the 
contemporary problem of conveying executory leases and other instruments 
the doctrine of estoppel did undergo significant revision in substance and 
in practice resulting in considerable potential benefits for all 
contractors in the rural world. Writing in 1828, one legal correspondant 
wondered precisely what the status of executory interests were in relation 
to estoppel; clearly he was unsure:
[I]t is perhaps no longer necessary to transfer an executory interest by 
a fine 'sur concessit' for years. There can be no doubt that the courts 
would give a declaratory deed accompanying a fine in fee, the effect 
which the parties intended it should produce; we may now safely regard a 
title as marketable which depends on that mode of assurance [3].
[1] Judgments nullifying Mansfield’s earlier dicta were not entirely 
successful in discouraging the idea that moral promises required no 
consideration until Eastwood v. Kenyon (1840) 113 £R 482-7, but the 
principle that writing negated the need for consideration was 
overturned as early as 1778 and the general principle that moral 
promises always implied contractual obligations - with or without 
evidence - was eventually countered by Lord Justice Kenyon in 1794 
(Peeks V .  Strutt (1794) 101 ^  384-86). Kenyon’s argument is the 
first and somewhat isolated example of the use of appeals to public 
policy in relation to contract in defiance of Mansfield (at 385).
[2] Hudson V .  Sharpe (1808) cited in P.V.B. ’Covenants in Leases by 
Estoppel’ Law Quarterly Review, 83 (1967), 21.
[3] [Anon.] ’On the doctrine of estoppel with reference to the transfer of 
contingent and executory interest’ Law Magazine, 1 (1828-9), 78.
Such confident expectation appears to have been not misplaced. In a quite 
separate development reviewed by the correspondant, an equity decision of 
Vice-Chancellor Sir John Leach made the most significant nineteenth century 
innovation in relation to simple land contracts [1].
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Leach’s decision established three significant points: first, that
estoppel binds both parties; that estoppel operates where a covenant
affecting an equitable trust operates (an extension of the rule in GiIman); 
and finally and most significantly that a conveyance by the most common of 
contemporary forms of land transfer in the early nineteenth in England (by 
lease and release) also operated an estoppel. The Law Magazine
correspondant extended the argument of Leach to make clear the implications 
of the decision:
And if we are now to regard it as settled that a lease and release 
may work an estoppel when the latter is by deed indented, which it 
almost invariably is,it will follow that a title from devisees in 
trust under the limitation in question, depending merely on that 
assurance, is undoubtedly marketable [2].
Whilst others were more cautious in their reception of Bensley, conveyance
by estoppel of land held by lease and release - and the uses associated
with such land - might conceivably allow lands so held to receive both a
[1] viz. Bensley v. Burdon (1826) 57 ^  444-447. A precursor of the
decision which appears to have remained unnoticed by contemporaries was
Helps V.Hereford et alios. (1819) 106 ^  355-358; see also Right
d.Jeffreys v.Bucknall (1831) 109 ER 1146-1149 per Tindal, C.J. where 
similar arguments were used.
[2] 'On the doctrine of estoppel...', 81.
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market and a capital value. Bensley effectively permitted those who held 
land in trust - for example, those who held land on behalf of minors or 
others lacking legal capability of action, or older trusts formed from 
ecclessiatical, academic or state institutions - to transfer the title to 
them easily and economically. Funds in existing trusts could therefore be 
mortgaged or could be used as collateral for a loan. It is of course 
difficult to estimate how far the decision in Bensley and other 
contemporary supporting cases actually increased the amount of capital 
borrowed against property by rural title holders after 1834. It is 
nevertheless clear that by electing to reduce the transaction costs 
associated with title transfer in this way the courts powerfully increased 
the potential value of property rights in trade. The economic effect of 
such a decision may in fact have been marginal in the succeeding decades 
because the lease and release already operated in place of the fine and no 
further encouragement was required for its adoption. Indeed, it would be 
easy to exaggerate the importance of the decision. Rather Bensley and 
associated contemporary changes in attitude toward estoppel in simple 
contract may have encouraged the use of the rural land market for the 
creation of present funds out of future interests at a time when the 
agricultural successes of the ’high farming’ period were already slipping 
away.
Contemporaries were certainly not unaware of the significance of the 
decision and, following the introduction of the possibility of estoppel for 
leases at common law, nineteenth century lawyers actively sought to 
encourage further the development of a wider interpretation of estopfel as a
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useful fiction for exchange and transaction under the common law of 
contract [1]. Later historians - and lawyers - have failed to recognise 
the significance of the quarter century of revision in the law of estoppel 
and several decisions of importance in relation to it [2]. By extending a 
medieval fiction of law to the domain of contracting upon property held 
other than by simple title, Georgian jurists removed the hind ranee of high 
costs to extensive contracting for property rights in land. It was only 
after mid-century that the courts sought to limit the impact of Bensley by 
declaring limitations upon the general rule [3] by which time much of the 
force of the rule had already been accepted in other areas of law.
[1] Notably after Bowman v. Taylor (1834) 111 ER 108-111 and Lainson v.
Tréméré (1834) 110 1410-1414 per Dampier, J. followed in rule of the
court. All of these rules, contemporary commentators argued, made the 
nature of the lease document itself determine whether the agreement 
worked an estoppel. See [Anon.] ’The Doctrine of Estoppel’ Legal 
Observer, 5 (1832), 138-141, based on a discussion of Bucknal1.
[2] See A.M.Pritchard ’Tenancy By Estoppel’ Law Quarterly Review, 80 
(1964), 395 n.88 on the impact of Bowman and as an early attempt to 
resurrect the notion of a revolution in estoppel. I maintain that the 
common error of underestimating the place of Bowman in the history of 
estoppel comes from Melville M.Bigelow A Treatise on the Law of 
Estoppel and Its Application to Practice (5th edition. Boston,
Professor Atiyah avers that Derry v. Peek 
the first statement of the latterday 
the role of estoppel in his essay 




(1891) 3 O k  12 at 310 is
misunderstanding regarding 
’Misrepresentation, warranty
(Oxford, 1986), 310. For a recent review of apparently new and.
nineteenth century terms, unanticipated interpretations of estoppel see 
Bert M.Feinbaum ’The Recent Recognition of the Doctrine of Estoppel by 
Lease in Massachusetts.’ New England Law Review, 17 (1982), 603-619;
George Spencer Bower The Law Relating to Estoppel by Representation 
edited Sir Alexander Kingcome Turner (3rd edition, London, 1977), 18.
Nickells V .  Atherstone (1847) 116 ER 358-61; Jorden v. Money (1854) 10 
ER 868-98 per Cranworth.LJ; Wilkinson v. Kirby (1854) 15 CB 430 per 
Maule, J.; Cuthbertson v. Irving (1859) 157 ^  1034-41. On the place 
of some of these cases in the history of estoppel. see Spencer Bower 
Law Relating to Estoppel, 17.
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Similarly, the law regarding ’forbearance’ underwent significant change at 
the same time: for the first time, the law began to consider the 
possibility that immediate remedies for breach might offer a more effective 
means of policing inadequate contract. The older legal historiography with 
its emphasis upon the so-called ’revolution in consideration’ regarded 
Longridge v Dorville (1821) [1] as nothing more than an attempt to
strengthen the hand of promissory elements in contract. It regarded the 
rise of promise and consideration as the key to the legal reform of 
contract in the nineteenth century, but failed to recognize that the early 
nineteenth century reforms - including the reform of forbearance by the 
courts - were rooted in the experience of industrialising but rural 
Englishmen who recognized in the complexity of the assumpsit action for 
breach a source of economic dysfunction. Indeed, even the great late 
nineteenth century legal historian Thomas Atkins Street recognized, albeit 
reluctantly, that the reform of forbearance ’simplifie[d] the issue...’ and 
the practice of action for breach [2].
Forbearance, like estoppel, is a doctrine of pleading rather than an issue 
for civil action and - also like estoppel - underwent significant change 
during the period discussed here, with particular consequences for rural 
contractors. As a part of the law of accord and satisfaction in contract
[1] Longridge v.Oorville (1821) 106 ER 1136-39.
[2] Thomas Atkins Street The Foundations of Legal Liability: A Presentation 
of the Theory and Development of the Common Law, Volume II :History and 
Theory of English Contract Law (Northport,N.Y., 1006), 79-80. In
general, see also Atiyah Rite and Fall, 165-6, 438-40,
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after the notorious Pinnels Case of 1600, the eighteenth century law of 
forbearance held that an agreement not to press an invalid or doubtful 
claim against a party was no indication of a consideration for the contract 
[1]. An example will make clear the importance of this apparently 
difficult legal concept. In Manning’s Case of 1600 [2], the promise of an 
heir, who actually received no benefit from his ancestor’s estate at death, 
to pay the debts of his ancestor was said to be unenforceable where the 
promise had been given in exchange for a promise not to sue him for 
recovery of the debts. As an element of the law of evidence, the appeal to 
this principle obviously had wide appeal: where some agreement had been 
made to forbear suing for recovery of debts or payments - or even damages 
for some tortious harm - this secondary agreement was no evidence that the 
original contract stood. By implication, then, forbearance over most of the 
eighteenth and early nineteenth century implied nothing more than that a 
secondary obligation existed and was not sufficient to indicate the will of 
the parties. Yet with the growing dependence of English common law upon the 
broad principle that the wills of the parties were to be regarded as 
preeminent as evidence of a contractual obligation, law began to 
reinterpret the doctrine of forbearance just as it had the law of estoppel. 
At first such reintepretation of forbearance as there was was only slowly 
adopted. In some cases, none of which appear to have been recognised as a 
part of this process, forbearance in relation to insurance was taken to be 
sufficient consideration for a contract to exist [3] and, after 1824, was
[1] See, for example, the cases cited in Street Foundat ions, 76-78.
[2] Ibid., 77.
[3] Stock V .  Mawson (1798) 125 ER 907-10 ; Thomas v. Courtney (1818) 206 
ER 1-4.
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taken to actually ameliorate those contracts for commercial insurance 
dictated by the severe Georgian law [1]. Complex contracts of this 
sort were however not to be isolated exceptions to a prevailing rule 
and in the case of Lonaridae v . Dorvi11e the more general point was 
established that forbearance - in circumstances to be established 
finally only over the next century - might be a good consideration for 
any form of contract. by word or by writing. Discharge from any 
obligation, then, might be 'bargained' for just as some original 
oontract might be arrived at by a process of free negotiation. One 
immediate consequence of this principle was that property rights now 
existed in all forms of assurance for which contractual obligations 
represented the sum assured; with this guarantee, then, arrangements 
for penalties contingent upon non-performance were henceforward to be 
accepted by the courts and became an easily inserted part of 
alomentary contracts. This low cost solution to the problem of 
policing cases of apparent breach of contract may have actually 
educed transaction costs by reducing the assurance and monitoring 
:o8ts associated with obligations at law.
Finally, in this catalogue of legal innovations intended to reduce 
the costs associated with contractual exchange. the early nineteenth
Ijcentury courts developed a modern theory of 'novation'. In the course 
jof this discussion of contract during the late eighteenth and early
tineteenth centuries. little attention has been paid to the doctrine f consideration which stood at the heart of the older, conservative, 
j|hlstoriography of contract. Effectively 'consideration' represents the 
Isvidence of a contract
lil] Watkins v. Flanagan (1824) 130 EB 166-170 and 49 Goo.Ill c.121
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in the form of some transferred entitlement, like money or a guarantee to 
) something - and without consideration proof of the existence of an 
iligation is obviously more difficult. The only significant innovation of 
itse years relating to this important aspect of the law of contract was 
le evolution of limitations upon novation, developments well known to and 
ipreciated by contemporaries but still largely ignored even by 
inservative legal historians. Novation effectively deals with the problem 
transferring consideration in debt and properly is part of the law of 
ibt and not of assumpsit; however, the early nineteenth century courts at 
ice widened and refined the doctrine in order to facilitate freer
intracting. Imagine that three individuals each has debts: A owes B, and B 
les C (A is not in debt to C, neither is C to A). The doctrine of novation 
lows the consideration for the discharge of A ’s debt to B by his payment 
C for an amount equivalent to B ’s debt to C - with B ’s agreement - to be 
held and the contract to bo declared sound. During the course of the late 
ghteonth century, this doctrine was at first merely confirmed [1] but 
'ing the early nineteenth century received refinement sufficient to
lure that evidence of the discharge of mutual debts (or other
Tigations) by novation was achieved [2]. How far the principle was
Itarded as a means of reducing bargaining and contracting costs by 
I itemporaries cannot bo assessed; certainly no contemporary comment on the 
ject appears in contemporary legal journals and little case law comment 
tifies to its being regarded as fundamental to contemporary contract 
Nevertheless, in common with many like innovations in law during this 
Tatlock V .  Harris (1789) 100 ER 517,
guxon V .  Chadley (1824) 107 ^  853-5; Wharton v. Walker (1825) 107 ER
1020- 1021 .
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period, it had the consequence of making contractual arrangements less 
expensive by virtue of the adoption of strict principles for the 
verification of the contract itself. Unlike most of the important 
innovations of the period, it depended upon an interpretation of the 
doctrine of consideration for its very existence.
Critical readers might object that in relation to all four elements 
of this hypothesised revision of contract law (forbearance. estoppel, 
frustration and novation) little evidence has been adduced to support 
the hypothesis that contemporaries regarded the reformed law of 
contract as necessarily more efficient and, in transaction cost terms, 
cheaper than the older medieval law. In fact the only recorded 
response of contemporaries came from lawyers - probably for the simple 
reason that the technicalities of contract-making were their concern 
alone. Whilst, as we shall see. the reform of market regulation often 
won popular acclamation after persistent complaints [1], in the same 
way that the reorganisation of market ownership and control had arisen 
from popular complaints about the insufficiency of existing facilities 
12), where legal reform was concerned ordinary people had very little 
knowledge of the subtlety of developments taking place in the higher 
courts. What is clear from an examination of these apparently arcane 
natters is that lawyers regarded their efforts as being directed 
toward a more efficient law of contract-making. Whilst thousands of 
»lementary contracts continued to be made every day, despite the older 
law of contracting. there is evidence that legal experts regarded the 
work of the courts in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century 
>8 Innovative, reducing the uncertainty and costliness of 
11 See infra p.269 and throughout Chps. 8 and 9.
12] See throughout Part 2 above.
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contracting. And whilst the remarks of lawyers writing in contemporary 
books and legal periodicals are not able to tell us how contemporary 
contractors might have regarded their work. it is only the expert 
testimony of the lawyers to which the historian has access. It is not 
possible, as it were, to point to a single satisfied customer; instead 
one must rely upon the evidence of the professional opinion of those 
whose work 'underwrote' contract making.
In practice, the materials available do not allow us to substantiate 
:he hypothesis that any individual contract was more easily and 
heaply agreed with less obfuscation and difficulty as a result of the 
reform of contract law (and one cannot even show that more contracts 
■iere concluded after the reforms). Nevertheless. the evidence of 
ontemporary jurists counts for much in suggesting that the intention 
3f the law was to make exchange easier and cheaper by making contract 
stipulations less oppressive, cheaper to specify and more reasonable 
snd reliable. The intention of the courts. then. counts for a good 
leal in maintaining the argument that the law looked for an 
opportunity to the make contracting easier - an observation which is 
imenable to interpretation favourable to the transaction cost model.
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:HAPTER SEVEN: CONTRACT REVOLUTION, LEASING AND THE INSTITUTIONAL ■^RAMEWORK OF RURAL JUSTICE. 1780-1840.
'[Thai transition from a law of property to a law of contract relating to property merely reflects the now familiar process by which the significance of property rights changed from their use-value to their exchange value' (Patrick Atiyah, 1979]
It will be apparent that many of the legal innovations in contract
aw referred to in the last chapter. whilst extending to simple
jontracts of the sort normally associated with rural, and non-
:ommercial. legal practice, were driven by a variety of
:onsiderations, many of them possibly inconsistent with the notion of
Itransaction costs economising activity. In the simplest contractual 
irrangements however (such as those for land) the motivation for 
reform appears to have been the reduction of the transaction costs 
isaociated with repetitive exchange and the reduction of specification 
:osts in contract. The background, so to speak, of these specific 
innovations in rural legal practice included and consisted in part of 
those general innovations in contract law enumerated above. Yet the 
seculiar circumstances of English land law placed difficulties in the 
a^y of immediate reform. The English system of land tenure and 
enancy was one of the most complex and one of the most important of 
the institutions that determined the size of the aggregate transaction 
sector in the rural economy of southern England during the late 
sighteenth century and early nineteenth century. The issue of tenure 
permeated all aspects of the economic life of the rural communities of 
the south, for the efficiency of tenure determined both the mobility 
all factors of agricultural production and the specificity of 
property rights in landed property themselves. Inefficient lease 
contracting, like any other form of contractual arrangement. reduces 
the specificity of those rights and consequently increases the 
transaction costs associated with property transfer.
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During the period examined here notable efforts were made to increase 
the contractual efficiency of lease contract with the apparent aim of 
reducing the costs of exchange incurred in agricultural operations. 
In often understated aspect of the rise of modern contracting. the 
conomic consequences for agriculture of the contract revolution, once 
inderstood. explains a good deal about the performance of the English 
agricultural sector in the early nineteenth century. While a number 
of significant and even basic changes had been made in the form of 
conveyance by lease in earlier centuries - through the specification 
of lease covenanted responsibilities decided by Spenser's Case of 1585 
1], through the eventual passing away of feudal 'services and 
obligations' [2] and the abrupt end to conveyance by word of mouth [3] 
inder the late Stuart statutory reform of land transfer. and through 
the effect of the Tudor Statute of Uses of 1535 upon the performance 
of covenants following title transfer - the lease instrument itself 
required little change in form as a legal document and document of 
contractual arrangement until well into the nineteenth century. Legal 
oriters, particularly those responsible for later abridgements of the 
law, textbooks and dictionaries of conveyancing practice were
tl] 72 EB 72-77.
2) Notably by 12 Car.II c.24.
3) 29 Car.II c.3.
still, in all essentials, able to adhere to the definition of the 
instrument originally given by Littleton in the sixteenth century. the 
lease was still a demise of a specified interest or, in Blackstone’s often 
quoted phrase ’...a conveyance in consideration of rent’ [1].
Yet the legal writers of the early nineteenth century and the courts
experienced considerable difficulty in describing how leases should operate
and in defining the circumstances in which a lease was, indisputably, a
lease and not an assignment of an interest. Thomas Platt, one of the most
distinguished nineteenth century authorities on the land law of England,
expressed well the root of this confusion in 1847:
An opinion has very generally prevailed that the existence of a 
reversion is one of the chief characteristics of a lease; and, what 
amounts to the same thing in different terms, that the transfer of the 
whole of a lessor’s estate in the hereditaments demised operates as an 
assignment to the exclusion of a reversion...Within the last twenty- 
five years, however, the point has undergone so much discussion, and so 
irreconcilable are the cases relating to it, that they call for 
examination with some degree of peculiarity [2].
[ 1 ] Commentaries on the Laws of England (7th edition, London, 1775), 175. 
Similar statements of the nature of the lease contract can be found in 
Giles Jacob A New Law Dictionary: containing the interpretation and 
definition of words and terms used in the Law (9th edition, London, 
1772), qv. ’Lease’; idem. Every Man His Own Lawyer; or a Summary of the 
Laws of England in a New and Instructive Method (London, 1772), 187; 
John Trusler The Country Lawyer (London, 1786), 2, note 1; [Anon.] A 
Law Grammar; or an Introduction to the Theory and Practice of English
Jurisprudence (London, 1791), 313; [Anon
selected for the information, caution and d
] Points in Law and Equity 
irection of all persons
concerned in Trade and Commerce (London, 1792] 
Law Dictionary (London,1792), 2, (London,
Compendious Law Dictionary (London,1803),
1 ) ,  137; Richard Burn A New 
1792), 65; Thomas Potts A
___________________________ 428-9; Charles Harcourt
Chambers A Treatise on Leases and Terms for Lives (London, 1819), 1; 
James Ram An Outline of the Law of Tenure and Tenancy containing the
first principles of the Law of Real Property 
James Holthouse A New Law Dictionary (London,
(London, 1825), 54; Henry 
1829), 181.
[2] Thomas Platt A Treatise on the Law of Leases; with Forms and Precedent 
(London, 1847), 1, 9-10.
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Platt was certainly not alone in identifying in his own times a virtual 
revolution in the law related to the leasing of agricultural property 
although modern historians have failed to recognize the significance of 
this change in the principles of tenure and tenancy. Some contemporary 
commentators, like Amos and Ferard, undoubtedly regarded the nineteenth 
century reform of the law of the lease as the product of mere
’...exceptions and qualifications...’ [1]; others like the Scottish 
solicitor Robert Bell, enviously observing English developments from 
Edinburgh in 1805, frankly recognized that both countries were making every 
effort to reform the lease law absolutely to accord with modern conditions 
of agriculture [2]. The Bar Committee on Land Transfer reviewed the state 
of the law relating to conveyance and registration of land during the 
course of the nineteenth century in 1886 and in its report expressed the 
view that
When the Real Property Commissioners of 1829 began their labours, 
the law of real property was nearly in the state in which it had 
been left by Lord Coke, while the current methods of conveyancing 
had acquired an enormously increased bulk and complexity. A great 
part of this was due to the successful ingenuity of conveyancers in 
devising remedies for the law’s admitted defects; and it has 
accordingly happened, that a large part of the remedial legislation 
dealing with this subject is little more than the adoption into law 
of the remedies devised by the conveyancers [3].
Among this array of opinions regarding the nature of the revision of land
law undertaken in early nineteenth century England lie contradictions and
counter-claims which appear at first sight to negate the idea of a
[1] A. Amos and J.Ferard A Treatise on the Law of Fixtures and other 
Property Partaking of both a Real and a Personal Nature (London, 1827),
X X  .
[2] Robert Bell A Treatise on Leases Explaining the Nature and Effect of 
the Contract of Lease, and the Legal Rights enjoyed by the Parties (3rd 
edition, Edinburgh, 1820), vii-x.
[3] Land Transfer.Published by Order of the Bar Committee (London,1886), 3.
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continuous revolution in legal practice. Yet whilst it will be admitted 
that the evolution of common law in relation to leasing practice during the 
early nineteenth century lagged somewhat behind that of other forms of 
institutional adaptation to the need for high volume, low cost, repetitive 
transactions, English jurists engaged in a prolonged examination of the 
principles of leasing during these years with the intention of finally 
summarizing and codifying in statute the various adaptations of the common 
law made during the preceding half century and to ensure that the 
instruments of land conveyance remained efficient in modern contractual 
envi ronments.
The background to this struggle to find an accurate and workable 
definition of the function and purposes of the lease instrument is 
difficult to understand for the economic historian but central for an 
appreciation of English agrarian economy in the early nineteenth century. 
The concept of the 'estate' and the interest of the lessor had been carried 
over from the feudal law of tenures almost entirely unchanged. Yet the 
function of the lease as a form of contractual arrangement was undergoing 
significant change independently of the decline in the influence of feudal 
land law itself. What happened in the course of the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries can be best characterised as result of the final 
decline of contractual instruments as mere statements of legal obligation 
and the emergence of a new concept of lease contract as a bargain or 
exchange of contracting and equal parties. Comparison of the standard works
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the two centuries on tenurial rights. by Wright and by Chambers (11, 
licates well the prevailing tendancy of the law. For Wright, writing in 
) 1730s, the superior qualities of feudal conveyance were still apparent, 
'-e there was no distinction between the instrumental and the functional 
)dcts of the transfer of property rights in land, or between what leases 
I and were required by their users to do. Land transfer - including 
inafer of ownership by lease and release - involved a recognition of 
igations on entry and exit, for fines and fees and so forth, but did not 
lemnify parties as formal contracts would. By the nineteenth century, 
ictice and the necessity for specified contractual relations in all 
)ects of rural agrarian production seems to have brought down not only 
I costs associated with property transfer but also the risk associated 
h property demise and the renting of agricultural land. This change was 
iculated through those instruments of contract which expressed the 
lingness of parties to exchange land as if it were vendable capital 
her than a lifetime endowment or a fixed asset for the exclusive use of 
ineage. In the words of Professor Patrick Atiyah, this attitude created
...a climate of opinion in which property rights themselves came to seem more absolute, and the old grievances against feudal burdens and taxes helped to give this new attitude to property a sense of legitimacy [2] .
Sir Martin Wright An Introduction' to the Law of Tenures (London. '30); Sir Robert Chambers A Treatise In and Tenures edited SirCarles Harcourt (London. 1824).
^tiyah Rise and Fall. 87.
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One consequence of this was the apparent decline in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries of the formal and fully specified lease as 
the ideal form of land contract. Freer contracts in which equal 
parties were regarded as having responsibility to specify fully their 
ovm negotiated requirements in the lease replaced the older legal 
habit of ascribing most of the contractual conditions to customary 
behaviour and specifying only the deviations from custom. The 
importance of this slow, but discernible, revolution in legal practice 
needs to be more fully explained.
For the lease instrument itself. the decline of the enforcement of 
customary obligation as the legal basis for contracting and the 
innovation of seemingly unfettered contracting was neither uniformly 
beneficial nor did it dispose of the problem of defining the lease 
Identified by Platt. It was this latter problem which troubled 
Georgian courts and prevented the full implementation of the reforms 
for freer contracting. It might prove relatively easy to distinguish 
the intention behind an agreement or a lease - Platt suggested 
identifying evidence of agreement to the conveyance [11 - but it 
proved to be a good deal more difficult to distinguish the intention 
behind an assignment (that is. a transfer of title) and a lease. The 
'doctrine of wills' (the supposition that evidence of the intentions 
of contracting parties was sufficient to support the legality of a 
land transfer) devised to discriminate between lease-type and 
transfe):— type conveyance proved unsuitable as the basis for a rule to 
lefine the conditions for legally enforceable assignments or leases.
 ^^ e course of this often confusing legal debate concerning the lease 
»* an instrument of contract for land
il] Platt Treatise. 1. 390.
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law can be best gauged through the remarks of Lord Plunkett in the 
sppeal case of Pluck v.Diaaes. heard before the House of Lords in 1831 
111 . In discriminating between an assignment and an instrumental 
lease, Plunkett argued that where an owner could sue for recovery of 
his land for unpaid rent a title was - incontrovertibly - an 
assignment and not a lease. Yet Plunkett was well aware of how such 
an unbending rule might limit property transfer rather than encourage 
it. In order to incorporate both the doctrine of intentionality (the 
doctrine that the intentions of the parties to a contract must be 
assumed to be represented by a valid contract) and the law of rent 
recovery in a definition of the assignment of a whole interest, 
Plunkett ingeniously turned to other evidence of intention within 
assignments and leases. Where a covenant for the renewal of a 
contract was evident in the document an obvious lease arrangement had 
been made, for no contracting owner would intentionally fail to 
specify the reversion of his own land. Plunkett's words are worthy of 
note as they contain clear evidence of the new spirit in the law of 
lease contract.
I have felt it my duty to urge this part of the case [i.e. intentionality] at the risk of being thought tedious, because the notion of a rigid and absolute assignment by an unbending rule of law. independent of the intention of the parties, has been carried in the argument to the alarming extent of saying that the grant of an interest. for the same lives for which the grantor holds, necessarily carries with it the covenant for perpetual renewal, which is a legal covenant running with the land; and that if a person having such an interest grants for three lives, reserving a >^ ent and not purporting to give to the grantee the benefit of the covenant of perpetual renewal, still the grantee must have it by virtue of the absolute assignment; a position this so formidable in this country, where these renewable interests are considered as perpetuities, and where the proprietors are in the habit of demising
111 Pluck v.Dlgges 5 EE 219-241. See also Poultnev v.__93 EE596-7; Preece v.Corrv 130 EE 968-9; Palmer v.Edwards 99 EE 122n-123n foic other contemporary discussions which replicate much of the argument of Plunkett.
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for the same lives for which they themselves hold... that it goes to 
shake the foundations of property [1].
What Plunkett and other innovators in the law relating to agricultural
contract established, belatedly perhaps, was the independence of the lease 
instrument as a form of long-term contract. Leases were henceforth to be 
promulgated and interpreted with the strict intentions of the parties with 
respect to their covenanted responsibilities. A by-product of this 
significant innovation in the law of agricultural contracting was the 
reduction in the specification costs associated with all forms of the 
leasing of land and property. By restricting the evidence of a lease to the 
supplementary clauses, or covenants, of leases early nineteenth century 
lawyers were effectively placing the responsibility for full specification 
of lease arrangements in the hands of the parties to the lease.
The reason why these arrangements for the interpretation of leases reduced 
rather than increased specification costs needs further amplification. In 
parallel developments to those discussed above, late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth century courts began to ’adopt’ the most frequently utilised 
covenants and to assume their existence from the behaviour of archetypical 
rational contractors. These ’adopted covenants’, which had no customary 
basis to them, were intended to make contracting easier by reducing the 
need for irrational covenanted responsibilities; at the same time they did 
not interfere with the customs and habits of local contract. It is evident, 
from the legal record of such ’adoptions’ that in general, the landlord’s 
covenants were more frequently protected than those of the tenant [Table 
6.1]. Nevertheless, the consequence of such adoptions appears unequivocally 
[74] Pluck V .  Diqges per Plunkett, L.J. at 231.
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[1] and by 1847, the year of the publication of the Report of the Select 
Committee on Agricultural Customs, the general reform of covenants was 
desperately needed. The revision of the position of covenant use in the 
famous case of Tulk v.Moxhay [2] in the following year has been regarded as 
the most significant departure from seventeenth century practice and 
represents the effective completion of the reform of leasing undertaken by 
nineteenth century jurists. As the ’coda’ to earlier reforms it anticipated 
latterday developments, in which public policy rather than equitable 
considerations influenced the law of land transfer, developments which are 
outside of the scope of the present essay [3].
In the light of the unequivocal condemnation of restrictive covenants by
those giving evidence before the 1847 committee - and by contemporary
[1] e.g. [Anon.] Museum Rusticum et Commerciale: or select papers on 
iculture. Commerce. Arts and Manufactures, 3 (London, 1765), 7-8;
Arthur Young The Farmer’s Guide to Hiring and Stocking Farms. 1, 
(London, 1770); [J.Lawrence] The New Farmer’s Calendar (3rd edition,
London, 1801), 130; [J.C.Loudon] An Immediate and Effectual Mode of
Raising the Rental of the Landed Property of England (London, 1808), 
lOff. It has to be admitted that the Equity side had already 
recognised this and had attempted to make some alteration to the 
interpretation of covenants from the mid-seventeenth century (e.g. G. 
Meriton Land-Lords Law: A Treatise Very Fit for Perusal of all 
Gentlemen, and others (London, 1665), Chp.IV) but reform here was 
neither complete nor systematic. Before the rule in Tulk appeared in 
the Common Law courts the single test in equity of the soundness of a 
covenant was the ’degree to which they (positive covenants) relate to 
the thing demised’(John Fonblanque A Treatise of Equity (London, 1793), 
1, 344.). It has been argued that Tulk merely followed and applied
these earlier rules of equity (’Notes’ Law Quarterly Review 4, (1888),
119-120; ’On Covenants Which Run With The Land’ Law Magazine 10, 
(1833), 342-57). This does not negate the argument developed here.
[7] 47 ^  1345-50.
[3] A.H. Manchester A Modern Legal History of England and Wales. 1750-1950 
(London, 1980), 321.
222
:ritics of the surviving lacunae of leasing covenant law [1], the 
protection offered to all 'negative covenants' (that is. covenants 
restricting the actions of leaseholders) by law was extended at one 
stroke to all covenants. even where they were not considered to 'run 
iiith the land' according to the definition in Spenser's Case [2] . 
Jntil the rule was restricted in 1881 [3], all covenants which placed 
tenants or landowners at a disadvantage through new expenditure 
('positive covenants') were supported at law. It has been argued that 
the doctrine of Tulk effected only a minor change in the costa of 
ontracting for land - that '...a would-be purchaser knowing of a 
positive covenant might sometimes be discouraged by it. though
presumably market forces would bring about an abatement of the 
purchase price which would be a countervailing factor' [4]. It is 
likely. then. that positive covenants acted more efficiently in the 
ontext of bargaining for capital resources once Tulk had removed 
loubts concerning the negative ones. Tulk probably enhanced the 
efficiency of the market as an allocative device for property rights 
in land and cleared away the more common resort to customary lease 
:ovenants. This process of covenant adoption and the eventual
extension of the equity rule in Tulk probably reduced the transaction 
:osts associated with all forms of
[1] 'Report of the SC on Agricultural Customs...' BPP Sess. 1847-8. 7. (461-i) passim. The debate is fully discussed and a model of tenancy developed in J.R. McCulloch 'A Treatise on the Letting and Occupancy of Land' in Treatises and Essays on Subjects Connected with Economical Policy (Edinburgh. 1833), 165-222.
12) R. Gilbert Brown The Law Relating to Covenants. 82-99. A covenant which 'runs with the land' relates exclusively to the land end people described therein.
[SlHavwood V Brunswick Permanent Building Society (1881) LB 8 Qfi 403-5
I
|[4) Simon Gardner 'The proprietory effect of contractual obligations under Tulk v.Moxhav and de Mattos v.Gibson' Law Quarterly Review. 98 (1982). 295-6.
land transfer by reducing the specification costs of contracting.
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Through these changes in the legal interpretation of contract a new 
approach to contracting emerged in the course of the middle of the 
nineteenth century, more obviously concerned with maintaining the 
efficiency of commercial contracting. Nevertheless, much of the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth century revolution in contract had been 
explicitly concerned with elementary contracts. The reform of forbearance, 
estoppel and the law of lease covenant, while all quite different in their 
detail, nevertheless had this in common : they all succeeded in reducing 
transaction costs associated with simple bargaining and contracting through 
reliance upon the 'will theory’ of contract. Nevertheless, legal 
innovation in relation to contract did not create alternative institutions 
for the policing and enforcement of contracts under the rule of the 
doctrine of wills. Indeed the non-existence of some framework for the 
administration of elementary contracts under such conditions suggests that, 
unlike the case of markets, property rights in verifying contracts could 
not be subcontracted. Some legal innovation within the courts system 
however did coincide with the rise of new forms of contracting.
The centralisation of the courts system of the Georgian era is perhaps one 
of the most enduring of the myths of late modern legal history. The 
venality of the offices of the court, the corruption and secrecy of the 
bench and the seeming tolerance by Parliament of the virtual monopoly of 
the higher courts in judging cases with contingent high fees all seem to 
point to the conclusion that the power of public opinion to demand reform 
of the inefficient and quasi-feudal remnants of central, authoritarian.
;:wer was weak and that the impetus for central control through the courts 
emained strong. Yet Holdsworth’s well known claim that ’...practically all 
he judicial work of the country was done by the judges of the common law 
ourts...’ [1] appears from recent research to be quite simply fallacious. A 
rumber of studies of the courts of conscience and request by Professor 
Arthurs and others have shown Holdsworth’s picture of a highly centralised 
metropolitian court to be ill-founded [2] for not only were the courts of 
sessions justices and assize circuits filled with often complex litigation 
and suit but new forms of legal institution were adap ted to meet the needs
1] William S.Holdworth A History of the English Law edited A.L.Goodhart 
and H.G.Hanbury (London, 1964), vol. 14, 182. Elie Halevy A History of 
the English People in 1815 (Harmondsworth, 1937), vol. 1, 59 ff. is an 
earlier corrective to this view and still the best general guide to the 
organisation of the courts system at national and local level.
2] H.W.Arthurs ’Without the Law’: Legal Pluralism and Administrative Law
in Nineteenth Century England (London,1986); idem.'Special Courts. 
Special Law: Legal Pluralism in Nineteenth Century England’ in
G.R.Rubin and David Sugarman (eds) Law Economy and Society, 1750-1914 
:Essays in the History of English Law (Abingdon.1984) , 380-411; idem. 
’Without the Law Courts of Local and Special Jurisdiction in
Nineteenth Century England’ Journal of Legal History 5, 1984.130-149.My 
work on this subject was undertaken before I was familiar with 
Professor Arthurs’ major work on this subject.Our common use of similar 
sources in relation to the courts of request founded in the 1830’s is 
due entirely to the duplication of research with necessarily small 
amounts of material available.Where his published work has duplicated 
my own. 1 have deferred to Professor Arthurs and cited his work instead 
of sources common to us both.
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)i the new contractual arrangements needed in late Georgian and early 
/ictorian Britain. Indeed through the creation and extension of 
jurisdictions the courts system of the eighteenth century was readily 
partially transfoirmed to accommodate the need for flexibility in 
contracting. The use of new jurisdictions, defined not by 
poographical area but by the type of litigation with which they dealt, 
Kas the cornerstone of these developments for whilst the concept of 
ifunctional ly different jurisdictions was not novel. during the late 
Bighteenth century an impressive number of writers came to regard the 
conomic efficiency of separate responsibilities for different courts 
18 one of the principal motives for their retention. The rationalist 
legal theories that grew out of the enlightenment rediscovery of 
natural law philosophy regarded separate and unique jurisdictions 
what contemporaries referred to as 'exclusive jurisdictions’) as a 
juarantee of social harmony. based upon the dubious principle that 
cases were tried by courts whose work was exclusively dedicated to 
limilar cases, and few jurists considered the economic value of the 
ocal administration of local cases directly. However some students 
>f the English courts system were persuaded of the economic efficiency 
>f the hierarchy of courts adopted in England and recognized in the 
economic efficiency of the contemporary courts system the very basis 
f the administration of justice. Richard Wooddeson argued, in common 
I'ith most natural lawyers of his time that while '...magistracy is by 
he law of nature, reason assuring men that they cannot well subsist 
•dthout civil society, nor civil society without government...', the 
I eed for local jurisdictions might also be demonstrated from the
fact that local property rights needed to be enforced locally [1]. 
Wooddeson further argued, in a lengthier analysis of the structure of the 
system of justice in England, that small specific jurisdictions offered an 
’...easy and prompt means of judicial redress...’ unlike the superior 
courts of common law [2]. Part of this justification for the survival of 
local jurisdictions came from a reading of legal history, part from the 
intuition that a local magistracy was always superior with regard to the 
need to establish property rights in the locality and a number of legal- 
historical accounts of the evolution of Anglo-Saxon justice in the early 
nineteenth century in fact married these two themes in attempting to 
explain the survival of a wide range of exclusive jurisdictions in Georgian 
England [3].
[1] Richard Wooddeson Elements of Jurisprudence Treated of in the 
Preliminary Part of a Course of Lectures of the Laws of England 
(London, 1783), 27. See also James Grant Essays on the Origin of 
Society, Language, Property, Government, Jurisdiction, Contracts and
Marriage (London, 1785), 107-155;
the Knowledge of the Laws and
timothy Cunningham Introduction to 
Constitutions of England (London,
[71812]),14; [Sir William Dugdale] History and Antiquities Relative to 
the Following Curious Subjects : namely, the Origin of Government; 
Beginning of Laws; Antiquity of Our Laws in England (London, 1780), 50- 
58 [This last work was first published in the late seventeenth century 
but was revised and republished until the nineteenth]. The argument 
finally received support in ’First Report of the S.C. on Superior 
Courts in England...’ BPP Sess. 1829, 9 (46), 79-80.
[2] Richard Wooddeson A Systematical View of the Laws of England : as
treated of in a course of Vinerian Lectures read at Oxford, in a series 
of years, commencing in Michaelmas Term, 1777 (London, 1792-3), 1, 101.
[3] e.g.William Enfield A Compendium of the Laws and Constitution of
England (London, 1809); Alexander Luder Tracts on Various Subjects in 
the Law and History of England (London, 1810); George Spence Essay on 
the Origin of the English Laws and Institutions; read to the Society of 
Lincoln’s Inn, Hilary Term 1812 (London, 1812).
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In fact the reorganisation of the courts system attempted during the first 
half of the nineteenth century made much use of these pretended defences of 
•the local jurisdictions of England. The economic impetus to reduce the 
expenses of justice was primarily responsible for this reorganisation, 
however, and not an attachment to rural, provincial, justice. The economy 
of legal expenses encouraged by the Whig parliaments of the last decades of 
the eighteenth century and popularly supported by many outside Parliament 
¡during the first decades of the nineteenth century [1] encouraged a not 
inconsiderable diminution in the expenditure of the central government upon 
the justiciary system. The reduced expenditures upon criminal justice alone 
were marked enough to bring about a substantial fall in the regular 
revenues from the funds for the superior courts in London. From 1814 to 
1820, central criminal law expenses were running at an average of £22,000 
per annum, whereas from 1821 to 1827 the same expences averaged only 
£18,000 per annum and between 1828 and 1834 the average fell to £14,850 per 
annum [2]. However salaries continued to rise for the higher court 
officials and judges and between 1814 and 1834 the salaries of the court
[1] Of the many appeals for reduced expenditures on the central courts of
justice, see Times 2 February 1806 ; ibid. 30 November 1807; ibid. 9 
March 1818; Annual Review 43, 1800, 144; ibid. 47, 1804,586; County 
Constitutional Guardian 1, 1822, 56-64.The call for reform of the
sinecures of the courts by Bentham and his allies is surveyed in Halevy 
op. cit. , 57-59.
[2] Calculated from BPP Sess. 1813-14, 11 (39), 169; ibid. Sess. 1814-15,
9 (154). 196; ibid. Sess. 1816, 12 (238), 178; ibid. Sess.1817, 13 
(279), 372; ibid. Sess. 1818, 13 (68). 242; ibid. Sess. 1819, 15
(47). 243; ibid. Sess. 1820, 11 (64), 124; ibid. Sess. 1821, 16 (44), 
4; ibid. Sess. 1822, 19 (21), 450; ibid. Sess.1823, 13 (49), 235;
ibid. Sess.1824, 16 (13). 242; ibid.Sess. 1825, 18 (29). 342; ibid.
Sess. 1826, 20 (86). 164; ibid. Sess. 1826-7, 15 (160), 271; ibid.
Sess. 1828, 17 (48), 420; ibid. Sess. 1829, 16 (40), 281; ibid. sess. 
1830, 18 (88). 488; ibid. Sess. 1830-1, 6 (280), 339; ibid.
Sess.1831. 13 (30). 273; ibid. Seas. 1831-2, 27 (278), 669; ibid.
Sess. 1833. 24 (168), 456; ibid. Sess.1834, 42 (183), 432.
sheriffs, the Clerk of the Hanaper and the Judges of the Common Law courts 
of England rose from a total of £69,546 to £377,966 [1]. Certainly some 
part of the explanation for this significant rise in officials' and judges’ 
salaries against a background of a relative fall in the funding for the 
higher courts should be sought in the changing pattern of funding of the 
courts after 1814 - for fees, the major source of income to judges from 
most higher courts, had already undergone a significant decline themselves 
by 1814 [2] and sums advanced from the Civil List for payments to 'Law and 
Justice* (effectively to the superior court judges and their attendants) 
never amounted to a significant additional contribution to the salaries of 
court officers even after they had been officially allowed in 1802 [3]. 
Yet if the expenditures upon the administration of justice through the 
superior courts and upon the salaries of the officers of the court appear 
to have moved in opposite directions, this is principally the result of the 
significant effort of the Select Committee on Finance of 1798 to reschedule 
legal expenditures away from the higher courts and to encourage summary
[1] Calculated from figures in BPP Sess. 1868-9, 35 (366). Figures have
been calculated to exclude the incomes of those engaged in metropolitan 
or colonial courts sitting in London.
[2] 'Return of Fees in the Courts of Justice...’ BPP Sess. 1813-14, 13
(102), 33; 'Committee of Inquiry into the Courts of Justice of 
England...'BPf Sess. 184-15, 18 (234 & 250), 33; 'A Return of any
Increase of Rate of Fees demanded and received in the Several Superior 
Courts of Justice...’ Sess, 1813-14 (230), 33-84.
[3] 'Details of Sums paid to the Civil List in Each Financial Year... to 
replace advances for grants* in App. IV to BPP Sess. 1868-9, 35 (366), 
457. After 1807 these supposed grants never rose above £10,828 a year.
Z V J
justice in the local courts and assizes [1].
Unlike the earlier committees of enquiry into the administration and use 
of the revenues from the previous decade - such as the Home Office’s 
unpublished report of 1785 on the expenses of the Auditors Office and the 
better known Commission of Enquiry into Fees and Emoluments of 1786 [2] - 
the 1798 Select Committee report neither sought to deal with all of the 
expences of the courts system nor to fulfil election promises of the 
reduction of sinecures and venal offices. The 1798 Committee concentrated 
solely upon the nature of the contemporary superior courts system and the 
associated costs. It identified two specific problems within the existing 
framework of justice: first, it noted that the system of so-called 
'official fees’ had become anachronistic and that salaries now represented 
the major source of income for the London-based higher court judges; and, 
secondly, it recognized that too many courts freely employed deputies in 
large and ever increasing numbers, deputies whose combined incomes seldom 
totalled less than three or four times the income of one judge. 
Consequently their major recommendation was ’...that Reduction and 
Retrenchment might be made most profitably to the Public, by the
[1] ’Twenty-seventh Report from the Select Committee on Finance...’ HC
Repts. 13, 1798, 199-343. Further citation comes from the published
report, Courts of Justice. The Report of the Select Committee Appointed 
by the House of Commons to Enquire into the Courts of Justice in 
Westminster Hall, the Courts of Assize. the Civil Law Courts and the 
different Subordinate Offices attached to each Court (London,1799).
[2] e.g. ’Accounts of the Office of Auditor...’[1785] PRO (Kew) HO 42/6/56 
~7; ’Report of the Commissioners on fees and emoluments of the Public 
Offices...’[1786] PRO (CL) PC 1/17/A 13(b) box 2; PRO (Kew) HO 42/10/1- 
53 [copy].
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Suppression of Offices which may be deemed comparatively inefficient’ [1].
Measuring the inefficiency of those posts appears to have been both 
difficult and protracted, yet the final recommendation of the committee to 
Parliament consisted of a suggested diminution of the salaried posts in the 
jhigher courts which plainly duplicated those of the provincial magistracy 
or served no real purpose in making the administration of justice more
efficient. This meant more than merely sending fewer cases to the higher 
1 courts; it implied that a more efficient mechanism for the execution of 
criminal justice and all forms of civil suit which found their way to the 
higher courts had to be developed. Consequently, and with the apparent 
assent of later governments, a significant and irreversible shift occurred 
in the allocation of resources for the administration of justice away from 
the metropolis and toward the rural and provincial courts of England
between 1800 and 1850. Table 6.2 below records the magnitude of that
change in the distribution of total expenditures for the provision of
courts through public expenditure by reconciling two entirely separate sets 
of estimates of funded expenditures by their provenance.
The transfer of over ten percent of total justiciary expenditures to the
provinces by 1850 seems at first rather small in proportion to the
overwhelming proportion of regular payments still enjoyed by the
centralised offices of the higher courts. However this transfer of
substantial sums was frequently applied to the development of existing 
jurisdictions or even to créât« new ones. Even before the appearance
['] Courts of Justice, 24-5.
Table 6.2: Structure of expenditures upon 'legal services', 1798 and 1850. 
(percentage of total expenditure on legal services by all government 













Sources: HC Repts. 13, 1798, 199-343; ibid. Supplement 11,1804 (175) 
, 716 : 'Report of the S.C. on County Rates...' BPP Sess. 1850, 13 
(468), Appendix E, 285-6
of Brougham's bill of 1830 for the setting up of 'district courts'
substantial attention had been given to the problem of encouraging
increased business to be done through local courts. The obvious solution to
the problem of immediately transferring more routine business to the
provinces was to reduce the amount of small claims routinely processed in
the superior courts by transferring the business to new or established
provincial jurisdictions. Indeed the majority of the new courts created
between 1800 and 1840 were established as courts of record purely for the
settlement of small debts. Most of these new small debt courts were founded
in the 1830's, under the aegis of the Brougham act, but in the first decade
of the nineteenth century some twenty-one such courts had already been
established across England, largely but not exclusively in accordance with
the regulating Act for the Recovery of Small Debts passed in 1786 [1]. By
[1] Calculated from the Local & Private Acts (1800-). The acts for the 
creation of these new courts were, in number: 1800-10, 21; 1811-20, 1;
1821-30, 0; 1831-40, 41. The 1786 Act is 26 Geo.Ill c.38.
1830 in England there were 481 courts of local jurisdiction, including 250
courts of request of which 165 had power of committal for small debts [1].
The significance of the creation of these new courts should not be
misunderstood. Whilst the majority of the ordinary jurisdictions of England
were not courts of record, the majority of the new courts for the recovery
of small debts certainly were (Table 6.3).
Table 6.3: Number of courts issuing process in all suits (assumpsit, 
replevin etc.) and issuing process for the recovery of debts of less 
than £5, 1830-31, by type of court in England and Wales.
All Suits Debts of less than £5
N X N X
Record 75 15.6 75 47.2
Request 63 13.1 57 35.4
Pleas 35 7.3 19 11.8
County/
Borough 126 26.2 3 1.9
Manor,Leet 
and Baron 115 23.9 1 0.6
Other 67 13.9 5 3.1
Source : ’ Abst ract of the Return of the Number of Courts 1
England and Wales...’ BPP Sess.1830, 23 (15),217-255;'Fourth Report 
of the R.C. on the Practice and Proceedings in the Courts of Common 
Law’ BPP Sess. 1831-2, 25, part 2 (239), Appendix I part v,283-593.
Courts of record perform quite a different function from other courts for
their major purpose is the recording or official recognition of titles and
other forms of legal document. In effect, the small court of record makes
[1] W.H.D.Winder ’The Courts of Requests’ Law Quarterly Review 52, 1936,
387, note 8; ’An Abstract of the Return of the Number of Courts of Law 
in England, Wales and Ireland, whether under the name of Courts of 
Requests, or any other name, which have power of committing to prison 
for debts of £5 and under £5...’ BPP Sess. 1830, 23 (15), 217-255.
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legally legitimate the property rights of individuals. Alongside the courts
of record founded for the purpose of debt recovery, courts of request -
usually extentions of existing jurisdictions - were also created. Their
greater popularity, with legislature and public, was largely the result of
their dealing exclusively with recovery and not with cases of disputed
title [1]. The growth of these small courts, intended to deal primarily
with small debt claims were established first in those rural, provincial,
towns which had already some local and well established jurisdiction and
whilst those existing courts were often little better than ill-organised
courts leet or courts baron which had all but fallen into disuse, it seems
to have been the intention of the Georgian reforms which preceded the
Brougham act to add to the effectiveness of these existing courts of
record. Towns like Bradford-on-Avon in Wiltshire [2], Boston in
Lincolnshire [3], Halesowen in Warwickshire [4] and Ipswich in Suffolk [5]
were among the first such jurisdictions sanctioned - all market towns in
the predominantly rural south. Yet gradually the small claims courts
established by Parliament began more frequently to be associated with the
needs of the trading community of manufacturers of the northern industrial
towns. After 1837 only 9 courts were established in towns to the south of a
line from the Severn estuary to the Wash. Contemporary commentators
certainly recognized the small claims courts of request established after
[1] Ritson op. cit, 47; Robert Maugham Oulines of the Jurisdiction of all 
the Courts in Engl and and Wales (London, 1838), 7.
[2] 47 Geo. Ill sess.2 C.39
[3] 47 Geo. III tess.2 c . 1.
[<»] 47 Geo. III sess.1 C.36
[5] 47 Geo. III sets.2 C.79
1830 as essentially courts for the recovery of industrial contractor’s 
debts; as ’creditors courts’ for industrial England and not for the rural 
provincial trader [1]. Travelling to the major towns of the north for 
redress was, apparently, too costly and too time consuming for northern 
manufacturers ; it proved more convenient and cheaper to have the courts 
set up by Lord Brougham’s act locally situated. Indeed the cost of the 
local courts set up after 1830 in the south were, if not markedly higher, 
somewhat greater than those of their imitators in the North [2].
Furthermore, evidence from a survey of 139,456 cases processed in these
new courts (Table 6.4 above) suggests that not only were court costs in
Table 6.4 : Distribution of the number of suits entered in local courts 
for recovery of small debts, 1826, by region and amount sought in 
recovery (percentage of total).
Below Between
£1 £1 and £2 £2 to £3 £3 to £4 £4 to £5 £5 to £10
Total 45. 14 31.26 5.96 3.70 13.46
North 48.52 35.06 5.65 3.95 6.81
South 43.98 29.90 6.08 3.61 15.84
Source:Calculated from ’An Abstract of the Number of Suits or Claims 
entered in each of the Courts of Request for the Recovery of Debts 
under £5 in England and Wales...’ BPP Sess. 1830, 23 (16),257-293 .
[1] See ’Local Courts’ Legal Observer I, 1830,46; [Anon] ’Courts of Local
Jurisdiction’ Monthly Review 124, 1830, 168-9; ’Observer’ An Estimate
of Mr Brougham’s Local Court Bill (London, 1830), 20; William Raines A 
Letter to the Right Honourable Lord Tenterden, Lord Chief Justice of 
the Court of King’s Bench etc, etc, on the Bill for Establishing Courts 
of Local Jurisdiction (London, 1830), 101.
[2] Based on a survey of the costs recited in various sections of 67 acts 
setting up local courts between 1800 and 1847.
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general higher in the southern counties of England but the amounts 
recovered from the defendant to a value greater than £4 were more 
frequently obtained in the south than in the north. In southern counties, 
over twenty per cent of claims were for values over three pounds; in the 
northern counties of England, less than eleven per cent of claims were for 
that amount or more. Equally, fewer than the average number of cases were 
brought to the new courts of record in the southern counties for amounts of 
less than two pounds. Infrequently were the decisions of such courts 
subject to review by superior courts [1] so defendants and plaintiffs alike 
were sheltered from the additional legal costs of further litigation.
Of course not all such courts only dealt with the recovery of debts.Only a 
third of the courts of request formally dealt with debt and, as we have 
already noted, a larger proportion of courts of record were involved in the 
task of recovering debts for plaintiffs than local courts of request. 
Nevertheless even in those courts of special jurisdiction similarly named 
and identified by Professor Arthurs recovery after the conclusion of a 
transaction appears to have been most frequently the cause of litigation
[2]. Naturally commercial rather than agricultural claims predominated in 
all courts of request, whether principally intended - as after the Brougham 
act - to encourage small debt recovery or not, largely because small
[1] Arthurs 'Special Courts, Special Law’, 397; idem.’'Without the Law’’, 
131.
[2] Arthurs ’’Without the Law’’, 133. Based on evidence from the Bristol 
Courts of Requests and Conscience. The slight evidence from the 
Trowbridge Court of Requests [Wilts.R.O. 212*/35/l-3; Annual Register 
10, 1768, 90] and the Court in the Isle of Wight [PRO (CL) AK 6/1]
neither of which are surveyed by Arthurs, confirms the general tenor of 
his argument without furnishing statistical data.
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shopkeepers or tradesmen with much variable capital stock in hand and
consequently little wish to effectively lend to their customers could
easily and inexpensively sue any late paying customer. The small amounts
generally recovered in the courts for the recovery of small debts was
therefore no accident; plaintiffs could sue and sue again, cheaply and
successfully [1]. In the existing courts of the corporations and town
councils of the market towns of the rural south, litigation tended to be
for higher amounts - indeed the major share of personal actions in such
courts (some 45X in fact) were for sums in excess of £200 and often reached
much higher sums [2]; they also tended to be more infrequently used. In
fact the courts set up for the recovery of small debts did little to
provide cheap and effective means of redress for rural contractors of land.
Still the bulk of those cases concerning real property went to the higher
courts. One author estimated that between one third and one half of all
actions in the superior courts concerned property alone [3]. Nevertheless
by placing recovery from small transactions at the centre of the work of
these new provincial courts, English law had effectively offered the means
of redress to a court like the sessions court in the treatment of the law
(broadly sympathetic to the principles of equity and less concerned with
the rigid observation of the common law) whilst preserving the independence
and local integrity of the jurisdiction. In the rural south,
[1] It is not possible to reconstruct the number of prosecutions per 
litigant for any of the courts because of the lack of any common system 
of reference for the names of appellants.
|[2] Calculated from ’First Report of Commissioners appointed to Enquire 
into Municipal Corporations of England and Wales...*BPP Sess. 1835, 23 
(1), 116 ff.
[3] ’Pract ical Dissertations on Conveyancing No.l. Directions for the 
study of the Laws of Real Property ’ Legal Observer 1, 1830,33.
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claims for amounts between those likely to be received following sessions 
trial and those expected in corporation court trials seem to have been most 
frequent. The creation of this large range of institutions significantly 
reduced the cost of going to law for the rural contractor.
The frequency, relative inexpense and the informality of their justice 
seems nevertheless to have made them mere arbitrators in small disputes and 
therefore not so much law-making or rule-creating institutions as the 
pragmatic policemen of rural contracting. Arthurs has argued [1] that 
their very existence suggests that innovation in contract law was largely 
superfluous. This would of course be true were it the case that all 
innovation in the law of contract after 1780 was intended to work through 
new and alternative institutions for the governance of contract. It might 
also have some validity were it the case that these new courts were set up 
as a part of the general revision of contract law undertaken during the 
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. In fact institutional 
adaptation generally lagged well behind the common law in devising novel 
forms of contract supervision and the legal 'revolution in contract’ was 
largely concerned with finding rules for the conduct of private 
transactions which reduced the need for any form of arbitration by courts 
of whatever composition. The fact that these new varieties of court alone 
were not required for the effective transition from low volume, costly, 
transaction to high volume, relatively inexpensive, forms of transaction 
says much for the efficiency of that alteration in legal principle.
[1] Arthurs Without the Law, Chps.l, 3-4.
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CHAPTER EIGHT:PRIVATE SUPERVISION AND THE PUBLIC WORLD OF THE RURAL ECONOMY
’Both the protection of property and the protection of contract 
must be established, at least to some extent, if the mercantile 
economy is to flourish. They are not provided by the traditional 
society; but they can be provided, to what (up to a point) may be 
a sufficient extent, by the merchants themselves. They may join 
together... to protect their property from violence; they may 
establish rules among themselves for the vertfication of property 
rights; and they may police their contracts...This, however, can 
hardly be possible unless the mercantile community has already 
acquired some social linkage or articulation. A random collection 
of individuals will hardly have it’ [Sir John Hicks, 1969].
In 1792 a contributor to the provincial journal The Country Spectator
voiced dissatisfaction with the fashionable view of the rural scene as an
idyll, a mirroi— like reflection of Gilpin’s gothic ’picturesque’.
There are some who still declaim on the quiet and felicity of 
retirement, and who would fondly persuade us, that Astrea still 
inhabits the earth and that Britain has its Arcadia [1].
In reality, as the author of this frank paper showed, the influence of the
metropolis was so pervasive that it influenced even the remotest corners of
Britain. In the most trivial ways the influence of metropolitian London had
reached the countryside - from the use of white lead in place of starch in
the provinces in imitation of the beauty powders used by London ladies [2]
to the emulation of London street whistles by country boys [3]. Often this
influence was due not to imitation but rather to the movement of Londoners
to the countryside. Their introduction of ’expensive luxuries before
[1] ’Enquiry into the simplicity of rural life’ The Country Spectator 1, 
(1792-3), 25.
[2] ’A Caution to the Ladies against the use of White Lead as a cosmetic’ 
The Bristol and Bath Magazine 1, (1783-4), 106-7.
[3] 'On the country Initatlon of London mfinners* The Country Spectator 1, 
(1792-3), 104,
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unknown in the country’ [1] was frequently cited as the reason for the 
corruption of the rural ideal. This influence of London manners upon rural 
society threatened to foster what William Marshall called the ’over-rated 
estimate of themselves’ [2] which he had found among the people of the 
south-west of England. The apparently false sense of the worthiness of 
provincial society which Marshall decried was, of course, a product of 
social as well as cultural pretension and as such is of little concern to 
this study. Nevertheless, the strict division between the rural and the 
urban in some contemporary literature and surviving documentary evidence 
suggests that it was the imitative zeal of the country people of southern 
England that distinguished them from ’civilized’ metropolitans.
Whether the result of imitation or importation, this delusion of London
manners and habits was frequently assumed to have corrupted, even
destroyed, the rural world. Late eighteenth century authors believed
affectation of any sort among country people was ridiculous if not
dangerous. Richardson’s Pamela endured the seduction of her simplicity by
city habits in the most popular contemporary warning to the genteel of the
consequences of lost innocence whilst, in more comic style, the
[1] [Anon.] A Political Enquiry into the Consequences of Enclosing Waste 
lands and the Causes of the Present High Price of Butchers Meat being
the Sentiments of a Society of Farmers in -shi re (London, 1785), 7.
Cf. J.Matthews Remarks on the Cause of the Scarcity and Dearness of 
Cattle. Swine, Cheese etc. etc. (London, 1799), 25; David Young 
iculture, the Primary Interest of Great Britain (Edinburgh, 1788), 
83-4.
[2] William Marshall The Rural Economy of the West of England including 
Devonshire and parts of Somersetshire Dorsetshire and Cornwall (London, 
1976) volume I, 25. On the phenomenon of rural emulation in general, 
see Richard A. Kent ’Home Demand as a Factor in Eighteenth Century 
Economic Growth: The Literary Evidence’ (unpublished M.Litt
dissertation. University of Cambridge, 1969), 130-60.
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Northamptonshire rural poet Clare mocked the imitative farmer’s daughter
Miss Peevish Scornful once the village toast 
Deemd fair by some and prettyish by most 
Brought up a Lady though her fathers gain 
Depended still on cattle and on grain 
She followd shifting fashions and aspired 
To the high notions baffled pride desired 
And all the profits pigs and poultry made 
Were gave to Miss for dressing and parade 
To visit balls and plays fresh hopes to trace 
And try her fortune with a simpering face 
And now and then in Londons crowds was shown 
To know the world and by the world be known [1].
The uneducated Miss Scornful finally reverts to plainer habits - because of
an illness apparently induced by ’having played show woman much too long’
[2] - and runs away with a farm servant. The moral of these tales of the
threat to country sobriety and chastity from urban custom, along with the
many others of the genre, was clear to contemporaries: the pleasures of the
countryside were quite irreconcileable with those of the metropolis.
Yet in a sense that is perhaps lost to historians every provincial 
parishioner lived not in an imitative community of would-be metropolitans 
but in a vibrant and cohesive community of singular institutions and 
practices. The eighteenth and nineteenth century rural parish which 
provides the geographical focus of this study was, in the words of one of 
its last profound witnesses ’...a miniature state and contain[ed]
[1] Eric Robinson and Geoffrey Summerfield (eds) Selected Poems of John 
Clare (Oxford, 1974), 76.
[2] ibid.
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representatives of the chief varieties of human life’ [1]. At the centre of 
the ’little state’ of the parish and the shire town was the institution of 
the market and the organisational and official structures and offices 
associated with it. Indeed it is the unique character of these offices and 
their function that distinguished rural from metropolitan and urban 
society. It has already been stated that this essay focuses not upon the 
agrarian aspect of rural life, but rather upon the organisational 
characteristics of the market society of the parish, hundred and shire, the 
structure of the rural ’state’ itself. Certainly the eighteenth century’s 
own equation of the rural with the derivative explains why rural parishes 
so ably aped the nation state in their organisation and administration, and 
historians’ insistence that rural communities were wholly or mainly 
agrarian and therefore subject to the ’agttM-kon jon^ur ’ of the long 
eighteenth century helps to identify the real strains upon rural 
institutions before 1840. Yet only the recognition of the unique qualities 
of rural administration, in hamlets as well as in county towns, allows the 
economic historian to account for the institutional change witnessed in the 
countryside and felt across Britain in the course of the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries. The distinctive i nst itut ional organisation 
of rural life, in other words, sufficiently distinguishes the rural from 
the metropolitan.
[1] Richard Jefferies ’The Future of Country Society’ [1877] in John
Pearson (ed.) Landscape and Labour (Bradford-on-Avon, 1979), 72. For
more contemporary opinions as to the local nature of the rural ’state’, 
see James Laver ’Customs and Manners’ in Alex Natan (ed.) Si 1ver 
Renaissance: Essays in Eighteenth Century English History (London,
1961), 108 ff; Basil Couzens-Hardy (ed.) The Diary of Sylas Neville,
1767-1788 (Oxford, 1950), 240.
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Tha moat conslatent difference between rural, provincial, economy 
(including the economies of the shire towns) and metropolitan economy 
t/ae the relative informality of the policing and control of 
contractual obligations. In the course of this and the next chapter. 
I want to illustrate how this had particular consequences for the 
transactions sector of the rural economy. In the late eighteenth and 
sarly nineteenth century two key areas of market supervision grew in 
importance - the unsanctioned practice of informing and the virtual 
privatisation of rights to weights and measures inspection and 
regulation. Similar developments in allied areas of rural life (such 
>8 the parallel development of quasi-private rights in corn 
inspection) suggest that Georgian England underwent something of a 
ninor revolution in economic organisation in the shires. We shall 
suggest that in an apparent attempt to reduce the costs associated 
<ith repetitive market trading - and in the novel environment of newly 
privatized market rights - the rural world engineered the solution to 
he problem of transaction costs by rewarding private initiatives in 
he field of exchange supervision. We shall rely upon the (admittedly 
nconclusive) evidence of changing patterns of regulatory control and 
'wnership to infer how transaction sector costs may have been reduced, 
urthermore, we shall suggest that specialisation in the form of 
t'upervision and policing and the diminished role of the unpaid and 
Voluntary personnel of the rural parish suggests a further reduction 
In exchange costs associated with regulation.
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The principal characteristic feature of the eighteenth century parish 
community in relation to market trade was the relative informality of 
governance - partly the result of the voluntary nature of parish offices (a 
feature well known to historians [1]), partly the result of organisational 
inefficiency itself. The extent to which this informality bordered upon 
corruption is too well known to require much elaboration here and is 
evident to even the casual reader of the voluminous contemporary literature 
on parish maladministration. Memorable examples abound of susceptible 
parish officers giving way to temptation, often through bribery or other 
inducements - too many, indeed, to do other than agree with the Webbs’ 
picture of the rural shires as veritable dens of vice and corruption. The 
Cambridge cleric James Plumtre witnessed with some surprise the poor rates 
of a Cambridgeshire parish being collected in a public house in 1800 [2] 
while the parish officers of Foxton in Leicestershire were reputed to have 
met under the (drunken) auspices of the local Friendly Society in 1785 [3]. 
In spite of the evolution of privatised responsibilities of the sort 
intimated below, considerable inducements had to be made to maintain the 
relatively inexpensive voluntary system which appeared to many contemporary 
commentators so riddled with inefficiency and corruption.
The revolution in parish administration that is associated with the 
attempted reduction in transaction sector costs in the rural world during 
the Georgian decades not only created new institutions; it partly reformed
[1] Especially following Sidney and Beatrice Webb The Development of 
English Local Government 1689-1835 (London, 1963), Part I.
[2] CUL Plumtre Papers Add. MSS. 5819 fo.l6.
[3] Northamptonshire Mercury January 17 1785.
2 4 5
old and suspect ones. Most notably the office of the churchwarden - for 
long the administrative arm of the parochial executive machine of the 
vestry - underwent significant reform in the course of the early nineteenth 
century. Churchwardens were an essential coordinating part of local 
government, both as empowered officers of the magistracy and as local 
representatives of the diocesan authorities [1]. Yet the extent of their 
influence over the economic life of the community has often been overlooked
[2]. They acted as the custodians (by law the ’bailiffs’) of the funds of 
their church and community [3] and were treated to the privileges of other 
’corporations sole’ in the management of parish funds [4]. Furthermore, 
they were entitled to a distinctive degree of protection from prosecution 
for what might be regarded as ’frivolous reasons’ [5]. With such 
unparalleled support for their work it might be supposed that the position 
of churchwarden was a not unpopular one and less given to the near criminal 
activities associated with other local parish officials. In fact, as the
[1] On their diocesan duties, not dealt with here, see Henry William Cripps
A Practical Treatise on the Laws Relating to the Church and Clergy 
(London, 1845). 180-204.
[2] Notably following Sidney and Beatrice Webb English Local Government 
(reprinted, London, 1963) volume I, 21-23.
[3] Bishop V .  Eagle 88 ER 607-08.
[4] Richard Burn Ecclesiastical Law third edition (2 vols., London, 1775), 
volume I, 378 developed the analogy between churchwardens’ powers and 
those of corporate bodies.
[5] 21  Jac.I C . 1 2 ;  Lewis v. James (n.d.) reported in Edwin Maddy Digest
of Cases Argued and Determined in the Arches and Prerogative Courts of 
Canterbury, the Consistory Court of London and t Court of Arches
(London, 1 8 3 5 ) ,  101 .  From 1837 ,  proceedings might only be initiated
against churchwardens where they had been ’wilfully disobedient’. See 
Millar and Simes v. Kelby and Palmer cited in Alfred Waddilove A Digest 
of Cases Decided in the Court of Arches. the Prerogative Court of 
Canterbury, the Consistory court of London and on Appeal therefrom to 
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (London, 1 8 4 9 ) ,  118 .
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Webbs pointed out in their magisterial study of the offices of shire and 
parish, churchwardens absconded with funds or cheated their fellow 
parishioners as frequently as other parish officials [1]. Furthermore, 
church and civil courts not infrequently dealt with cases in which those 
liable to serve as churchwardens sought to escape the office or be declared 
exempt before both the civil and ecclessioStical justiciary. During the late 
eighteenth and early nindeenth centuries a large number of deliberate 
exemptions from service in the office were sought on the basis of customary 
practice [2] and, for the first time, a number of appeals on the grounds of 
local practicability and necessity came before the courts [3]. As an 
unpaid office - even fees were only paid until 1778 [4] - the churchwardens 
post was not only unpopular, it was actively despised and avoided. 
Following the notorious contemporary case of Dr. Beavor of Norwich in 1789 
- whose refusal to serve brought his case before Doctors’ Commons
[1] Webb English local Government, I, 64 ff.
[2] According to Canon 89 of the Church, the obligation to serve might not 
generally be challenged upon the basis of local custom. However, an 
increasing number of exemptions of putative customs of appointment 
followed judgment in Middleton v. Crofts 26 ER 708-802 and the London 
customs allowed under Stephenson v. Langston 161 ER 588-90.
[3] For example. Peers, clergymen, MPs, barristers, attornies and court
clerks had already been given on the basis of custom and exemptions 
allowed by statute allowed for dissenters ( 1 Will & Mary c.l8 ss.4,7) 
and physicians (32 Hen.VIII c.40). New exemptions to emerge in the 
course of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries included 
surgeons (18 Geo.II c.15); apothecaries (6 Will. Ill c.4); those who 
had prosecuted felons (10 & 11 Will. IV c.23); militiamen (2 Geo.HI 
C.20 , 42 Geo.Ill c.90 s.174) and Roman Catholic priests (31 Geo. Ill
C.32 S . 8 ) .  The exemption for aldermen confirmed in Rex v. Abdy (71 ER) 
was later rescinded (Annual Register 29 (1782), 125). This account of
the growing volume of appeals for exemption is based on reconstruction 
using statutes of the period and the (often unreliable) contemporary 
guides by Burn Ecclessiatical Law, 369-70 and John Paul The Parish 
Officer’s Complete Guide sixth edition (London, 1793), 17.
[4] Until 18 Geo.II c.l9. See also Times 15 April 1790.
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[1] - there appears to have been some reappraisal of the function of local 
and parish officers, leading to a greater willingness in Norfolk to make 
available 'oaths of ineligibility’ in Norfolk within two years [2]. How 
widespread such reluctance to serve was is very difficult to ascertain, yet 
throughout the late eighteenth century significant resistance to the 
traditional duties of parish officers emerged and, in the most implacable 
opposition to these unpaid duties of all, churchwardens appear to have 
finally thwarted attempts by the shire justices to have them administer the 
settlement laws of Elizabeth in relation to vagrants in 1787 [3]. The 
diminution of the churchwardens statutory and customary obligations which 
followed is testimony to the growing specialisation of administrative power 
placed, not in the hands of efficient paid officers as the Webbs believed 
but, as we shall see. in the hands of private individuals with personal 
interests in the economic regulation of parish trade and commerce or the 
newly formed constabulary forces [4]. The fact that, at the end of the
[1] Times 7 November 1790.
[2] Norwich Chronicle 21 July 1792.
[3] William Man Godschall A General Plan of Parochial and Provincial 
Pol ice (London, 1787), 7. At least one commentator saw this as an 
assertion of the independence of the unpaid volunteer administrators 
from local government, Northampton Mercury 17 February 1787. Cf. Part 
of MSS. dissertation on the duties of parish officers. [71800], 
J.P.Morris MSS., Wilts.R.O. 317/29, where churchwardens exemptions are 
hardly mentioned.
[4] On the reduction in their statutory and civil powers. see subsequent 
editions of Godschall General Plan and on the reduced role of the 
churchwarden in ecclesjiatical matters, see Humphrey Prideaux Pi rect ions 
to Churchwardens for the Faithful Discharge of their Duty ed. Robert P. 
Tyrwhitt, eighth edition (London, 1830), 17. Only one altering statute 
adding to churchwardens' responsibilities before 1840 is listed in 
Henry Riddell and John Warrington Rodgers An Index to the Public 
Statutes from 9 Hen. Ill to 10 & 11 Viet. Inclusive (London,1848) . 32- 
3.
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Georgian decades. churchwardens were effectively only policing the older, 
Tudor, parish laws resulted from the attempt to economise on regulatory and 
supervisory costs through the privatisation of those powers churchwardens 
had found most irksome. In the rest of this chapter and the following one, 
it will be demonstrated that, in relation to two particularly important 
forms of market supervision, the Georgian shires conducted a virtual 
revolution in administration through the specification of property rights 
in supervision - a revolution whose scope was greater than is indicated 
alone by the two. detailed, illustrative cases given here. The newly 
created rights in supervision meant that supervision remained largely 
informal - in contrast to the more formal supervisory practise of Victorian 
England - but significantly diminished in effectiveness and efficiency. The 
rise of the professional informer in the rural south and the development of 
private rights in weights and measures supervision (which will be described 
in the next chapter) together ensured the continuance of that market 
informality which characterised Georgian rural economic administration.
Of all of the many forms of defining and preserving property rights the 
definition of common standards for the exercise of property transfer and 
for formalised exchange is perhaps the most common in history. The 
definition of unique weights and measures or standards for products sold in 
the market for example empowers those who regulate trade and diminishes the 
potentiality for 'shirking* behaviour or plain illegality by traders. On 
the one hand it protects all parties to a bargain from the insecurity of 
unspecified transactions and on the other hand it affirms the power of the 
owners of trading sites and associated rights to define the legitimate form
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of trade in the confines of the market itself. The specification of 
simple contracts of the sort routinely undertaken every day in the 
provincial markets of southern England during the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries naturally incurred substantial costs, but 
the form in which weights and measures regulation was undertaken 
ensured that those costs were minimised where possible. Just as the 
prescriptive rights to market toll were sold or rented to those 
willing to subcontract the running of the market. so too alternative 
institutional arrangements were established by which lucrative private 
rights in the specification of market standards were created and 
administered with the agreement of local and central government and 
with the intended benefit of reducing the coats associated with market 
trade. For most of the period that is the focus of this essay this 
quasi-official institution of the inspectorate was responsible for the 
maintenance of just and equitable market transactions, and whether 
appointed or self appointed sought to make a living from the 
transgressors of the laws of the rural economy.
The distance of years persuades us too easily of the unimportance of 
)xact weights and measures and honest market trading but at the 
Jeginning of the period the toleration of illegal weights and 
nderweight products was hardly countenanced. By the end of the 
’apoleonic Wars nearly one hundred laws had been passed in Britain 
concerning weights and measures and England alone had more than two 
'undred different types of customary weights and measures in use [1]; 
•w of these many regulatory laws had apparently
11 Patrick Kelly Metrology; or An Exposition of Weights and Measures, hieflv Those of Great Britain and France (London, 1816). xv; Georgekene Keith Different Methods of Establishing_ ftjQ_ VnlformltY_eights and Measuree Stated and Compared (London. 1817), 2.
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achieved the desired effect for abuses abounded. Yet, according to one 
contemporary commentator,
...although the laudable endeavours of Parliament for so many 
years had failed of complete success, yet they were highly useful 
in preventing new irregularities. The wear indeed of weights and 
measures, the avarice of dealers, and the ignorance of artificers, 
especially in constructing measures of capacity, contribute to 
increase that diversity which requires the constant vigilence of 
the magistrate to prevent [1].
Only through an effective system of surveillance and control was it likely 
that 'irregularities’ in trade would be prevented and, in spite of frequent 
and ingenious attempts to devise complete systems of weights and measures 
for Britain based upon a common standard with worldwide application [1], it 
is this approach to the problem of ensuring a continuity of market 
standards that influenced late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. 
Weights and measures regulation was indubitably a moral problem and not a 
scientific one. At the heart of the issue lay the problem of regulating not 
the product of farmers and the goods of market traders but the market 
itself. Fear of the effects of monopoly - of product and of market 
information - constantly appeared in Georgian discussions of the 
functioning of the rural provincial market economy and detection was no 
less a theme for these early market economists. The exercise of control 
over the market trade of the nation in the essential commodities (in wheat 
and other grains in particular) was more than simply an emotive concern of 
the pamphleteers however. It was perhaps the political issue of primary
[1] Kelly Me~fc rology, 64-5.
[2] Henry Hennessy 'On a uniform system of weights etc. for all nations’
Atlantis 2, 1858, 301-329 and George Skene Keith ’Observations on the 
Final Report of the Commissioners of Weights and Measures’ Edinburgh 
Philosophical Journal 6, (1821-2), 41-47 review the less fanciful
schemes from the standpoint of nineteenth century measurement science.
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importance for rural political society - and assuredly it was made to
appear political at both the highest and the lowest level of public
administration. The anonymous author who wrote in 1805 that
The violent outcry against the great farmers and monopolisers which 
prevailed three years since [following the dearth of 1801], was 
raised by the daemon of jacobinism as the precursor of an outcry 
against property and distinction [1]
was not alone in regarding any criticism of English market conditions as 
overtly threatening to the political stability of the nation for on both 
sides of the question of market structure the role of factors and farmers 
was regarded as primarily a political one. Sir Thomas Turton considered 
any thought of engineered market inefficiency through combination ’...most 
dangerous...’ [2] whilst in strict opposition to the so-called 
’monopolisers’ Septimus Hodson described the effect of their control of 
prices as ’malignant’ [3]. The provincial politics of market malpractice 
exercised many writers during these years and most if not all characterised 
the efficient market - after Smith - as one in which information was freely 
available and stocks were not held off the market to raise prices in years 
of seeming dearth but real abundance. Yet for the opponents of the farming 
and trading community a conspiracy against a fair market consistantly 
thwarted the attempt to establish fair prices for consumers in the shires. 
The conspiracy of the ’mealmen’, the dealers and the farmers against the
[1] [Anon.] A Defence of Principle of Monopoly of Corn-factors or Middlemen 
and Arguments to prove that War does not produce a scarcity of the 
necessities of life (London, 1805), 20.
[2] Sir Thomas Turton An Address to the Good Sense and Candour of the 
People in Behalf of the Dealers of Corn second edition (London, 1800), 
158.
[3] Septimus Hodson An Address to the Different Classes of Persons in Great 
Britain on the Present Scarcity and High Price of Provisions (London, 
1795), 5.
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rural populace raised the spectre for opponents of monopoly not of a civil
war for grain but of secret cabals of the wealthy; of arrangements to ’fix’
the market and preserve the ill-defined 'agricultural interest’. In the
words of one of the more dispassionate critics of the agricultural interest
The combination does not act in any fixed or marked 
character, but consists in a general and uniform consent 
to do the best they can for their own interest, however 
against the interest of the public; their mode of 
diffusing the secrets of monopoly... arranges the plan, 
and communicates it to all its members at once [1].
In this suspicious rural world, such cabals were regarded as exercising a
fearful control over the prices and supply of essential market goods
through morally dubious ’market rigging’ practices. Fraudulent farmers and
dealers in corn traded at low prices before the market opened, or regrated
on corn, or forestalled in the market or otherwise attempted to affect the
market price of corn; worst of all, farmers were known to hold onto corn in
years of dearth in hopes that prices would rise yet higher. The west
country cleric, John Malham, noted in 1798 that
By these and the like IRREGULAR PRACTICES, the public are 
precluded from the advantages of a fair and open market 
and a few individuals are suffered to prescribe the terms 
on which that public shall be nourished and supported.
The unreasonable and extravagant demand of the farmer, in 
seasons in which abundance and superfluity are not 
manifest, is submitted to by the miller or baker, without
any means of investigating the propriety and
reasonableness of the demand; and the community are 
compelled to submit to the advance, which the latter must 
consequently make upon the consumer, without having any
[1] George Brewer The Rights of the Poor Considered; with the Causes and 
Effects of Monopoly and a Plan of Remedy by Means of a Popular 
Progressive Excise (London, 1800), 71.Common use of the phrase ’the 
secrets of monopoly’ or the ’arcana of trade’ (Gentleman’s Magazine 79, 
(1809), 1216) suggests that the private practices of the market trader
were themselves a cause of discontent.
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remedy [1].
Similar arguments were raised by others - that the formation of effective 
monopolistic associations of traders and producers would affect the retail 
prices of all goods; that the poor would starve; that crime would rise 
[2]. Thus one persisting theme of this critique of market imperfection was 
the need for some official overseeing of the determination of weights and 
standards and trading practices, for both traders and farmers were 
notoriously given to adjusting weights in their own favour and cheating the 
people. Sadly the critics of the farming interest regarded the available 
inspection system as imperfect and supposed ’...that for nearly half a
[1] Revd. J.Malham The Scarcity of Wheat Considered; or a Statement of 
the Impolicy of the Late and Present Price of Wheat (Salisbury, 
1800), 7.
[2] Among the many discussions of monopoly in the corn trade during these
years, see Buxton Lawn The Corn Trade Investigated and the Shocking 
System Exposed (Bath, 1800); Hervey, Viscount Mountmorres Impartial 
Reflections upon the Present Crisis (London, 1796); Alexander Dirom An 
Inquiry into the Corn Laws and Corn Trade of Great Britain and their 
Influence on the Prosperity of the Kingdom (Edinburgh, 1796); [Dr.Blane] 
Inquiry into the Causes and Remedies of the Late and Present Scarcity 
and High Prices of Provisions in a Letter to the Right Hon. Earl Spencer 
KG. (London, 1800); [Anon.] Live and Let Live A Treatise on the Hostile 
Rivalries between the Manufacturer and Landworker (London,[1787]). 
Often these and other similar pamphlets deliberately confused 
’swindling’ with ’monopoly’, a habit of mind not uncharacteristic of the 
last two decades of the eighteenth century as a whole (M.S.Servian ’The 
Fair Swindler of Blackheath, a Case Study on the Importance of 
Reputation in Late 18th Century Legal and Commercial Affairs’ Journal of 
Legal History 8, (1987), 79). Equally common was the confusion of 
regrating on corn with monopoly power (see, among many such pieces. 
Gentleman’s Magazine 66, (1796), 102-3), a point recognised by the
farming interest in reply to calls for tighter restriction upon market 
sale of grain in times of scarcity (for example, in Rowland Hunt A Word 
On The Times To Those Who Buy: Also Five Minutes Advice Before Going To 
Market To Those Who Sell [second edition] (Shrewsbury, 1800), 9-10; 
’Common Sense’ The Cause of the Present Threatened Famine Traced to its 
Real Source viz, to the Actual Depreciation on our Circulating Medium,
occassioned by the Paper Currency (London, 1800), 7-8; 
Gentleman’s Magazine, 74, (1804), 949-51).
[Review of Hunt]
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century the magistracy have been blind f o o l s . 1 ]. At local level the 
practices of these supposed exploiters of the needs of simple families were 
unpopular and regarded as devious enough to evade detection unless the 
strict rigour of the law was applied against them in the matter of weights 
and measures regulation. Two forms of institutional adaptation reflect the 
desperate need for some form of active policing of market infractions by 
traders. On the one hand, the voluntarism characteristic of Georgian 
provincial economy allowed community policing by the unpaid and partly paid 
officers of the parish or town; but on the other, newer forms of 
surveillance emerged which depended upon the capacity of that economy to 
permit opportunistic action in situations where property rights were not 
fully enforced. These latter institutions - of informer and inspector - 
both benefited in this regard from the relative inefficiency of the market 
economy of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. Neither of 
course were wholly novel institutions, but in their intensity of use, their 
almost 'professional' ethics and their highly organised state, they came to 
represent new forms of privatised market control through liability rules in 
the absence of fully enforced property rights.
To speak of informers and the practice of informing as an essential
element of the rural regulatory regime appears at first to confirm the
hypothesis - foreign to our argument - that property rights in the rural
communities of the agricultural south remained unprotected and unpoliced.
In fact the lack of centralised regulation in market society meant that
private access to the benefits of unofficial regulation was possible. One
[1] James Naismith An Examination of the Statutes now in force relating to 
the Assize of Bread (Wisbech, 1800), 7.
2 5
consequence of this, and of the opportunism consequent upon the separation 
of monitoring functions and ownership, was the creation of a decentralised 
’market' in monitoring services. An extension of informal rural 
institutions, these decentralised, atomistic, elements of provincial market 
regulation included professional informers. In London, the work of the 
informer seems to have been largely concerned with the detecting of 
infractions of the trades of artificers and the services of an urban 
metropolis and there appear to have been very few or no gangs of informers 
of the kind regularly turning up in the pages of provincial newpapers, 
sessions papers and other records [1]. There, the problem of surveillance 
was principally one of discovering from a large number of traders which 
individuals were regularly infringing not only national law but also that 
metropolitan law which became such a feature of the Georgian legislation 
intended for the protection of property. In the countryside, however, the 
problem was of a different order. Property rights in trade were more 
clearly connected with the elementary trades of baker, butcher and so 
forth. Whilst in London much of the activity of the informer was dedicated 
to apprehending those found infringing lottery rules [2], in the 
countryside most of the informers’ time from the very beginning of our 
period appears to have been devoted to the detection of underweight bread, 
false reeling of yarns, the selling of gloves without authorized stamps and
[1] Sir Leon Radzinowicz A History of English Criminal Law and Its 
Administrât ion volume II (London, 1956), 142-155. There is no comparable 
account of the use of informers in provincial Georgian England.
[2] ibid.. 148-150.
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the selling of wool in unmarked bags [1]. In all but two cases neither 
formal nor even informal internalised forms of monitoring precluded such 
opportunistic action [2]. On whatever occasion informers sought to place 
information in the hands of the courts, their actions appear at first 
inspection to suggest that rural regulation - like police and government 
was ill coordinated and therefore necessarily inefficient. Yet the act of 
laying an information, whether at the quarter sessions or with the
constable, constituted at once the most inexpensive form of control over
the economic activities of traders and the greatest threat to the integrity
of the common law. The cost of cheaply policing the rural south and
protecting the legality and fairness of transactions appears to have been 
the encouragement oF doubtful methods by shady and unscrupulous 
individuals. In the somewhat untypical contemporary opinion of an anonymous 
contributor to the radical Norfolk journal The Cabinet (notorious for its 
opposition to the game laws and their rigorous enforcement by the assize):
[1] e.g.Salisbury and Winchester Journal 8 June 1789; ibid. 10 Oct 1794; 
ibid. 2 July 1790; Felix Farley's Bristol Journal 2 July 1790; 
Northamptonshire Mercury 24 January 1785 and other cases cited below. 
It is of course impossible to tell how frequently the professional 
informer took advantage of each of the pieces of legislation covering 
these items.
[2] The cases in whi 
was in relation 
gloves; inspector 
century by trader 
John Styles 'Embe 
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...the wretch who gains a livelihood by enforcing 
obedience to laws which are pernicious, or useless, is 
exposed to the utmost contempt, whether he feeds upon the 
game laws, or the stamp duties; whether he levies a 
penalty upon the weaver of tucks, or cloth buttons [1].
The seeming paradox of the position of the informer in the economy of the
late eighteenth century was precisely that he made his living from the
existence of bad laws, and therefore illustrated the inadequate nature of
contemporary regulation, and yet engaged in the ruthless exploitation of
his fellow citizens’ incomprehension or avoidance of the law. This
ambiguity in the position of the informer - at once the hero and the
villain of the rural trading world - is reflected most accurately in the
contemporary discussions of particular cases of informing. Informing, it
should be recognized, was something of a minor industry in the rural world
and in an economic system dominated by informal, relatively inexpensive
regulation 'professional informers’ were free to take advantage of the high
transaction costs implied by the existence of so many varied laws
regulating trade by virtually transfering property rights in informing to
themselves. Newspapers seem to have supported the laying of informations
during years of dearth and consequent high prices - many public informers
revealed that their neighbours were selling fine flour during the months of
virtual famine in 1795 and 1801 - but opposed routine informing by those
seeking to profit by the reward often given for successful prosecution in a
wide variety of regulatory cases at the quarter sessions. The ’professional
informer’ (one newspaper called them ’domestic spies’ in order to heighten
[1] ’H.C.R.’ ’On the essential and accidental characteristics of informers’ 
The Cabinet 1, (1795), 286. Cf. Patrick Colquhoun A Treatise on the
Functions and Duties of a Constable (London, 1803), 56-7.
the sense of popular disgust [1]) was the object of censure throughout the 
period in the rural communities of the south of England.
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Of course the majority of informations brought before the courts were 
entirely routine, the result of infringements discovered in the course of 
trade and made known by customers and occasionally by fellow traders [2]; 
rarely was monetary reward the major consideration in deciding to inform 
upon traders in these circumstances. When eleven of the baker William 
Scarbrow’s customers laid informations against him before the 
Huntingdonshire sessions for selling underweight bread it was with the 
expressed intention of reestablishing the regular supply from the baker 
upon a fairer basis to his customers and not to penalise him or seek 
recompense for underweight bread [3]. Rival traders as well as customers 
often made allegations against each other when quite other motives were 
evident (revenge featuring most frequently among the reasons given for 
supporting prosecution). One Bath baker, for example, laid informations 
against her fellow traders having been fined herself for selling 
underweight bread and ’...knowing that others broke through the Act of 
Parliament...' regulating the sale of bread [4]. Numerous similar 
prosecutions were recorded during the period by traders anxious for revenge
[1] Huntingdon, Bedford, Cambridge & Peterborough Gazette 18 January 1817.
[2] Numerous instances can be found, but see ibid., 12 July 1817; ibid., 6 
May 1820; Salisbury and Wiltshire Journal 8 Juno 1789; idem. 10 October 
1794; Northamptonshire Mercury 24 January 1785 for examples.
[3] Notification of informations in conviction of William Scarbrow, 7 
February 1795, Huntingdonshire O.S. Papers, Box II bundle 3, Hunts.R.O. 
HCP/1/2.
[4] Berrow*s Worcester Journal 8 October 1801.
or to widen the regulatory net by catching known malefactors [1] but even 
the most malicious acts of informing by peers in trade cannot have 
engendered the same degree of fear and hatred that the work of the 
professional informer created.
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Informers of the professional variety were numerous, apparently well known
and seemingly ubiquitous. Contemporary warnings of the arrival of
professional informers were common and usually took a form similar to that
recorded in a south Midlands newspaper in 1803:
Farmers would do well to be on their guard against a set of 
informers, who are now traversing the country, for the sole 
purpose of lodging complaints against all persons using five 
horses in their teams on the turnpike roads [2].
Those involved in the baking trade were most frequently the subject of the
informations brought to the courts by these professional travelling 'spies’
since informers often laid several informations against several bakers at
the same time. In support of their petition for a similar regulatory regime
and weight 'allowances’ as were granted to the London bakers, the committee
of provincial bakers formed in 1813 to make representations to Parliament
cited a number of cases of devious and nefarious informing practices which,
they claimed, had become all too common in the provincial rural towns.
Referring chiefly to those cases involving the notorious contemporary
informing 'team' of Johnson and Benwell the bakers offered eight examples
of dubious, untrue or unconvincing allegations made against them by these
[1] e.g. Huntingdonshire, Bedfordshire, Cambridgeshire and Peterborough 
Gazette 23 November 1816; ibid., 22 March 1817; Salisbury and Wiltshire 
Journal 24 April 1788; ibid., 8 April 1793.
[2] Northamptonshire Mercury 2 July 1803. On this form of informing, see 
also Felix Farley's Bristol Journal 6 June 1795 and Salisbury and 
Winchester Journal 11 July 1799.
260
two professional informers. One example will suffice to illustrate 
the hostility of the bakers to the informers and their method of 
bringing prosecutions:
Mr Elum. Baker, Hammersmith, sold 6 Quartern Loaves to the same Informers [Johnson and Benwell] and being told who they were sent hie Daughter about 12 years of age to follow them, she returned home and informed her Father they had gone to the Goat Public House. Mr. Elum immediately went to the said House and on entering it was informed by a person belonging to it that the Informers were making a good thing of it today in the Kitchen, where he saw his own bread and 40 more loaves - One of the informers in the act of fleecing a Loaf, and from the quantity of pieces of Bread which he saw on the Table he is sure there would not be less than three to four pounds weight. In consequence of this discovery Mr.Elum was not summoned [1].
Benwell and Johnson were among a number of similar teams of 
professional informers who made a living out of providing evidence to 
the courts for the prosecution of bakers in the provinces [2]. 
Operating without the sanction of the law and almost always without 
authorized warrants for seizures the informers defeated the aim of 
legal enforcement - by making it arbitrary - and effectively took the 
powers of regulation in rural communities away from the rural 
onstabulary. Yet this organisational framework for detecting 
Illegality in trade was not at all inefficient. In fact the 
leparation of surveillance and prosecution by encouraging informers - 
owever indirectly - probably reduced local market transaction costs, 
f individual informers were willing to police and prosecute negligent 
raders
11 PRO (Kew) H.O. 42/132/435-7.
2] 'Report of the Select Committee on the Petitions of Country lakers' BPP Sess. 1018, 9 (345), 232-5. On other gangs see in articular Times July 17 1786; ibid. November 6 1822; Felix Farley's iclstol J9urnal July 30 1791; Berrow's Worcester Journal June 30 1803. |ating the arrival of the 'professional gang' is dangerous given the ucity of central records relating to them, but experience of iwspaper reports suggests that they arrived in number and as a roblem in the 1700's and early 1790's rather than later or earlier.
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in expectation of a reward, and that reward was to come from the penalty 
paid by the refractory trader, the use of even professional informers could 
prove economically efficient for the parish and the county. On one 
occasion indeed there is a suggestion that informers were even directly 
’employed’ by the parish to catch the illegal trader [1]. Rarely were 
informers open to any personal risk from prosecution, for none of the 
relevant statute law of the period included penalties for false information 
or for wrongful statements against rural traders. Only in one, probably 
unique, case were informers exposed to any personal liability from false 
information laid before the courts: the infamous and previously mentioned 
Johnson - one of the most notorious of the homo counties informers of the 
period - was personally warned by the Legal Observer in 1830 that, because 
of poorly drafted legislation, penalties and not rewards would be divided 
equally between informers and the poor of the parish where illegal entries 
in the parish registers were reported and that, as a result, an informer 
could be expected to serve a term of seven years transportation as a result 
of the miscreance of others [2]. This single exception only strengthens 
the validity of the general case that informers could not lose in 
submitting their evidence to courts; indeed the only possible action 
against them following the failure of their evidence to bring a conviction 
- short of a personal action brought by the accused tradesman - was to be 
tried as a common scold or slanderer, both parts of the medieval common law
[1] i.e. in Hull. Felix Farley’s Bristol Journal 6 June 1795. Some large
boroughs, like Newport in Monmouthshire, maintained rewards for 
informers as part of their ordinances (Brynmor Pierce Jones From 
Elizabeth to Victoria. The Government of Newport (Mon.) 1SS0-18S0 
(Newport, 1957), 58) as did other national quasi-official bodies like
the Board of Excise.
[2] ’Caution to Informers' The Legal Observer 1, 3, (1830), 43.
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which failed to find a precise interpretation in contemporary legal 
practice in the provinces [!]• With little risk to be had from false 
accusation and attractive benefits to be gained from the habit of 
informing, professional informers effectively appropriated property rights 
in surveillance and the policing of trade and created a new ’market’ for 
convictions, bringing actions to court for profit and judging their success 
not in terms of the greatness of the detected fraud but by the size of the 
resulting reward.
In spite of (or perhaps because of) the efficiency of this ’market’ in 
criminal prosecution the communities of the rural south of England reacted 
strongly to the idea of government by informer and of justice by paid 
witness and several professional informers appear to have suffered physical 
injury or molestation at the hands of angry crowds or indicted individuals
[2] . After failing to gain the expected conviction of one Mr. White of 
Gloucester, one informer ’...was followed by a considerable mob, who pelted 
him with mud and dirt to such a degree, that he was completely disfigured’
[3] and was subsequently discovered to have had plans to lay similar 
informations against traders in Worcester, Tewkesbury and other parts of
[1] e.g.Quarter Sessions proceedings book, 1800-1808, Hunts. R.O. HCR box 
16, bundle 2, entry for 7 April 1807. Trials for ’conspiracy’ among 
gangs appear infrequently throughout the period (e.g. Times 6 November 
1832). However, it may be no accident that the only case of a 
convict ion for false (market) information I have found is of a hawker 
in Cambridge, Huntingdonshire, Bedfordshire, Cambridgeshire and Peter­
borough Gazette June 6 1818.
[2] e.g. Annual Review 18, (1798), 184; Bath Chronicle 29 December 1808;
PRO (Kew) H.O. 40/18/37; Radzinowicz History of English Criminal Law. 
152.
[3] Berrow’s Worcester Journal 6 September 1810.
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the Severn valley. After all, informers were notoriously dishonest 
themselves and frequently double-dealing in their relations with both the 
courts and their victims. When two innkeepers were convicted of having 
received poached hares from local poachers at Honiton and Cullompton in 
Devon, it was the poachers who informed the constables of the illegal 
purchases of the two publicans [1] and when a Salisbury butter factor was 
prosecuted on the basis of an information it was commented that he himself 
was ’...a noted swindler...' [2]. Clearly some of the unpopularity of the 
local informer was transferred to the 'professional' but few local and 
occasional informers were so severely abused save, as we shall see, in 
selected instances.
Professional informers were not alone in being so abused and it is clear 
that even those whose duty it was to bring illegal practices to the 
attention of the magistracy where they required investigation and possible 
prosecution suffered from the popular censure of traders and community 
alike. This apparent rejection of local supervision of the standards of 
trade - which must have been in the interests of all - suggests that the 
rural communities of the south believed there to be no need for any form of 
regulatory control or supervision.
[1] Salisbury and Winchester Journal 14 November 1791.
[2] ibid. 24 April 1788. (Popular censure was not, of course, reserved for 
informers but rather imitated that meted out in often violent form to 
more adventurous perjurers who regularly sought to gain from the 
conviction of felons; for contemporary examples of crowd sanctions of 
this type in England, see 'Remarks on the Punishment of the Pillory' 
Edinburgh Magazine or Literary Amusement 48, (1780), 71-73).
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A more detailed examination of contemporary complaints reveals, however,
that in the main contemporaries objected to the manner in which regulatory
supervision was practiced and had some difficulty in recognizing any
distinction between the ’professional informer’ and the constable in the
matter of informing. Inspectors of corn markets came in for much complaint
and hostile opposition and were regarded as little better than paid
informers because they gained at least a part of their salary from the
courts in the form of rewards for successful prosecutions before the
reforms of market administration in the first half of the nineteenth
century in the weights and measures legislation applied outside of London.
Attacks upon inspectors were not infrequent. One north Devon inspector
received the following memorable threatening letter in 1812:
Having seen a paper stuck up in this Town about some man being 
fin’d at Bideford for selling a Certain Measure and you we the 
poor understand was the informer, let me intreat [sic] you to be 
causious [sic] for depend upon it Winter Nights is not past [sic] 
therefore you person shall not go home alive, or if you chance 
escape the hand that guides this pen lighted match will do eaqual 
[sic] execution [to] your family. I know not But the whole shall 
be enveloped in flames [.] your Carkese [carcass] if any part 
shall be found will be given to the Dogs, if it Contains any 
Moisture for the Animal to Devour it.beware of your cattle in the 
field for depend upon it Nothing shall be wanting to bring you to 
destruction [1].
Another chilling note, written in another hand and sent to the hapless 
inspector pointed out that ’...bets are 10-to-l you are not in existence 
three months longer’ [2]. Inspectors of the Corn Returns and the local
[1] ’Thomas Certain’ to F.Shurray, 3 July 1812. PRO (Kew) 42/121/108-9.
[2] Anon, to Skurray, 10 March 1812 PRO (Kew) 42/121/110. E .P .Thompson’s 
interpretation of these unique survivals is somewhat different from my 
own because of his failure to recognize Skurray as the Inspector of 
Corn appointed for the district. E.P.Thompson The Making of the 
English Working Class second edition (Harmondsworth, 1968), 68.
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officials charged with the enforcement of the Caroline weights and
measures regulations and with the maintenance of the assize standards - as
well as much additional legislation - of the market towns were often more
directly assaulted, however, and in the few instances in which contemporary
records of assaults upon them mention popular opposition to their actions
in taking corn from the market or restraining traders from selling
underweight or unfit items as the reason for their suffering physical
assault little appears to have been done immediately thereafter to remedy
the situation by town, borough or parish authorities [3]. Far from being
protected, indeed, the constables and - to some extent - the churchwardens
were expected to police any disturbance subsequent to the seizure of
illegal goods in the market and were often embroiled in virtual riotous
disputes concerning the confiscation. Clearly informing was easily
confused with voluntary community regulation - and with good reason. When
legislation was forthcoming in an attempt to regulate weights and measures,
it did little to reduce opportunism through a consistent assignment of
market rights in surveillance and inspection. As we shall see. Parliament
in fact chose to externalise surveillance and policing and created new
rights in market supervision which were, apfarently, entirely inconsistent
with public policy. In relation to weights and measures regulation, public
opinion played some part in securing the relatively independent but
[1] e .g.Cambridgeshire OS Minute Books , entry for 13 July 1804, Cambs.
R.O O/SO/11 fol. 282; Bath Chronicle 29 December 1808; PRO (Kew) H.O
42/87/366-368; N.W.Surry and J.H.Thomas (eds) Portsmouth Record Series 
Book of Original Entries (Portsmouth, 1976), 3, entry for 18 December 
1731. One contemporary commentator noted that, in Herefordshire in 
1819, 'If any police-officer be exemplary and active [in discovering 
pilfering or other market offences], they do not feel sorry even if he 
is murdered’. George Laurence Gomme (ed.) The Gentleman’s Magazine 
Library: Manners and Customs (London, 1885), 18.
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opportunistic agency of the Georgian inspectorate, an inspectorate 
i^ hich in all but name was an ill organised and uncoordinated club of 
private individuals whose position as the external agents of the rural 
'state' prolonged their independence in action and responsibility to 
their own benefit and to the cost of the community as a whole.
Again, the historical evidence available to us cannot conclusively 
prove the existence of planned (and achieved) reductions in transaction 
costs as a result of the changing pattern of regulation through the 
reformed Inspectorate. Rather we have had to infer from indirect 
evidence of the performance of pre-existing organisational forms how 
virtual 'privatisation' affected the costliness of market operation. 
Just as the legal evidence of cases proved insufficient conclusively to 
validate the claim that legal reform actually reduced transaction costs 
- and instead we had to place some reliance upon inference - the 
elative spareness of historical data in relation to regulatory practise 
rimilarly forces us to rely upon conjecture based upon non-quantitative 
lata. These reservations should bo born in mind, for no amount of 
rchival research is likely to reduce the significant role that 
nference from the evidence of organisational performance must play in 
ccounts of the transaction cost considerations affecting the English 
Ural economy in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.
CHAPTER NINE: THE REGULATION OF MARKET CONTRACTS. 1780-1840 : WEIGHTS 
AND MEASURES.
2 6 7
’Personalized exchange in simple, unspecialized societies 
depends for enforcement upon behavioural codes, and the 
perceived legitimacy of the contractual relationship 
significantly influences judges and juries. If measurement 
were perfect and the judicial process precisely awarded the 
’correct’ amount of damages to injured parties in a contract 
violation, then opportunism would not play the part that it 
does in influencing economic organisation’ [Douglass C. North,
1981]
To suggest that the continuing influence of informers in industrialising 
Britain reflects the pertinacity of older forms of customary market 
behaviour is surely to miss an important phenomenon of the late Georgian 
years in the rural world. While there are no absolute statistics for the 
number of informations levied during the period, nor even for the 
indictments of informers themselves for slander, that might tell us in more 
detail how far informing had become a more common practice, the more 
frequent references in the ephemeral literature of the period to the roving 
gangs of informers and their professional attitude suggests that the 
creation of unpoliced private opportunities in public market activity for 
supervision was becoming a more productive and lucrative occupation in the 
rural towns. In the meantime, quasi-hierarchies were established for the 
internal regulation of unpopular monopolistic practices, the most heinous 
of which - regrating - produced at the height of the popular hysteria and 
the riots of the southwestern and eastern counties a range of palliative 
measures designed not to replace informers but to augment the effectiveness 
of detection. Fines, the prohibition of advertisements and sale of wheat
in the barn, rewards for information and other devices were used throughout 
the mid-1790’s to secure effective reductions in regrating and engrossing
[1]. Committees of sessions regularly insisted upon vigilonce from the 
constabulary and rewarded active policing, but apart from reaffirming local 
opposition to local opportunism these efforts achieved little.
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Throughout the 1790’s constant efforts were raised to force parliament and 
the courts to admit the important role of weights and measures regulation 
in preserving the interests of the consumer. Finally the necessary support 
was given to the Caroline statutes in a case before King’s Bench. In 1791 
it was the Isle of Wight justices who brought before the superior court a 
case intended to determine whether farmers’ and traders’ customary measures 
were, in fact, legal; the case of Rex v. Major [2] was widely regarded in 
fact as a significant victory for the cause of reform. At the end of the 
case, the Salisbury and Wiltshire Journal noted the significance of the 
decision.
The total abolition of customary or arbitrary measures 
and the introduction of one equal and general measure for 
the sale of corn throughout the kingdom, so long desired, 
will probably soon take place, in consequence of a late 
unanimous judgement of the Court of King’s Bench on that 
head. This matter was about a year since taken up by 
Messrs. Holmes, Barwis, Rushworth and the Rev. Dr.
Worsley, four Justices of the Peace in the Isle of Wight, 
who uniting with the respectable number of opulent 
farmers of that county, entered into a subscription to 
withstand the combination of corn buyers and prosecute
m: 1
[1] From a long list, see for example Salisbury and Winchester Journal 8 
May 1797; ibid. 6 November 1796; Felix Farley’s Bristol Journal 18 
April 1795; ibid. 7 May 1796; ibid. 11 June 1796; ibid. 27 August 1796; 
Berrow’s Worcester Journal 10 April 1800.
[2] 100 ER 1282-1283 (1792)
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the business to effect, which they have now happily 
accomplished, though at an expence of near 3000 1. [1].
In the decision of the court, Bearcroft J. argued that buyers would be 
incriminating themselves if forced to admit to having bought by non­
standard weights and on this interpretation of the consequences of a 
contract between buyer and seller in unregulated measures the case turned. 
Kenyon, C.J., argued further that none of the subsequent cases admitting 
the possibility of local measures were contrary to the principle of the 
Caroling statutes. In essence the case law of weights and measures after
1792 was placed upon a surer footing by a careful, not a revolutionary,
court. Only in 1826 was any alteration in this general formula adopted at 
common law; only then were even the most well established customary weights 
admitted to market trade by the courts [2]. Rex v.Major accomplished in a 
few hours what had been demanded for more than a century. The following 
year one of the judges in the case. Lord Kenyon, reflected that ’...after 
the case of Rex v. Major was decided, we had an opportunity of knowing 
from the grand juries in different counties that the decision gave great
satisfaction’ [3]. In the provincial market towns of the south, the
decision was received with equal enthusiasm and even the farmers and 
dealers recognized the value of assured measures. In Andover
... the statute measure was not only universally adopted 
by the farmers, but cheerfully [sic] acquiesced in by the 
dealers, who were convinced that great benefit will 
result to the public therefrom; and in many numerous
[1] Salisbury and Winchester Journal 25 Juno 1792. Cf.Times 25 August 1792.
[2] Tyson v. Thomas 148 ER 350-354 (1826). The judgment was naturally 
welcomed by the farming community. See, for example, ’News of 
Agriculture, Rural Economy etc.’ British Farmers’ Magazine, 1 (1826-7), 
264, especially the comments of Jehosophat Postle.
[3] Rex V .  Arnold 101 ER 197-199, Kenyon C.J. at 199.
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companies 'permanence to the new measure' was toasted in 
bumpers [1].
Support for the common law court's decision, whilst probably not absolute, 
appears to have been considerable and in the great grain markets of 
Salisbury, Warminster and Devizes in Wiltshire and Dorchester in Dorset it 
was the farmers who began subscription schemes to pay for the prosecution 
of those found using illegal weights after the decision became known [2], 
It took Parliament more than a year to catch up with the common law and 
local, voluntary, practice and it was only in 1794 that the statute law 
finally accorded with the local practice of market surveillance and 
prosecution through local funding. From 1794 sessions were required to 
appoint, at their own expense, an inspector of weights and measures 
responsible for the regulation of all measures used [3].
Against this background of the national coordination of weights and 
measures supervision the continuation of local practices and procedures for 
supervision after 1794 suggests that the national control over contracts in 
markets remained unsatisfactory at least until the legislative reforms of
[1] Salisbury and Winchester Journal 10 October 1792. Cf. Cambridgeshire 
Quarter sessions Order Book, 1786-96, Cambs.R.O. OS/SO/9, entry for 5 
October 1792.
[2] Salisbury and Winchester Journal 8 April 1793; Felix Farley's Bristol 
Journal 18 July 1792.
[3] 35 Geo. Ill c.l02 s.2.
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1824 and 1835. As we shall see, the continuing independence of sessions 
appointees and borough inspectors from a national standard of practice 
produced great inequalities in weights and measures specification and 
enforcement. The local power over the enforcement of the existing 
legislative controls was often transferred to borough corporations or 
courts of common council by acts of Parliament, or by the transfer of 
prescriptive powers over the market. Whilst the Corporation of Chichester 
had kept control of weights and measures before the passing of a market 
bill in 1807, that bill effectively transferred such powers to the new 
market authorities [1]: similarly at Saxmundham in Suffolk the committee 
organising the new market in 1836 wanted the control over the weights and 
measures to pass to them adding that ’...the Committee shall have the power 
of making bye-laws from time to time, for the regulation and management of 
the establishment...’ [2]. With the control over the major markets passing 
out of the hands of individuals and into the hands of corporate bodies and 
groups of local investors, it is not unreasonable to expect that the 
control over weights and measures regulation in rural communities would 
have been subject to similar forces. Indeed control over those very aspects 
of regulation allowed and encouraged those very corporate bodies to specify 
precisely the return from prescriptive rights ownership they might expect
[1] 47 Geo. Ill c. 84 s.lO (1807).
[2] ’Prospectus for Enlarging and Improving Saxmundham Market’ [1836], 
Suffolk R.O. (Ips.) HA 34/50/21/6.1(b). This document is also 
reproduced in Joan Thirsk with Jean Imray (eds.) Suffolk Farming in the 
Nineteenth Century [Suffolk Records Society Volume I] (Ipswich, 1958), 
158-160. Cf. ’Copy of Address...’ [1836] HA 18/EF/l whore a detailed 
account of the administration of the market after the transfer to the 
committee is given. Other markets followed similar patterns of 
administrative practice, for example Kingston-upon-Thames in Surrey 
(Surrey R.O. KB 19/1/1) and Marlborough in Wiltshire (Wilts. R.O. G 
22/ 1/ 202).
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and to allow them to exercise considerable control over the volume of 
market trading. These rights were, however, of Vi'ttle worth in themselves 
for whilst the specification of the standards of weights and measures lay 
in the hands of the national government, the local owners by prescription 
might only enforce those standards. The provision of specified standards 
for market trade was certainly not profitable in itself for the owners of 
markets and consequently, as shall be illustrated, they tended to 
subcontract this work to others willing to gain their income from policing 
the market on their behalf.
Yet within the permitted area of control given to local corporate bodies
and county quarter sessions, there existed some room for local innovation
and control before national enforcement was made complete after 1835. Both
the sessions appointees and borough inspectors were responsible for
punishing offences against the Georgian statute and the common law of
weights and measures. However the relative informality of control and
separation of property rights from central administration that
characterised other forms of local government during the period also proved
to be the basis of weights and measures regulation locally. The Inspectors
of Weights and Measures appointed under the Caroline and early Hanoverian
legislation were to be appointed by the justices at petty sessions for
their own divisions; no divisions appointed inspectors after 1797 [1].
[1] 37 Geo. Ill C . 1 4 3  s.l required that only those places appointed for 
the regulation of weights and measures under that Act should continue 
to employ them. Effectively, then, no new posts were created at 
divisional level after 1797. Between 1795 and 1797 the effect of 35 
Geo.Ill c.102 S.7 was to allow court leets the authority to continue to 
appoint inspectors; this latter form of regulation was not hindered by 
the 1797 Act (William Marriott The Country Gentleman’s Lawyer and the 
Farmer's Complete Law Library (London, 1808), 4 ) .
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These inspectors - who were never regarded in law as the sessions’ 
employees but rather as nominees acting on their behalf but with a free 
hand - effectively controlled local supervision in their own interests, for 
the regulation of local weights and measures might prove to be a lucrative 
and not overburdensome appointment. The East Anglian gentleman Samuel 
Playford for one was so persuaded of the real benefits of the office that 
he managed to secure two appointments as inspector in two separate counties 
- Cambridgeshire and Suffolk - quite illegally [1].
One very obvious reason for the apparent popularity of the post was the 
relative assurance of a regular salary regardless of the effectiveness of 
policing. Yet the very fact that a substantial portion of the regular 
payments to such inspectors came in the form of fines or from the sale of 
illegal weights which were subsequently broken and melted down suggests 
that some portion of their regular income was expected to come from the 
performance of their duties. Inspectors had in fact some considerable 
interest in the efficient performance of their tasks. In 1834 and 1835 some 
44% of the direct payments to Suffolk inspectors came from fines or from 
the breaking of illegal weights [2], and in general smaller but still 
considerable amounts of money came from the same source. In the same years 
in Essex, at least 37% of the payments to inspectors came from this source
[1] County treasurers accounts, Cambs. R.O OS/10/4 fos. 383-428 inter 
alia; Bury division, Suffolk sessions accounts ledger, Suffolk R.O. 
(Bury) 0/F3. Cf. B.P.Jones Elizabeth to Victoria, 149, in which one 
worried weights and measures inspector complained ’...that the work 
took so much time for so little pay that he wished to resign a post 
which was too onerous...’.
[2] Bury division, Suffolk sessions, cash book, 1789-1827, Suffolk R.O. 
(Bury) 0/Fl fos. 120 ff.
[1], in Wiltshire 33X came from confiscation and fines [2], whilst in 
Hertfordshire the figure was 32% or more [3] and in Bedfordshire was also 
32% [4]. Figures for Kent were less clearly presented and more difficult 
to calculate but it appears that some 38% of inspectors revenues came from 
capturing weights and obtaining a reward for laying an information against 
the guilty trader [5].
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If between one third and two fifths of the income of inspectors came from 
successful prosecutions, it might be expected that efficient inspectors 
would seek to maximise the number of convictions. What appears to have 
happened , rather, is that inspectors - like professional informers - tried 
to maximize the number of prosecutions, for no machinery short of private 
prosecution existed for false arrest. Their own private interest in 
seizures and the trial of alle gedly fraudulent traders hardly appears to 
have encouraged a cautious attitude to their duties. In the unique town of 
Cambridge, in which the University 'Taxors’ had the right of weights and 
measures inspection and of seizing stock, but not the right to fines - 
which ended up in the University treasury - prosecutions were less frequent 
and the inspections more generous; an average of ten seizures a year of
[1] Essex R.O. 0/FA b fo.42.
[2] Wilts. R.O. OS Al/155 bundle 1.
[3] Herts. R.O. OS Misc. 1777c.
[4] Beds. R.O. CTAA /I.
[5] Kent A.O. 0/GA/l/3a. The Kent sessions, like the Great Yarmouth 
Borough accounts, list only the fines received and one must assume that 
salaries remained static in order to calculate the percentage 
contribution of fines to inspectors’ incomes. See Norwich R.O. Great 
Yarmouth borough MSS. C 14/4.
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between one and twenty underweight loaves in the whole town seems either 
remarkably lenient or unprofessional. but in most cases according to the 
University Registrar, Joseph Romilly, ’The Bakers submit almost invariably 
and there has been no trial of a refractory Baker in the Court of the 
V[ice] C[hancellor] of the U[niversity] for 5 years’ [1]. Compare this 
relatively quiet surveillance with that of most of the towns and divisions 
of southern England in which rights to the inspection and arrest of 
offending traders (both bakers and others) were freely transfered to a 
quasi-professional inspectorate. With the plain incentive to maximise 
their detection rate in the form of lucrative fines most inspectors - 
ironically perhaps given their employment - appear to have been willing to 
sacrifice accuracy for volume.
As a result a very considerable number of cases came before the courts in 
the early years of the nineteenth century, all too many of which appear to 
have resulted in acquittal. In Wiltshire the somewhat overenthusiastic 
inspector of weights and measures, William Beech, reported with avidity 
that ’...more than two thirds of the County shopkeepers are using light 
weights etc. by which the poor are sufferers...’ and seized two hundred 
illegal weights within his first month of appointment [2] and in the county 
of Hertford the divisional inspector Josias Johnson reported that in three 
perambulating inspections of the county he had summoned 150 people to
[1] Joseph Romilly to S.M.Phillips (copy), 11 March 1835, CUL University 
Archives MSS. T/VIII/6. The Portreeve of the Cinque Ports appears to 
have exercised power over weights and measures in a similar fashion. 
See [Anon.] A Description of En Al and and Wales, Containing an Account 
of Each County (London, 1769) volume 5, 55.
[2] ’Account of a Survey taken of Division No. 2 by William Beech, 
Inspector...’[1840] Wilts.R.O. OS Al/155.
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account for false weights after having ’...thrice carefully inspected every 
Shop, Public House and Beer Shop...’ in his division; Johnson virtually 
begged on the basis of this evidence not to be removed from his new
position, seemingly arguing thereby that arrests and not convictions were 
the true sign of an effective divisional inspectorate [1]. This enthusiasm 
for prosecution, whether the result of ovei— much zeal or simply a desire 
for greater income from the successful conviction of refractory traders and 
farmers, led to only a very small number of sessions cases related in the 
files of the respective county sessions. In the two counties surveyed by 
Beech and Johnson, the criminal prosecution of offenders against the
weights and measures laws never actually reached the remarkable figure of 
suspects they arrested and while the long mistrusted official statistics do 
indeed hide any prosecutions which may have taken place at the borough 
courts and probably underestimate the incidence of crime in the shires, 
both counties would have had to undei— report the crime of weights fraud by
a factor of ten to have validated the claims of the two inspectors [2].
Not all counties managed to exploit the personal interest of their 
inspectors by pressing them to accept a third of their incomes from fines. 
In 1820 the Quarter Sessions of Buckinghamshire appointed a ’Committee to 
Enquire into the Necessity of the Office of Inspector of Weights and 
Measures’ to investigate the efficiency with which inspectors had managed 
to uncover the use of false weights.In fact the committee could find record 
of no more than nine fines for false weights paid to the County Treasurer 
by the local inspectors, who received no personal reward for
[1] Josias Johnson to the Marquis of Salisbury, 4 April 1844, Herts.R.O OS 
Misc. B96 /e.
[2] ’Tables...of Criminal Offenders’ §PP Sess. 1840 37 (321), 1023.
2 7 7
catching those evading the law, between 1800 and 1820. It complained in 
that year
...that the said Offices have not been executed with that 
Vigilance and Attention which would be productive of 
beneficial Effects to the Public; as it may be seen on 
reference to the Accounts of the County Treasurer from the 
time of the Appointments [of inspectors] in 1800 to Easter 
Session 1820 inclusive. that the only Returns made to the 
County are, one from the Inspector of Burnham Hundred, two 
from the Aylesbury Hundreds, three from Buckingham Hundreds, 
two from Cottesloe and one Penalty from Haddenham parish - 
But on examining the Records it appears that various 
Convictions beyond those above referred to have been returned 
to the Sessions between those respective Periods, in which 
case the Produce and Penalties have not been paid into the 
Treasurers Hands, but which agreeably to the two last recited 
Acts we recommend should in future be done and a renumeration 
to the Inspectors or Informers made by an Order on the 
Treasurer - so that all Penalties levied should appear in the 
Treasurers Accounts [1].
In part the legislative reforms of the Georgian period meant that the 
efficiency of inspectors in finding false weights might actually determine
some part of the levy for the county rates too. Consequently the fact that
so few false weights were found in Buckinghamshire meant that little 
additional income was available for the county. In practice the funding of 
this informal system of weights and measures validation and the 
surveillance of local marketing was considerably complicated by
considerable indecision regarding the ownership of fines recovered. The
1795 Act for the Prevention of the Use of Defective Weights required that, 
after conviction before the sessions justices, the miscreant trader would 
be punished
...by distress and sale of the goods and chattels of the 
person or persons so of fending...[which were then] to be 
paid to the treasurer of the county, riding or division,
[1] 'Report of the Committee to Enquire into the Necessity of the Office of 
Inspector of Weights and Measures...', 17 October 1820, Bucks. R.O. 
O/AM/8/4 fo.l.
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where the said offence shall be committed, to be by him 
applied towards the expences of carrying this act into 
execution. and the residue (if any) in aid of the general 
county rate [1].
Meanwhile a 'reasonable recompense or satisfaction' for the inspectors was 
directed to be paid out of the county rates [2]. Within two years a 
further Act [3] allowed the County Treasurer to recover not only fines but 
the Divisional inspectors' costs on their behalf - again for submission to 
the county rates - and allowed the county to break and sell captured 
weights for scrap for the first time. More significantly the same Act 
allowed parish, borough or hamlet inspectorates to be established 
(churchwardens had carried out similar duties with the force of mere custom 
previously) to be paid for out of the parish poor rates. At parish and at 
county level, inspectors’ salaries and costs came from the general funds to 
be applied to a variety of local administrative and welfare services and 
yet in part their success in the apprehending of weights and measures fraud 
contributed to those funds.
At parish level, of course, some regular inspection system had been in 
place for some time. Clerks of Markets, Mayors or Churchwardens ensured 
that market measures accorded with local custom and that nobody was 
knowingly defrauding purchasers. Yet until the 1797 Act the problem of 
finance appeared insoluble. Local investigation was frequently regarded as
[1 ] 35 Geo. Ill C . 1 0 2  s.2. ( 1 7 9 7 ) .  The previous year the London Committee 
of Aldermen had devised a plan for the regulation of the wheat and 
flour markets by weight which appears to have acted as a model for the 
provincial regulation of corn and other markets in this act. See 
Gentleman's Magazine, 6 6 ,  ( 1 7 9 6 ) ,  962 .
[ 2 ]  i b i d .  S . 4 .
[3] 37 Geo. Ill c.143 ss.l-S.
being extraordinarily inefficient even after the enabling legislation of 
1794 and in at least two counties (Wiltshire and Buckinghamshire) the 
sessions correspondence files reveals frequent dissatisfaction with the 
parish and borough regulatory system [1].
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In fact local innovations in the practise of regulation were not 
infrequent throughout this period - both before and after the later Act. 
Against the background of growing discontent over the level of local, 
parish, poor rates frequent and not inconsiderable efforts were made in a 
number of boroughs to reduce the costs of policing and increase the value 
of successful surveillance. The Wiltshire borough of Marlborough provides 
the historian with particularly full records of this process, for the 
costliness of weights and measures regulation out of parish poor rate funds 
was regarded as a continuing problem by the Clerks of the Market both 
before and after 1797. In Marlborough it was the evolution of new forms of 
penalty for non-compliance with the standard weights established in 1792 
that most immediately affected local market folk and most effectively 
charts the history of the costliness of regulation, for in general borough 
and parish inspectorates had little opportunity to make economies in their 
surveillance activities; theirs was a weekly round of inspections, carried 
on year after year, with little assistance or hope of catching all illegal 
trading. Before 1786, the Marlborough Clerk’s court regularly imposed heavy 
fines and broke up captured weights [2], In an attempt to increase the 
effectiveness of the policing of the markets - and no doubt to calm the
[1] Bucks. R.O., 0/WM/c/ 1-9; Wilts.R.O., OS/a/1/1-155, bundle 2.
[2] Minute books of the Clerk of the Marlborough Market, 1785-1851, Wilts.
R.O. G 22/1/188/1 fo.5, entry for 16 August 1786.
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apparently unhappy local traders - offenders were required by 1790 to 
submit their illegal weights to the Clerk for correction and subsequent 
return. They were not required to pay a fine and merely paid the cost of 
the physical alteration of weights [!]• After the imposition of the 
standard Winchester bushel by statute in 1792, however, this practice 
appears to have been less frequently used. With responsibility for ensuring 
the local observance of national weights standards now passing to all 
current inspectorates, the costliness of inspection increased. Weights had 
to be ordered from London with which to compare the weights used in the 
Marlborough market. Hence from the late 1790’s, and within two months of 
the passing of the 1797 Act enabling the collection of substantial fines by 
local inspectors to be paid to the poor rate fund, confiscated weights were 
again being broken and heavy fines imposed for illegal use of false weights
[2]. From 1801, the Clerk made further attempts to reduce the costs and 
increase the efficiency of regulation by again imposing harsh penalties and 
forcing guilty traders both to forfeit their weights and have their names 
published in local newspapers - a practice which slowly began to gain some 
following in number of boroughs [3]. What appears at first surprising from 
the record of the Marlborough court at least is that price changes do not 
appear to have been directly and singularly responsible for the changing 
administration of penalties; plainly clerks and other inspectors
[1] ibid. fo.20, entry for 20 September 1790 onwards.
[2] ibid, fo.49 ff., entry for 16 September 1797 onwards.
[3] ibid. fo. 70, entry for 25 April 1801. For examples of the use of
publication as a deterrent elsewhere, see SO Geo.Ill c.38 s.72 (1810) 
(Brighton Market Act); 56 Geo. Ill c.25 s.28 (1816) (Cowes market
Act). The first recommendation for this form of punishment appeared in 
Times 26 April 1790.
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worried far more about the cost of administering weights and measures 
regulations than in the effectiveness of the measures for securing lower 
prices and 'even trade’. In other provincial courts or at common councils 
of boroughs too there appears to have been a very similar pattern in the 
evolution of penalties. In Hertford, then a thriving market town, the 
resort to harsh penalties moved unevenly and almost countei— cyclically with 
price movements. The decline in the number of presentments in years of 
high grain prices (for example, in 1791, 1801 and 1815) was accompanied by 
a decline in the use of the penalty of breaking weights and throughout the 
early years of the nineteenth century fines alone were generally imposed 
and weights were not routinely broken [Table 5.1]. Only in the years in 
which a larger number of presentments were made were fines supplemented by 
alternative forms of penalty [1].
Table 5.1: Presentments to the Court of the Clerk of the
Market , Hertford, 1776- 1835 (August or September court).
1776 32 1791 4 1808 32 1826 31
1778 25 1793 31 1809 28 1829 28
1779 16 1800 13 1815 5 1830 14
1786 33 1801 6 1817 19 1831 27
1787 10 1804 23 1818 21 1832 11
1789 7 1805 10 1819 13 1834 15
1790 9 1806 8 1820 8 1835 8
Source: Hertford Borough MSS. volume 16 fos. 135-202, Herts. 
R.O.
Similarly, in the small east Berkshire market town of Maidenhead over a
part of the same period the experience of penalty and policing followed the
same pattern: fines alone were levied in years of little activity but were
supplemented by similarly numerous additional forfeits for infractions of
[1] Clerk of the Market of Hertford papers, Herts. R.O. Hertford Borough 
MSS. vol. 16 fos. 135-202.
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the statute law when presentments grew in number [1]. Again, price changes 
seem to have had little positive correlative effect upon the development of 
the system of enforcement adopted in Maidenhead. It is perhaps invidious to 
assert that these cases suggest positively that it was the cost of 
regulation and not the effectiveness of it that motivated organisational 
change within the provincial establishment in relation to weights and 
measures regulation. Nevertheless it can be argued from this slight 
evidence that local officers empowered to seize and break weights and 
measures were more concerned with the consequences for their poor rate than 
the consequences for the poor of unjust weights. Certainly the policing of 
communal standards did not automatically confer communal benefits anyway.
Where fines were imposed, following either divisional inspection and trial 
at the sessions court or at the parish or borough courts established to 
regulate trade, they tended to remain at the customary levels determined by 
the practice of those courts. While the 1795 Act had permitted penalties of 
any amount between 5 shillings and 20 shillings [2] few counties appear to 
have reached this upper limit of penalties (the Hertford market court 
retained fines at levels established in the 1760’s until at least the 
1830’s). Yet the very fact that fines remained customary - usually 
representing the charges for the administration of the case and some ’fee’ 
for the inspector - meant that the parish or county income from fines and 
even from the sale of the metal in false weights was small. In the Bury 
division of Suffolk quarter sessions fines usually totalled not more than
[1] Clerk of the Market of Maidenhead papers, Berks. R.O., M/JMs 1-3.
[2] 35 Geo. Ill c.l02 s.2.
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thirty pounds during the year and, in spite of the fact that they might 
have done so from 1797, the sessions of Suffolk only raised additional 
funds by selling false weights for melting down after 1830; this raised 
revenues to an average of over eighty pounds each year between 1830 and 
1839 (Table 5.2).
Table 5.2 : Revenues of 
and recovery of weights 
1811-1839.
Suffolk Quarter sessions from fines 
in the Bury divisional inspectorate
£ s. d.
1811 4 18 1/2
1812
1813 37 7 5
1814 33 18 0




1819 12 3 2 1/2
1820 17 11 3
1821 73 0 5 1/2
1822 19 18 11 1/2
1823 58 15 2 1/2
1824 7 8 11 1/2
1825 3 19 6
1826 4 10 0
1827 9 17 6
1828
1829
1830 114 10 11
1831 82 18 10
1832 45 14 9
1833 39 14 1
1834 82 15 5
1835 52 4 8
1836 118 1 2
1837 118 9 7
1838 n o 14 4
1839 137 15 2
Sources: Cash Book, Bury Division of Quarter Sessions, 1789-1827,
Suffolk R.O. (Bury) Q /FI ; Disbursement accounts, 1811-24, 
Suffolk R.O. (Bury) Q/F2 ; Quarter Sessions Treasurer’s ledger. 
Bury division, 1830-1867, Suffolk R.O.(Bury) Q/F3.
So the additional levy from the breaking of weights significantly raised 
the revenues for the courts where it was adopted. Like the Bury Division of 
Suffolk, many divisional inspectorates and their county treasurers failed 
to immediately incorporate the allowance for breaking of weights. thereby 
raising revenues. The administration and economics of the regulation of 
market trade were plainly not easy to manage for many counties.
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In fact at almost every turn in the development of the nineteenth century 
system of weights and measures validation there were complications in the 
simple machinery of local prosecutions and the specification of standards 
which bedeviled the avowed aim of the legislation to reduce the 
specification cost of the use of these simple contractual devices. 
Inspectors both before the nineteenth century reforms and after, complained 
that the validation of their own test weights had to be completed, at some 
considerable expense, in London [1]; that they desperately required some 
assistance to help with divisional inspections which were carried out over 
large areas of each shire, usually equivalent to a half or a third of the 
county [2]; and that the shortage of copies of weights increased their 
duties - on each inspection, official standard weights had to be collected 
from the shire hall and returned thereafter [3]. Far from alienating all of
[1] For example, J.B. Axford to John Swayne, County Treasurer, 14 November 
1834, Wilts. R.O. OS /A1 /155; Anonymous report of a case concerning 
weights and measures, n.d. [dated 1825 from internal evidence], Beds. 
R.O. O /AV /2 fo.2.; Letters concerning 'sending up’ of weights and 
related sessions business, [71825], East Sussex R.O. Winchelsea 
Corporation MSS., MS.364-67.
[2] William Le Hardy (ed) Hertfordshire County Records: Calendar to the 
Sessions Minute Books and other Sessions Records with Appendices. 1752- 
1799 volume 8 (Hertford, 1935), 468.
[3] e.g. Bucks. R.O. O/WM/C/7.
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the associated expenses in weights and measures regulation by transferring 
effective control over the part of the property rights in validation to 
inspectors, the treasurers of the counties and the owners of markets and 
their associated courts regularly paid for much of the rou tine cost of 
administration of the system; nevertheless it can be asserted that without 
the subcontracting of weights supervision the costs of market operation 
would have been much greater in reality. Constant efforts were made at 
national level to make the administration of the law economically viable 
for the counties and considerable attention appears to have been given to 
the problem of determining penal ties which would not leave counties and 
town councils out of pocket. In 1797 the entire bench was required to press 
warrants for the recovery of false weights from traders [1]; under the 1815 
Act for the more effectual Prevention of the Use of false and deficient 
Measures’ only one justice was now required to issue a warrant [2]. 
However little attempt appears to have been made to reduce the non­
recurring costs of regulation: even in the consolidating legislation of 
1824, the cost of obtaining copies of the official standards were 
exclusively assigned to the counties and no part of the real costs of 
obtaining weights was placed at the door of the central administration, 
apparently the specific intention of the drafter of the legislation [3].
[ 1 ]  37 Geo. Ill C . 1 4 3  s . 2  ( 1 7 9 7 ) .
[2] 55 Geo. Ill c.43 s. 2 (1815).
[3] 5 Geo.IV C . 7 4  s.l3 (1824). My conclusion that the 1823 Bill and later 
Act was intended to place the burden of the supply of weights upon the 
county sessions, borough courts and court leets comes from a reading of 
’Remarks upon some of the practical Provisions contained in the Weights 
and Measures Bill..’ [71823], Goldsmiths Library, University of London, 
MS.459/1. Cf. Annual Review, (1823), 321 in which the parliamentary 
debate on the first reading of bill reports no animadversion on this 
point.
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The considerable costs of weights and measures regulation brought about 
urgent and often exacting enquiries in the shires and the town councils 
into the real costs of administering the acts of Parliament ; several 
counties instigated formal inquiries as late as the 1830’s and 1840’s into 
the efficiency of the system adopted under the Georgian legislation.Apart 
from the continuing investigations by the Buckinghamshire sessions already 
mentioned, several counties included some consideration of weights and 
measures regulation in their general surveys of county expenditures during 
this period and a number of sessions launched specific investigations in 
this area.In Hertfordshire - for which the weights and measures issue seems 
to have been particularly important - the only item considered by an ad hoc 
committee of 1841 was the ’...districts, emoluments and duties etc. of the 
Inspectors of Weights and Measures..* [1]. The problem appears to have been 
that several irregularities appeared in the accounts of fines furnished to 
the county clerk by the inspectors. The following year the sessions court 
adopted the recommendations of its committee that the accounts of the 
inspectors should not be forwarded to the finance committee of the sessions 
unless details of all levies and fines were sent in along with the precept 
of the justices permitting the inspection of weights and measures [2]. 
Expense was, however, always the most important issue for the sessions and, 
as a parliamentary inquiry revealed in 1833, the sums involved just for 
inspectors salaries and revenues from fines were often considerable (Table 
5.3).
[1] G.H.Hotham to J.S.Storey, 12 November 1841, Herts.R.O. OS Misc.B96 /7.
[2] Le Hardy Hertfordshire County Records. 356.
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Table 5.3 ; Salaries and expences of the Inspectors of Weights 
Measures, 1821-32 for selected counties and divisions of 
counties, including London.
Beds. Midd. Norfolk Suffolk(a) Suffolk(b) London
1821 £115 9s lOd £74 9s 6d £119 19s Od £84 4s 4d
1822 £6 9s 6d £142 12s Id £168 4s 8d £102 19s 7d £428 18s lOd
1823 £199 6s 7d £52 10s Od £69 14s 9d £392 13s lOd
1824 £42 10s Od £100 4s 6d £421 15s Id
1825 £ 94 7s 9d £433 11s 3d
1826 5s 6d £225 Os Id £430 19s 9d
1827 £292 4s 6d £282 18s 3d £101 19s 8d
1828 £134 19s 8d £103 16s Od
1829 £171 11s 5d £70 1 s 3d
1830 £173 17s 3d £79 8s 9d £90 8s 3d
1831 £180 6s 8d £79 8s 9d £91 Is Od
1832 £198 2s Id £81 14s 7d £107 3s 3d
Sources:’Accounts from Treasurers of Sums Received.1821-32...’BPP Sess. 
1833, 32 (522) : 1-169 ; 'An Account of the Amount....of the Salary and 
Expences...’ BPP Sess. 1826-7, 16 (434) : 565.
Note: Suffolk (a), Ipswich Division ; Suffolk (b), Woodbridge Division.
To appreciate the real cost of these supposedly inexpensive services when
in quasi-public hands, it should be remembered that these fees and
allowances for a few divisions and counties were part of a total
expenditure of only £783,442 upon all of the services of the local
government offices by all the English counties in 1832 [1]. The figures
reported in 1833, whilst neither complete nor necessarily representative of
the same kinds of expenditure, probably underestimate rather than
overestimate the costs of regulating weights in provincial England. It
certainly appears extraordinary that the cost of regulating weights in the
[1] J. Watson-Grice National and Local Finance : A Review of the Relations 
between the Central and Local Authorities in England, France, Belgium 
and Prussia during the Nineteenth Century (London, 1910), 18.
numerous large markets of the metropolis were, on average, only four times 
greater than those of the Woodbridge division of Suffolk which had only 
three market towns in need of inspection and whilst the fixed costs of 
weights and scales may account for some of this additional cost in the 
capital, the expenses of inspectors in both made up a smaller proportion of 
the total charge.
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Before 1835, in fact, the supervision of weights and measures was both
relatively easy and rewarding; after 1835 the dissatisfaction of the
counties and the boroughs with the efficiency and with the cost of a
'privatised' inspectorate together with a series of court decisions
admitting the possibility of selling by non-standard, customary, weights
[1] effectively drove the government to accept the need for the
establishing of a more professional corp of weights examiners. Finally in
1835 Parliament passed an act to finally transfer the administration of
weights and measures to a locally established constabulary. Four years
later, with the passing of the 1839 Rural Police Act the power to undertake
inspections and seize false weights passed to the new police force which,
although more Georgian than Victorian still, was at least salaried and not
dependent upon the number of prosecutions for their reward. Gone were the
quasi - private rights to market specification and some traders - possibly
despairing of the apparent incorruptibility of a professional force of
inspectors - wished the old inspection system were back again. In a final
forlorn appeal to the local magistracy before the new police force took
over the duties of the inspectors and sundry constables, the traders of the
[1] Joseph Chitty A Collection of Statutes of Practical Utility (London, 
1837), 1106-1107 note (b).
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Risbridge and Lackford hundreds in Suffolk complained
That your petitioners feel confident that under the 
present system of Inspection in our District every 
important function is carried out impartially and 
judiciously, that nothing hitherto has been wanting to 
protect the public...[and that through the twice yearly 
surveys by quarter sessions appointees]...every facility 
is offered the honest trader to keep his Weights and 
Measures correct and just [1].
It should be noted that these complaints came from an area of Suffolk 
renowned for traditionally sending more offenders to a sessions trial than 
any other comparable district of the county from as early as 1804 [2]. 
Whether the disgruntled memorialists of the Suffolk hundreds were 
remembering kinder days in which bribery or corruption of the inspectorate 
was possible cannot be precisely ascertained but it seems likely that their 
fondness for the 'impartial and judicious’ treatment of the older form of 
weights and measures surveillance owed not a little to its relative 
inefficiency as a means of detection and policing. What is significant is 
that by 1839 it was not the farmers of the area that complained of the 
assumption of the uniform service founded under the 1839 Act but the 
grocers, bakers, millers and other shopkeepers; the regulation of trade had 
moved away from being merely the regulation of production and wholesale 
merchandising to being the inspection of retail trade by a professional 
force of independent inspectors. In a community of retail traders, 
inspection costs were arguably smaller than in economies with an extended
[1] Petition to Suffolk Quarter Sessions, n.d., [71839], Suffolk R.O.
(Bury) 0/APw 1 (23). For a detailed account of the role of Suffolk
constabulary in weights regulation before 1839, see the extracts in 
J.D.Wheeler 'The Borough of Bury St. Edmunds constabulary, 1836-57’ 
Suffolk Review 2, (1963), 194-7. For more typical reactions to the 1839 
Bill, in which Hertfordshire constables are indicted with inefficiency 
in their policing of weights and measures, see W, Branch Johnson ’The 
Parish Constable in 1830’ Amateur Historian 4, (1960), 328.
[2] Iris; or Norwich and Norfolk Advertiser 14 July 1804.
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hierarchical form of traders, middlemen and producers - each competing one 
with the other. Indeed it may be argued in Coasian terms that the 
specification costs of trade would necessarily be reduced through increased 
competition. Suffice it to say here that the story of the evolution of the 
mass market retail sector is not truly a part of the history of the rural 
south during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries and that, 
in spite of the efforts of the councils, boroughs and sessions of the rural 
south to economise upon the specification costs of market trade to reduce 
the transaction costs of market trade during the period, underlying 
economic structural change during the latter half of the nineteenth and 
early part of the twentieth century probably performed that task more 
successfully and more efficiently.
This brief survey of the history of the regulation and inspection of 
Georgian and Regency market exchange has nevertheless pointed toward some 
important general conclusions which deserve amplification. In studying the 
practical face of legal supervision of market exchange two essential points 
emerge: first, that the very informality of the rural state belies the
argued efficiency of sub-contracted supervision and, secondly, that 
practise departed from the aim of legal reform in 1792, 1825 and 1835 to 
reduce the costs of market regulation and thus local expenditures. Both 
informers and weights inspectors seized the opportunity offered by the 
faliure to internalise regulatory control within the market system and 
turned it to their own advantage. The rise of the ’informing gang’ 
largely a late eighteenth and early nineteenth century phenomenon - and the 
continuation of the independent inspectorate until 1839 suggests that
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pportunist behaviour within the market institutions of the provincial 
south was considerable and that alternative regulated institutional 
structures failed to evolve principally because of anticipated 
costliness rather than because of any suspicion that supervision was 
of necessity an unwelcome intrusion. In an age in which popular 
suspicion of the market dealer ran higher than hitherto, it is perhaps 
surprising that largely voluntaristic forms of economic organisation 
remained in place as a means of preventing exploitation and rank 
Illegality. In terms of the PRTC model developed here, however, it is 
perfectly explicable. The creation of private rights in the offices 
of market supervision might have reduced transaction costs for the 
owners of the market and for the market user. What appears at first 
sight confusing to the observer is the longevity and survival of 
elements of private opportunist action in these nominally community 
based institutions. This need not cause any surprise however: the 
voluntarism of the Informer and the weight fines 'farmers' was 
probably the easiest solution that the ill-coordinated, decentralised, 
market could find in the circumstances. Again, inference from evidence 
of organisational behaviour has led us to the conclusion that the 
changing nature of regulatory organisation - and the entailed 
privatisation of policing rights in market trade - had consequences 
for an immeasureable and chimerical transaction sector. We have not 
proved that the organisational changes we have shown led to altered 
levels of transaction cost: in common with other parts of this essay 
the effort has been to demonstrate that by focusing attention upon an 
hypothesised transaction sector at all we have been enabled better to 
understand often subtle, often complex, institutional transformations.

CHAPTER TEN: PROPERTY RIGHTS, TRANSACTION COSTS AND THE ECONOMIC HISTORY 
OF MODERN BRITAIN.
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’...economical questions, or such as relate to wealth or 
property, demand the careful attention of the historian, 
inasmuch as they influence most powerfully a nation’s 
moral and political condition, that is, in the highest 
sense of the terms, its welfare or misery’[Thomas Arnold 
1842]
One of the principal themes of this essay has been economic and not 
historical: it has partly been the purpose of much of the above to justify 
the verdict of many economic theorists that the economic analysis of 
property rights is fraught with peculiar difficulties of method and, 
necessarily, of empirical implementation. However, the main product of the 
essay has been to demonstrate the value of a PRTC approach to the 
development of the modern economy and while the historical theme of 
institutional development through property rights redistribution in accord 
with PRTC theory has no doubt appeared at times somewhat laboured, it may 
be nevertheless maintained that the study of the institutions of property 
and associated transaction costs brings us nearer to an understanding of 
the origins of modern economic structure and, thereby, performance. At a 
time when not only economic historians are concerned with the competitive 
environment and the adaptability of institutions, this form of historical 
economics provides the most successful challenge to those who regard all 
institutional adaptation as a function of macroeconomic performance. Yet 
ours is by no means the only institutional analysis of British economic 
performance since the eighteenth century; it is however the most satisfying 
for the student of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. It
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has also been able to deal with an important difficulty in the way of 
advancing our knowledge of the history of the structure of the economy, for 
it has provided a perspective upon what might be called the 'business 
history of the market’. A history of structural change in the economic 
hierarchy of production without an understanding of the long term evolution 
of the market is somewhat analagous to a 'Hamlet without the Prince’, for 
if the decline of the market resulted from the development of internalising 
hierarchies and alternative governance structures it is for the historian 
to account for that decline as much as for the institutional innovation of 
developed capitalism. In general all alternative formulations of long-term 
business history tacitly assume that firms superseded markets because the 
latter were no longer efficient allocative devices; however, no 
organisational evidence has been adduced to support this view. In order to 
place the current work in the grander perspective of that current business 
and economic history literature which explicitly deals with the history of 
structure, it is necessa.rjto examine the foundations of structural economic 
history; it will then be possible to place our knowledge of the behaviour 
and structure of the Georgian market economy of the rural south in the 
context of alternative theory and of wider historical change.
Some economic historians who make use of the institutional approach in 
economic history argue that institutional rigidity and inflexibility has 
been the dominant characteristic of the recent British economic past and 
that subsequent decline in the twentieth century has been due to the 
obstruction of ’...individualistic as well as collective efforts at
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economic innovation’[1]. They argue that only supply-side, market, 
rigidities affect organisations and effect institutional change and that, 
consequently, property rights are largely unaffected by changing conditions 
associated with rising or falling aggregate levels of transaction cost. 
Indeed, new British institutionalist writing - inasmuch as it exists as a 
separate and distinguishable genre of economic history [2] - largely
ignores the development of the transactions sector and instead focuses upon 
the comparative advantage of other non-atomistic market cultures. It is, in 
fact, a defence of a very old fashioned variety of technocratic corporatism 
quite alien to modern European industry - by which collective decisions 
were hierarchically arranged by an ineluctable economic logic comparable 
with Coase’s inescapable mechanism of the invisible hand. Allied with 
Wiener’s searching critique of the cultural foundations of structural 
retardation [3], the new historical institutionalism brings together these 
themes of the structural obstinacy, ambivalence to growth and politico-
[1] Bernard Elbaum and William Lazonick ’An Institutional Perspective on 
British Decline’ in Bernard Elbaum and William Lazonick (eds.) The 
Decline of the British Economy (Oxford, 1986), 2.
[2] The neoinstitutionalism I am refering to is comprehensively surveyed in
Elbaum and Lazonick Peeline, 1-17, 39-45 and the works cited therein.
The use of the term ’British’ institutionalism is strictly inaccurate. 
Most of the contributors to this developing research area are in fact 
North American. British historical economic institutionalism as a 
critique of the neoclassical theory of institutions is chiefly 
represented still by W. Arthur Lewis The Theory of Economic Growth 
(London, 1955), Chp.3, esp. 142-162, although an older native institut- 
tionalism, led by C.R.Fay, deserves some attention. Since British 
business historians turned their attention to the economic theory of 
corporate economy after the work of Ronald Coase had achieved a certain 
notoriety among industrial economists, the historical economic study of 
organisation has been heavily influenced by neoclassical theory and 
Coasian extensions thereof (notably Leslie Hannah The Rise of the 
Corporate Economy [second edition] (London,1983), Chp. 1).
[3] Martin Wiener English Culture and the Decline of the Industrial Spirit, 
1850-1980 (Cambridge,1981).
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economic corporatism that are said to characterise British economic history 
since the end of the last century.
This 'new British institutionalism’ departs significantly from our own 
approach in two important ways. First it embraces the neoclassical 
economists’ account of the nineteenth century firm as the physical 
manifestation of that perfectly competitive organism of commerce whose 
development was engineered by nineteenth century growth and whose
characteristics were to remain largely unchanged until the early twentieth 
century. Integration and corporate growth through acquisition it is argued 
were the consequence of the need to protect markets, but further adaptation 
was apparently thwarted by an innate industrial conservatism. Secondly the 
British new institutionalist historiography regards the passing of the 
’market culture’ necessary to encourage institutional adaptability as an 
essential feature of modern industrial decline. From a late eighteenth 
century perspective, neither supposition appears convincing.
An alternative to this ’new British institutionalism’ which also claims to 
account for the performance of the macroeconomy from evidence of structural 
change is the more conventional Chandlerian analysis most recently applied 
to the study of the history of the multinational corporation and the
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multiproduct, multidivisional firm [1]. In Britain historians have in 
general failed to recognize in Chandler’s work any sign of what he himself 
regards as a new ’institutional, comparative’ economic history [2]; rather, 
British business history has been dominated by a more eclectic approach to 
the study of the structure and organisation of the economy in which 
econometric, case study and theoretical elements are drawn together [3]. 
Since the 1960s, indeed, British economic and business historians have been 
somewhat reluctant to choose between various proffered methods of business 
history and have sought truth in diversity. Yet the Chandlerian approach 
has had some notable followers, either in the form of a close alignment
[1] Reviewed in Stephen Nicholas ’The hierarchical division of labour and
the growth of British manufacturing multinationals: 1870-1939’ in Alice 
Teichova, Maurice Levy Leboyer and Helga Nussbaum (eds.) Multinational 
Enterprise in Historical Perspective (Cambridge,1986), 241-256; Diane
Hutchinson and Stephen Nicholas ’Modelling the Growth Stages of British 
Firms’ Business History 29, 1987, 46-64; T.R.Gourvish ’British Business 
History and the Transition to a Corporate Economy: Entrepreneurship and 
Management Structures’ Business History 29, 1987, 18-45; H.J.Archer ’An 
eclectic approach to the historical study of U.K. multinational 
enterprises’ unpublished PhD dissertation. University of Reading, 1986, 
Chp. 1.
[2] Alfred D.Chandler ’Comparative Business History’ in D.C.Coleman and
Peter Mathias (eds.) Enterprise and History : Essays in Honour of 
Charles Wilson (Cambridge, 1984) pp. 3, 9-10. It should be noted that
Chandler’s ’comparative method’ is intended to be a pragmatic but 
objective historical tool and not, as in the case of the so-called 
’comparative institutions approach’ developed by Coase and Demsetz, a 
largely subjective form of transaction cost analysis. Barry P.Brownstein 
’Pareto optimality, external benefits and public goods: a subjectivist 
approach’ Journal of Libertarian Studies 4, 1980, 98-100 is instructive
in relation to the differences between the methodology of Demsetz/Coase 
and, by implication and through an analysis of the objections of neo- 
Austrian economists (notably Israel Kirzner), Chandler’s own brand of 
institutional comparâtivism.
[3] Notably in Hannah Rise of the Corporate Economy, passim.
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with the comparative method itself [1] or more obliquely through adherence 
to the application of Chandler’s peculiar version of transaction cost 
method [2]. In Britain, in fact, the generic Chandlerian paradigm has never 
entirely held sway, so that while one historian can regard the proper 
subject of the study of the business history of the nineteenth century firm 
to be the decision-making of economic agents [3], another regards the 
function of the business historian to be the selective elucidation of those 
factors which 'favoured or retarded’ the achievement of the corporate 
business structure of the twentieth century [4]. One reason for this 
apparent diversity is purely chronological. For Chandler, the history of 
the modern business enterprise is overwhelming the story of the decline of 
a merchanting economy and its replacement by a settler economy in the 
course of the nineteenth century; Chandler, in short, seeks to chart the
[1] B.W.E. Alford ’Entrepreneurship, business performance and industrial
development’ Business History, 19 (1977), 116-138; Francis E. Hyde
’Economic Theory and Business History. A Comment on the theory of profit 
maximisation’ Business History 5, (1962-4), 1-10; Peter L. Payne ’The
uses of Business History: A Contribution to the Discussion’ Business 
History S, (1962-4), 11-21. (It should be noted that British business
historians have never in general advocated or articulated support for a 
comparative institutionalist analysis of the type favoured by Schweitzer 
- born in part of that central European institutionalism carried over 
from the nineteenth century and revived by socialist theorists like Halm 
in Germany in the 1920’s and , subsequently, in America - a version of 
institutionalism which still commands some following in the United 
States (Arthur Schweitzer ’Comparative Enterprise and Economic Systems’ 
Explorations in Economic History 7, (1969-70), 413-432)).
[2] Hannah Rise, Chp.l; Leslie Hannah (ed.) Management Strategy and 
Business Development: An Historical and Comparative Study (London,1976); 
Barry Supple ’Introduction’ in B.E.Supple (od) Essays in British 
Business History (Oxford,1977); Peter L. Payne ’Industrial 
Entrepreneurship and Management in Great Britain’ in M.M. Postan and 
Peter Mathias (eds) The Cambridge Economic History of Europe, VII, part 
1 (Cambridge, 1978), 180 -230 for discussion of this work.
[3] Alford, ’Entrepreneurship, business performance’, 123-4.
[4] Hannah Rise of the Corporate Economy, 6.
decline of mercantile forms of allocation rather than pure market ones 
[1]. In this at least he keeps good company with some Marxist historians 
who have all but rejected the idea that ’merchant capitalism’ was ever 
likely to have been anything other than a transitional form of economic 
organisation [2], and argues that American economic development was in this 
sense not at all atypical.
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In Britain - an imperial economy with well established internal trade - 
the early nineteenth century witnessed if anything a growing strength of 
the foreign trade and mercantile sectors of the economy. Consequently a 
number of factors associated with the expansion of American trade (sharply 
rising consumer demand, the growth of new transportation networks, the 
political security of the new republic and the westward movement of the 
economy as a whole) had little or no effect upon the mercantile sector and 
caused little of that transference of wealth from merchanting to production 
which characterised the development of the modern American firm. In 
Britain, indeed, the internalisation of production by mercantile agents 
would have proved unthinkable in a business empire dependent upon the iron 
Ricardian law of comparative advantage and free trade, and it is difficult 
to think of any other European economies for which the American experience
[1] Alfred D. Chandler The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in 
American Business (Cambridge, Mass., 1977), Chp. 1. Recently, Chandler 
has tacitly recognised that the experience of Britain may have been 
somewhat different from that of the United States - see Alfred D. 
Chandler ’Comment’ in Keiichiro Nakagawa (ed) Strategy and Structure in 
Big Business; Proceedings of the First Fuji Conference (Tokyo, n.d.), 
40.
[2] e.g. Elizabeth Fox-Genovese and Eugene D. Genovese Fruits of Merchant 
Capital; Slavery and Bourgeois Property in the Rise and Expansion of 
Capitalism (Now York and Oxford, 1983), 4-8-, Michel Beaud A History of 
Capitalism 1500-1980 (London, 1984), Chp. 1.
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would seem to have been at all applicable. This very real difference 
between the experience of the United States and that of Britain has 
resulted in the frequent appeal of British economic historians to growth 
itself as the engine of business development in the course of the 
nineteenth century. contradicting the basic hypothesis of Chandlerian 
institutional economic history that structural change is primarily 
endogenous.
In this essay, we have offered an alternative approach to economic 
institutional development which, while broadly sympathetic to the 
Chandlerian aim of developing an account of economic development featuring 
the endogeneity of organisational change. is nevertheless sufficiently in 
keeping with the heterodox post-Commons tradition of ’institutionalism’ to 
recognise that the study of the evolution of market and hybrid forms of 
governance structure requires that human agency be replaced by 
institutional function in any account of the evolution of organisational 
form. Here we have focused upon the often forgotten history of the market 
as the precursor of the nineteenth century firm and the later twentieth 
century corporation. The intention has been to illustrate how far a broadly 
’institutionalist’ account of the history of the institution of the 
provincial market fits the facts, and to illuminate some portion of the 
subsequent history of other allocative devices; it may in fact be worth 
making the consequences of acceptance of the current work plain.
Inasmuch as the nineteenth century, non-integrated, firm was the product 
of contemporary competitive conditions and the need to economise upon
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intra-agent and market transactions, the hierarchical arrangements it 
developed were neither new nor entirely suited to atomistic capitalism. We 
have suggested, in a somewhat indirect and veiled way, how the internal 
structure of the firm may have copied not the governance structures of a 
'pure market’, in which ownership and control were not divorced, but may 
rather have adapted the transaction technologies of eighteenth century 
market society by further internalising private rights to specification, 
measurement, policing of contracts and so forth. We have also argued that 
the specification of those private rights had proceeded a fair way without 
the need for some organising structure like the modern firm. Alternative 
hierarchical arrangements dependent upon the externalisation of incentive 
costs in the absence of formalised hierarcUie-s - like the policing of the 
market by informers and inspectors paid ’by results’; like the development 
of free contracting, the low cost fully specified lease and the creation of 
new institutions for the supervision of elementary contracts; and like the 
transfer of rights in markets to collective bodies of private rights 
holders - preceeded and no doubt moulded firm-type institutions, which in 
contrast internalised monitoring functions to reduce shirking and other 
varieties of opportunism. This process of discovering external solutions to 
problem of transaction costs in the market economy appears to have been the 
key feature of this period in the evolution of economic organisation. 
Equally it would appear that only in a world of relatively high transaction 
costs and in the absence of internalised hierarchical structures would such 
sub-contracting forms of organisation for the monitoring, enforcement and 
policing of exchange have been possible. It would be worth further 
investigation to discover how far the nineteenth century firm actually
depended upon these predecessor organisations for their structure and 
operation. With these eighteenth and early nineteenth century observations 
in mind it is also worth investigating whether the development of 
hierarchical arrangements within firms was determined in the course of the 
nineteenth century by experience of market needs or by the adaptation of 
these intermediate firm-type hierarchies of the provincial market.
In brief, and in contrast to the Chandlerian position, this essay has 
suggested that the reduction of transaction costs associated with the rise 
of firm-type hierarchies properly began in the market institutions of the 
eighteenth and early nineteenth century. Through the creation of separate 
property rights in monitoring, control and specification in contract, 
Georgian Britons sought the externalisat ion of transaction costs in the 
absence of existing non-market hierarchies. The divisionalisation of 
control and allocation associated with the internal organisation of firms 
and firm-type hierarchies may have failed to materialise in the rural south 
principally because of the longevity of older forms of the community 
control and policing of market society. Whether or not this was the case 
markets did not, so to speak, 'become' firms, nor did firms emerge after 
the decline and disappearance of markets. Rather the two continued side by 
side well into the nineteenth century, sharing often common features of 
form and internal structure.
There is naturally a danger in seeing in all of this some grander scheme 
of economic development in which the articulation of allocative efficiency 
through institutional change - driven by the level of transaction costs
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determined not only the development of the natural forms of capitalist 
enterprise but also the development of capitalism itself as an accumulative 
form of economy. Yet it must be remembered that it is only the incremental 
institutional change of governance structures and not the absolute change 
from one form of economy to another that is the concern of PRTC 
methodology. As Braudel has gently reminded us ’Capitalism does not invent 
hiererachies, any more than it invented the market, or production, or 
consumption; it merely uses them. In the long procession of history, 
capitalism is the latecomer. It arrives when everything is ready...In other 
words, the specific problem of the hiererachy goes beyond capitalism, 
transcends it, controls it a priori’ [1]. Consequently no single form of 
analysis is likely to be able to account for the tendency toward internal 
organisational form that is the basic theme of PRTC accounts in economic 
history. Equally we have not needed to claim, as Douglass North has of 
late, that such a general theme does exist in the history of economic 
institutional development and is the emergence of democratic freedoms [Z]* 
This so-called ’political economic history’ is in reality an extension of 
libertarian thought to the domain of the economic past and relies upon 
agreement to the premiss that all forms of organisation create malleable and 
non-opportunistic ’ideologies’. In such an account of the decline of the
[1] Fernand Braudel Afterthoughts on Material Civilization and Capitalism 
translated by Patricia Ranum (Baltimore and London, 1977), 75.
[2] Since Structure and Change in Economic History (Now York, 1981) and
Margaret Levi and Douglass C.North ’Toward a Property-Rights Theory of 
Exploitation’ Politics & Society 11, 1982, 315-320, North’s version of
PRTC method has been becoming more overtly libertarian (in the Austrian 
sense) and more political. His most expansive treatment is 
’Institutions, Economic Growth and Freedom: An Historical Introduction’ 
Department of Economics, Chicago University, Workshop in Economic 
History, seminar paper 8687-04 (1986).
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market and the rise of the firm, the transaction sector includes 
substantial elements representing ’ideology’ (by which North has indicated 
he means more than just bounded rationality) which are the focus of 
economising activity by existing governance structures like markets. Firms 
emerge, according to this grand theory of evolutionary political economy, 
because the costs of sustaining the invalid ideology of market 
individualism became greater than the benefits from the continuance of 
market allocation. Here we have need to take little account of 
’ideological’ considerations in extending the PRTC method to the study of 
institutional change in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century.
Yet if the use of PRTC methodology has a more humble role in the study of
this ’business history of the market’, the case it offers is no less open
to challenge for that. In general there have been two great traditions of
thought which have sought to account for the decline of markets and their
replacement with alternative forms of hiererachy, both of which depart
significantly from the PRTC approach. Albert O.Hirschman has conveniently
described these as the ’feudal shackles’ thesis and the opposing ’self-
destruction’ thesis [1], the latter a largely late nineteenth century.
Hegelian, argument while the former is intimately associated with early
enlightenment thought. The second argues that the conflict between public
morality and the commercial ethics of competitive behaviour are destined to
destroy the market and replace it with some higher form of collective
allocation. In an extension of the classical economists’model of growth,
[1] Albert O.Hirschman ’Rival Interpretations of Market Society: 
Civilizing, Destructive or Feeble ?’ Journal of Economic Literature 20, 
1982, 1463-1484. I have extended Hirschman’s argument somewhat here but 
the essential character of that argument remains unaffected.
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for instance, Marx famously argued that the accumulation of unproductive 
capital would create the circumstances in which the market economy and 
society of the nineteenth century would be replaced by a more efficient 
allocative device in which capital replaced labour and competed away 
profits. The first approach is, however, less obviously grounded in theory 
and carries something of the air of Cassandra-like ’futurism’. Smith, the 
most well known champion of the market, argued that feudal institutions and 
motivations would destroy the market economy unless individual self- 
interest (or ’self-love’) was given full reign in the market [1]. Only the 
powerful self-love of the monopolist and merchant could escape the effect 
of these restrictive codes of feudal governance and, unless a moral 
revolution were effected in favour of self-love in economic life market 
institutions would be replaced by centralising hiererachies.
Certain Marxist economic historians have made much of both in explaining
the relatively short life of pure market capitalism, but in general
economists and historians only occasionally allude to the full form of
these opposing explanations. The ’feudal shackles’ thesis has recently been
popularised by a resurgent right in the Anglo-American world along with use
of much of the public choice theory of the Chivirla economists and the
’self-destruction’ argument regularly reappears as part of a critique of
capitalism by neo-Ricardians and Marxists alike. Both approaches depend
upon agreement to the simple proposition that changes in economic
motivation affect institutional structure and cause organisational change
[1] See J.Ralph Lindgren The Social Philosophy of Adam Smith (The Hague, 
1973), 107 citing Smith in the Theory of Moral Sentiments. Generally,
see Donald Winch Adam Smith’s politics: an essay in historiographical 
revision (Cambridge, 1979), Chp.-4.
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and portions of both live on in alternatives to PRTC explanations of the 
business history of market economy. In this essay we have set great store 
by the fact that we have had to make no assumptions about human motivation 
- and have certainly not had to assume that market behaviour is always and 
everywhere affected to the same degree by the desire for profit or utility 
maximisation. Instead, the PRTC approach developed here regards 
institutional change as the consequence of transaction cost reduction alone 
and pays no attention to the state of public mores or the degree of market 
individualism itself. In this sense the PRTC approach developed in this 
essay - which focuses upon institutions and not upon competitive outcomes - 
is superior to alternative formulations of the history of market 
institutions. However. it must be remembered that this study has 
concentrated only upon the development of late eighteenth century rural 
English experience and the pattern of institutional evolution elsewhere may 
not match that of the provincial south.
These alternatives to the PRTC approach taken in the essay are in a very 
real sense rivals in the contest for a satisfactory account of the 
evolution of strategy and structure in past time, but none appear to have 
adequately replaced the fundamental characteristics of the historical 
economic method utilised in this study. This essay has been in part an 
attempt to develop a contemporary method of historical economics but it has 
also been able to suggest how organisational change has occurred over time 
in the rural institutions of the south of England. In the final part of 
this chapter and essay, I want to consider the possible applications of 
such a method to the wider theme of the development of economic
organisation in capitalist society by exploring briefly - and in a less 




In common with much work within the PRTC paradigm, we have asserted that 
the logic of organisational change is to be found in the economising 
function of hierarchy, and have maintained that in the absence of 
alternatives to non-market hierarchy, markets are forced to externalise 
elements of aggregate transaction cost by the creation of separate property 
rights in policing, enforcement and search. The reader will have asked 
already why it was that in the course of the nineteenth century the 
internal hierarchical arrangement of the firm superceded that of the market 
- that is, why the transition to firm-based hierarchy occurred when it did. 
One possible answer to this lies in the fact that throughout the later 
nineteenth century private and communal rights became increasingly 
difficult to distinguish one from the other. The growth of 'state 
communalism’ was a theme for Dicey and T.H.Green, for Marshall and 
Schmoller, precisely because it constituted the single most important 
aspect of nineteenth century development. For them, as for some later 
historians middle and late-Victorian local corporatism distinguished the 
Victorian from the Georgian age, and there is some truth in the assertion 
that later nineteenthj^towns and cities deliberately divorced ownership from 
control in order to gain from further reductions in market failure. The 
Factory Acts, the Passenger Acts, the social legislation of Disraeli's
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first ministry and even the Edwardian reform of the Poor law in the form of 
the Workman’s Compensation Act can be - and to some extent already have 
been - interpreted in this way. One can regard the effort to minimise 
transaction costs and eradicate market failure as the prime reason for the 
creation of municipal socialism in the larger cities of the industrial 
regions of England and Scotland, for the increasing resort to statute in 
preference to judge-made law in the regulatory sphere and for the 
abandonment of classical laissez-faire in relation to the regulation of 
work discipline.
One consequence of this movement toward the internalisation of potential 
transaction costs which has been characteristic of the last two centuries 
has been the growth of voluntaristic associations and the transformation of 
political society to a participatory, pluralistic, democratic form. 
Through the agency of representative groups, trades unions, political 
lobbies and parties and other forms, organisations have sought to integrate 
political and economic decision-making more completely than localised 
municipalisation allowed. Yet here too the absence of formalised 
hierarchical arrangements have required some alternative strategic 
solutions to be preferred. Mancur Olson’s celebrated ’theory of groups’ on 
the right and the rediscovery of the principles of Marx’s theory of 
alienation on the left since the 1970’s both attest to the need for a full 
explanation of the fact that such groups have great difficulty in 
attracting extensive support and reducing transaction costs through the 
absolute internalisation of sources of market failure. In fact, in their 
role as monopolistic institutions, they actually create the conditions for
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market failure.
Firms and firm-type hierarchies, however, are quite properly the focus of 
most attention and, since Gardner and Means wrote, both economists and 
economic historians have been well aware of the consequences for economic 
performance of changes in industrial structure. The rise of corporatism, 
technocracy. Fordism, scientific management and the discipline of 
management merely attest to the wider significance of the creation of giant 
corporations in the course of the last three quarters of the twentieth 
century. Corporate growth may in fact be regarded as the final stage in the 
evolution of internalising strategies for transaction cost reduction, but 
it should be remembered that corporations achieve this end by creating 
’internal markets' for components and skills similar to those which are 
characteristic of some forms of state socialism. Market failure is arrested 
by the corporation through mimicry of the functions of market organisation.
In fact elements of market form and function remain embedded in the 
structural foundations of contemporary economic organisation precisely 
because the effort to internalise complex external effects and enhance 
welfare has become too difficult and costly and the option of partial 
externalisation through sub-contracting arrangements, joint ventures, 
information agreements and product licensing has emerged as a strategic 
solution to the problem - and in a form not entirely unrelated to the 
experience of the rural world of the eighteenth century. In the modern 
economy, contractual relations serve the purpose of internal allocative 
devices - such as markets - and liability rules in bilateral contracts are
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increasingly replacing the coordinated monitoring and policing of partners. 
This movement toward liability-based contracting is partly a result of the 
legal revolution in elementary contract of the nineteenth century (Chapter 
6 above); partly the outcome of greater contractual and technological 
specialisation in production; and partly the result of the changing 
industrial structure of modern capitalism. Contracting, in short, reflects 
the effort to minimise allocative costs through the full assignment of 
property rights and the establishing of an efficient system of forfeit and 
liability for market failure.This movement toward the unpoliced, 
decentralised, contractual arrangements of the modern economy is perhaps 
the most important feature of later twentieth century capitalist 
enterprise. Equally, of course, firms have engaged in the process of 
rationalisation through acquisition, merger, patenting monopoly and other 
forms of reducing potential threats from competitors since the nineteenth 
century. Whether explained in conventional terms as the outcome of 
strategic conduct in defence of existing monopoly, as (in neo-behaviourist 
terms) the result of perceived synergistic gains from vertically integrated 
management control and research and development activity, or (in 
evolutionary terms) as the outcome of a process of industrial 'natural 
selection’, we can regard the process of market concentration as the result 
of transaction cost forces.
If modern capitalism represents a different form of organisation with 
respect to transactions than that of the classical nineteenth century firm, 
the latter stands in the same relation to the provincial market. In this 
[essay we have argued throughout that transaction costs considerations have
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shaped the evolution of the structure of the economy, not as the result of 
rational calculation or through constraints upon individual utility 
functions, but through institutions themselves. The rise of the modern 
economy can be written largely in these terms; as the development of a 
complex network of 'transaction cost economising’ elements, comprising both 
firms, governments and other forms of association intended to reduce the 
costs first of exchange and latterly of transaction through contractual 
arrangements. The leitmotiv of this essay has been the failure of the 
eighteenth century and early nineteenth century rural English market to 
transform itself sufficiently to achieve this end; the remarkable feature 
of its evolution however is that it went some way toward it by the awkward 
route of creating private rights in transaction technology and 
decentralising - even privatising - rights in control and policing. The 
true marks of modernism in economic terms may indeed be that organisations 
do not need to create such separable rights and externalise control in 
order to reduce transaction costs. The creation of alternative forms of 
internal hierarchy which achieve the same end - or even perform more 
adequately in the task - is in fact the principal theme of modern economic 









1.3 COUNTY RECORD OFFICE COLLECTIONS 
1.3.1 Bedfordshire Record Office, Bedford
Papers in a case concerning weights and measures [nd,71800], O/AV/2.
Accounts of the rebuilding of Dunstable market,1803-04, R5/955.
’Treasurers General Account of the Application of the County Rate...', 
1794-1824, C.T. 0. 7.
County Treasurers Accounts, 1834-63, C.T.A.A. /I.
Treasurers Accounts, 1824-58, C.T.A.M.
Invasion returns under the Defence of the Realm Act, 1803, HAlS/1; AD 1975. 
Dunstable Corporation tolls, 1743-1855 and notices concerning toll, 1743 and 
1814, AD 3236.
Leighton Buzzard toll leases, KK.320-3 (1 bundle, no piece numbers).
Letters and plans relating to Polton market, various dates, HA 326-332.
1.3.2 Berkshire Record Office. Reading
Leases of Wallingford Market. 1634-1829, W/TM , W/TLt 1-11.
Lease of market tolls, Wallingford, 1700-1878, W/RTc 1-3.
Records of the Court of the Clerk of the Market of Maidenhead,1760-1834, 
M/JMs 1-3.
Diary of the Constable of Cookham Dean, 1800-39, D/P 43/10/1,2. 
Broadsheet detailing Berkshire preparations for invasion, 1803, D/ECw Z3. 
Berkshire Militia Book, 1796-98, 1801-04, D/EP/4 05-07.
Presentments to the Court Leet acting as the Clerk of the Markets Court, 
Abingdon,1788, JM/4/2.
Petition relating to the holding of markets,Abingdon, 1797, A/AM 1.
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’The Actual State of Preparation in the County of Berks...made in the 
Spring and Summer of the year 1798', Radnor MSS. D/ERa 07.
1.3.3 Buckinghamshire Record Office, Aylesbury 
Quarter Sessions case books, 1802-28, 0S/JC/1-6A.
Agreements to reduce consumption, 1796, O/AM/1/1-131.
Correspondence regarding imposition of 5 Geo. IV c.74, 1825, O/WM/C/1-9. 
Correspondence concerning weights and measures, 1814-1930, O/WM/0/1-32. 
Papers relating to the administration of weights and measures,1820-21, 
O/AM/8/1.
Earl of Buckinghamshire MSS., Hobart Papers, 1801-4, D/MH.
'Plan for Establishing a System of Communication Throughout Each County’, 
1803, L/P 18.
’Posse Comitatus’ Invasion returns, 1798, [2 volumes], L/P 15-16. 
Invasion returns of Aylesbury and Ashenden Hundreds, L/P 17-18.
1.3.4 Cambridgeshire Record Office, Cambridge
Minute book of the Ely hundred and South Witchford Hundred Militia,1797- 
1802 , LP/297/1.
Minute Book on Defence of the Realm, 1803-04, LP /283.
Quarter Sessions order books, 1776-1786, OS/SO/8.
Quarter Sessions order books, 1786-1792, QS/SO/9.
Quarter Sessions order books, 1796-1810, QS/SO/11, llA.
Quarter Sessions order books, 1810-1817, QS/SO/12.
County Treasurers accounts, two volumes, QS/10/4-5.
Ely and Witchford divisional accounts, 1811-33,[uncatalogued in 1984].

1.3.7 Essex Record Office, Colchester
Convictions for false weights, 1801, Brentford Petty Sessions, 0/AMw. 
Presentments of Inspectors of Weights and Measures to 1797, 0/SBb/l.
Fines for false weights, 1830- , 0/FAb/l.
Invasion returns for various Hundreds and parishes,1803-05,D/DHa 01/10; 
D/P 18/3/102; D/P 3 6/17/5; D/P 242/17; D/D Cm 08; D/P 129/17/1.
1.3.8 Gloucestershire Record Office, Gloucester
Market profit accounts arranged by commodity, 1786-, Gloucester 
Corporation MSS. F 4/13.
Gloucester Corporation Minute books, 1778-1790, Gloucester Corporation 
MSS. B3 /11-12.
Invasion returns, 1803, Clifford of Frampton-on-Severn MSS., D/149/X29 
/5-38.
1.3.9 Hampshire Record Office. Winchester
Quarter Sessions correspondence concerning the Defence of the Realm Act, 
1801, Bolton MSS. ll/M/49/231.
Notebook of memoranda on waggons and carts mobilised in case of invasion, 
1801, Bolton MSS. ll/M/49/243.
Invasion returns,1798/1801, Land Tax miscellaneous papers, B/XVIII a/5/3.
1.3.10 Hertfordshire Record Office, Hertford
Indentures for verification of weights and measures and delivery of 
standard weights. 1796-1853, OS/Misc. 1777 A, B94/4 ; L.Misc.968-9. 
Returns of petty sessions for forfeitures and penalties for deficient
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weights, 1833-44, OS./Misc. 1777, 1779, 1780, 1794.
Correspondence concerning weights and measures, various dates, OS./Misc. 
B 96/7.
County treasurers accounts, 1821-34, OS./Misc. 69.
County treasurers abstracts of accounts, 1836-1841, OS./Misc. BlOl. 
Minutes of the Common Council of Hertford, c.1700-c.1900,[5 volumes]. 
Borough of Hertford Corporation MSS. [no accession reference].
Accounts of militia baggage costs, 1796-8 and 1801, MIL/5.
1.3.11 Huntingdonshire Record Office, Huntingdon
Quarter sessions minute books, 1797-1835, HCR box 16, box 20B.
Quarter sessions proceedings book, 1797-99, HCR 49/1179.
Quarter sessions proceedings and letter book, 1816-19, HCR 49/1179b. 
Quarter sessions proceedings book, 1800-08, HCR box 16 bundle II. 
Quarter sessions letter book, 1820-23, HCR 49/1179 bundle IV. 
Correspondence concerning the defence of the realm, c.1803, 
Hinchingbrooke MSS. 9/9-10.
Resolutions of Huntingdonshire General Meeting, Hinchingbrooke MSS. 
9/13.
Huntingdon Town Sessions book, 1788-1817, Huntingdon Corporation MSS. 
Acc. 2525 box 15.
Tenders for the new market of Huntingdon, 1840, Huntingdon Corporation 
MSS. Acc. 2525, box 3, bundle 10.
Case on tolls in the Huntingdon market, 1827, Huntingdon Corporation 
MSS. Acc. 2525, box 3, bundle 6.
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Lease of Bildeston market, Suffolk, 1765, HA 61/436/247.
Summonses for the Court of Pie Poudre, Eye, 1819, Eye Borough MSS.K/5/21. 
Journal and letterbooks,1769-1834,Bury St. Edmunds Corporation MSS.D4/1/4 
Suffolk Sessions, Bury division, accounts ledger 1830-67, 0/E3.
Petitions to Suffolk sessions, various dates, 0/APw 1 (23).
Invasion returns for Barnardiston , 1803, and Blything Hundred, 1803, 
(Ipswich) HA ll/Bl/3/2; (Bury) 613/19/1.
1.3.17 West Sussex Record Office, Chichester 
Lease of the market. Rye Corporation MSS.121.
Invasion returns, various Hundreds and parishes, 1803, Add. MSS. 2736-7.
1.3.19 Wiltshire Record Office. Trowbridge
'Great Rolls' [sessions records] 1791-1821 [arranged by bundle]. 
Proclamations and printed form relating to invasion,1798-1801, 730/258. 
Correspondence relating to weights and measures, 1834-40, OS/Al/155. 
Minutes of the OS Finance Committee, 1831-72, OS/Al/720/3.
Minutes of the Quarter Sessions Committee'... for the regulation of 
County Expenditures’. 1830-1, OS/A/720/2.
Minutes of the Quarter Sessions Committee on County Rates, 1817-41, 
OS/Al/720/1.
'Conditions for letting...the Tolls and Profits of the Corn Market’,1802, 
Devizes Borough MSS., G/20/1/86.
Memorial of Devizes farmers and dealers concerning market,1804, Devizes 
Borough MSS. G/20/1/89.
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Minute books of the Clerk of the Marlborough Market, Marlborough Town 
Council MSS. G 22/1/188/1-3.
1.3.20 Worcestershire Record Office, Worcester
Assignment of tolls of stallage, piccage etc.. Borough of Evesham MSS. 
7123/8/1.
2.CONTEMPORARY PERIODICALS (excluding newspapers)
Annals of Agr iculture and Other Useful Arts Volumes 1-46 (London and Bury 
St. Edmunds,1784-1809).
Annual Register Volumes 1-73 (London,1758-1840).
Annual Review and History of Literature Volumes 1-7 (London,1802-08).
Annual Hampshire Repository Volumes 1-2 (Winchester,1799-1801).
Architectural Magazine, and Journal of Improvement in Architecture, 
Building and Furnishing Volumes 1-5 (London,1834-38.
Bristol and Bath Magazine Volumes 1-3 (Bristol, 1782-3).






4; CONTEMPORARY MAPS, ATLASES AND PLANS
The following is the list of cartographic sources used in the construction 
of Table 5.4 above. The items are listed by cartographer, short title, date 
of edition, dimensions and scale. Dimensions are given to the nearest 
quarter of a centimetre. See Mark A. Gray ’The Use of Small Scale Maps in 
Local History Research’ Quest: Journal of the Avon Local History Society 9, 
(1979), p.9 for details of standard citation practice.
[Anon] ’A New Map of the University and City of Oxford...’1817 44.5x39cm., 
1":200 yards.
[Anon] ’Borough of Plymouth Engraved by John Cooke...’ in [Anon] 
Interesting Particulars Relative to that Great National Undertaking the 
Breakwater Now Constructing in Plymouth Sound Plymouth,1820. 11.5x8.75 cm., 
1":0.166 miles.
[Anon.] ’Lancaster’ in William Baines History. Directory and Gazetteer of 
the County Palatine of Lancaster. Liverpool, 1824-5. 15x24cm., 1":400 feet.
'Boston’in Thomas Moule The E Counties Delineated: Or a Topographical
Description of England. London,1837 23.5x17.5cm., 1“:1.75 chains.
’Plan of the Borough of Reading, Berks.1813’ 1813 facing title page of John 

















Maddy, E., Digest of Cases Argued and Determined in the Arches and 
Prerogative Courts of Canterbury, the Consistory Court of London and the 
High Court of Arches. London,1835.
Malham, Revd. J., The Scarcity of Wheat Considered; or a Statement of the 
Impolicy of the Late and Present Price of Wheat. Salisbury,1800.
Man, J., The History and Antiquities, Ancient & Modern, of the Borough of 
Reading in the County of Berks.. Reading,1816.
Marriot, W. , The Country Gentleman^s Lawyer; and the Farmer's Complete Law 
Library London,1808.
Marshall, W. , The Rural Economy of Gloucestershire. 2nd edn., London,1796.
------------------ The Rural Economy of the West of England including
Devonshire and parts of Somersetshire Dorsetshire and Cornwall. 2 vols., 
London,1796.
Matthews, J., Remarks on the Cause of the Scarcity and Dearness of Cattle, 
Swine. Cheese etc, etc.. London,1799.
Matthews, W., A Dissertation on Rural Improvements; Being the Substance of 
an Introduction to the Ninth Volume of the Letters and Papers of the Bath 
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